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PARTICULAR NOTICE. 

Persons noticing the omission of any important 
facts, documeacs, narratives, nimorSj incidentSj or 

poetry, in the volumes ot the Rebeiucn ReCOlxi, 

will oblige the Editor by calUng his attention to such. 

Frank Moore, 

NS W- V './.i-./^ . -:'.u/j'.Y. iS6a.. 



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B. HiicliaiDin's " VSykcs'8 Division. 

C. Chapmiin's " ) 

D. Orillin's " ) . „. , • 

E. Mavtiniiale's " UlorcU's Division. 

F. Butterfielfl'9 " ) 

G. McCull's Divisinn, . 
U. Coucii's Division, 4Ui Army Corps, (Kejes a.) 



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Artillery Reserve. „ , 

a First Connecticut Art.ller.v, Col. K. O. iiier. 

Cavalry, A verill's Brigade 
I Third Army Corps, (Hfintzelman s.) 
U. Second Army Corps, (Sumner s.) 



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THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC: 



Gen. McCLELLA:N'S EEPOET 



OF ITS OPERATIONS WHILE UNDER HIS COMMAND 



WITH MAPS AND PLANS. 



NEW-YORK : 

G-. P. PUTNAM, PUBLISHER, 4:4.1 BROADWAY, 

1864. 






Jfcv 



THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



r*. 



LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 

TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OP MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN UPON THE ORGANIZATION OP 

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, AND ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, FROM 

JULY TWENTY-SIXTH, ISGl, TO NOVEMBER SEVENTH, 1862. 

War Dbpartment, WAsniNCTOU City, D. C, December 22, 1863. 
Sir : In compliance with the resolution dated December fifteenth, 1863, I have the honor to 
communicate herewith "the report made by Major- General George B. McClellan, concerning the 
organization and operations of the army of the Potomac while under his command, and of all 
army operations while he was commander-in-chief." 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Edwin M. Stanton, 

„ „ ^ Secretary of War. 

Hon. ocnuTLER Colfax, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 



EEPOET OF MAJOE-GENERAL GEOEGE B. McCLELLAN". 



FIRST PERIOD 
CHAPTEK I. 

Nkw-York, August 4, 1S63. 

Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the 
official report of the operations of the army of 
the Potomac while under my charge. Accom- 
panying it ai'e the reports of the corps, division, 
and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the 
various engagements, battles, and occurrences of 
the campaigns, and important documents con- 
nected with its organization, supply, and move- 
ments. These, with lists of maps and memo- 
randa submitted, will be found appended, duly 
arranged, and marked for convenient reference. 

Charged, in the spring of 18G1, with the opera- 
tions in the department of the Ohio, which in- 
cluded the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and lat- 
terly Western Virginia, it had become my duty to 
counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in 
Western Virginia, which were immediately direct- 
ed to the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, and the possession of the Kanawha 
Valley, with the ultimate object of gaining Wheel- 
ing and the control of the Ohio River. 

The successful affairs of Philippi, Rich Mount- 
ain, Carrick's Ford, etc., had been fought, and I 
had acquired possession of all Western Virginia 
north of the Kanawha Valley, as well as of the 
lower portion of that valley. 

I had determined to proceed to the relief of 
the upper Kanawha Valley, as soon as provision 
was made for the permanent defence of the 
mountain passes leading from the east into the 
region under control, when I received at Beverly, 
in Randolph County, on the twenty-first of July, 
18G1, intelligence of the unfortunate result of the 
battle of Manassas, fought on that day. 

On the twenty-second I received. an order by 
telegraph, directing me to turn over my com- 



mand to Brigadier-General Rosecrans, and repair 
at once to Washington. 

I had already caused reconnoissances to be 
made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain 
pass ; also on the Hunterville road, near Elk- 
water, and at Red House, near the main road 
from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon 
and night of the twenty-second I gave the final 
instructions for the construction of these works, 
turned over the command to Brigadier-General 
Rosecrans, and started, on the morning of the 
twenty-third, for Washington, arriving there on 
the afternoon of the twenty-sixth. On the twen- 
ty-seventh I assumed command of the division 
of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and 
around Washington, on both banks of the river. 

With this brief statement of the events which 
immediately preceded my being called to the 
command of the troops at Washington, I pro- 
ceed to an account, from such authentic data as 
are at hand, of my military operations while com- 
mander of the army of the Potomac. 

The subjects to be considered naturally ar- 
range themselves as follows : 

The organization of the army of the Potomac. 
The military events connected with the defences 
of Washington, from July, 18G1, to March, 1862. 
The campaign on the Peninsula, and that in Mary- 
land. 

The great resources and capacity for powerful 
resistance of the South at the breaking out of the 
Rebellion, and the full proportions of the great 
conflict about to take place, were sought to be 
carefully measured ; and I had also endeavored, 
by every means in my power, to impress upon 
the authorities the necessity for such immediate 
and full preparation as alone would enable the 
Government to prosecute the war on a scale com- 
mensurate with the resistance to be offered. 



r.06 



REBELLION RECORD, 1S63. 



On the fourth of August, 1861, I addressed to 
the J'rosilciit the following memorandum, pre- 
pared at his recjut'st : 

MEMORANDUM. 

The olijcctof tho present war differs from those 
in whiih nations are en^Mj,'ed, mainly in this : 
tliat the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a 
peace, and make a treaty on advanta;j:eous terms ; 
in this contest it has l)ccome necessary to crush 
a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, 
and warlike to constitute a nation. We have 
not only to defeat their armed and organized 
forces in the Geld, but to display such an over- 
whelming strengtli as will convince all our an- 
tagonists, especially those of the governing, 
aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of re- 
sistance. Our late reverses make this course 
imperative. Ifad we been successful in the re 
cent battle (Manassas) it is possible that we 
might have lieen spared the labor and expenses 
of a great elfort 

Now we have no altern,ative. Their success 
will etiable the political leaders of the rebels to 
convince tho mass of their people that we are 
inferior to them in force and courage, and to 
command all their resources. The contest began 
with a class, now it is with a people — our mili- 
Uiry success can alone restore the former issue. 

Hy thoroughly defeating their armies, taking 
their strong places, and pvu-suing a rigidly pro- 
tective policy as to private property' and tniarmed 
persons, and a lenient course as to private sol- 
diers, we may well hope for a permanent restora- 
tion of a peaceful Union. But in tho first in- 
.stance the authority of the Government must be 
.supported by overwhelming physical force. 

Our foreign relations and financial credit also 
imperatively demand that the inilitar}' action of 
the Government should be prompt and irresisti- 
ble. 

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle- 
field, and it seems proper for us to make the first 
great struggle there. But while thus directing 
our main •elf" )rts, it is neces.sary to dimini.sh the 
rcsist^mce there offered us, by movements on 
other points botli l)y land and water. 

Without entering at present into details, I 
would advise that a strong movement be made on 
the .Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out 
of Missouri. 

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that 
Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would 
advise a movement tlirough that State into East- 
em Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the 
Union men of that region and of seizing tiie rail- 
roads U-ading from .Memphis to the east. 

The possession of these roads by us, in con- 
nection with the movement on the Mississippi, 
woidd go far toward determining tlic evacuation 
of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all 
iho passes into Western Virginia from the cast 
should be .securely guarded, but I would advise 
no movement from that quarter toward Kich- 
nirind, unless the political condition of Kentucky 
renders it impo.ssiblo or inexpedient for us to 



make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee 
tlirough that State. Every effort should, how- 
ever, be made to organize, equip and arm as 
many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in 
order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments 
available for other operations. 

At as early a day as practicable, it would be 
well to protect and reopen the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe 
should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to re- 
tain them in our po.ssession. 

The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line 
of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburgh 
will be very materially diminished so soon as our 
force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong, 
and efficient, because no capable general will 
cross tlic river north of this cit}^, when we have 
a strong army here ready to cut ofl" his retreat. 

To revert to the west. It is probal)le that no 
very large additions to the troops now in Mis- 
souri will be necessary to secure that State. 

I presume that the force required for the move- 
ment down the Mississippi will be determined 
by its commander and the President. If Ken- 
tucky assumes the right position, not more than 
twenty thousand will be needed, together with 
those that can be raised in that State and East- 
ern Tennessee, to secure the latter region and its 
railroads as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. 

The Western Virginia troops, with not more 
than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, 
should, under proper management, suffice for its 
protection. 

When we have reorganized our main army 
here, ten thousand men ought to be enough to 
protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the 
Potomac, five thousand will garrison Baltimore, 
three thousand Fort Monroe, and not more than 
twenty thousand will be necessary at the utmost 
for the defence of Washington. 

For the main army of operations I urge the 
following composition : 

250 regiments of infixntrj^ say, .225,000 men. 
100 field batteries, 600 guns, . . 15,000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry, 25,500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops, . .. 7,500 " 



Total, 273,000 " 

The force must be supplied with the necessary 
engineer and pontoon trains, and with transporta- 
tion for every thing save tents. Its general line 
of operations should be so directed that water 
transportation can be availed of from point to 
point, by means of the ocean and the rivers 
enq)tying into it. An essential feature of the 
plan of operations will be the employment of a 
strong naval force to protect the movement of a 
fleet of transports intended to convey a consider- 
able body of troops from point to point of the 
enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions 
and rendering it necessary for thein to detach 
largely from their main body in order to protect 
such of their cities as may be threatened, or else 
lancfing and 'forming establishments on their 
coast at any favorable places that opportunity 



DOCUMENTS. 



507 



might offer. This naval force should also co- 
operate with tlie main army in its efforts to seize 
tlie important seaboard towns of the rebels. 

It cannot be ignored that the construction of 
railroads has introduced a new and very import- 
ant element into war, by the great facilities thus 
given for concentrating at particular positions 
large masses of troops from remote sections, and 
by creating new strategic points and lines of oper- 
ations. 

It is intended to overcome this difficulty by 
the partial operations suggested, and such otl>ers 
as the particular case may require. We must 
endeavor to seize places on the railways in the 
rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and 
■ we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order 
that each State may be forced, by the necessity 
of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to 
the confederate army. 

The proposed movement down the Mississippi 
will produce important results in this connection. 
That advance and the progress of the main array 
at the East ■will materially assist each other by 
diminishing the resistance to be encountered by 
eacli. 

The tendency of the Mississippi movement 
upon all questions connected with cotton is too 
well understood by the President and Cabinet to 
need any illustration from me. 

There is another independent movement that 
has often been suggested and which has always 
recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to 
a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through 
the Indian Territory upon Red River and West- 
ern Texas for the purpose of protecting and de- 
veloping the latent Union and free State senti- 
ment well known to predominate in Western 
Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in 
Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately 
organize that section into a free State. How far 
it w^ill be possible to support this movement by 
an advance through New-Mexico from California, 
is a matter which I have not sufficiently ex- 
amined to be able to express a decided opinion. 
If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as 
bringing into play the resources and warlike 
qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identify- 
ing them with our cause and connecting the bond 
of Union between them and the general govern- 
ment. 

If it is not departing too far from my province, 
I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate 
alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; 
their sympathies and interests are with us — their 
antipathies exclusively against our enemies and 
their institutions. I think it would not be diffi- 
cult to obtain from the Mexican government the 
right to use, at least during the present contest, 
the road from Guaymas to New-Mexico ; this con- 
cession would very materially reduce the obsta- 
cles of the column moving from the Pacific ; a 
similar permission to use their territory for the 
passage of troops between the Panuco and the 
Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column 
of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some 
«f the small hai'bors north of it, upon and across 



the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing 
a shot. 

To what extent, if anj', it would be desirable to 
take into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is 
a question entirely political, on which I do not 
venture to offer an opinion. 

The force I have recommended is large ; the 
expense is great. It is possible that a smaller 
force might accomplish the object in vie\v, but I 
understand it to be the purpose of this great 
nation to reestablish the power of its government, 
and restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest 
possible time. 

The question to be decided is simply this : shall 
we crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the 
war in one campaign, or shall we leave it as a 
legacy for our descendants ? 

When the extent of the possible line of opera- 
tions is considered, the force asked for the main 
army under my command cannot be regarded as 
unduly large ; every mile we advance carries us 
farther from our base of operations and renders 
detachments necessary to cover our communica- 
tions, while the cnem}^ will be constantly concen- 
trating as he falls back. I propose, with the 
force which I have requested, not only to drive 
the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, 
but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, 
Pensacola, Mobile, and New-Orleans ; in other 
words, to move into the heart of the enemy's 
country and crush the rebellion in its very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads as we 
advance, the difficulties of transportation will le 
materially diminished. It is perhaps unneces- 
sary to state that, in addition to the forces named 
in this memorandum, strong reserves should be 
formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the exigen- 
cies of the treasury may be lessened by making 
only partial payments to our troops, when in the 
enemy's country, and by giving the o))ligations 
of the United States for such supplies as may 
there be obtained. Geo. B. McClell.vx, 

Major-General. 

I do not think the events of the w^ir have prov- 
ed these views upon the method and plans of its 
conduct altogether incorrect. They certainly 
have not proved my estimate of the number of 
troops and scope of operations too large. It is 
probable that I did under-estimate the time ne- 
cessary for the completion of arms and equip- 
ments. It was not strange, however, that by 
many civilians intrusted with authority there 
should have been an exactly opposite opinion 
held on both these particulars. 

The result of the first battle of Manassas had 
been almost to destroy the moralo and organiza- 
tion of our army, and to alarm Government and 
people. The national capital was in danger ; it 
was necessary, besides holding the enemy in 
check, to build works for its defence, strong and 
capable of being held by a small force. 

It was necessary also to create a new army for 
active operations and to expedite its organization, 
equipment, and the accumulation of the material 
of war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all 



508 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-03. 



my cncr^rics for the next three months were con- 
Btaritlv ilcvoteil. 

Tiin'e is a necessary element in the creation ot 
armies, ami I do not,"thcref(ire, think it necessary 
to inoTv than mention the imi)atience with which 
many n-ardetl tlie delay in the arrival of new 
levies, though recruited and pressed forward with 
unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and sup- 
[Jv of arms and ecjuipmcnts, or the vehemence 
wi'th which an immediate advance upon the 
enemy's works directly in our front was urged 
by a patriotic hut sanjijuinc people. 

The President, too, was anxious for the speedy 
employment of our army, and although possessed 
of my plans through frequent conferences, desi- 
red a pajier from me upon the condition of the 
forces under my command and the immediate 
mea.sures to be taken to increase their efficiency. 
Accordingly, in the latter part of October I ad- 
dressed the following letter to the Secretary of 
War : 

SiK : In conformity with a personal understand- 
ing with the President yesterday, I have the 
honor to submit the following statement of the 
condition of the army under my command, and 
the measures re(|uireil for the preservation of the 
Government and the suppression of the rebellion. 

It will be remembered that in a memorial I had 
the honor to address to the President soon after 
my arrival in Washington, and in my communi- 
cation adikessed to Lieutenant-Gcneral Scott, 
under date of eighth of August; in my letter to 
the President authorizing him, at his request, to 
withdraw the letter written by me to General 
Scott ; and in my letter of the eighth of Septem- 
ber, answering your note of inquiry of that date, 
my views on the same subject are frankly and 
fully expressed. 

In these several communications I have stated 
the force I regarded as necessary to enable this 
army to advance with a reasonable certainty of 
success, at llie .same time leaving the capital and 
tlie line of the Potomac sufllciently guarded, not 
only to secure the retreat of the main army, in 
the event of disaster, but to render it out of the 
enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Mary- 
land. 

So much time has passed, and the winter is ap- 
proaching so rapidly, that but two courses are 
left to the (iovernment, namely, either to go into 
winter quarters, or to assume the ofiensive with 
forces greatly inferior in ntnnbers to the ai'my I 
regarded as desirable and necessary. If political 
considerations render the first cijurse unadvisablc, 
the second alone remains. While I regret that it 
has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps possi- 
ble, to concentrate (he forces of the nation in this 
vicinity, (remaining on the defensive elsewhere,) 
keeping the attention and efforts of tlie Govern- 
ment fixed njion this as the vital point, where 
the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it 
may still be that, by introducing unity of action 
ami design among tlie various armies of the land, 
by determining the courses to be pursued by the 
various uommandcrs under one general plan, 



transferring from the other armies the super- 
fluous strength not required for the purpose in 
view, and thus reenforcing this main army, 
whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we 
may yet be able to move with a reasonable pros- 
pect of success before the winter is fairlj^ upon us. 

The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that 
the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the 
country in its hands. 

The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, 
and the effect of the next battle will be so import- 
ant throughout the future, as well as the pres- 
ent, tliat I continue to urge, as I have ever done 
since I entered upon the command of this army, 
upon the Government to devote its energies and 
its available resources toward increasing the num- 
bers and efficiency of the army on which its sal- 
vation depends. 

A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs 
of engineers and artillery of this army, gives us 
the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifi- 
cations, thirty-three thousand seven hundred and 
ninety-five men — say thirty-five thousand. 

The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- 
pendencies is about ten thousand. I have sent 
the cliief of my staff to make a careful examina- 
tion into the condition of these troops, and to 
obtain the information requisite to enable me to 
decide whether this number can be diminished, 
or the reverse. 

At least five thousand men will be required to 
watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry and its 
vicinity ; probably eight thousand to guard the 
Lower Potomac. 

As you are aware, all the information we have 
from spies, prisoners, etc., agrees in showing 
that the enemy have a force on the Potomac not 
less than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, 
well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and 
strongly intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that 
to insure success, or to render it reasonably cer- 
tain, the active army should not number less than 
one hundred and fiftj^ thousand efficient troops, 
with four hundred guns, unless some material 
change occurs in the force in front of us. 

The requisite force for an advance movement 
by the army of the Potomac may be thus esti- 
mated : 

Column of active operations, 150,000 men, 400 guns. 

Garrison of tlie city of AVasliington, 3.^,000 " 40 " 

To puani the Potomac to Harper's Ferry, 5,' 00 " 12 " 

To guard tlie Lower Potomac, 8,000 " 24 " 

Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis, .. 10,003 " 12 " 

Total effective force required, 203,000 men, 488 guns. 

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 
two hundred and forty thousand men, should the 
losses by sickness, etc., not rise to a higher per- 
centage than at present 

Having stated what I regard as the requisite 
force to enable this army to advance, I now pro- 
ceed to give the actual strength of the army of 
the Potomac. 

The aggregate strength of the army of the Po- 
tomac, by the official report on the morning of 
the twenty-seventh instant, was one hundred and 



DOCUMENTS. 



509 



sixty -eight thousand three hundred and eighteen 
officers and men, of all grades and arms. This 
included the troops at Baltimore and Annapohs, 
on the Upper and Lower Potomac, the sick, ab- 
sent, etc. 

The force present for duty was one hundred 
and forty-seven thousand six hundred and ninety- 
five. Of this number, four thousand two hun- 
dred and sixty-eight cavalry were completely un- 
armed, three thousand one hundred and sixty- 
three cavalry only partially armed, five thousand 
nine hundred and seventy -nine infixntry unequip- 
ped, making thirteen thousand four hundred and 
ten unfit for the field, (irrespective 'of those not 
yet sufficiently drilled,) and reducing the effective 
force to one hundred and thirty-four thousand 
two hundred and eighty-five, and the number 
disposable for an advance to seventy-six thou- 
sand two hundred and eighty-five. The infont- 
ry regiments are, to a considerable extent, arm- 
ed with unserviceable weapons. Quite a large 
number of good arms, which had been intended 
for this army, were ordered elsewhere, leaving 
the army of the Potomac insufficiently, and, in 
some cases, badly armed. 

On the thirtieth of September there were with 
this army two hundred and twenty-eight field 
guns ready for the field ; so far as arms and 
equipments are concerned, some of the batteries 
are still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. I 
have intelligence that eight New-York batteries 
are en route hither ; two others are ready for 
the field. I vvill still (if the New-York batteries 
have six guns each) be one hundred and twelve 
guns short of the number required for the active 
column, saying nothing, for the present, of those 
necessary for the garrisons and corps on the Po- 
tomac, which would make a total deficiency of 
two hundred guns. 

I have thus briefly stated our present condi- 
tion and wants ; it remains to suggest the means 
of suppl3nng the deficiencies. 

First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as 
fast as procured, whether manufactured in this 
country or purchased abroad, be sent to this 
army until it is fully prepared for the field. 

Second, that the two companies of the Fourth 
artillery, now understood to be en route from 
Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered to this 
army, to be mounted at once ; also, that the 
companies of the Third artillery, en route from 
California, be sent here. Had not the order for 
Smead's battery to come here from Ilarrisburgh, 
to replace the laattery I gave General Sherman, 
been so often countermanded, I would again ask 
for it. 

Third, that a more effective regulation may be 
aiade authorizing the transfer of men from the 
volunteers to the regular batteries, infantry and 
cavalry ; that we may make the best possible 
use of the invaluable regular " skeletons." 

Fourth, I have no official information as to the 
United States forces elsewhere, but, from the 
best information I can obtain from the War De- 
partment and other sources, I am led to believe 
that the United States tioops are : 
S. D. 33. 



In Western Virginia, about 30,000 

In Kentucky, 40,000 

In Missouri, 80,000 

In Fortress Monroe, 11,000 

Total, 101,000 

Besides these, I am informed that more than 
one hundred thousand are in progress of organi- 
zation in other Northern and AYestern States. 

I would therefore recommend that, not inter- 
fering with Kentucky, there should be retained in 
Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force 
for defensive purposes, and that the surplus 
troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, to 
enable it to assume the offensive ; that the same 
course be pursued in respect to Fortress Monroe, 
and that no further outside expeditions be at- 
tempted until we have fought the great battle in 
front of us. 

Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten 
the enrolment, organization and armament of 
new batteries and regiments of infixntry. 

Sixth, that all the battalions now raised for new 
regiments of regular infantry be at once ordered ^ 
to this army, and that the old infixntry and caval- mI 

ry en route from California be ordered to this 
army immediately on their arrival in New-York. 

I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the 
objects to be accomplished, and the means by 
which we may gain our ends. 

A vigorous employment of these means will, in 
my opinion, enable the army of the Potomac to 
assume successfully this season the offensive 
operations which, ever since entering upon the 
command, it has been my anxious desire and 
dilligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The 
advance should not be postponed beyond the 
twenty-fifth of November, if possible to avoid it. 

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy 
in action are indispensable. The entire military 
field should be grasped as a whole, and not in 
detached parts. 

One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; 
a single will should direct and carry out these 
plans. 

The great object to be accomplished, the crush- 
ing defeat of the rebel army (now) at Manassas, 
should never for one instant be lost sight of, but 
all the intellect and means and men of the Gov- 
ernment poured upon that point. The loyal 
States possess ample force to effect all this and 
more. The rebels have displayed energy, unan- 
imitj'', and wisdom worthy of the most desperate 
days of the French revolution. Should we do 
less? 

The unity of this nation, the preservation of 
our institutions, are so dear to me that I have 
willingly sacrificed my private happiness with 
the single object of doing my duty to my country. 
When the task is accomplished, I shall be glad 
to return to the obscurity from which events have 
drawn me. 

Whatever the determination of the Government 
may be, I will do the best I can with the army 
of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever 
may be the task imposed upon me. 



510 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Permit inc to adil that, on tliis occasion as here- 
tcforo, it has lieeii my aim neither to exaggerate 
nor unJcrratf tliu power of tlie enemy, nor fail to 
express clearly the means by which, in my judg- 
ment, tliat |)<)\ver may be broken. Urging the 
energy <«f |pre|taratioii and action, wliich has ever 
hoen^niy choice, but with tlic li.vcd purpose by 
no act of mine to expose the ( iovernincnt to hazard 
l.y premature movement, and reijucsting that this 
communication may be laid before the President, 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your 
obedient servant, G. B. MoCi.kllan, 

M^jor-GeneraL 

IIoD. Simon Camehon, 

Socrctary of War. 

When I assumed command in Washington, on 
the twenty-seventh of July, 18G1, the number of 
troops in and around the city was about fifty 
thou-sand infantry, less than one tliousand caval- 
ry, and six hundred and fifty artillerymen, with 
nine imperfect licld-batterics of thirty pieces. 

( >n the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade 
organization of (ieneral McDowell still existed, 
and the iroops were stationed at and in rear of 
Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at 
Fort Ilunyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in 
the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment 
at the Theological Seminary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, 
and many of the regiments were encamped on the 
low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom in 
the best positions for defence, and entirely inad- 
equate in numbers and condition to defend the 
long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 

On the Maryland side of the river, upon the 
heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regi- 
ments were stationed, whose commanders were 
imlepcndent of each other. 

Tiiere were no troops on the important Tenally- 
town road, or on the roads entering the city from 
tho south. 

The camps were located without regard to pur- 
poses of defence or instruction, the roads were 
not picketed, and there was no attempt at an or- 
ganization into brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for defence 
such as to oiler a vigorous resistance to a respect- 
able body of the enemy, citbcrin the position and 
immbers of the troop.s, or the number and char- 
acter of the defensive works. Earthworks, in 
the nature of tefc.t dc pout, looked upon the ap- 
proaches to the (ieorgetown aqueduct and ferry, 
the Long Bridge and Alexandria, by the Little 
river turnpike, and some simple (lefensive ar- 
rangements were made at the Chain Bridge. 
With tiic latter exception not a single defensive 
work had been commenced on the Maryland side. 

There was nothing to prevent the enemy shell- 
ing the city from heights within easy range, 
which could be occupied by a hostile column al- 
most with'nit resistance. "Many soldiers had de- 
serted, and the streets of VVashington were 
crowded with stragcling oflicers and men, absent 
from their stations without authority, whose be- 
havior indicated the general want of discipline 
»nd organization. 



I at once designated an efficient staff, afterward 
adding to it as opportunity was afforded and ne- 
cessity required, who zealously cooperated with 
me in the labor of bringing order out of confusion, 
reassigning troops and commands, projecting and 
throwing up defensive M-orks, receiving and organ- 
izing, equipping and providing for the new levies 
arriving in the city. 

The valuable services of these officers in their 
various departments, during this and throughout 
the subsequent periods of the history of the arm}^ 
of the Potomac, can hardly be sufficiently appre- 
ciated. Their names and duties will be given in 
another part of this report, and they are com- 
mended to the favorable notice of the War Depart- 
ment. 

The restoration of order in the city of Wash- 
ington was effected through the appointment of 
a provost-marshal, whose authority was supported 
by the few regular troops within my command. 
These troops were thus in position to act as a 
reserve, to be sent to any point of attack where 
their services might be most wanted The energy 
and ability displayed by Colonel A. Porter, the 
Provost Marshal, and his assistants, and the strict 
discharge of their duty by the troops, produced 
the best results, and Washington soon became 
one of the most quiet cities in the Union. 

The new levies of infantiy, upon arriving in 
Washington, were formed into provisional bri- 
gades and placed in camp in the suburbs of the 
city for eqipment, instruction and discipline. As 
soon as regiments were in a fit condition for trans- 
fer to the forces across the Potomac, they were 
assigned to the brigades serving there. Brigadier- 
General F. J. Porter was at first assigned to the 
charge of the provisional brigades. Brigadier- 
General A. E. Burnside was the next officer as- 
signed this duty, from which, however, he was 
soon relieved by Brigadier-General S. Case)'', who 
continued in charge of the newly arriving regi- 
ments until tho array of the Potomac departed for 
the Peninsula, in March, 1862. The newly ar- 
riving artillery troops reported to Brigadier-Gen- 
eral William F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, and 
the cavalry to Brigadier General George Stone- 
man, the Chief of Cavalry. 

By the fifteenth of October, the number of 
troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the 
garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard 
and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Po- 
tomac below Washington, and as far as Cumber 
land above, the troops under the command of 
(Jencral Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies, 
were as follows : 

Total present for dut)'', 133,201 

" sick, .• 9,290 

" in confinement, 1,156 

Aggregate present, 143, 647 

" absent, 8,404 

Grand aggregate, 152,051 

The following table exhibits similar data for 



DOCUMENTS. 



511 



the periods stated, including the troops in Mary 
land and Delaware : 





Present. 


Absent. 


Total present 
and absent. 


Date. 


For duty. 


Sick. 


In confine- 
ment. 


Dec. 1,1 SOI, 169,452 
Jan. 1. ISlii, 191,4S0 
Feb.l.lSfri, 190,806 
Mar. 1,1862, 193,142 


15,102 
14,790 
14,36.3 
13,167 


2,1S9 . 
2.260 
2,917 
2,103 


11,470 
11,707 
14,110 
13,570 


198,213 
219,707 
222,190 
221,987 



For convenience of reference the strength of the 
arnay of the Potomac at subsequent periods is 
given. 







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In organizing the array of the Potomac, and 
preparing it for the field, the first step taken was to 
organize the infantry into bi'igadcs of four regi- 
ments each ; retaining the newly arrived regi- 
ments on the Maryland side until their armament 
and equipment were issued and they had obtained 
«ome little elementary instruction, before assign- 
ing tliem permanently to brigades. When the 
organization of the brigades was well established, 



and the troops somewhat disciplined and instruct- 
ed, divisions of three brigades each were gradually 
formed, as is elsewhere stated in this report, 
although I was always in favor of the organiza- 
tion into army corps as an abstract principle. I 
did not desire to form them until the army had 
been for some little time in the field, in order to 
enable the general officers first to acquire the re- 
quisite experience as division commanders on 
active service, and that I might be able to decide 
from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise 
these important commands. 

For a similar reason I carefully abstained from 
making any recommendations for the promotion 
of officers to the grade of major-general. 

When new batteries of artillery arrived they 
also were retained in Washington until their 
armament and equipment were completed, and 
their instruction sufficiently advanced to justify 
their being assigned to divisions. The same 
course was pursued in regard to cavalry. 1 regret 
that circumstances have delaj-ed the Chief of 
Cavalry, General George Stoneman, in furnishing 
his report upon the organization of that arm of 
service. It will, however, be forwarded as soon 
as completed, and will, doubtles.^;, show that the 
difficult and important duties intrusted to him 
were efficiently performed. He encountered and 
overcame, as far as it was possible, continual and 
vexatious obstacles arising from the great defi- 
ciency of cavalry arms and equipments, and the 
entire inefficiency of many of the regimental 
officers first appointed ; this last difficulty was, 
to a considerable extent, overcome in the cavalry, 
as well as in the infantry and artillery, by the 
continual and prompt action of courts-martial 
and boards of examination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every 
cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre and re- 
volver, and at least two squadrons in every regi- 
ment with carbines. 

It was intended to assign at least one regiment 
of cavalry to each division of the active arm}-, 
besides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular 
regiments and some picked regiments of volun- 
teer cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control 
rendered it impossible to carry out this intention 
fully, and the cavalry force serving with the army 
in the field was never as large as it ought to have 
been. 

It was determined to collect the regular infan- 
try to form the nucleus of a reserve. The advan- 
tage of such a body of troops at a critical mo- 
ment, especially in an army constituted mainly 
of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been 
frequently illustrated in military history, and was 
brought to the attention of the country at the first 
battle of Manassas. I have not been disappoint- 
ed in the estimate formed of the value of these 
troops. I have always found them to be relied 
on. Whenever they have been brought under 
fire they have shown the utmost gallantry and 
tenacity. The regular infantry, which had been 
collected from distant posts and which had been 
recruited as rapidly as the slow progress of re- 
cruiting for the regular service would allow, add- 



512 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



ed to the small battalion with McDowell's army, 
which I found at AVashington on my arrival, 
amounted, on the thirtieth of August, to one 
thousand and forty men ; on the twenty-eighth 
of February, 18G2, to two thousand six hundred 
and cightv-two, and on the thirtieth of April to 
four thousand six hundred and three. On the 
seventeenth of May, 1862, they were assigned to 
General Porter's corps for organization as a di- 
vision, with the fifth regiment New-York volun- 
teers, which joined May fourth, and the tenth 
New-York volunteers, which joined subsequent- 
ly. They remained from the commencement 
under the command of Brigadier-General George 
Sykes, Major Third inflxntry United States army. 

ARTILLERY. 

The creation of an adequate artillery establish- 
ment for an array of so large proportions was a 
formidable undertaking ; and had it not been 
that the country possessed in the regular service 
a body of accomplished and energetic artillery 
officers, the task would have been almost hope- 
less. 

The charge of organizing this most important 
arm was confided to Major (afterward Brigadier- 
General) William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, 
whose industry and zeal achieved the best re- 
sults. The report of General Barry is appended 
among the accompanying documents. By refer- 
ring to it, it will be observed that the following 
principles were adopted as the basis of organiza- 
tion : 

" 1. That the proportion of artillery should be 
in the proportion of at least two and one half 
pieces to one thousand men, to be expanded, if 
possible, to three pieces to one thousand men. 

"2. That the proportion of rifled guns should 
be restricted to the system of the United States 
ordnance department ; and of Parrott and the 
'smooth bores' (with the exception of a few 
howitzers for special service) to be exclusively 
the twelve-pounder gun, of the model of 18.57, 
variously called the 'gun-howitzer,' the 'light 
twelve-pounder, or the ' Napoleon.' 

" 3. That each field-battery should, if practi- 
cable, be composed of six guns, and none to be 
less than four guns, and in all cases the guns of 
each battery should be of uniform calibre. 

"4. That the field-batteries were to be assign- 
ed to divisions, and not to brigades, and in the 
proportion of four to each division, of which one 
was to be a battery of re,i;ulars, the remainder 
of volunteers, the captain of the regular battery 
to be the commandant of artillery of the division. 
In the event of several divisions constituting an 
army corps, at least one half of the divisional 
artillery was to constitute the reserve artillery of 
the corps. 

"5. That the artillery reserve of the whole 
army should consist of one hundred guns, and 
should comprise, besides a sufficient number of 
light ' mounted batteries,' all the guns of posi- 
tion, and until the cavalry were massed, all the 
horse artillery. 

"6. That the amount of ammunition to ac- 



company field-batteries was not to be less than 
four hundred rounds per gun. 

"7. A siege train of fifty pieces. This was 
subsequentl}^ expanded, for special service at the 
siege of Yorktown, to very nearly one hundred 
pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres and 
enormously heavy weight of metal of two two 
hundred pounders, five one hundred pounders, 
and ten thirteen-inch sea-coast mortars." 

As has been before stated, the Chief of Artil- 
lery reports the whole of the field artillery of the 
army of the Potomac, July twenty-eighth, 1861, 
was comprised of nine imperfectly equipped bat- 
teries, of thirty guns, six hundred and fifty men, 
and four hundred horses. In March, 1862, when 
the whole army took the field, it consisted of 
ninety-two batteries, of five hundred and twenty 
guns, twelve thousand five hundred men, and 
eleven thousand horses, fully equipped and in 
readiness for active field service; of the whole 
force thirty batteries were regulars, and sixty- 
two batteries volunteers. During the short pe- 
riod of seven months, all of this immense amount 
of material was issued by the ordnance depart- 
ment and placed in the hands of the artillery 
troops after their arrival in Washington. About 
one fourth of all the volunteer batteries brought 
with them from their respective States a few 
guns and carriages, but they were nearly all of 
such peculiar calibre as to lack uniformity with 
the more modern and more serviceable ordnance 
with which the other batteries were armed, and 
they, therefore, had to be withdrawn and re- 
placed by more suitable material. While about 
one sixth came supplied with horses and har- 
ness, less than one tenth were apparently fully 
equipped for service when they reported ; and 
every one of these required the supply of many 
deficiencies of material, and very extensive in- 
struction in the theory and practice of their spe- 
cial arm. 

The operations on the Peninsula by the army 
of the Potomac commenced with a full field-artil- 
lery force of fifty-two batteries of two hundred 
and ninety-nine guns. To this must be added 
the field-artillery of Franklin's division of McDow- 
ell's corps, which joined a few daji-s before the cap- 
ture of Yorktown, but was not disembarked from 
its transports for service until after the battle 
of Williamsburgh, and the field-artillery of Mo- 
Call's division of McDowell's corps, (four batter- 
ies, twenty-two guns,) which joined in June, a 
faw days before the battle of Mechanicsville, 
(June twenty-sixth, 1862,) making a grand total 
of field-artillery, at any time with the army of the 
Peninsula, of sixty batteries of three hundred and 
forty-three guns. With this large force, saving in 
six corps d'armec of eleven divisions, and the ar- 
tillery reserve, the only general and field-officers 
were one brigadier-general, four colonels, three 
lieutenant-colonels, and three majors, a number 
obviously insufficient, and which impaired to a 
great degree, in consequence of the want of rank 
and official influence of the commanders of corps 
and division artillery, the efficiency of the arm. 
As this faulty organization can be suitably cor- 



DOCUMENTS. 



513 



rected only by legislative action, it is earnestly 
hoped that the attention of the proper authorities 
may be at an early day invited to it. 

When there were so many newly organized 
volunteer field-batteries, many of whom received 
their first and only instruction in the intrenched 
camps covering Washington during the three or 
four inclement months of the winter of 1861-'62, 
there was, of course, much to be improved. Many 
of the volunteer batteries, however, evinced such 
zeal and intelligence, and availed themselves so 
industriously of the instructions of the regular of- 
ficers, their commanders, and the example of the 
regular batteries, their associates, that they made 
rapid progress, and attained a degree of profi- 
ciency highly creditable. 

The designations of the different batteries of 
artillery, both regular and volunteer, follow with- 
in a few pages. 

The following distribution of regiments and 
batteries was made, as a preliminary organization 
of the forces at hand, shortly after my arrival in 
Washington. The infantrj^, artillery, and caval- 
ry, as fast as collected and brought into primary 
organization, were assigned to brigades and divi- 
sions, as indicated in the subjoined statements. 

Organization of the Didision of the Potomac, 
August 4, 1861. 

Brigadier- General Hunter'' s irigade. — Twenty- 
third, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-fifth, and Thirty-sev- 
enth regiments New-York volunteers. 

Brigadier-General Ileintzelman^ s brigade. — 
Fifth regiment Maine volunteers. Sixteenth, Twen- 
ty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh regiments New- 
York volunteers, and TidbalUs battery, (A,) Se- 
cond United States artillery. 

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman'' shrigade. — 
Ninth and Fourteenth regiments Massachusetts 
volunteers, De Kalb regiment New-York volun- 
teers. Fourth regiment Michigan volunteers, Ham- 
ilton's battery, (Fj,) Third United States artillery, 
and company I, Second United States cavalry. 

Br'igadier- General Kearny'' s brigade. — First, 
Second, and Third regiments New-Jersey volun- 
teers. Green's battery, (G,) Second United States 
artillery, and company G, Second United States 
cavalry. 

Brigadier- General Eooher's brigade. — First and 
Eleventh regiments Massachusetts volunteers. Se- 
cond regiment New-Hampshire volunteers, and 
Twenty-sixth regiment Pennsylvania volunteers. 

Colonel Key ess brigade. — Twenty-second,Twen- 
ty-fourth, and Thirtieth regiments New-York vol- 
unteers, and Fourteenth regiment New-York 
State militia. 

Brigadier- General FranHin's brigade. — Fif- 
teenth, Eighteenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-se- 
cond regiments New-York volunteers, Piatt's bat- 
tery, (M,) Second United States artillery, and 
company C, New- York (Lincoln) cavalry. 

Colonel Blenker''s brigade. — Eighth and Twen- 
ty-seventh regiments New-York volunteers. Twen- 
ty seventh regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, and 
Garibaldi Gunrd, New-York volunteers. 

Colonel R't,chardMn' s brigade. — Twelfth regi- 



ment New-York volunteers, and Second and Third 
regiments Michigan volunteers. 

Brigadier-General Stones brigade. — Thirty- 
fourth and Tammany regiments New-York volun- 
teers. First regiment Minnesota volunteers, and 
Second regiment New-York State militia. 

Colonel William F. 6'mi7A'« brigade. — Second 
and Third regiments Vermont volunteers. Sixth 
regiment Maine volunteers. Thirty-third regiment 
New-York volunteers, company II, Second United 
States cavalry, and Captain Mott's New-York 
battery. 

Colotiel Couehh brigade. — Second regiment 
Rhode Island volunteers. Seventh and Tenth re- 
giments Massachusetts volunteers, and Thirty- 
sixth regiment New- York volunteers. 

The Second regiment Maine, the Second regi- 
ment Wisconsin, and the Thirteenth regiment 
New- York volunteers, stationed at Fort Corcoran. 

The Twenty-first regiment New-York volun- 
teers, stationed at Fort Runyon. 

The Seventeenth regiment New- York volun- 
teers, stationed at Fort Ellsworth. 

By October the new levies had arrived in suffi- 
cient numbers, and the process of organization so 
far carried on that the construction of divisions 
had been efiected. 

The following statement exhibits the composi- 
tion of the array, October fifteenth, 1861. 

Organization of the Army of the Potomac, Oc- 
tober 15, 1861. 

1. Brigadier- General George Stonemayi^s cav- 
alry command. — Fifth United States cavalry, 
Fourth Pennsylvania cavalry, Oneida cavalry, 
(one company,) Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, 
(Harlan's,) and Barker's Illinois cavalry, (one 
company.) 

2. Colonel IT. J. Runfs artillery reserve. — Bat- 
teries L, A, and B, Second United States artiller}-, 
batteries K and F, Third United States artillerj', 
battery K, Fourth United States artillery, battery 
H, First United States artillery, and battery A, 
Fifth United States artillery. 

3. CITY GUARD, BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW PORTER. 

Cavalry. — Companies A and E, Fourth United 
States cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery K, Fifth United States ar- 
tillery. 

Infantry. — Second and Third battalions United 
States infiintry. Eighth and First companies 
United States infantry, and Sturgis's Rifles, (Illi- 
nois volunteers.) 

4. BANKs's DIVISION, 

Cavalry. — Four companies Third regiment 
New York cavalry, (Van Allen's.) 

Art'dlery.—'Raiit'?, battery E, Fourth United 
States artillery, detachment Ninth New-York ar- 
tillery, Matthews's battery E, First Pennsylvania 
artillery, Tompkins's battery A, First Rhode Is- 
land artillery. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade: Twelfth 
Massachusetts, Twelfth and Sixteenth Indian^ 
Thirtieth Pennsylvania volunteers. Stiles's bri- 
gade : Third Wisconsin, Twenty-ninth Pennsyl- 



514 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. 



vania. and Thirteenth ^lassachusetts volunteers, 
and Ninth New-York State militia. Gordon'.s 
brigade: Second Massachusetts, Twenty-eighth 
and Nineteenth New-York, Fifth Connecticut, 
Forty-sixth and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, 
and First Maryland volunteers. 

Mcdowell's division. 

Cavalri/.— Second New-York cavalry, (Harris's 
Light,) Colonel Davis. 

ArtUler)/.— Battery M, Second, and battery G, 
First United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Kcyes's brigade: Fourteenth New- 
York State militia, and Twenty-second, Twenty- 
fourth, and Thirtieth New-York volunteers. Wads- 
worth's Ijrigade: Twelfth, Twenty-first, Twen- 
ty-third, and Thirty-fifth New-York volunteers. 
King's brigade: Second, Si.xth, and Seventh Wis- 
consin, and Nineteenth Indiana volunteers. 

heintzelman's division. 

Cavalry. — First New- Jersey cavalry, Colonel 
Halsted. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery, C, United 
States artillery. 

Infantry. — Richardson's brigade : Second, 
Third, and Fifth Michigan, and Thirty-seventh 
New-York volunteers. Sedgwick's brigade : Third 
and Fourth Maine, and Thirty-eighth and Forti- 
eth New-York volunteers. Jameson's brigade : 
Thirty-second, Sixty-third, Sixty-first, and Forty- 
fifth Pennsylvania volunteers, and Wild Cat re- 
serves, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 

F. J. porter's division. 

Cavalry. — Third Pennsylvania cavalry, Colonel 
Averill, and Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry. Colo- 
nel Gregg. 

Artillery. — Battery E, Second, and battery *E, 
Third United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Morell's brigade : Thirty-third Penn- 
sylvania, Fourth Michigan, Ninth Massachusetts, 
and Fourth New-York volunteers. Martindale's 
brigade : Thirteenth New-York, Second Maine, 
and Eighteenth Massachusetts volunteers, and 
Dc Kali) regiment New-York volunteers. Butter- 
field's brigade: Fiftieth New-York, Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania, (Colonel McLean,) Seventeenth and 
Twenty-fifth New- York volunteers, and Stock- 
ton's independent Michigan regiment. 

franklin's division. 

Cavalry. — First New-York cavalry. Colonel 
McReynolds. 

Artillery. — Batteries D and G, Second United 
States artillery, and Hexamer's battery, (New- 
Jersey volunteers.) 

Infantry. — Kearny's brigade: First, Second, 
Third, ami Fourth New-Jersey volunteers. Slo- 
cum's brigade: Sixteenth, Twenty-sixth, and 
Twenty-seventh New-York, and Sixth Maine 
volunteers. Newton's brigade: Fifteenth, Eigh- 
teenth, Thirty -first, and Thirty-second New- York 
volunteers. 

* TMs battery was transferred to Sherman's expedition. 



STONE S DIVISION. 

Cavalry. — Six companies Third New-York (Yan 
Allen) cavalry. 

Artillery. — Kirby's battery T, First United 
States, Vaughn's battery B, First Rhode Island 
artillery, and Bunting's Sixth New- York inde- 
pendent battery. 

Infantry. — Gorman's brigade: Second New- 
York State militia. First Minnesota, Fifteenth 
Massachusetts, and Thirtj^-fourth New-York vol- 
unteers, and Tammany regiment, (New- York vol- 
unteers.) Lander's brigade : Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Massachusetts, and Seventh Michigan 
volunteers, and a company of Massachusetts sharp- 
shooters. Baker's brigade : Pennsjd vania volun- 
teers, (First, Second, and Third California.) 

buell's division. 

Artillery. — Batteries D and H, First Pennsyl- 
vania artillery. 

Infantry. — Couch's brigade : Second Rhode 
Island, Seventh and Tenth Massachusetts, and 
Thirty-sixth New-York volunteers. Graham's 
brigade : Twenty-third and Thirty-first Pennsyl- 
vania, and Sixty-seventh (First Long Island) and 
Sixty-fifth (First United States Chasseurs) New- 
York volunteers. Peck's brigade: Thirteenth and 
Twenty-first Pennsylvania, and Sixty-second (An- 
derson Zouaves) and Fifty-fifth New-York volun- 
teers. 

mccall's division. 

Cavalry. — First Pennsylvania reserve cavalry, 
Colonel Bayard. 

Artillery. — Easton's battery A, Cooper's bat- 
tery B, andlveim's battery G, First Pennsylvania 
artillery. 

/w/lfrt^ry. ^Meade's brigade : First rifles Penn- 
sylvania reserves. Fourth, Third, Seventh, Elev- 
enth, and Second Pennsylvania reserve infantry. 
brigade : Fifth, First, and Eighth Pennsyl- 
vania reserve infantry. brigade : Tenth, 

Sixth, Ninth, and Twelfth Pennsylvania reserve 
infantry. 

hooker's division. 

Cavalry. — Eight companies Third Indiana cav 
airy, Li6utenant-Colonel Carter. 

Artillery. — Elder's battery E, First United 
States artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : First and Eleventh 

Massachusetts, Second New-Hampshire, Twenty- 
sixth Pennsylvania, and First Michigan volun- 
teers. Sickles's brigade : First, Second, Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth regiments Excelsior brigade, 
New-Y'ork volunteers. 

blenker's brigade. 

Cavalry. — Fourth New- York cavalry, (mount- 
ed rifles,) Colonel Dickel. 

Artillery. — One battery. 

Infantry. — Eighth and Twenty-ninth New- 
York, Twenty-seventh and Thirty-fifth Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers. Garibaldi Guard, and Cameron 
Rifles, (New-York volunteers.) 

smith's division. 
Cavalry. — Filth Pennsylvania cavalry, (Cam- 
eron dragoons,) Colonel Friedman. 



DOCUMENTS. 



515 



Artillery. — Ayres's battery F, Fifth United 
States artillery, Mott's Second New-York inde- 
pendent battery, and Barr's battery E, First Penn- 
sylvania artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : Second, Third, Fourth, 

and Fifth Vermont volunteers. Stevens's brigade : 
Thirty-fifth and Forty-ninth New-York, and Sixth 
Maine volunteers, and *Seventy-ninth New- York 
State militia. Hancock's brigade : *Forty-seventh 
and Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, Forty-third New- 
York, and Fifth Wisconsin volunteers. Compa- 
nies B and E, Bcrdan's sharp-shooters. 

Casey' s proKisionul briffades.— Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh New-Jersey volunteers, *Round-Head re- 
giment, (Pennsylvania volunteers,) battalion Dis- 
trict of Columbia volunteers, Fortieth Pennsylva- 
nia, Eighth New-Jersey, and Fourth New-Hamp- 
shire volunteers. 

5. Garrison of Alexandria. — Brigadier-Gene- 
ral Montgomery, Military Governor. Cameron 
Guard, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 

Garrison of Fort Albany. — Fourteenth Massa- 
chusetts volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Fichardson. — Fourth Con- 
necticut volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Washington. — Company D, 
First United States artillery, companies H and I, 
Thirty-seventh New-York volunteers and United 
States recruits unassigned. 

6. DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — Company of Pennsylvania cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, Second United States 
artillery, Second Massachusetts light battery, 
and a battery of New-Y'ork artillery. 

Infantry.— Third, Fourth, and Fifth New- 
York, Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Massachu- 
setts, Twenty-first Indiana, Sixth Michigan, 
Fourth Wisconsin, Seventh Maine, Second Mary- 
land battalion, and Reading City Guard, volun- 
teers. 

On the eighth of March, 18G2, the President 
directed, by the following order, the organization 
of the active portion of the army of the Potomac 
into four army corps, and the formation of a fifth 
corps from the division of Banks and Shields. 

The following is the text of the President's 
order : 

[President's General War Order No. 2.] 

Executive Mansion', I 
WAsniNGTOM, March 8, 1862. ( 

Ordered, 1st. That the Major-Gcneral com- 
manding the army of the Potomac proceed forth- 
with to organize that part of the said army des- 
tined to enter upon active operations, (including 
the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left 
in the fortifications about Washington,) into four 
army corps, to be commanded according to sen- 
iority of rank, as follows : 

First corps to consist of four divisions, and to 
be commanded by Major-General I. McDowell. 
Second corps to consist of three divisions, and to 

• The Seventy-ninth New-Yorlf State militia, the Forty-seventh 
Pennsylvania volunteers, and the Round-Head regiment, were 
transferred to General Sherman's expedition. 



be commanded by Brigadier-General E. V. Sum- 
ner. Third corps to consist of three divisions, 
and to be commanded by Brigadier-General S. 
P. Heintzehnan. Fourth corps to consist of 
three divisions, and to be commanded by Briga- 
dier-General E. D. Kcyes. 

2. That the divisions now commanded by the 
officers above assigned to the commands of army 
corps shall be embraced in and form part of their 
I'espective corps. 

3. The forces left for the defence of Wa.shing- 
ton will be placed in command of Brigadier-Gen- 
eral James Wadsworth, who shall also be Mili- 
tary Governor of the District of Columbia. 

4. That this order be executed with such 
promptness and despatch as not to delay the 
commencement of the operations already directed 
to be undertaken by the army of the Potomac. 

5. A fifth army corps, to be commanded by 
Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from 
his own and General Shields's (late General 
Lander's) division. Abraham Lincoln. 

The following order, which was made as soon 
as circumstances permitted, exhibits the steps 
taken to carry out the requirements of the Pres- 
ident's war order No. 2 : 

ARMY CORPS. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ( 

Fairfax Court-Hocse, Va., March 13, 1862. f 

General Orders No. 151. 

In compliance with the President's war order 
No. 2, of March eighth, 1862, the active portion 
of the army of the Potomac is formed into army 
corps, as follows : 

First corps, Major-General Irwin JIcDowcll, to 
consist for the present of the divisions of Frank- 
lin, McCall, and King. Second corps, Brigadier- 
General E. V. Sumner ; divisions, Richardson, 
Blenker, and Sedgwick. Third corps, Brigadier- 
General S. P. Heintzehnan ; divisions, F. J. Por- 
ter, Hooker, and Hamilton. Fourth corps, Bri- 
gadier-General E. D. Keyes ; divisions. Couch, 
wSmith, and Casey. Fifth Corps, Major-General 
N. P. Banks ; divisions, Williams and Shields. 

The cavalry regiments attached to divisions 
will, for the present, remain so. Subsequent or- 
ders will provide for these regiments, as well as 
for the reserve artillery. Regular infantry and 
regular cavalry arrangements will be made to 
unite the divisions of each army corps as prompt- 
ly as possible. 

The commanders of divisions will at once re- 
port in person, or where that is impossible, by 
letter, to the commander of their army corps. 

By command of Major-General McClellan. 

A. V. COLBURN, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

I add a statement of the organization and 
composition of the troops on April first, com- 
mencing with the portion of the army of the 
Potomac which went to the Peninsula, giving 
afterward the regiments and batteries left on tho 
Potomac, and in Maryland and Virginia after 
April first, 18G2. 



.•516 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Troops of the army of the Potomac sent to the 

Peninsula in March and early in April, 1862. 

1st. Cavalry reserve, Brigadier-General P. St. 
G. Cooke. — Emory'.s brigade : Fifth United States 
cavalry, Sixth United States cavalry, Sixth Penn- 
sylvania cavalry. Blake's brigade : First United 
States cavalry, Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, 
Barker's squadron of Illinois cavalry. 

2d. Artillery reserve. Colonel Henry J. Hunt : 
Graham's battery K and G, First United States, 
six Napoleon guns ; Randall's battery E, First 
United States, six Napoleon guns ; Carlisle's bat- 
tery E, Second United States, six twenty-pound- 
er Parrott guns ; Robertson's battery, Second 
United States, six three-inch ordnance guns; 
Benson's battery M, Second United States, six 
three-inch ordnance guns; Tidball's battery A, 
Second United States, six three-inch ordnance 
guns ; Edwards's battery L and M, Third United 
States, six ten-pounder Parrott guns ; Gibson's 
battery C and G, Third United States, six three- 
inch ordnance guns ; Livingston's battery F and 
K, Third United States, four ten-pounder Par- 
rott guns; Howe's battery G, Fourth United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; De Russy's battery 
K, Fourth United States, six Napoleon guns ; 
Weed's battery I, Fifth United States, six three- 
inch ordnance guns ; Smead's battery K, Fifth 
United States, four Napoleon guns ; Ames's bat- 
tery A, Fifth United States, six — four ten-pound- 
er Parrott and two Napoleon — guns ; Diedrick's 
battery A, New-York artillery and battalion, 
, six twenty -pounder Parrott guns; Vogelie's bat- 
tery B, New- York artillery and battalion, four 
twenty-pounder Parrott guns ; Knierim's battery 
C, New-York artillery and battalion, four twenty- 
pounder Parrott guns ; Grimm's battery D, New- 
York artillery and battalion, six thirty-two- 
pounder howitzer guns. Total, one hundred 
guns. 

3d. Volunteer engineer troops. General "Wood- 
bury : Fifteenth New-York volunteers; Fiftieth 
New- York volunteers. 

Regular engineer troops, Captain Duane : Com- 
panies A, B, and C, United States engineers. 

Artillery troops, with siege trains: First Con- 
necticut heavy artillery. Colonel Tyler. 

4th. Infantry reserve, (regular brigade,) General 
Sykos : nine companies Second United States in- 
fantry, seven companies Third United States in- 
fantry, ten companies Fourth United States in- 
fantry, ten companies sixth United States infan- 
try, eight companies Tenth and Seventeenth 
United States infantry, six companies Eleventh 
United States infantry, eight companies Twelfth 
United States infantry, nine companies Four- 
teenth United States infantry, and Fifth New- 
York volunteers, Colonel Warren. 

SKCOND COKI'S, OENERAL SUMNER. 
Cavalry. — Eighth Illinois cavalry. Col. Farns- 
worth, and one squadron Sixth New-York cav- 
alry. 

Richardson's division. 
Artillery. — Clark's battery A and G, Fourth 
United States, six Napoleon guns ; Frank's bat- 



tery G, First New-York, six ten-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Pettit's battery B, First New- York, six 
ten-pounder Parrott guns ; Hogan's battery A, 
Second New-York, six ten-pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — Howard's brigade: Fifth New- 
Hampshire, Eighty-first Pennsylvania, and Six- 
ty-first and Sixty-fourth New- York volunteers. 
Meagher's brigade : Sixty-ninth, Sixty-third, and 
Eighty-eighth New-York volunteers. French's 
brigade: Fifty-second, Fifty-seventh, and Sixty- 
sixth New- York, and Fifty-third Pennsylvania 
volunteers. 

Sedgwick's division. 

Artillery. — Kirby's battery I, First United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; Tompkins's battery 
A, First Rhode Island, six — four ten-pounder 
Parrott and two twelve-pounder howitzer — gvms ; 
Bartlett's battery B, First Rhode Island, six — 
four ten-pounder Parrott and two twelve-pound- 
er howitzer— guns ; Owen's battery G, six three- 
inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Gorman's brigade : Second New- 
York State militia, and Fifteenth Massachusetts, 
Thirty -fourth New-York, and First Maine volun- 
teers. Burns's brigade : Sixty-ninth, Seventy- 
first, Seventy-second, and One Hundred and 
sixth Pennsylvania volunteers. Dana's brigade : 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, Sev- 
enth Michigan, and Forty-second New-York vol- 
unteers. 

Note. — Blenker's division detached and as- 
signed to the mountain department. 

THIRD CORPS, GENERAL HEINTZELMAN, 

Cavalry. — Third Pennsylvania cavalry, Colo- 
nel Averill. 

porter's division. 

Artillery. — Grifiin's battery K, Fifth United 
States, six ten-pounder Parrott guns : Weeden's 
battery C, Rhode Island; Martin's battery C, 
Massachusetts, six Napoleon guns; Allen's bat- 
tery E, Massachusetts, six three-inch ordnance 
guns. 

Infantry. — Martindale's brigade : Second 
Maine, Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massa- 
chusetts, and Twenty-fifth and Thirteenth New- 
York volunteers. Morell's brigade : Fourteenth 
New-York, Fourth Michigan, Ninth Massachu- 
setts, and Sixty-second Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Butterfield's brigade : Seventeenth, Forty -fourth, 
and Twelfth New-York, Eighty-third Pennsylva- 
nia, and Stockton's Michigan volunteers. 

First Berdan sharp-shooters. 

hooker's division. 

Artillery. — Hall's battery H, First United 
States, six — four ten-pounder Parrott and two 
twelve-pounder howitzer — guns ; Smith's bat- 
tery. Fourth New- York, six ten -pounder Parrott 
guns; Bramhall's battery. Sixth New-York, six 
three- inch ordnance guns ; Osborn's battery D, 
First New-York artillery, four three-inch ord- 
nance guns. 

Infantry. — Sickles's brigade : First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Excelsior, New-York. 



DOCUMENTS. 



517 



Naglee's brigade : First and Eleventh Massachu- 
setts, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, and Second 
New-PIanipshire volunteers. Colonel Starr's bri- 
gade: Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Nevp- 
Jersey volunteers. 

Hamilton's division. 

Artillcri/.— Thompson's battery G, Second 
United States, six Napoleon guns ; Beam's bat- 
tery B, Ne\A'-Jersey, six — four ten-pounder Par- 
rott and two Napoleon — guns ; Randolph's bat- 
tery E, Rhode Island, six — four ten-pounder Par- 
rott and two Napoleon — guns. 

Infantry. — Jameson's brigade : One Hundred 
and Fifth, Sixty-third, and Fifty-seventh Penn- 
sylvania, and Eighty-seventh New-York volun- 
teers. Birney's brigade : Thirty-eighth and For- 
tieth New-York, and Third and Fourth Maine 

volunteers. brigade : Second, Third, and 

Fifth Michigan, and Thirtv-seventh New- York 
volunteers. 

fourth corps, general keyes. 
couch's division. 

Artillenj. — McCarthy's battery C, First Penn- 
sylvania, four ten-pounder Parrott guns ; Flood's 
battery D, First Pennsylvania, four ten-pounder 
Parrott gixns ; Miller's battery E, First Pennsyl- 
vania, four Napoleon guns ; Brady's battery F, 
First Pennsylvania, four ten-pounder Parrott 
guns. 

Infantry. — Graham's brigade : Sixty-seventh, 
(Firs't Long Island) and Sixty-fifth (First United 
States Chasseurs) New-York, Twenty-third, Thir- 
ty-first, and Sixty-first Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Peck's brigade : Ninety-eighth, One Hiindred 
and Second, and Ninety-third Pennsylvania, and 
Sixty-second and Fifty-fifth New-York volun- 
teers. brigade: Second Rhode Island, 

Seventh and Tenth Massachusetts, and Thirty- 
sixth New-York volunteers. 

smith's division. 

Artillery. — Ayres's battery F, Fifth United 
States, six — four ten-pounder Parrott and two 
N'apoleon — guns; Mott's battery, Third New- 
STork, six — four ten-pounder Pan-ott and two Na- 
poleon — guns ; Wheeler's battery E, First New- 
York, four three-inch ordnance guns ; Kennedy's 
battery. First New-York, six three-inch ordnance 
guns. 

Infantry. — Hancock's brigade: Fourth Wis- 
consin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, Forty-third 
New -York, and Sixth Maine volunteers. Brooks's 
brigade : Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Vermont volunteers. Davidson's brigade : Thir- 
ty-third, Seventy-seventh, and Forty-ninth New- 
York, and Sc tenth Maine volunteers. 

Casey's division. 
Artillery. — Regan's battery, Seventh New- 
York, six three-inch ordnance guns ; Fitch's 
Eighth New-York, six three-inch ordnance guns; 
Bates's battery A, First New- York, six Napoleon 
guns; Spratt's battery H, First New- York, four 
three-inch ordnance guns. 



Infantry.— KfAm's brigade: Eighty-fifth, One 
Hundred and First, and One Hundred and Third 
Pennsylvania, and Ninety-sixth New- York vol- 
unteers. Palmer's brigade : Eighty-fifth, Ninety- 
eighth, Ninety-second, Eighty-first, and Ninety- 
third New-York volunteers. brigade : One 

Hundred and Fourth and Fifty-second Pennsyl- 
vania, Fifty-sixth and One Hundredth New-York, 
and Eleventh Maine volunteers. 

5. Provost-guard: Second United States cav- 
alry ; battalions Eighth and Seventeenth United 
States infantry. 

At general headquarters : Two companies 
Fourth United States cavalry ; one company 
Oneida cavalry, (New- York volunteers ;) and one 
company Sturgis's Rifles, (Illinois volunteers.) 

The following troops of the army of the Poto- 
mac were left behind, or detached on and in front 
of the Potomac for the defence of that line, April 
first, 18G2. Franklin's and McCall's divisions, 
at subsequent and different dates, joined the 
active portion of the army on the Peninsula. 
Two brigades of Shields's division joined at Har- 
rison's Landing : 

FIRST CORPS, GENERAL McDOWELL. 

Cavalry.— YiYst, Second, and Fourth New- 
York, and First Pennsylvania. 

Sharp-shooters. — Second regiment Berdan's 
sharp-shooters. 

franklin's division. 

Artillery.— Plait's battery D, Second United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; Porter's battery A, 
Massachusetts, six — four ten-pounder Parrot*- 
and two twelve-pounder howitzer — guns ; Hex 
amer's battery A, New-Jersey, six— four ten 
pounder Parrott, and two twelve-pounder howit- 
zer—guns ; Wilson's battery F, First New-York 
artillery, four three-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry, — Kearny's brigade: First, Second, 
Third, and Fourth New-Jersey volunteers. Slo- 
cum's brigade : Sixteenth and Twenty-seventh 
New- York, Fifth Maine, and Ninety-sixth Penn- 
sylvania volunteers. Newton's brigade: Eigh- 
teenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-second New- York, 
and Ninety -fifth Pennsylvania volunteers. 

mocall's division. 

Artillery.— SaymouT's battery C, Fifth United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; Easton's battery A, 
First Pennsylvania, four Napoleon guns ; Coop- 
er's battery B, First Pennsylvania, six ten-pound- 
er Parrott guns ; Kein's battery C, First Penn- 
sylvania, six — two ten-pounder and four twelve- 
pounder Parrott — guns. 

Infantry.— RQyno\(\s's brigade: First, Second, 
Fifth and Eighth Pennsylvania reserve regiments. 
Meade's brigade: Third, Fourth, Seventh and 
Eleventh Pennsylvania reserve regiments. Ord's 
brigade ; Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth Penn- 
sylvania reserve regiments. 

First Pennsylvania reserve rifles. 

king's division. 
Artillery.— Gihhon'?, battery B, Fourth United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; Monroe's battery D, 



518 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



First Rhode Island, six ten-pounder Parrott 
guns; Gcrrish's battery A, New-Hampshire, six 
Napoleon ^uiis ; DurreU's battery, Pennsylvania, 
six ten-poundor Parrott guns. 

Infantry. brigade: Second, Sixth, 

and Seventh \\'isconsin, and Nineteenth Indiana 
volunteers. Patrick's brigade: Twentieth, 
Twenty-first, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fifth 
New- York State militia. Augurs brigade : Four- 
teenth New-York State militia, and Twenty-sec- 
ond, Twenty-Fourth, and Thirtieth New- York 
volunteers. 

FIFTH CORPS, GENERAL BANKS. 

Cavalry. — First Maine, First Vermont, First 
Michigan, First Rhode Island, Fifth and Eighth 
New-York, Keyes's battalion of Pennsylvania, 
eighteen companies of Maryland, one squadron 
of Virginia. 

Unattached. — Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania 
volunteers, and Fourth regiment Potomac home 
brigade, (Maryland volunteers.) 

Williams's division. 

Artillery. — Best's battery F, Fourth United 
States, six Napoleon guns ; Hampton's battery, 
Maryland, four ten-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Thompson's battery, Maryland, four ten-pounder 
Parrott guns ; Mathews's battery F, Pennsylvania, 

six three-inch ordnance guns ; battery M, 

First New-York, six ten-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Knapp's battery, Pennsylvania, six ten-pounder 
Parrott guns ; McMahon's battery, New-York, six 
three-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade: Twelfth 
and Second Massachusetts, and Sixteenth Indi- 
ana, First Potomac home brigade, (Maryland,) 
First company Zouaves d'Afrique, (Pennsylva- 
nia) volunteers. brigade : Ninth Is^ew- 

York State militia, and Twenty-ninth Pennsylva- 
nia, Twenty-ninth Indiana, and Third "Wisconsin 
volunteers. brigade: Twenty-eighth New- 
York, Fifth Connecticut, Forty-sixth Pennsylva- 
nia, First Maryland, Twelfth Indiana, and Thir- 
teenth Massachusetts volunteers. 

SIIIELDS'S division. 

Artillery. — Clark's battery E, Fourth United 
States, six ten-pounder Parrott guns ; Jenks's bat- 
tery A, First Virginia, four ten-pounder Parrott 
and two six-pounder guns; Davy's battery B, 
First Virginia, two ten-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Huntington's battery A, First Ohio, six thirteen- 
pounder James's guns; Robinson's battery L, 
First Ohio, two twelve-pounder howitzers and 

four six-pouudor guns ; and battery. 

Fourth Ohio artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : Fourteenth In- 
diana, Fourth, Eighth, and Sixty-seventh Ohio, 
Seventh Virginia, and Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania 
volunteers. • brigade : Fifth, Sixty-sec- 
ond, and Sixty-sixth Ohio, Thirteenth Indiana, 
and Thirtj'-ninth Illinois volunteers 



brigade: Seventh and Twenty-ninth Ohio, Sev- 
enth Indiana, First Virginia, and Eleventh Penn- 
sylvoiiia volunteers. Andrew sharp-shooters. 



OENERAL WADSWORTn S COMMAND. 

Cavalry.— ^Y'lvsi New- Jersey cavalry, at Alex- 
andria, and Fourth Pennsylvania cavalry, east of 
the Capitol. 

Artillery and Infantry. — Tenth New-Jersey 
volunteers, Bladensburgh road ; One Hundred and 
Fourth New- Y^ork volunteers, Kalorama Heights; 
First AVisconsin heavy artillery. Fort Cass, Vir- 
ginia ; three batteries of New-York artillery. Forts 
Ethan Allen and Marcy ; depot of New-York light 
artillery. Camp Barry ; Second District of Colum- 
bia volunteers, Washington City ; Twenty -sixth 
Pennsylvania volunteers, G street wharf ; Twenty- 
sixth New-Y'ork volunteers. Fort Lyon ; Ninety- 
fifth New-Y^ork volunteers. Camp Thomas ; Nine- 
t}''-fourth New-York and detachment of Eighty- 
eighth Pennsylvania volunteers, Alexandria ; 
Ninety-first Pennsylvania volunteers, Franklin 
Square barracks ; Fourth New York artillery. 
Forts Carroll and Greble; One Hundred and 
Twelfth Pennsylvania volunteers, Fort Saratoga ; 
Seventy-sixth New- York volunteers. Fort Mas- 
sachusetts ; Fifty-ninth New-Y'^ork volunteers, 
Fort Pennsylvania ; detachment of Eighty-eighth 
Pennsylvania volunteers. Fort Good Hope ; Nine- 
ty-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, Fort Mahon ; 
Second New-York light artillery, Forts Ward, 
Worth, and Blenker ; One Hundred and Seventh 
and Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, Ken- 
dall Green ; Dickerson's light artiller}', Eighty- 
sixth New-York, and detachment of Eighty-eighth 
Pennsylvania volunteers, east of the Capitol ; 
Fourteenth ^Massachusetts (volunteers) heavy 
artillery and Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Forts Albany, Tillinghast, Richardson, Runyon, 
Jackson, Barnard, Craig, and Scott ; detachments 
of Fourth United States artillery and Thirty-sev- 
enth New- York volunteers. Fort Washington ; 
Ninety-seventh, One Hundred and First, and 
Ninety-first New- York, and Twelfth Virginia vol- 
unteers, Fort Corcoran. 

In camp near Washington. — Sixth and Tenth 
New-York, Swain's New-Y''ork, and Second Penn- 
sylvania cavalry, all dismounted. 

These troops (three thousand three hundred 
and fifty-nine men) were ordered to report to 
Colonel Miles, commanding railroad guard, to re- 
lieve three thousand three hundred and six older 
troops ordered to be sent to Manassas to report 
to General Abercrombie. 

GENERAL DIX's COMMAND, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — First Maryland cavalry and detach- 
ment of Purnell Legion cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, Second United States; 
battery — , Maryland ; battery L, First New- 
York, and two independent batteries of Penn- 
sylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — Third and Fourth New-York, 
Eleventh, Eighty-seventh, and One Hundred and 
Eleventh Pennsylvania, detachment Twenty-first 
Massachusetts, Second Delaware, Second Mary- 
land, First and Second Eastern Shore (Maryland) 
home guards, and Purnell Legion (two battalions) 
Maryland volunteers. 

In a staff charged with labors so various and 



DOCUMENTS. 



519 



important as that of the army of the Potomac, a 
chief was indispensable to supervise the various 
(Icpartnients and to relieve the Commanding Gen- 
eral of details. The office of chief of staff, well 
known in European armies, had not been con- 
sidered necessary in ou?" small peace establish- 
ment. The function.s of the office were not de- 
fined, and, so far as exercised, had been includ- 
ed in the Adjutant-General's department. The 
small number of officers in this department, and 
the necessity for their employment in other 
duties, have obliged commanding generals, dur- 
ing this war, to resort to otVier branches of the 
service to furnish suitable chiefs of staff. 

On the fourth of September, 1801, I appoint- 
ed Colonel II. B. Marcy, of the Ins])ector-Gcn- 
eral's department, chief of staff, and he entered 
upon service immediately, discharging the vari- 
ous and important duties with great fidelity, in- 
dustry, and ability, from this period until I was 
removed from command at Rectortown. Many 
improvements, have been made during the war 
in our system of staff administration, but much 
remains to be done. 

Our own experience, and that of other armies, 
agree in determining the necessity for an efficient 
and able staff. To obtain this, our staff estab- 
lishment should be based on correct principles, 
and extended to be adequate to the necessities 
of the service, and should include a system of 
staff and line education. 

The affairs of the Adjutant-General's depart- 
ment, while I commanded the army of the Poto- 
mac, were conducted by Brigadier-General S. 
Williams, assisted bj^ Lieutenant-Colonel James 
A. llardie, aid-decamp. Their management of 
the department during the organization of the 
army in the fall and winter of 1801, and during 
its subsequent operations in the field, was ex- 
cellent. 

They were, during the entire period, assisted 
by Captain Richard B. Irwin, aid-de-camp, and 
duT-ing the organization of the army b}' the fol- 
lowing-named officers : Captains Joseph Kirk- 
land, Arthur McCIellan, M. T. McMahon, AVilliam 
P. Mason, and William F. Biddle, aids-de-camp. 

My personal staff, when we embarked for the 
Peninsula, consisted of Colonel Thomas M. Key, 
additional aid-de-camp ; Colonel E. II. Wright, 
additional aid-de-camp and major. Sixth United 
States cavalry ; Colonel T. T. Gantt, additional 
aid-de-camp -, Colonel J. J. Astor, Jr., volunteer 
aid-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Colburn, 
additional aid-de-camp and captain, Adjutant- 
General's department ; Lieutenant-Colonel X. B. 
Sweitzer, additional aid-de-camp and captain, 
First United States cavalry ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edward McK. * Hudson, additional aid-de-camp 
and captain. Fourteenth United States infantry ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Yon lladowitz, addition- 
al aid-de-camp; Major H. Von Ilammerstcin, ad- 
ditional aid-de-camp ; Major W.W. Russell, Utiited 
Stales marine corps ; Major F. LeCompte, of the 
S\vis.s army, volunteer aid-de-camp ; Captains 
Joseph Kirkland, Arthur McCIellan, L. P. D'Or- 
ieans, R. D'Orleans, M. T. McMahon, William P. 



Mason, Jr., William F. Biddle, and E. A. Ray- 
mond, additional aids-de-camp. 

To this number I am tempted to add the Prince 
de Joinville, who constantly accompanied me 
through the trying campaign of the Peninsula, 
and frequently rendered important services. 01^ 
these officers Captain McMahon was assigned to 
the personal staff of Brigadier-General Franklin, 
and Captains Kirkland and Mason to that of 
Brigadier-General F. J. Porter during the siege 
of Yorktown. They remained subsequently with 
those general officers. Major LeCompte left the 
army during the siege of Yorktown ; Colonels 
Gantt and Astor, Major Russell, Captains L. P. 
D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond at the 
clo.se of the Peninsula campaign. Before its ter- 
mination Captains W. S. Abert and Charles R. 
Lowell, of the Sixth United States cavalry, join- 
ed my staff as aids-de-camp, and remained with 
me until I was relieved fiom the command of the 
army of the Potomac. All of these officers serv- 
ed me with great gallantry and devotion ; they 
were ever ready to execute any service, no mat- 
ter how dangerous, difficult, or fatiguing. 

ENGINEERS. 

When I assumed command of the army of the 
Potomac I found Major J. G. Barnard, United 
States engineers, subsequently Brigadier-General 
of volunteers, occupying the position of chief 
engineer of that army. I continued him in the 
same office, and at once gave the necessary in- 
structions for the completion of the defences of 
the capital, and for the entire reorganization of 
the department. 

Under his direction the entire system of de- 
fences was carried into execution. This was 
completed before tlie army departed for Fort 
Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of the skill 
of the engineers and the diligent labor of the 
troops. 

For some months after the organization of the 
army of the Potomac was commenced there were 
no engineer troops with it. At length, however, 
three companies were assigned. Under the 
skilful management of Captain J. C. Duane, 
United States engineers^ the.se new companies 
rapidly became efficient, and, as will be seen, 
rendered most valuable service during the ensu- 
ing campaigns. 

The number of engineer troops being entirely 
inadequate to the necessities of the arm}', an 
effort was made to partially remedy tliis defect 
by detailing the Fifteenth and Fiftieth New- York 
volunteers, which contained many sailors and 
mechanics, as engineer troops. They were first 
placed under the immediate superintendence 
of Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander, United 
States engineers, by whom they were instructed 
in the duties of pontoniers, and became some- 
what familiar with those of sappers and miners. 
Previous to the movement of the army for the 
Peninsula this brigade was placed under the 
command of Brigadier-General D. P. Wood- 
bury, Major United States engineers. 

The labor of preparing the engineer and bridge 



520 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



trains devolved chiefly upon Captain Diiane, who 
•was instniftet? to procure tlie new model French 
bridge train, as I was satisfied that the India- 
rubber pontoon was entirely useless for the gen- 
eral purposes of a campaign. 

The engineer department presented the fol- 
lowing complete organization when the army 
moved for the Peninsula : 

Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard. Chief En- 
gineer; First Lieutenant H. C. Abbot, topo- 
graphical engineers, aid-de-camp. Brigade vol- 
unteer engineers, Brigadier-General Woodbury 
commanding : Fifteenth New-York volunteers. 
Colonel McLeod Murphy ; Fiftieth New-York 
volunteers. Colonel C. B. Stewart. Battalion, 
three companies LTnited States engineers, Captain 
J. C. Duane commanding ; companies respectively 
commanded by First Lieutenants C. B. Reese, C. 
E. Cross, and 0. E. Babcock, United States en- 
gineers. The Chief Engineer was ably assisted in 
his duties by Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexan- 
der, and First Lieutenants C. R. Comstock, M. 
D. McAlester, and Merrill, United States en- 
gineers. Captain C. S. Stuart and Second Lieu- 
tenant F. U. Farquhar, United States engineers, 
joined after the army arrived at Fort Monroe. 

The necessary bridge equipage for the opera- 
tions of a large army had been collected, consist- 
ing of batteau.x with the anchors and flooring 
material, (French model,) trestles, and engineers' 
tools, with the necessary wagons for their trans- 
portation. 

The small number of officers of this corps 
available rendered it impracticable to detail en- 
gineers permanently at the headquarters of corps 
and divisions. The companies of regular engi- 
neers never had their proper number of officers, 
and it was necessary, as a rule, to follow the 
principle of detailing engineer officers tempora- 
rily whenever their services were required. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. 

To the corps of topographical engineers was 
intrusted the collection of topographical informa- 
tion and the preparation of campaign maps. Un- 
til a short time previous to the departure of the 
arm}- for Fort Monroe, Lieutenant-Colonel John 
W. Macomb was in charge of this department, 
and prepared a large amount of valuable mate- 
rial. Ho was succeeded by Brigadier-General 
A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position 
throughout the Peninsula campaign. These offi- 
cers were assisted by Lieutenants H. L. Abbott, 
0. G. Wagner, N. Bowen, John M. Wilson, and 
James II. Wilson, topographical engineers. This 
number, being the greatest available, was so 
small that much of the duty of the department 
devolved upon parties furnished by Professor 
Bachc, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and 
other gentlemen from civil life. 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topo- 
graphical maps, the labors of this corps were 
diflicult and arduous in the extreme. Notwith- 
standing the energy and ability displayed by 
General Humphreys, Lieutenant-Colonel ^la- 
comb, and their subordinates, who frequently 



obtained the necessary information under fire, 
the movements of the army were sometimes un- 
avoidably delayed by the difficulty of obtaining 
knowledge of tlie country in advance. The re- 
sult of their labors has been the preparation of 
an excellent series of maps, which will be invalu- 
able to any army traversing the same ground. 

During the campaign it was impossible to draw 
a distinct line of demarcation between the duties 
of the two corps of engineers so that the labors 
of reconnoissances of roads, of lines of intrench- 
ments, of fields for battle, and of the position of 
the enemy, as well as the construction of siege 
and defensive works, were habitually performed 
by details from either corps, as the convenience 
of the .service demanded. 

I desire to express my high appreciation of the 
skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by the 
officers of both corps of engineers, under the 
most trying circumstances. 

During the Maryland campaign I united the 
two corps under Captain J. C. Duane, United 
States engineers, and found great advantages 
from the arrangement. 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

For the operations of the medical department 
I refer to the reports, transmitted herewith, of 
Surgeon Charles S. Tripler and Surgeon Jona- 
than Letterinan, who, in turn, performed the du- 
ties of Medical Director of the army of the Poto- 
mac, the former from August tv>-elfth, ISfil, until 
July first, 1S(j2, and the latter after that date. 
The difficulties to be overcome in organizing and 
making effective the medical department were 
very great, arising principally from the inexpe- 
rience of the regimental medical officers, many 
of whom were phj'sicians taken suddenly from 
civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had 
to be instructed in their duties from the very 
alphabet," and from the ignorance of the line 
officers as to their relations with the medical offi- 
cers, which gave rise to confusion and conflict of 
authority. Boards of examination were insti- 
tuted, by which manj' ignorant officers were re- 
moved ; and by the successive exertions of Sur- 
geons Tripler and Letterman, the medical corps 
was brought to a veiy high degree of efficiency. 
With regard to the sanitaiy condition of the 
army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says that 
the records show a constantly increasing immu- 
nity from disease. " In October and November, 
ISrtl, with an army averaging one hundred and 
thirty thousand men, we had seven thousand 
nine hundred and tliirty-two cases of fever of all 
sorts ; of these, about one thousand were re- 
ported as cases of typhoid fever. I know that 
errors of diagnosis M'ere frequently oommitted, 
and therefore this must be considered as the limit 
of typhoid cases. If any army in the world can 
show such a record as this, T do not know when 
or where it was assembled." From September, 
18(31, to February, 18C2, while the army was in 
creasing, the number of sick decreased from 
7 per cent to 0.18 per cent. Of these, the men 
sick in the regimental and general hospitals 



DOCUMENTS. 



521 



were less ihan one half; the remainder were 
slight case ;, under treatuient in quarters. " Dur- 
ing this tmie, so far as rumor was concerned, the 
array was being decimated by disease every 
month." Of the sanitary condition of the array 
during the Peninsula campaign, up to its arrival 
at Ilarrihon's Landing, Dr. Tripler says: "Dur- 
ing this campaign the army was favored with ex- 
cellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. 
Those scourges of modern armies — ^ dysentery, 
typhus, cholera- -were almost unknown. We had 
some t3'phoid fc^ er and more malarial fevers, but 
even these never prevailed to such an extent as 
to create any alarm. The sick reports were 
sometimes larger than we cared to have them ; 
but the great majoi'ity of the cases reported were 
such as did not threaten life or permanent disa- 
bility. I regret that I have not before me the 
retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I 
might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored 
to recover them, but have been unsuccessful. My 
recollection is, that the whole sick report never 
exceeded eight per cent of the force, and this 
including all sorts of cases, the trivial as well as 
the severe. The army of the Potomac must be 
conceded to have been the most healthy army in 
the service of the United States." 

His remarks at the conchision of his report 
upon our system of medical administration, and 
his suggestions for its improvement, are espe- 
cially worthy of attention. 

The service, labors, and privations of the troops 
during the seven days' battles had, of course, a 
great effect on the health of the army, after it 
reached Harrison's Landing, increasing the num- 
ber of sick to about twenty per cent of the whole 
force. 

The nature of the military operations had also 
unavoidably placed the medical department in 
a very unsatisfactory condition. Supplies had 
been almost entirely exhausted or necessarily 
abandoned; hospital tents abandoned or de- 
stroyed, and the medical officers deficient in 
numbers and broken down by fatigue. 

All the remarkable energy and ability of Sur- 
geon Letterman were required to restore the effi- 
ciency of his department ; but before we left 
Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in fitting 
it out thoroughly with the supplies it required, 
and the health of the army was vastly improved 
by the sanitary measures which were enforced 
at his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army was re- 
moved from the Peninsula made it necessary to 
leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded afterward, 
nearly all the bivggage and transportation, includ- 
ing medical stores and ambulances, all the ves- 
sels being required to transport the troops them- 
selves and their ammunition ; and when the army 
of the Potomac returned to Washington after 
General Pope's campaign, and the medical de- 
partment came once more under Surgeon Letter- 
man's control, he found it in a deplorable condi- 
tion. Tiie officers were worn out by the labors 
they had performed, and the few supi)lies that 
had been broujrht from the Peninsula had been 



exhausted or abandoned, so that the work of re- 
organization and re .. applying had to be again 
performed, and this while the army was moving 
rapidly, and almost in the face of the enemy. 
That it was successfully accomplished is shown 
by the care and attention which the wounded 
received after the battles of South-Mountain and 
Antietam. 

Among the improvements introduced into his 
department by Surgeon Letterman, the principal 
are the organization of an ambulance corps, the 
system of field hospitals, and the method of sup- 
plying by brigades, all of which were instituted 
during the Maryland campaign, and have since 
proved very efficient. 

quartermastek's department. 

On assuming command of the troops in and 
around Washington, I appointed Captain S. Van 
Vliet, Assistant Quartermaster, (afterward Briga- 
dier-Genei-al,) Chief Quartermaster to my com- 
mand, and gave him the necessary instructions 
for organizing his department, and collecting the 
supplies requisite for the large army then called 
for. 

The disaster at Manassas had but recently oc- 
curred, and the army was quite destitute of 
quartermaster's stores. General Van Vliet, with 
great energy and zeal, set himself about the task 
of furni.shing the supplies immediately necessary, 
and preparing to oi)tain the still larger amounts 
which would be required by the new troops, 
which were moving in large numbers toward the 
capital. The principal depot for supplies in the 
city of Washington was under charge of Colonel 
D. H. Ruckcr, Assistant Quartermaster, who ably 
performed his duties. Lieutenant-Colonel R. In- 
galls, Assistant Quartermaster, was placed in 
charge of tlie department on the south side of 
the Potomac. I directed a large depot for trans- 
portation to be established at Perryville, on the 
left bank of the Susquehanna, a point equally ac- 
cessible b}' rail and water. Captain C. G. Saw- 
telle. Assistant Quartermaster, was detailed to 
organize the camp, and performed his duties to 
my entire satisfaction. Captain J. J. Dana, As- 
sistant Quartermaster, had immediate charge of 
the transportation in and about Washington, as 
well as of the large number of horses purchased 
for the use of the artillery and cavalry. The 
principal difficulties which General Van Vliet had 
to encounter arose from the inexperience of the 
majority of the officers of his department in the 
new regiments and brigades. 

The necessity of attending personally to minor 
details rendered his duties arduous and harass- 
ing in the extreme. All obstacles, however, were 
surmounted by the untiring industry of the Chief 
Quartermaster and his immediate subordinates, 
and when the ariny was prepared to move the 
organization of the department was found to be 
admirable. 

When it was determined to move the army to 
the Peninsula, the duties of providing water 
transportation were devolved by the Secretary of 
War upon his assistant, the Honorable John 



S22 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Tucker. The vessels were ordered to Alexan- 
dria, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls was placed 
in immediate charge of the embarkation of the 
troops, transportation, and material of every de- 
scription. Operations of this nature, on so ex- 
tensive a scale, had no parallel in the history of 
our country. 

The arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel In- 
palls were perfected with remarkable skill and 
energy, and the army and its material were em- 
barked and transported to Fortress Monroe in a 
very short space of time, and entirely without 
I0S.S. 

During the operations on the Peninsula, until 
the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, Gen- 
eral Van Vliet retained the position of Chief Quar- 
termaster, and maintained the thorough organi- 
zation and efficiency of his department. The 
principal depot of supplies were under the imme- 
diate charge of Lieutenant-Colonels Ingalls and 
Sawtelle. 

On the tenth of July, 1862, General Van Vliet 
having requested to be relieved from duty with 
the army of the Potomac, I appointed Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Ingalls Chief Quartermaster, and he 
continued to discharge the duties of that office 
daring the remainder of the Peninsula and the 
Maryland campaigns in a manner which fully 
sustained the high reputation he had previously 
acquired. 

The immediate amount of labor accomplished, 
often under the most difficult circumstances, the 
admirable system under which the duties of the 
department were performed, and the entire suc- 
cess which attended the efforts to supply so large 
an army, reflect the highest credit upon the offi- 
cers upon whom those onerous duties devolved. 
The reports of General Van Vliet and Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Ingalls, with the accompanying docu- 
ments, give in detail the history of the depart- 
ment from its organization until I was relieved 
from the command of the army of the Potomac. 

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 

On the first of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. 
Clark, Commissary of Subsistence, joined my 
staff, and at once entered upon his duties as 
Chief Commis.sary of the army of the Potomac. 
In order to realize the responsibilities pertaining 
to this office, as well as to form a proper estimate 
of the vast amount of labor which must necessar- 
ily devolve upon its occupant, it is only necessary 
to consider the unprepared state of the country 
to engage in a war of such magnitude as the pres- 
ent, and the lack of practical knowledge, on the 
part of the officers, with reference to supplying 
and subsisting a large, and at that time, unor- 
ganized army. Yet, notwithstanding the exist- 
ence of these groat obstacles, the manner in 
which the duties of the commissionary depart- 
ment were discharged was such as to merit and 
trail forth the conmiendation of the entire army. 

During the stay of the army of the Potomac 
in the vicinity of Washington, prior to the Pe- 
ninsula campaign, its subsistence was drawn 
chieflv from tUe deu6ts which had been estab- 



lished by the commissary department at Wash- 
ington, Alexandria, Forts Corcoran and Runyon. 
In the important task of designating and estab- 
lishing depots of supplies. Colonel Clarke was 
ably seconded by his assistants, Colonel Amos 
Beckwith, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Bell, Commissary of 
Subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. 
Porter, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; 
Captain Thomas Wilson, Commissary of Subsist- 
ence, U. S. A. ; Captain Brownell Granger, Com- 
missary of Subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; Cap- 
tain W. H. Bell, Commissary of Subsistence, U. 
S. A. ; Captain J. H. Woodward, Commissary of 
Subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; and Captain W. 
R. Murphy, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. 
volunteers. 

For a full knowledge of the highly creditable 
manner in which each and all of the above-men- 
tioned officers discharged their duties, I invite 
attention to the detailed report of Colonel Clarke. 
The remarks and suggestions contained in his 
report are worthy of attention, as affording valu- 
able rules for the future guidance of the sub- 
sistence department in supplying armies in the 
field. The success of the subsistence depart- 
ment of the army of the Potomac was in a great 
measure attributable to the fact that the subsist- 
ence department at Washington made ample pro- 
vision for sending supplies to the Peninsula, and 
that it always exercised the most intelligent fore 
sight. It moreover gave its advice and counte- 
nance to the officers charged with its duties and 
reputation in the field, and those officers, I am 
happy to say, worked with it, and together, in 
perfect harmony for the public good. During 
the entire period that I was in command of the 
army of the Potomac there was no instance with- 
in my knowledge where the troops were without 
their rations from any fault of the officers of this 
department. 

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

This very important branch of the service was 
placed under the charge of Captain C. P. Kings- 
bury, Ordnance corps. Colonel and Aid-de-Camp. 
Great difficulty existed in the proper organiza- 
tion of the department for the M^ant of a suffi- 
cient number of suitable officers to perform the 
duties at the various headquarters and depots of 
supply. But fixr greater obstacles had to be sur- 
mounted, from the fact that the supply of small 
arms was totally inadequate to the demands of 
a large army, and a vast proportion of those fur- 
nished were of such inferior quality as to be un- 
satisfactory to the troops, and condemned br 
their officers. The supply of artillery was more 
abundant, but of great variety. Rifled ordnance 
was just coming into use, for the first time in 
this country, and the description of gun and kind 
of projectile which would prove most effective, 
aiul should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere 
matter of theory. To obviate these difficulties, 
large quanties of small arms of foreign manu- 
facture were contracted for; private enterprise 
in the construction of arms and ammunition was 



DOCUMENTS. 



623 



encouraged ; and by the time the army was or- 
dered to move to the Peninsula the amount of 
ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. Much 
also had been done to bring the quality, both of 
arms and ammunition, up to the proper standard. 
Boards of officers were in session continually 
during the autumn and winter of 1861, to test 
the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. 

The reports of these boards, confii-mcd by sub- 
sequent experience in the field, have done much to 
establish the respective claims of different invent- 
ors and manufacturers. During the campaigns of 
the Peninsula and Maryland, the officers connected 
with the department were zealous and energetic, 
and kept the troops well supplied, notwithstanding 
the perplexing and arduous nature of their duties. 
One great source of perplexity was the fact that 
it had been necessary to issue arms of all varieties 
and calibres, giving an equal diversity in the kinds 
of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness 
was therefore incumbent upon the officers in 
charge to prevent confusion and improper distri- 
bution of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- 
charged the duties of his office with great effi- 
ciency until the day of July, 1862, when his 

health required that he should be relieved. First 
Lieutenant Tliomas G. Baylor, ordnance corps, 
succeeded him, and performed his duty during the 
remainder of the Peninsula and Maryland cam- 
paigns with marked ability and success. 

The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury 
and Lieutenant Baylor renders it impossible for 
me to enter at all into the details of the organiza- 
tion of the department. 

provost-m.-vrshal's department. 

Immediately after I was placed in command of 
the "Division of the Potomac," I appointed Col- 
onel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth regiment infantry, 
Provost-Marshal of Washington. All the available 
regular infantry, a battery and a squadron of cav- 
alry were placed under his command, and by his 
energetic action he soon corrected the serious 
evils which existed, and restored order in the 
city. 

When the army was about to take the field. 
General Porter was appointed Provost-^^arshal 
General of the army of the Potomac, and held 
that most important position until the end of the 
Peninsula campaign, when sickness, contracted 
in the untiring discharge of his duties, compelled 
him to ask to be relieved from the position he had 
so ably and energetically filled. 

The Provost-Marshal General's department had 
the charge of a class of duties which had not be- 
fore, in our servi^-e, been defined and grouped 
under the management of a special department. 
The following subjects indicate the sphere of this 
department: suppression of marauding and de- 
predations, and of all brawls and disturbances, 
preservation of good order, and suppression of 
disturbances beyond the limits of the camps. 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 

Suppression of gambling-houses, drinking- 
houses, or bar-rooms, and brothels. 



Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and 
places of public amusement. 

Searches, seizures, and arrests. Execution of 
sentences of general courts-martial, involving im- 
prisonment or capital punishment. Enforcement 
of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating li- 
quors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, and of 
orders respecting passes. 

Deserters from the enemy. 

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 

Countersigning safeguards. 

Passes to citizens within the lines, and for pur- 
poses of trade. 

Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the 
soldiers. 

General Porter was assisted by the following 
named officers : 

Major W. H. Wood, Seventeenth United States 
infantry; Captain James McMillom, acting Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General, Seventeenth United States 
inAintry; Captain W. T. Gentry, Seventeenth Uni- 
ted States infantry ; Captain J. W. Forsurth, Eigh- 
teenth United States infantry ; Lieutenant J. AV. 
Jones, Twelfth United States infantry; Lieuten- 
ant C. F. Trowbridge, Sixteenth United States 
infantry; and Lieutenant C. D. Mehaffey, Fii'st 
United States infantry. 

The provost-guard was composed of the Second 
United States cavalry. Major Pleasanton, and a 
battalion of the Eighth and Seventeenth United 
States infantry, Major Willard. After General 
Porter was relieved, Major AVood was in charge 
of this department until after the battle of Antie- 
tam, when Brigadier-General Patrick was appoint- 
ed Provost-Marshal General. 

COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

AVhen the army took the field, for the purpose 
of securing order and regularity in the camp of 
headquarters, and facilitating its movements, the 
office of commandant of general headquarters was 
created, and assigned to Major G. 0. Ilaller, Sev- 
enth United States infantry. Six companies of 
infantry were placed under his orders for guard 
and police duty. Among the orders appended to 
this report, is the one defining his duties, which 
were always satisfactoril}'^ performed. 

JUDGE-ADVOCATE. 

From August, 1861, the position of Judge- Ad- 
vocate was held by Colonel Thomas T. Gantt, 
Aid-de-Camp,until compelled by ill-health to retire, 
at Harrison's Landing, in August, 1862. His re- 
views of the decisions of courts-martial during 
this period were of great utility in correcting tho 
practice in military courts, diffusing true notions 
of discipline and subordination, and setting before 
the army a high standard of soldierly honor. 
Upon the retirement of Colonel Gantt, the duties 
of Judge-Advocate were ably performed by Colo- 
nel Thomas M. Key, Aid-dc-Camp. 

SIGNAL CORPS. 

The method of conveying intelligence and or- 
ders, invented and introduced into the service by 
Major Albert J. Mycr, signal officer United State* 



624 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-03. 



ai-my, wa;-i first practically tested in large opera- 
tions during the organization of the army of the 
Potomac. 

Under the direction of Major Myer, a signal 
corps was formed by detailing officers and men 
from the diUerent regiments of volunteers and in- 
structing them in the use of the flags by day and 
torches by night. 

The chief signal officer was indefatigable in his 
exertions to render his corps effective,- and it soon 
became available for service in every division of 
the army. In addition to tlie flags and torches, 
Major ^iyer introduced a portable insulated tele- 
gi-aph wire, which could be readily laid from point 
to point, and which could be used under the same 
general system. In front of Washington, and on 
the Lower Potomac, at any point within our lines 
not reached by the military telegraph, the great 
usefulness of this system of signals was made 
manifest. Ikit it was not until after the arrival 
of the army upon the Peninsula, and during the 
siege and battles of that and the Maryland cam- 
paigns that the great benefits to be derived from 
it on the field and under fire were fully appreci- 
ated. 

There was scarcely any action or skirmish in 
which the signal corps did not render important 
services. Often under heavy fire of artillery, 
and not unfrequently while exposed to musketry, 
the officers and men of this corps gave informa- 
tion of the movements of the enemy, and trans- 
mitted directions for the evolutions of our own 
troops. 

The report of the chief signal officer, with ac- 
companying documents, will give the details of 
the services of this coi'ps, and call attention to 
those members of it who were particularly dis- 
tinguished. 

TELEGRAPHIC. 

The telegraphic operations of the army of the 
Potomac were superintended by Major Thomas 
J. Eckert, and under the immediate direction of 

Mr. Caldwell, who was, with a corps of 

operators, attached to my headquarters during 
the entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and in 
Maryland. 

'i'he services of this corps were arduous and 
efficient. Under the admirable arrangements of 
Major Eckert they were constantly provided with 
all the material for constructing new lines, which 
were rapidly established whenever the army 
changed position ; and it was not unfrequently 
the case that the operatives worked under fire 
from the enemy's guns ; yet they invariably per- 
formed all the duties required of them with great 
alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom that 
I was without the means of direct telegraphic 
communication with the War Department and 
with the corpo commanders. 

From the organization of the army of the Po- 
tomac up to November first, 18G2, including the 
Peninsula and Maryland campaigns, upward of 
one thousand two hundred (1200) miles of 
military telegraph line had been constructed in 
connection with tlie operations of the army, and 



the number of operatives* and builders employed 
was about two hundred, (200.) 

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enter- 
prising aeronaut, who had the management of 
the balloons, I was greatly indebted for the valu- 
able information obtained during his ascensions. 

I have more than once taken occasion to recom- 
mend the members of my staff, both general and 
personal, for promotion and reward. I beg leave 
to repeat these recommendations, and to record 
their names in the history of the army of the 
Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their coun- 
try owes a debt of gratitude still unpaid, for the 
courage, ability, and untiring zeal they displayed 
during the eventful campaigns in which they 
bore so prominent a part. 



CHAPTKB II. 



On the fifteenth of October the main body of 
the army of the Potomac was in the immediate 
vicinitjr of AVashington, with detachments on 
the left bank of the Potomac as far down as 
Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williamsport 
and its vicinity. The different divisions were 
posted as follows : Hooker at Budd's Ferry, Low- 
er Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort Lj-on and 
vicinitj^; Franklin near the Theological Seminary ; 
Blenker near Hunter's Chapel ; McDowell at Up- 
ton's Hill and Arlington ; F. J. Porter at Hall's 
and Miner's Hills ; Smith at Mackall's Hill ; Mc- 
Call at Langley ; Buell at Tenallytown, Meridian 
Hill, Emory's Chapel, etc., on the left bank of 
the river ; Casey at AVashington ; Stoneman's 
cavalry at Washington ; Hunt's artillery at Wash- 
ington ; Banks at Darnestown, with detachments 
at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, 
etc. ; Stone at Poolesville •, and Dix at Baltimore, 
with detachments on the Eastern Shore. 

On the nineteenth of October, 1861, General 
McCall marched to Drainsville with his division, 
in order to cover reconnoissances to be made in 
all directions the next day, for the purpose of 
learning the position of the enemy, "and of cov- 
ering the operations of the topographical engi- 
neers in making maps of that region. 

On the twent3'-ninth, acting in concert with 
General McCall, General Smith pushed strong 
parties to Freedom Hill, Vienna, Flint Hill, Pea- 
cock Hill, etc., to accomplish the same purpose 
in that part of the front. These reconnoissances 
were successful. 

On the morning of the twentieth I received 
the following telegram from General Banks's head- 
quarters : 

Darsestown. October 20, 1861. ' 

Sir : The signal station at Sugar Loaf tele- 
graphs that the enemy have moved away from 
Leesburgh. All quiet here. 

R. M. COPKLAND, 

Assistant Adjutant-GeneraU 

General Marcv, 

Whereupon I sent to General Stone, at Pooles- 
ville, the following telegram : 

Camp GnirriN, October 20, 1S61. 

General McClellan desires me to inform you 
that General McCall occupied Drainsville yester- 



DOCUMENTS. 



525 



day, and is still thero. Will send out heavy 
reconnoissances to-day. in all directions from that 
point. The General desires that you will keep a 
good look-out upon Leesbur2,h, to see if this move- 
ment has the effect to drive them a\vay. Per- 
haps a slight demonstration on your part would 
have the effect to move them. 

A. Y. Coi,BURN, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Brig. -Gen. C. P. Stone, Poolesville. 

Deeming it possil>le that General McCall's 
movement to Drainsville, together with the sub- 
sequent reconnoissances, might have the effect 
of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburgh, 
and the despatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to 
confirm this view, I wished General Stone, who 
had only a. line of pickets on the river, the mass 
of his troops being out of sight of, and beyond 
range from, the Virginia bank, to make some dis- 
play of an intention to cross, and also to watch 
the enemy more closely than usual. I did not 
direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he 
should cross the river in force for the purpose of 
fighting. 

The above despatch was sent on the twentieth, 
and reached General Stone as early as eleven 
A.M. of that day. I expected him to accomplish 
all that was intended on the same day ; and this 
he did, as will be seen from the following des- 
patch, received at mj' headquarters in Washing- 
ton from Poolesville on the evening of October 
twentieth : 

Made a feint of crossing at this place this af- 
ternoon, and at the same time started a recon- 
noitring party toward Leesburgh from Harrison's 
Island. The enemy's pickets retired to intrench- 
ments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet 
received. I have means of crossing one hun- 
dred and twenty -five men once in ten minutes at 
each of two points. River falling slowly. 
C. P. Stone, 

Brigadier-General. 

Major-General McClellan. 

As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen- 
eral McCall would be needed to cooperate with 
General Stone in any attack, he was directed to 
fall back from Drainsville to his original camp, 
near Prospect Hill, as soon as the required recon- 
noissances were completed. 

Accordingly he left Drainsville on his return, 
at about half-past eight a.m. of the twenty -first, 
reaching his old camp at about one p..m. 
' In the mean time I was surprised to hear from 
General Stone that a portion of his troops were 
engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at 
once sent instructions to General McCall to re- 
main at Drainsville, if he had not left before the 
order reached him. 

The order did not raach him until his return 
to his camp at Langley. He was then ordered 
to rest his men, and hold his division in readi- 
ness to return to Drainsville at a monent's notice, 
should it become necessary. Similar instructions 
were given to other divisions during the after- 
noon. 

S. D. 34. 



The first intimation I received from General 
Stone of the i-eul nature of his movements was in 
a telegram, as follows: 

Edwards'3 Ferrt, October 21—11.10 a.m. 
The enemy have been engaged opposite Harri- 
son's Island ; our men are behaving admirably. 

C. P. Stone, 

Brigadier-Genenfl. 

Major-General McClellan. 

At two P.M. General Banks's Adjutant-General 
sent the following : 

Darnestown, October 21, 1361 — 2 p.m. 
General Stone safely crossed the river this 
morning. Some engagements have taken place 
on the other side of the river — how important is 
not known. R. M. Copeland, 

^ Acting Assistant Adjutant-GeneraL 

General R. B. Marct. 

General Stone sent the following despatches on 
the same day at the hours indicated : 

Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, 1S6I— 2 p.m. 

There has been sharp firing on the right of our 
line, and our troops appear to be advancing there 
under Baker. The left, under Gorman, lias ad- 
vanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, and if the 
movement continues successful, will turn the 
enemy's right. C. P. Stone, 

Brigadier-G eneiul . 

Major-General McClellan. 

Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, ISCl — 4 p.m. 
Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker 
on the right ; Gorman on the left. Right, sharply 
engaged. C. P. Stone, 

Brigadier-General. 

General McClellan. 

Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, 1861—9.80 p.m. 

I am occupied in preventing further disaster, 
and try to get into a position to redeem. We 
have lost some of our best commanders — Baker 
dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted. The 
wounded are being carefully and rapidly re- 
moved ; and Gorman's wing is being cautiously 
withdrawn. Any advance from Drainsville must 
be made cautiously. 

All was reported going well up to Baker's deatii, 
but, in the confusion following that, the right 
wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, 
unless a night attack is made, be in the same 
position as last night, save the loss of many good 
men. C. P. Stone, 

Brigadier-General. 

Major-General McClellan. 

Although no more fully inforn^ed of the state 
of affairs, I had during the afternoon, as a pre- 
cautionaiy measure, ordered General Banks to 
send one brigade to the support of the troops at 
Harrison's Island, and to move with the other 
two to Seneca Mills, ready to support General 
Stone if necessar}^ The half-past nine p.m. des- 
patch of General Stone did not give me an entire 
understanding of the state of the case. 

Aware of the difficulties and perhaps fatal con- 
sequences of recrossing such a river as the Poto^ 



526 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



mac after a repulse, and from thd^e telegrams 
supposing his whole force to be on the Virginia 
side, I directed General Stone to intrench himself, 
and hold the Virginia side at all hazards until 
reenforcements could arrive, when he could safely 
withdraw to the Maryland side, or hold his posi- 
tion on the Virginia side, should that prove ad- 
visable. 

General Banks was instructed to move the rest 
of his division to Edwards's Ferry, and to send 
over as many men as possible before daylight to 
reenforce Stone. He did not arrive in time to 
effect this, and was instructed to collect all the 
canal-boats he could find, and use them for cross- 
ing at Edwards's Ferry in sufficient force to en- 
able the troops already there to hold the opposite 
side. 

On the twenty-second I went to the ground in 
person, and reaching Poolesville, learnecf for the 
first time the full details of the aifair. 

The following extract from the evidence of 
General Stone before the " Committee on the 
Conduct of the "War " on the fifth of January, 
1862, will throw further light on this occurrence. 

General Stone says he received the order from 
my headquarters to make a slight demonstration 
at about eleven o'clock a.m. on the twentieth, and 
that, in obedience to that order, he made the 
demonstration on the evening of the same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the twenty- 
first, M'hich resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, 
he was asked the following questions : 

Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate 
with yourself, or had you orders from the Gene- 
ral-in-Chief to make it?" 

To which he replied : " It originated with my- 
ijelf — the reconnoissance." 

Question. " The order did not proceed from 
(ieneral McClellan ?" 

Answer. '' I was directed the day before to 
make a demonstration ; that demonstration was 
made the day previous." 

Question. " Did you receive an order fi'om the 
General-in-Chief to make the reconnoissance ?" 

Answer. " No, sir." 

Making a personal examination on the twenty- 
third, 1 found that the position on the Virginia 
side at Edwards's Ferry was not a tenable one, 
but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops 
by da3dight. I therefore caused more artillery 
to be jjlaced in position on the Maryland side to 
cover the approaches to the ground held by us, 
and crossed the few additional troops that the 
high wind permitted us to get over, so as to be 
as secure as possible against any attack during 
the day. Before nightfall all the precautions 
were taken to secure an orderly and quiet pas- 
sage of the troops and guns. 

The movement was commenced soon after da^k, 
under the personal supervision of General Stone, 
who received the order for the withdrawal at fif- 
teen minutes past seven p.m. 

By four a.m. of the twenty-fourth every thing 
had reached the Maryland shore in safety. 

A few days afterward I received information 
which seemed to be authentic, to the efifect that 



large bodies of the enemy had been ordered froni 
Manassas to Leesburgh, to cut off our troops on 
the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had 
probably prevented a still more sei'ious disaster. 

I refer to General Stone's report of this battle, 
furnished the AVar Department, and his pub- 
lished testimony before the " Committee on the 
Conduct of the War " for further details. 

The records of the War Department show ray 
anxiety and efforts to assume active offensive 
operations in the" fall and early winter. It is 
only just to say, however, that the unprecedent- 
ed condition of the roads and Virginia soil would 
have delayed an advance till February, had the? 
discipline, organization, and equipment of the 
army been as complete at the close of the fiill as 
was necessary, and as I desired and labored 
against every impediment to make them. 

While still in command only of the army of 
the Potomac, namely, in early September, I pro- 
posed the formation of a corps of New-Englanders 
for coast service in the bays and inlets of the 
Chesapeake and Potomac, to cooperate with my 
own command, from which most of its material 
was drawn. 

On the first of November, however, I was call- 
ed to relieve Lieutenant-General Scott in the 
chief and general command of the armies of 
the Union. The direction and nature of this 
coast expedition, therefore, was somewhat chang- 
ed, as will soon appear in the original plan sub- 
mitted to the Secretary of War, and the letter 
of instructions later issued to General Burn- 
side, its commander. The whole country indeed 
had now become the theatre of military opera- 
tions from the Potomac to beyond the Mississip- 
pi, and to assist the navy in perfecting and sus- 
taining the blockade it became necessary to 
extend these operations to points on the sea- 
coast, Koanoke Island, Savannah, and New-Or- 
leans. It remained also to equip and organize 
the armies of the West, whose condition was lit- 
tle better than that of the army of the Potomac 
had been. The direction of the campaigns in the 
West, and of the operations upon the seaboard, 
enabled me to enter upon larger combinations 
and to accomplish results, the necessity and ad- 
vantage of which had not been unforeseen, but 
which had been beyond the ability of the single 
army formerly under my command to effect. 

The following letters, and a subsequent paper 
addressed to the Secretary of War, sufficiently 
indicate the nature of those combinations to 
minds accustomed to reason upon military oper- 
ations : 

IlBADQnARTERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, 1 

Wasuixgton, September 6, ISOl. ) 

vSiR : I have the honor to suggest the follow- 
ing proposition, with the request that the neces- 
sary authority be at once given me to carry it out : 
to organize a force of two brigades of five regi- 
ments each, of New-England men, for the gen- 
eral service, but particularly adapted to coast 
service — the officers and men to be sufficiently 
conversant with boat service, to manage steamers, 
sailing vessels, launches, barges, surf-boats, iioat- 



DOCUMENTS. 



527 



ing batteries, etc. To charter or buy for the 
command a sufficient number of propellers, or 
tug-boats, for transportation of men and supplies, 
the machinery of which should be amply pro- 
tected by timber ; the vessels to have permanent 
experienced officers from the merchant service, 
but to be manned by details from the command. 
A naval officer to be attached to the staff of the 
commanding officer. The flank companies of 
each regiment to be armed with Dahlgreu boat 
guns, and carbines with water-proof cartridges ; 
the other companies to have such arms as I may 
hereafter designate ; to be uniformed and equip- 
ped as the Rhode Island regiments are. Launches 
and floating batteries with timber parapets of 
sufficient capacity to land or bring into action 
the entire force. 

The entire management and organization of 
the force to be under my control, and to form an 
integral part of the army of the Potomac. 

The immediate object of this force is for oper- 
ations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and the 
Potomac ; by enabling me thus to land troops at 
points where they are needed, this force can also 
be used in conjunction with a naval force oper- 
ating against points on the sea-coast. This coast 
division to be commanded by a general officer of 
my selection ; the regiments to be organized as 
other land forces ; the disbursements for vessels, 
etc., to be made by the proper department of the 
army upon the requisitions of the general com- 
manding the division, with my approval. 

I think the entire force can be organized in 
thirty days, and by no means the least of the 
advantages of this proposition is the fact that it 
will call into the service a class of men who 
would not otherwise enter the army. 

You will immediately perceive that the object 
of this force is to follow along the coast and up 
the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main 
army when it advances. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
George B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. Simon Cameron, 

,' Secretary of War. 

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the 
requisite vessels, and adapting them to the special 
purposes contemplated, this expedition was not 
ready for service until January, IBOS. Then in 
the chief command, I deemed it best to send it to 
North-Carolina, with the design indicated in the 
following letter : 

Headqdartebs of thb Army, Washington, I 
January 7, 1S62. f 

General : In accordance with verbal instruc- 
tions heretofore given you, you will, after uniting 
with Flag-Officer Goldsborough at Fort Monroe, 
proceed under his convoy to Hatteras Inlet, where 
you will, in connection with him, take the most 
prompt measures for crossing the fleet over the 
Bulkhead into the waters of the sound. Under 
the accompanying general order constituting the 
department of North-Carolina, you will assume 
command of the garrison at Hatteras Inlet, and 
make such dispositions in regard to that place as 



your ulterior operations, may render necessary, 
always being careful to provide for the safety of 
that very important station in any contingency. 

Your first point of attack will be Roanoke 
Island and its dependencies. It is presumed that 
the navy can reduce the batteries on the n^arshes, 
and cover the landing of your troops on the main 
island, by which, in connection with a rapid 
movement of the gunboats to the northern ex- 
tremity, as soon as the marsh battery is reduced, 
it may be hoped to capture the entire garrison 
of the place. Having occupied the island and 
its dependencies, you will at once proceed to the 
erection of the batteries and defences necessary 
to hold the position with a small force. Should 
the flag-officer require any assistance in seizing 
or holding the debouches of the canal from Nor- 
folk, you will please afford it to him. 

The Commodore and yourself having completed 
your arrangements in regard to'Roanoke Island, 
and the waters north of it, you will please at 
once make a descent on Newborn, having gained 
possession of which and the railroad passing 
through it, you will at once throw a sufficient 
force upon Beaufort, and take the steps necessary 
to reduce Fort Macon and open that port. When 
you seize Newbern, you will endeavor to seize 
the railroad as far west as Goldsborough, should 
circumstances favor such a movement. The 
temper of the people, the rebel force at hand, 
etc., will go far toward determining the question 
as to how far west the railroad can be safely oc- 
cupied and held. Should circumstances render 
it advisable to seize and hold Raleigh, the main 
north and south line of railroad passing through 
Goldsborough should be so effectually destroyed 
for considerable distances north and south of 
that point, as to render it impossible for the 
rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A great 
point would be gained, in any event, hy the 
effectual destruction of the Wilmington and Wel- 
don Railroad. 

I would advise great caution in moving so far 
into the interior as upon Raleigh. Having accom- 
plished the objects mentioned, the next point of in- 
terest would probably be Wilmington, the reduc- 
tion of which may require that additional means 
shall be afforded you. I would urge great caution, 
in regard to proclamations. In no case w )uld I 
go beyond a moderate joint proclamation r ith the 
naval commander, which should say as liitle as 
possible about politics or the negro; merely state 
that the true issue for which we are fighting is 
the preservation of the Union, and upholding 
the laws of tlie general Government, and stating 
that all who conduct themselves properly will, 
as far as possible, be protected in their persons 
and property. 

You will please report your operations as often 
as an opportunity ofiers itself 

With my best wishes for your success, I am, 
etc., etc. Geo. B. McClellan, 

M;ijor-Genei-iil Commanding ia ChieC 

Brigadier-General A. K. Burmside, 

Commanding Expedition. 

The following letters of instruction were sent 



628 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. 



to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman, and Cut- 
ler ; and I also communicated verbally to these 
officers ni}' views in full regarding the field of 
operations assigned to each, and gave them their 
instructions as much in detail as was necessary 
at that time : 

Hbadquartrbs of the Army, I 

AVasiiisgton, D. C, Novenibei- 11, 1861. f 

Genekai. : In assigning you to the command 
of the department of Missouri, it is probably 
unnecessaiy for me to state that I have intrusted 
to you a duty which requires the utmost tact 
and decision. 

You have not merely the ordinary duties of a 
military commander to perform, but the ftir more 
difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of chang- 
ing prob;il)ly the majority of the personnel of the 
staff of the department, and of reducing to a 
point of economy, consistent with the interest 
and necessities of the State, a system of reckless 
expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of be- 
fore in the history of the world. 

You will find in your department many gene- 
ral and staff ofiicers holding illegal commissions 
and appointments, not recognized or approved 
by the President or Secretary of War. You will 
please at once inform these gentlemen of the 
nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay 
or allowances are issued to them until such time 
as commissions may be authorized by the Presi- 
dent or Secretary of War. 

If any of them give the slightest trouble, you 
will at once arrest them and send them, under 
guard, out of the limits of 3'our department, in- 
forming them, that if they return they will be 
placed in close confinement. You will please ex- 
amine into the legality of the organization of the 
troops .serving in the department. When you 
find any illegal, unusual, or improper organiza- 
tions, you will give to the officers and men an 
opportunity to enter the legal military establish- 
ment under general laws and orders from the 
AVar Department ; reporting in full to these 
headquarters any officer or organization that may 
decline. 

You will please cause competent and reliable 
staff-officers to examine all existing contracts 
immediately, and suspend all payments upon 
them Mntil you receive the report in each case. 
Where there is the slightest doubt as to the pro- 
priety of the contract, you will be good enough 
to refer the matter, with full explanation, to these 
headquarters, stating in each case what would 
be a fair compensation for the services or mate- 
rials rendered under the contract. Discontinue 
at once the reception of material or services un- 
der any doubtful contract. Arrest and bring to 
I)rom[)t trial all officers who have in any wixy 
violated their duty to the Government. In re- 
gard to the political conduct of affairs, you will 
please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of 
Missouri and the adjacent States that we are 
fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to 
uphold the power of our national Government, 
and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace 
and ^'ood order. 



With respect to military operations, it is pro- 
bable, from the best infoj-mation in my posses- 
sion, that the interests of the Government will 
be best served by fortifying and holding in 
considerable sti-enjth Rolla, Sedalia, and other 
interior points, ketping strong patrols constajitly 
moving from the terminal stations, and concen- 
trating the mass of the troo])s on or near the 
Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations 
as the public interests may demand. 

I would be glad to have you make as soon as 
possible a personal inspectiort of all the import- 
ant points in your department, and report the 
result to me. I cannot too strongly impress 
upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me 
constantly advised of the strength, condition, 
and location of your troops, together with all 
facts that will enable me to maintain that gene- 
ral direction of the armies of the United States 
which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to 
you to maintain thorough organization, disci- 
pline, and economy throughout your department. 
Please inform me as soon as possible of every 
thing relating to the gunboats now in process of 
construction, as well as those completed. 

The militia force authorized to be raised by 
the State of Missouri for its defence will be un- 
der your orders. 

I am. General, etc., etc. 

George JJ. McCleli.an, 

M.ijor-General Commanding U. S. A. 

Major-Gen eral II. W. Halleck, U. S. A., 

Commanding Department of Missouri. 

Hbadquarters of thr Armt, I 

Washingto:^, November 7, ISG'2. j" 

General: In giving you instructions for your 
guidance in command of the department of the 
Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely 
wish to express plainly the general ideas which 
occur to me in relation to the conduct of opera- 
tions there. That portion of Kentucky west of 
the Cumberland River is by its position so close- 
ly related to the States of Illinois and Missouri, 
that it has seemed best to attach it to the depart- 
ment of Missouri. Your operations there, in 
Kentucky, will be confined to that portion of the 
State east of the Cumberland River. I trust 
I need not repeat to you that I regard the im- 
portance of the territory committed to your care 
as second only to that occupied by the army 
under my immediate command. It is absolutely 
necessary that we shall hold all the State of 
Kentucky ; not only that, but that the majority 
of its inhabitants shall be warmly in fiivor of 
our cause, it being that which best subserves 
their interests. It is possible that the conduct 
of our political affairs in Kentucky is more im- 
portant than that of our military operations. I 
certainly cannot overestimate the importance of 
the former. You will please constantly to bear 
in mind the precise issue for which we are fight- 
ing ; that issue is the preservation of the Union 
and the restoration of the full authority of the 
general Government over all portions of our ter- 
ritoiy. AVe shall most readily suppi'css this re- 
bellion and restore the authority of the Govern- 



DOCUMENTS. 



529 



meiit by religiously respecting the constitutional 
righld of all. T know that I express the feelings 
and opinion of the President when I say that we 
are figliting only to preserve the integrity of the 
Union and the constitutional authority of the 
general Government. 

The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon 
it that their domestic institutions will in no man- 
ner be intcrferred with, and that they will receive 
at our hands every constitutional protection. I 
have only to repeat that you will in all respects 
carefully regard the local institutions of the region 
in which you command, allowing nothing but the 
dictates of military necessity to cause you to de- 
part from the spirit of these instructions. 

So much in regard to political considerations. 
The military problem would be a simple one 
could it be entirely separated from political in- 
fluences ; such is not the case. Were the popu- 
lation among which you are to operate wholly or 
generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville 
should be your tirst and principal objective point. 
It so happens that a large majority of the inhab- 
itants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the 
Union ; it therefore seems proper that you 
should remain on the defensive on the line 
from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw 
the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by 
Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Ivnoxville, 
in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and 
thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennes- 
see to rise, while you at the same time cut off the 
railway communication between Eastern Virginia 
and the Mississippi. It will be prudent to fortify 
the pass before leaving it in your rear. 

Brigadier-General D. C. Buell. 

Headqitarters of the Armt, I 
WAsniNGTQN, November 12, 18G2. ) 

General : Upon assuming command of the 
department, I will be glad to have you make as 
soon as por.sible a cai'eful report of the condition 
and situation of 3'our troops, and of the military 
and political condition of your command. The 
main point to which I desire to call your atten- 
tion is the necessity of entering Eastern Tennessee 
as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances 
of success, and I hope that you will, with the 
least possible delay, organize a column for that 
purpose, sufficiently guarding dt the same time 
the main avenues by which the j-ebels may invade 
Kentucky. Our conversations uu the subject of 
military operations have been so full, and my 
confidence in your judgment is so great, that I 
will not dwell further upon the subject, except to 
urge upon you the necessity of Tcoepitig mo fully 
informed as to the state of aflairs, both military 
and political, and your movements. In regard to 
political matters, bear in mind that we aie fight- 
ing only to preserve the integrity of the Union 
and to uphold the power of the General Govern- 
meut; as far as military necessity will permit, 
religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. 
Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, 
and while employing the utmost energv in mili- 
tary movement-s, bo careful so to tivat the un- 



armed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the 
breach existing between us and the rebels. 

I mean by this that it is the desire of the 
Government to avoid unnecessary irritation by 
causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. 
Where there is good reason to believe that per- 
sons are actually giving aid, comfort, or informa- 
tion to the enemy, it is of course necessary to 
arrest them ; but I have always found that it is 
the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious 
arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well 
to direct that no arrest shall be made except by 
your order or that of your generals, unless in ex- 
traordinary cases, always holding the party mak- 
ing the arrest responsible for the propriet}- of his 
course. It should be our constant aim to make it 
apparent to all that their property, their comfort, 
and their personal safety will be best preserved by 
adhering to the cause of the Union. 

If the military suggestion, I have made in this 
letter prove to have been founded on erroneous 
data, you are of course perfectly free to change 
the plans of operations. 

Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, 

Commanding Department of the Ohio. 

IlKADQtTARTERS OF TOR ArMT, f 

■Washington, February 11, 1S62. )" 

General: Your despatches in regard to the 
occupation of Dafuskie Island, etc., were received 
to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first time, your 
requisition for a siege-train for Savannah. 

After giving the subject all the consideratioii 
in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, 
under present circumstances, the siege and cap- 
ture of Savannah do not promise results com- 
mensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When 
I learned that it was possible for the gunboats 
to reach the Savannah River, above Fort Pulaski, 
two operations suggested themselves to my mind 
as its immediate results. 

First. The capture of Savannah by a " coup 
de mnhi''' — the result of an instantaneous advance 
and attack by the army and navy. 

The time for this has passed, and your letter 
indicates that you are not accountable for the 
failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, 
on the contrary, you perceived its advantages. 

Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its 
supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by a 
bombardment. 

Although we have a long delay to deplore, 
the second course still remains open to us; and 
I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, 
and its bombardment as soon as the thirteen-inch 
mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confi- 
dent you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you 
gain all that is really essential ; you obtain com 
pletc control of the harbor ; you relieve the block- 
ading fleet, and render the main body of your 
force disposable for other operations. 

I do not consider the posse^^sion of Savannah 
worth a siege after Pulaski is in our hands. But 
the possession of Pulaski is of the first import- 
ance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and 
I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. 



530 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



But, after all, tlie greatest moral effect would 
be produced by the reduction of Cliarles-ton and 
its defences. There the rebellion had its birth ; 
there the unnatural hatred of our Government is 
most intense ; there is the centre of the boasted 
power and coura<i;e of the rebels. 

To gain Fort Sumter and hold Charleston is 
a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and 
considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I 
would be glad to have you study. Some time 
must elapse before we can be in all respects ready 
to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route 
and armies in motion which have certain prelim- 
inary objects to accomplish, before we are ready 
to take Charleston in hand. But the time will 
before long arrive when I shall be prepared to 
make that movement. In the mean time, it is my 
advice and wish that no attempt be made upon 
Savannah, unless it can be carried with certaintj^ 
by a '•^ coup cle main." 

Please concentrate your attention and forces 
upon Pulaski and Fcrnandina. St. Augustine 
might as well be taken by way of an interlude, 
while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. 
Success attends us everywhere at present. 
Very truly, yours, 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding United States Army. 
Brigadier-General T. VV. Siier.man, 

Commanding at Port Royal, etc. 

HEADQnARTERS OF THE ArMY, I 

Washington, February 23, 1S62. f 

General : You are assigned to the command 
of the land forces destined to cooperate with the 
navy in the attacks upon New-Orleans. You will 
use every means to keep your destination a pro- 
found secret, even from your staff-officers, with 
the exception of j^our chief of staff, and Lieuten- 
ant Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your 
disposal will consist of the first thirteen regiments 
named in your memorandum handed to me in 
person, the Twenty-first Indiana, Fourth Wiscon- 
sin, and Sixth Michigan, (old and good regiments 
from Baltimore.) 

The Twenty-fir.st Indiana, Fourth Wisconsin, 
and Sixth Michigan will await your orders at Fort 
Monroe. 

Two companies of the Twenty-first Indiana 
are well drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry 
force already en route for Ship Island will be suf- 
ficient for your purposes. 

After full consultation with officers well ac- 
quainted with the country in which it is proposed 
to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that 
two (2) light batteries fully equipped, and one (1) 
without horses, will be all that are necessary. 

This will make your force about fourteen thou- 
sand four hundred infantry, two hundred and 
seventy-five cavahy, five hundred and eighty ar- 
tillery ; total, fifteen thousand two hundred and 
fifty-five men. The Commanding General of the 
Qcj)artment of Key West is authorized to loan 
you, temporarily, two regiments; Fort Pickens 
can, probably, give you another, which will bring 
your force to nearly eighteen thousand. 

The object of your expedition is one of vital 



importance — the capture of New-Orleans. The 
route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the 
first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only 
one) is in the resistance offered by Forts St. Philip 
and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can 
reduce these works ; in that case you will, after 
their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them 
to render them perfectly secure ; and it is recom- 
mended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy 
guns and some troops be left at the pilot station (at 
the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the 
event of a disaster. These troops and guns will, 
of course, be removed as soon as the Forts are 
captured. 

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, 
you will land j^our forces and siege-train, and en- 
deavor to breach their works, silence their fire, 
and carry them by assault. 

The next resistance will be near the English 
Bend, where there are some earthern batteries. 
Here it may be necessary for you to land your 
troops and cooperate with the naval attack, al- 
though it is more than probable that the navy, 
unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these 
works are taken, the city of New-Orleans neces- 
sarily falls. In that event, it will probably be 
best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your 
troops, also the eastern bank of the river above 
the city. It may be necessary to place some 
troops in the cit}^ to preserve order ; but if there 
appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to con- 
trol the city, it may be best for purposes of dis- 
cipline to keep your men out of the city. 

After obtaining possession of New-Orleans, it 
will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding 
its approaches from the east, and particularly to 
gain the Manchac Pass. 

Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Living- 
ston will next claim your attention. 

A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects 
we have in view. I need not call your attention 
to the necessity of gaining possession of all the 
rolling stock you can on the different railway.s, 
and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. 
The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined na- 
val and land force should be accomplished as soon 
as possible after you have gained New-Orleans. 
Then endeavor to open your communication with 
the northern column by the Mississippi, always 
bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jack- 
son, Mississippi, as soon as 3'ou can safely do so, 
either after or before you have effected the junc- 
tion. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining 
full possession of all the approaches to New-Or- 
lean.s. When that object is accomplished to its 
fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a com- 
bined attack on Mobile, in order to gain posses- 
sion of the harbor and works, as well as to control 
the railway terminus at the city. In regard to 
this, I will send more detailed instructions as the 
operations of the northern column develop them- 
selves. 

I may briefly state that the general objects of 
of the expedition are, first, the reduction of New- 
Orleans and all its approaches; then Mobile and 
its defences ; then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It 



DOCUMENTS. 



531 



is probable that by the time New-Orleans is re- 
duced, it will be in the power of the Government 
to rcenforce the land forces suRiciently to accom- 
plish all these objects. In the mean time you 
will please give all the assistance in 3'our power 
to the arni}^ and navy commanders in your vicin- 
ity, never losing sight of the fact that the great 
object to be achieved is the capture and tirm re- 
tention of New-Orleans. 

I am, etc., Geo. B. McClellan, 

Slajor-General Commanding United States Army. 

Major-General B. F. Bltlek, 

United States Volunteers. 

The plan indicated in the above letters compre- 
hended in its scope the operations of all the ar- 
mies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as 
well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be 
seen, that its various parts should be carried out 
simultaneously, or nearly so, and in cooperation 
along the whole line. If this plan was wise, and 
events have failed to prove that it was not, then 
it is unnecessary to defend anj^ delay which would 
have enabled the army of the Potomac to perform 
its share in the execution of the whole work. 

But about the middle of January, 1862, upon 
recovering from a severe illnes.s, I found that ex- 
cessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the 
army of the Potomac had taken possession of the 
minds of the Administration. 

A change had just been made in the War De- 
partment, and I was soon urged by the new Sec- 
retary, Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to 
secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, and to free the banks of the Lower Po- 
tomac from the rebel batteries which annoyed 
passing vessels. 

Very soon after his entrance upon ofBce, I laid 
before him verbally my design as to the part of 
the plan of campaign to be executed by the army 
of the Potomac, which M-as to attack Richmond 
by the Lower Chesapeake. He instructed me to 
develop it to the President, which I did. The 
result was, that the President disapproved it, and 
by an order of January thirty-first, 1862, substi- 
tuted one of his own. On the twenty-seventh of 
.January, 1862, the following order was issued 
without consultation with me : 

[President's General War Order No. 1.] 

ExECCTiVB Mansion. J 
WisniSGTON, January 27, 1S62. ( 

Ordered, That the twenty-second day of Feb- 
ruarj-, 1862, be the day for a general movement 
of the land and naval forces of the United States 
against the insurgent forces. That especially the 
army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of 
the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the 
army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and 
flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of 
Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 

That all other forces, both land and naval, 
with their respective commanders, obey existing 
orders for the time, and be ready to obey addi- 
tional orders when duly given. 

That the heads of departments, and especially 
the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all 



their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with 
all other commanders and subordinates of land 
and naval forces, will severally be held to their 
strict and full responsibilities for prompt execu- 
tion of this order. 

Abraham Lincoln. 

The order of January thirty-first, 1862, was as 
follows : 

[President's Special War Order No. 1.] 

EXKC0TIVK Maxpios, \ 

WASniNGTON, January 31, 18C2. ) 

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the 
army of the Potomac, after providing safely for 
the defence of Washington, be formed into an 
expedition for the immediate object of seizing 
and occupying a point upon the railroad south- 
westword of what is known as Manassas Junc- 
tion, all details to be in the discretion of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and the expedition to move 
before or on the twenty-second day of February 
next. Abraham Lincoln. 

I asked His Excellency whether this order was 
to be regarded as final, or whether I could be 
permitted to submit in writing my objections to 
his plan, and my reasons for preferring my own. 
Permission was accorded, and I therefore pre- 
pared the letter to the Secretary of War, which 
is given below. 

Before this had been submitted to the Presi- 
dent, he addressed me the following note : 

ExEcnrivE Mansidk, I 
Washingtos, February 3, 1862. ( 

My Dear Sir : You and I have distinct and 
different plans for a movement of the army of 
the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesa- 
peake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and 
across land to the terminus of the railroad on the 
York Rivei-; mine to move directly to a point 
on the railroad south-west of Manassas. 

If you will give satisfactory answers to the 
following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan 
to yours : 

ist. Does not your plan involve a greatly 
larger expenditure of i/meand money than mine? 

2d. Wherein is a victory viofe certain by your 
plan than mine? 

3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by 
your plan than mine ? 

4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in 
this ; that it would break no great line of the 
enemy's comraunication.s, while mine would ? 

5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat 
be more difficult by your plan than mine? 

Yours, truly, Abraham Lincoln. 

Major-General McClellan. 

These questions were substantially answered 
by the following letter of the same date to the 
Secretary of ^Var: 

Headquartrrs op the Armt, 

Washi.ngton, Februarys, 186i f 

Sir: I ask your indulgence for the following 
papers rendered necessary by circumstances. 
I assumed command of the troops in the vicin- 



632 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



ity of Washington on Saturdaj'-, Jul.y twenty- 
seventh, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull 
Run. 

I found no army to command ; a mere collec- 
tion of regiments cowering on the banks of the 
Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited 
by the re:;ent defeat. 

Nothing of any consequence had been done to 
secure the southern approaches to the capital 
by means of defensive works ; nothing whatever 
had been undertaken to defend the avenues to 
the city on the northern side of the Potomac. 

The troops were not only undisciplined, un- 
drillcd, and dispirited ; they were not even placed 
in military positions. The city was almost in a 
condition to have been taken by a dash of a regi- 
ment of cavalry. 

Without one day's delay T undertook the diffi- 
cult task assigned to me ; that task the honora- 
ble Secretary knows was given to me without 
solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have 
accomplished it will best be shown by the past 
and the present. 

The capital is secure against attack, the exten- 
sive fortifications erected by the labor of our 
troops enable a small garrison to hold it against 
a numerous army, the enemy have been held in 
check, the State of Maryland is securely in our 
possession, the detached counties of Virginia are 
again within the pale of our laws, and all appre 
hension of trouble in Delaware is at an end ; 
the enemy are confined to the positions they oc- 
cupied before the disaster of the twenty-first 
July. More than all this, I have now under my 
command a well-drilled and reliable army, to 
which the destinies of the country may be con- 
fidently committed. This army is young and 
untried in liattle ; but it is animated by the high- 
est spirit, and is capable of great deeds. 

That so much has been accomplished and such 
an arm}' created in so short a time, from nothing, 
will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest 
glories of the administration and the nation. 

Many weeks, I may say many months ago, 
this army of the Potomac was fully in condition 
to repel any attack ; "but there is a vast differ- 
ence between that and the efficiency required to 
enable troops to attack successfully an army 
elated by victory and intrenched in a position 
long since selected, studied, and fortified. 

In the earliest papers I submitted to the Pres- 
ident, I asked for an effective and movable force 
far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of 
the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. 

Even when in a subordinate position, I always 
looked beyond tlie operations of the army of the 
Potomac ; I was never satisfied in my own mind 
with a barren victory, but looked to combined 
and decisive operations. 

AVhen 1 was placed in command of the armies 
of the United States, I innnediately turned my 
Rtttntion to the whole field of operations, regard- 
ing the army of the Potomac as only one, while 
the most important, of the masses under my com- 
mand. 

I confes'-' that I did not then appreciate the 



total absence of a general plan, which had before 
existed, nor did I know that utter disorganization 
and want of preparation pervaded the Western 
armies. 

I took it for granted that they were nearly, if 
not quite, in condition to move toward the ful- 
filment of my plans. I acknowledge that T made 
a great mistake. 

I sent at once — with the approval of the Execu- 
tive — officers I considered competent to command 
in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions 
looked to prompt movements. I soon found that 
the labor of creation and organization had to be 
performed there; transportation — arms — cloth- 
ing — artillery — discipline, all were wanting. 
These things required time to procure them. 

The generals in command have done their 
work most creditably, but we are still dela)'ed. 
I had hoped that a general advance could be 
made during the good weather of December ; I 
was mistaken. 

My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern 
Tennessee Railroad, as a preliminary movement, 
then to follow it up innnediately by an attack on 
Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same 
time as possible. 

I have ever regarded our true policy as being 
that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seek- 
ing for the most decisive results. I do not wish 
to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike 
at the heart. 

Two bases of operations seem to present them- 
selves for the advance of the army of^he Poto- 
mac : 

1st. That of Washington — its present posi- 
tion — involving a direct attack upon the intrench- 
ed positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manas- 
sas, etc., or else a movement to turn one or both 
flanks of those positions, or a combination of the 
two plans. 

The relative force of the two armies will not 
justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on 
his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon 
communication, and cannot prevent him from 
collecting for the decisive battle all the detach- 
ments now on his extreme right and left. 

Should we attack his right flank by the line 
of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac 
below that river, and near his batteries, we could 
perhaps prevent the junction of tlie enemy's right 
with his centre, (we might destroy the former ;) 
we would remove the obstructions to the naviga- 
tion of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon 
transportation by establishing new depots at the 
nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more 
directly his main railway communication. 

The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth 
of the Bull Run are watched by the rebels ; bat- 
teries are said to be placed on the heights in the 
rear, (concealed by the woods,) and the arrange- 
ment of his troops is such that he can oppose 
some considerable resistance to a passage of that 
stream. Information has just been received, to 
the effect that the enemy are intrenching a line 
of heights extendmg from the vicinity of Sang- 
ster's (Union Mills') toward Evansnort. Early in 



DOCUMENTS. 



533 



Janu.an'^, Spri.;'j;'s Ford was occupied by General 
Rhodes, witii three thousand six hunch-ed men 
and ei",-ht (8) o;unR; there are strong reasons for 
believing that Davis's Ford is occupied. These 
circumstances indicate or prove that the enemy 
anticipates the movement in question, and is pre- 
pared to resist it. Assuming for the present that 
this operation is determined upon, it maj' be well 
to examine briefly its probable progress. In the 
present state of affliirs, one column (for the move- 
ment of so large a force must be made in several 
columns, at least five or six) can reach the Aoca- 
tinck without danger ; during the march thence 
to Occorjuan, our right flank becomes exposed to 
an attack from FairAix Station, Sangster's, and 
Union Mills. This danger must be met by occu- 
pying in some force either the two first-named 
places, or better, the point of junction of the roads 
leading thence to the village of Occoquan ; this 
occupation must be continued so long as we con- 
tinue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, 
or until a battle is won. 

The crossing of the Occoquan should be made 
at all the fords from Wolf's Run to the mouth ; 
the points of crossing not being necessarily con- 
fined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy 
occupy this line in force, we must, with what as- 
sistance the flotilla can afl^ord, endeavor to force 
the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the en- 
emy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in 
flank himself 

Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it 
would be necessary to throw a column by the 
shortest route to Dumfries ; partly to force the 
enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac; 
partly to cover our left flank against an attack from 
the direction of Acquia; and lastly, to establish 
our communications with the river by the best 
roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy 
would by this time have occupied the line of the 
Occoquan above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in 
force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat 
further to the south-west. 

Our next step would then be to prevent the 
enemj^ from crossing the Occoquan between Bull 
Run and Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank 
while moving on Brentsville. This might be ef- 
fected by occupying Bacon Race Church and the 
cross-roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still 
more effectually by moving to the fords them- 
selves, and preventing him from debouching on 
our side. 

These operations would possibly be resisted, 
and it wouUl require some time to effect them, as, 
nearly at the same time as possible, we should 
gain the fords necessary to our purposes above 
Broad Run. Having secured our right flank, it 
would become necessary to carry Brentsville at 
an}^ cost, for we could not leave it between the 
right flank and the main body. The final move- 
ment on the railroad must be determined by cir- 
cumstances existing at the time. 

This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the 
groat advantage possessed by the enemy in the 
strong central position he occupies, with roads 
diver jiing in every direction, and a strong line of 



defence enabling him to remain on the defensive, 
with a small force on one flank, while he concen- 
trates every thing on the other for a decisive 
action. 

Should we place a portion of our force in front 
of Centreville, while the rest crosses the Occo- 
quan, we commit the error of dividing our army 
by a ver}^ diflicult obstacle, and by a distance too 
great to enable the two parts to support each 
other, should either be attacked by the masses 
of the enemy, while the other is held in check. 

I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on 
the fact that the force left near Sangster's must 
be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of 
the Occoquan until the deci.sivc battle is over, so 
as to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, 
unless it should be decided to select and intrench 
a new base somewhere near Dumfries, a proceed- 
ing involving much time. 

After the passage of the Occoquan by the main 
army, this covering force could be drawn into a 
more central and less exposed position — say Brim- 
stone Hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this lati- 
tude the weather will for a considerable period be 
very uncertain, and a movement commenced in 
force on roads in tolerably firm condition will be 
liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by 
rains and snow. It will, therefore, be next to im- 
possible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a 
disadvantage bj' rapid manoeuvres. Our slow 
progress will enable him to divine our purposes, 
and take his measures accordingly. The proba- 
bility is, from the best information we possess, 
that the enemy has improved the roads leading 
to his lines of defence, while we have to w^rk as 
we advance. 

Bearing in mind what has been said, and the 
present unprecedented and impassable condition 
of the roads, it will be evident that no precise pe- 
riod can be fi.xed upon for the movement on this 
line. Nor can its duration be closely calculated ; 
it seems certain that many weeks ma}^ elapse be- 
fore it is possible to commence the march. As- 
suming the success of this operation, and the 
defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at 
once arises as to the importance of the results 
gained. I think these results would be confined 
to the possession of the field of battle, the evacu- 
ation of the line of the Upper Potomac by the 
enemy, and the moral effect of the victory ; im- 
portant results, it is true, but not decisive of the 
war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's 
main artn3% for he could fill back upon other po- 
sitions, and fight us again and again, should the 
condition of his troops permit. If he is in no con- 
dition to fight us again out of the range of thein- 
trenchments at Richmond, we would find it a 
very diflicult and tedious matter to follow him up 
there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges 
and otherwise impede our progress througli a re- 
gion whei-e the roads are as bad as they well cin 
be, and we would probably find ourselves (breed at 
last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek 
a shorter land route to Richmond, with a fsmaller 
available force, and at an expenditure of much 
more time, than were we to adopt tlie short line 



534 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



at once. We would also have forced the enemy 
to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive 
measures at the very points where it is desirable 
to strike liiin wiien least prepared. 

II. The second base of operations available for 
the army of the Potomac is that of the lower 
Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest pos- 
sible land route to Richmond, and strikes direct- 
ly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East. 
The roads in that region are passable at all 
'iftasons of the year. 

The country now alluded to is much more 
favorable for offensive operations than that in 
front of Washington, (which is very unfavora- 
ble,) much more level, more cleared land, the 
woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the 
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A 
movement in force on tliat line obliges the ene- 
my to atiandon his intrenched position at Ma- 
nassa.s, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and 
Norfolk. He tnu,^t do this ; for should he permit 
us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be 
averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, 
in which he must be the assailant. This move- 
ment, if successful, gives us the capital, the 
communications, the supplies of the rebels; Nor- 
folk would fall ; all the waters of the Chesapeake 
would be ours ; all Virginia would be in our 
power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennes- 
see and North-Carolina. The alternative pre- 
sented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a 
position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass 
beneath the Caudine forks. 

Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a 
perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon 
Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered 
by the fleet. 

During the whole movement our left flank is 
covered b}"^ the water. Our right is secure, for 
the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach 
us^ in time ; he can only oppose us in front ; we 
bring our fleet into full play. 

After a successful battle our position would 
be — Burnside forming our left — Norfolk held 
securely — our centre connecting Burnside with 
Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburgh — -Buell 
in Eastern Tennessee and North-Alabama — Hal- 
leck ai. Nashville and Memphis. 

The ne.xt movement would be to connect with 
Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington 
and Cliarleston ; to advance our centre into 
South-Carolina and Georgia ; to push Buell 
either toward Montgomery, or to vmite with the 
main army in Georgia ; to throw llalleck soutli- 
ward to meet the naval expedition from New- 
Orleans. 

We should then be in a condition to reduce at 
our leisure all the Southern seaports ; to occupy 
all the avenues of communication ; to use the 
great outlet of the Mississippi ; to reestablish 
our goveriunent and arms in Arkansas, Louisi- 
ana, and Texas ; to force the slaves to labor for 
our subsistence, instead of that of t!ie rebels; to 
bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is 
the object I have ever liad in view — this is the 
genwal plan which I hope to accomplish. 



For many long months I have labored to prepare 
the army of the Potomac to play its part in the 
programme ; from the day when I was placed in 
command of all our armies, I have exerted my- 
self to place all the other armies in such a condi- 
tion that they, too, could perform their allotted 
duties. 

Should it be determined to operate from the 
Lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which 
promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on 
the Lower Rappahannock. This point is easily 
reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is nei- 
ther occupied nor observed by the enemy — it is 
but one march from West-Point, the key of that 
region, and thence but two marches to Rich- 
mond. A rapid movement from Urbana would 
probably cut off" Magruder in the Peninsula, and 
enable us to occupy Richmond, before it could 
be strongly reenforced. Should we fail in that, 
we could, with the cooperation of the navy, cross 
the James and throw ourselves in rear of Rich- 
mond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and 
attack us, for his position would be untenable, 
with us on the southern bank of the river. 

Should circumstances render it not advisable 
to land at Urbana, we can use Mobjack Bay ; or, 
the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fori 
Monroe as a base, and operate with complete se- 
curity, although with less celerity and brilliancy 
of results— up the Peninsula. 

To reach whatever point may be selected as a 
base, a large amount of cheap water transporta- 
tion must be collected, consistingmainly of canal- 
boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, etc., towed 
by small steamers, all of a very different charac- 
ter from those required for all previous expedi- 
tions. This can certainly be accomplished with', 
in thirty days from the time the order is given. 
I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in 
my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a 
landing place for the first detachments; to trans- 
port by water four divisions of infantry with 
their batteries, the regular infantry, a few wag- 
ons, one bridge train, and a few squadrons of 
cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position 
the place of embarkation for as many as possible ; 
to move the regular cavalry and reserve artillery, 
the remaining bridge trains and wagons, to a 
point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry 
them- over the river by means of North River 
ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahan- 
nock, (covering the movement by an infantry 
force near Heaths ville,) and to cross the Rappa- 
hannock in a similar way. The expense and 
difficulty of the movement will then be very 
much diminished, (a saving of transportation of 
about ten thousand horses,) and the result none 
the less certain. 

The concentration of the cavalry, etc., on the 
lower counties of Maryland can be effected with- 
out exciting suspicion, and the movement made 
without delay from that cause. 

This movement, if adopted, will not at all 
expose the city of Washington to danger. 

The total force to be thrown upon tlie new line 
would l)e, according to circumstances, ii'om one 



DOCUMENTS. 



535 



hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and 
forty thousand. I hope to use the latter number 
by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and 
still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that in 
all projects offered, time will probably be the 
most valuable consideration. It is my decided 
opinion that, in that point of view, the second 
plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay, 
highly probable, that the weather and state of 
the roads may be such as to delay the direct 
movement from Washington, with its unsatisfoc- 
tory results and great risks, far beyond the time 
required to complete the second plan. In the 
first case we can fix no definite time for an ad- 
vance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. 
Nothing like their present condition was ever 
known here before ; they are impassable at pre- 
sent. We are entirely at the mercy of the weath- 
er. It is by no means certain that we can beat 
them at Manassas. On the other line T regard 
success as certain by all the chances of war. 
We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to 
abandon his prepared position for one which we 
have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and 
where success must produce immense results. 

My judgment, as a General, is clearly in favor 
of this project. Nothing is certain in war, but 
all the chances are in favor of this movement. 
So much am I in favor of the southern line of 
operations, that I would prefer the move from 
Fortress Monroe as a base — as a certain though 
less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, 
to an attack upon Manassas. 

I know His Excellency the President, you, and 
I, all agree in our wishes ; and that these wishes 
are, to bring this war to a close as promptly as 
the means in our possession will permit. I be- 
lieve that the mass of the people have entire 
confidence in us — I am sure of it. Let us, then, 
look only to the great result to be accomplished, 
and disregard every thing else. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
Geo. B. McClellan, 

Magor-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

This letter must have produced some effect 
upon the mind of the President, since the execu- 
tion of his order was not required, although it 
was not revoked as formally as it had been is- 
sued. Many verbal conferences ensued, in which, 
among other things, it was determined to collect 
as many canal-boats as possible, with the view 
to employ them largely in the transportation of 
the army to the Lower Chesapeake. The idea 
was at one time entertained by the President to 
use them in forming a bridge across the Potomac 
near Liverpool Point, in order to throw the army 
over that point ; but this was subsequently aban- 
doned. It was also found by experience that it 
would require much time to prepare the canal- 
boats for use in transportation, to the exrent that 
had been anticipated. 

Finally, on the twenty-seventh of February, 
1862, the Secretary of War, by the authority of 
the President instructed Mr. John Tucker, As- 



sistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the 
necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport 
the army of the Potomac to its new field of oper- 
ations. 

The following extract from the report of Mr. 
Tucker, dated April fifth, will show the nature 
and progress of this well-executed service : 

" I was called to Washington by telegraph, on 
seventeenth January last, by Assistant Secre- 
tary of War Thomas A. Scott. I was informed 
that Major-General McClellan wished to see me. 
From him I learned that he desired to know if 
transportation on smooth water could be obtained 
to move at one time, for a short distance, about 
fifty thousand troops, ten thousand horses, one 
thousand wagons, thirteen batteries, and the 
usual equipment of such an army. He frankly 
stated to me tliat he had always supposed such a 
movement entirely feasible, until two experienced 
quartermasters had recently reported it imprac- 
ticable, in their judgment. A few days after- 
ward, I reported to General McClellan that I 
was entirely confident the transports could be 
commanded, and stated the mode by which hi.*; 
object could be accomplished. A week or. two 
afterward I had the honor of an interview with 
the President and General McClellan, when the 
subject was further discussed, and especially as 
to the time required. 

"I expressed the opinion that, as the move- 
ment of the horses and wagons would have to 
be made chiefiy by schooners and barges, that as 
each schooner would require to be properly fitted 
for the protection of the horses, and furnished with 
a supply of water and forage, and each transport 
for the troops provided with water, I did not 
deem it prudent to assume that such an expedi- 
tion could start within thirty days from the time 
the order was given. 

" The President and General McClellan both 
urgently stated the vast importance of an earlier 
movement. I replied that if favorable winds 
prevailed, and there was great despatch in load- 
ing, the time might be materially diminished. 

" On the fourteenth February you (Secretary 
of War) advertised for transports of various de- 
scriptions, inviting bids on the twenty-seventh 
February. I was informed that the proposed 
movement by water was decided upon. That 
evening the Quartermaster-General was informed 
of the decision. Directions were given to secure 
the transportation — any assistance was tendered. 
He promptly detailed to this duty two most effi- 
cient assistants in his department. Colonel 
Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapolis, where 
it was then proposed to embark the troops, and 
Captain Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet 
me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the 
vessels. With these arrangements I left Wash- 
ington on the twenty-eighth February. 

" I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared 
by Captain Hodges, of the vessels chartered, 
which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from 
whom they were taken : 



536 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



1 13 steamer?, at an average price per day, . $215 10 

188 schooners, " " " . 24 45 

88 barges, " " " . M 27 

" In thirty-seven days from the time I received 
the order in' Washington (and most of it wns ac- 
complisheil in thirty days) these vessels trans- 
ported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Wash- 
ington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure 
having been changed, which caused delay) one 
hundred and twenty-one thousand five hundred 
men, fourteen thousand live hundred and ninety- 
two animals, one thousand one hundred and fifty 
wagons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambu- 
lances, besides pontoon-bridges, telegraph mate- 
rials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, 
etc., required for an army of such magnitude. 
The only loss of wliicli I have heard is eight 
mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore 
in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe — 
the cargoes being saved. With this trifling ex- 
ception, not the slightest accident has occurred, 
to my knowledge. 

" I respectfully but confidently submit that, 
for the economy and celerity of movement, this 
expedition is without a parallel on record. 

" John Tucker, 

"Assistant Secretary of War." 

In the mean time the destruction of the bat- 
teries on the Lower Potomac, by crossing our 
troops opposite them, was considered, and pre- 
parations were even made for throwing Hooker's 
division across the river, to carry them by as- 
sault. Finally, however, after an adverse report 
from Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, Chief En- 
gineer, given below, who made a reconnoissance 
of the positions, and in view of the fact that it 
was still out of the power of the Navy Depart- 
ment to furnish suitable vessels to cooperate 
with land troops, this plan was abandoned as 
impracticable. A close examination of the ene- 
my's works and their approaches, made after 
they were evacuated, showed that the decision 
was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of 
accomplishing the capture of these works, so 
much desired by the President, was by a move- 
ment by land from the left of our lines, on the 
right bank of the Potomac — a movement obvi- 
ously miwisc. 

The attention of the Navy Department as early 
as August twelfth, 18(51, had been called to the 
necessity of maintaining a strong force of efficient 
war vessels on the Potomac. 

IlEADQOAKTEnS DIVISION OF THE PoTOMAC, ) 

WisniNGTON, August 12, 18C1. J 
Sm : T have wJ-day received additional informa- 
tion which convinces me that it is more than 
probable that the enemy will, within a very 
short lime, attempt to throw a respectable force 
from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Maryland. 
This attempt will probably be preceded by the 
erection of lotteries at ihitthias and White 1 louse 
Points. Such a movement on the part of the 
enemy, in connection with others probably de- 
signed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. 



I most, earnestly urge that the strongest possible 
naval force be at once concentrated near the 
mouth of Acquia Creek, and that the most vigil- 
ant watch be maintained day and night, so as to 
render such passage of the river absolutely im- 
possible. 

I recommend that the Minnesota and any 
other vessels available from Hampton Roads be 
at once ordered up there, and that a great quan- 
tity of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for 
several weeks' supply. At least one strong war 
vessel should be kept at Alexandria, and I again 
urge the concentration of a strong naval force on 
the Potomac without dela.y. 

If the Naval Department will render it abso- 
lutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river 
below Washington, the security of the capital 
will be greatly increased. 

I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate com- 
pliance with these requests. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant. George B. McOlellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the United States Navy. 

It was on the twenty-seventh of September, 
1861, that General Barnard, Chief Engineer, in 
company with Captain Wyman of the Potomac 
flotilla, had been instructed to make a reconnois- 
sance of the enemy's batteries as far as Matthias 
Point. In his report of his observations he says : 

"Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, 
and thence down to Chopawampsic, cannot be 
pi'evented. We may, indeed, prevent their con- 
struction on certain points, but along here some- 
where the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as 
many batteries as he chooses. What is the rem- 
edy ? Favorable circumstances, not to be anti- 
cipated nor made the basis of any calculations, 
might justify and render successful the attack of 
a particular battery. To suppose that we can 
capture all, and by mere attacks of this kind 
prevent the navigation being molested, is very 
much the same as to suppose that the hostile 
army in our own front can prevent us building 
and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington 
and Alexandria by capturing them, one and all, 
as fast as they are built." 

In another communication upon the subject of 
crossing troops for the purpose of destroying the 
batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, 
General Barnard says: 

" The operation involves the forcing of a very 
strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that 
we would have to do if we were really opening a 
campaign against them there. 

" It is true we hope to foi-ce this line by turn- 
ing it, by landing on Freestone Point. AV^ith 
reason to believe that this may be successful, it 
cannot be denied that it involves a risk of failure. 
Should we, then, considering all the consequences 
which may be involved, enter into the operation, 
merely to capture the Potomac batteries ? I think 
not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other 
gunboat capable of keeping alongside these bat- 
teries, so far control their fire as to keep the nav- 



DOCUMENTS. 



537 



i,2;ation sufficiently free as long as we require it? 
Captain Wjanan says yes." 

It was the opinion of competent naval oflBcers, 
and T concur with them, that had an adequate 
force of strong and well-armed vessels been act- 
ing on the Potomac from the beginning of August, 
it would have been next to impossible for the 
rebels to have constructed or maintained bat- 
teries upon the banks of the river. The enemy 
never occupied Matthias Point, nor any other 
point on the river, which was out of supporting 
distance from the main arniy. 

When the enemy commenced the construction 
of these batteries, the army of the Potomac was 
not in a condition to prevent it. Their destruc- 
tion by our army would have afforded but a tem- 
porary relief unless we had been strong enough 
to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This 
could be done either by driving the enemy from 
Manassas and Acquia Creek, by main force, or by 
manoeuvring to compel them to vacate their po- 
sitions. The latter course was finally pursued, 
and wnth success. 

About the twentieth of February, 1862, addi- 
tional measures were taken to secure the reopen- 
ing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The 
preliminary operations of General Lander for this 
object are elsewhere described. 

I had often observed to the President and to 
members of the Cabinet that the reconstruction of 
this railway could not be undertaken until we 
were in a condition to fight a battle to secure it. 
I regarded the possession of Winchester and 
Strasburgh as necessary to cover the railway in 
the rear, and it was not till the month of Februa- 
ry that I felt prepared to accomplish this very 
desirable but not vital purpose. 

The whole of Banks's division and two brigades 
of Sedgwick's division were thrown across the 
river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade of 
Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the 
Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the 
Monocacy. A sufBcient number of troops of all 
arms were held in readiness in the vicinity of 
Washington, either to march via Leesburgh or to 
move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should this be- 
come necessary in carrying out the objects in 
view. 

The subjoined notes from a communication 
subsequently addressed to the War Department 
will sufficiently explain the conduct of these op- 
ei'ations. 



"When I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly 
stated to the President and Secretary of War that 
the chief object of the operation would be to open 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by arossing the 
river in force at Harper's Ferry ; that T had col- 
lected the material for making a permanent bridge 
by means of canal-boats ; that from the nature of 
the river, it was doubtful whether such a bridge 
could be constructed ; that if it could not, T would 
at least occupy the ground in front of Har])er's 
Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the 
railroad bridge ; and finall}', when the communi- 



cations were perfectly secure, move on Winches- 
ter. 

" When I arrived at the place T found the bat- 
teau bridge nearly completed ; the holding-ground 
proved better than had been anticipated ; the 
weather was favorable, there being no wind. I 
at once crossed over the two brigades which had 
arrived, and took steps to hurry up the other 
two, belonging respectively to Banks's and Sedg- 
wick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing sup- 
plies had not then become apparent. That night 
I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry 
and four batteries of heavy artillery to come up 
the next day, (Thursday,) besides directing 
Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up on 
Friday. 

" Next morning the attempt was made to pass 
the canal-boats through the lift-lock, in order to 
commence at once the construction of a permanent 
bridge. It was then found for the first time that 
the lock was too small to permit the passage of 
the boats, it having been built for a class of 
boats running on the Shenandoah Canal, and 
too narrow by some four or six inches for the 
canal-boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are 
all large enough for the ordinary boats. I had 
seen them at p]dwards's Ferry thus used. It had 
always been represented to the engineers by the 
military railroad employes, and others, that the 
lock was large enough, and, the difference being 
too small to be detected by the eye, no one had 
tiiought of measuring it, or suspecting any diffi- 
culty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to 
build the permanent bridge. A violent gale had 
arisen, which threatened the safety of our only 
means of communication ; the narrow approach 
to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with 
wagons that it was very clear that, under exist- 
ing circumstances, nothing more could be done 
than to cross over the baggage and su}iplies of 
the two brigades. Of the others, instead of being 
able to cross both during the morning, the last 
arrived only in time to go over just before dark. 
It was evident that the troops under orders 
would only bB in the way, should they arrive, 
and that it would not be possible to subsist them 
for a rapid march on Winchester. It was there- 
fore deemed necessary to countermand the order, 
content ourselves with covering the reopening of 
the railroad for the present, and in the mean time 
use every exertion to establish, as promptly as 
possible, depots of forage and subsistence on the 
Virginia side, to supply the troops, and enable 
them to move on Winchester independently of 
the bridge. The next day, (Friday,) I sent a 
strong reconnoissance to Charlestown, and, undei 
its protection, went there myself. I then deter- 
ipined to hold that place, and to move the troops 
composing Lander's and Williams's commands 
at once on Martinsburgh and Bunker Hill, thus 
effectually covering the reconstruction of the rail- 
road. 

"Having done this, and taken all the steps in 
my power to insure the rapid transmission of sup- 
plies over the river, I returned to this city, well 
satisfied with what had been accomplished. 



538 



REBELLION BECORD, 1862-63. 



WTiile up the river I learned that the President 
was dissatisfied \vith the state of affairs ; but on 
my return here, understood from the Secretary 
of War that upon learning the whole state of the 
case the President was fully satisfied. T content- 
ed myself, therefore, with giving to the Secretary 
a brief statement, as I have written here." 

The design aimed at was entirely compassed, 
and before the first of April, the date of my de- 
parture for the Peninsula, the railroad was in 
running order. Asa demonstration upon the left 
flank of the enem}% this movement no doubt as- 
sisted in determining the evacuation of his lines 
on the eighth and ninth of March. 

On my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 
twenty-eighth of February, the preparations ne- 
cessary to carry out the wishes of the President 
and Secretary of War in regard to destroying 
the batteries on the Lower Potomac were at once 
underUiken. Mature reflection convinced me 
that this operation would require the movement 
of the entire arm3% for I felt sure that the enemy 
would resist it with his whole strength. I under- 
took it with great reluctance, both on account of 
the extremely unfavorable condition of the roads 
and my firm conviction that the proposed move- 
ment to the Lower Chesapeake would necessarily, 
as it subsequently did, force the enemy to aban- 
don all his positions in front of Washington. 
Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign 
to precipitate this evacuation by any direct attack, 
nor to subject the army to any needless loss of 
life and material by a battle near Washington, 
which could produce no decisive results. The 
preparations for a movement toward the Occo- 
quan, to carry the batteries, were, however, ad- 
vanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I 
had invited the commanders of divisions to meet 
at headquarters on the eighth of March, for the 
purpose of giving them their instructions, and re- 
ceiving their advice and opinion in regard to their 
commands, when an interview with the President 
indicated to me the possibility of a change in my 
orders. 

His Excellency sent for me at a very early hour 
on the morning of the eighth, and renewed his 
expressions of dissatisfaction with the affair of 
Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the new 
movement down the Chesapeake. Another re- 
cital of the same facts which had before given 
^4atisfaction.to His l^xcellency again produced, as 
I supposed, the same result. 

The views which I expressed to the President 
were reiinforced by the result of a meeting of my 
general officers at headquarters. At that meet- 
ing my plans were laid before the division com- 
manders, and were approved by a majority of 
those present. Nevertheless, on the same day 
two important orders were issued by the Presi- 
dent, without consultation with me. The first 
of these was the General War Order No. 2, direct- 
ing the formation of army corps, and assigning 
their commanders. 

I had always been in favor of the principle of 
an organization into army corps, but preferred 
deferring its practicid execution until some little 



experience in campaign and on the field of battls 
should show what general officers were most 
competent to exercise these high commands, for 
it must be remembered that we then had no offi- 
cers whose experience in war on a large scale was 
sufficient to prove that they possessed the neces- 
sary qualifications. An incompetent commander 
of an army corps might cause irreparable damage, 
while it is not probable that an incompetent di- 
vision commander could cause any very serious 
mischief. These views had frequently been ex- 
pressed by me to the President and members of 
the Cabinet ; it was therefore with as much regret 
as surprise that I learned the existence of this 
order. 

The first order has been given above ; the sec- 
ond order was as follows : 

[President's General War Order No 3.] 

Executive Man'sios, > 
Washisgton, March 8, 1862. ( 

Ordered, That no change of the base of opera- 
tions of the army of the Potomac shall be made 
without leaving in and about Washington such a 
force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief 
and the commanders of army corps, shall leave 
said city entirely secure. 

That no more than two army corps (about fifty 
thousand troops) of said army of the Potomac 
shall be moved en route for a new base of opera- 
tions until the navigation of the Potomac, from 
Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be 
freed from the enemy's batteries, and other ob- 
structions, or until the President shall hereafter 
give express permission. 

That any movement as aforesaid, en route for 
a new base of operations, which may be ordered 
by the General-in-Chief, and which may be in- 
tended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall 
begin to move upon the bay as early as the eigh- 
teenth March instant, and the General-in-Chief 
shall be responsible that it moves as early as 
that day. 

Ordered, That the army and navy coooperate 
in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's 
batteries upon the Potomac between Washington 
and the Chesapeake Bay. 

Abraham Lincoln. 

L. Thomas, 

Adjutant- General. 

After what has been said already in regf-rd to 
the effect of a movement to the Lower Chesapeake 
it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this 
document, further than to say that the time of 
beginning the movement depended upon the state 
of readiness of the transports, the entire control 
of which had been placed by the Secretary of 
War in the hands of one of the Assistant Secre- 
taries, and not under the Quartermaster General ; 
so that even if tlie movement were not impeded 
by the condition imposed, in regard to the bat- 
teries on the Potomac, it could not have been in 
my power to begin it before the eighteenth of 
March, unless the Assistant Secretary of War 
had completed his arrangements by that time. 

Meanwhile important events were occurring 



DOCUMENTS. 



539 



which materially modified the designs for the sub- 
sequent campaign. The appearance of the Merri- 
mac off Old Point Comfort, and the encounter 
with the United States squadron on the eighth 
of March, threatened serious derangement of the 
plan for the Peninsula movement. But the en- 
gagement between the Monitor and Merrimac 
on the ninth of March, demonstrated so satisfac- 
torily the power of the former, and the other 
naval preparations were so extensive and formi- 
dable, that the security of Fort Monroe, as a base 
of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and 
although the James River was closed to us, the 
York River, with its tributaries, was still open as 
a line of water communication with the fortress. 
The general plan, therefore, remained undisturb- 
ed, although less promising in its details than 
when the James River was in our control. 

On Sunday, the ninth of March, information 
from various sources made it apparent that the 
enemy was evacuating his positions at Centreville 
and Manassas as well as on the Upper and Lower 
Potomac. The President and Secretary of War 
were present when the most positive information 
reached me, and I expressed to them my inten- 
tion to cross the river immediately, and there 
gain the most authentic information, prior to de- 
teniiining what course to pursue. 

The retirement of the enemy toward Richmond 
had been expected as the natural consequence of 
the movement to the Peninsula, but the adoption 
of this course immediately on ascertaining that 
such a movement was intended, while it relieved 
me from the results of the undue anxiety of my 
superiors, and attested the character of the de- 
sign, was unfortunate in that the then almost 
impassable roads between our position and theirs 
depiived us of the opportunity for inflicting dam- 
age usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large 
army in the Aice of a powerful adversary. 

The retirement of the enemy and the occupa- 
tion of the abandoned positions which necessarih' 
followed presented an opportunity for the troops 
to gain some experience on the march and bi- 
vouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid 
of the superfluous baggage and other " impedi- 
ments " which accumulate so easily around an 
army encamped for a long time in one locality. 

A march to Manassas and back would produce 
no delay in embarking for the Lower Chesa- 
peake, as the transports could not be ready for 
some time, and it afforded a good intermediate 
step between the quiet and comparative comfort 
of the camps around Washington, and the rig- 
ors of active operations, besides accomplishing 
the important object of determining the positions 
and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, 
with the possibility of being able to harass their 
rear. 

I therefore issued orders during the night of 
the ninth of March for a general movement of 
the army the next morning toward Centreville 
and Manassas, sending in advance two regiments 
of cavalry imder Colonel .Werill with orders to 
reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact 
condition of affairs, and do whatever he could 



to retard and annoy the enem}"- if really in re- 
treat ; at the same time I telegraphed to the Sec- 
retary of War that it would be necessary to de- 
fer the organization of the army corps until the 
completion of the projected advance upon Ma- 
nassas, as the divisions could not be brought 
together in time. The Secretary replied, re- 
quiring immediate compliance with the Presi- 
dent's order, but on my again representing that 
this would compel the abandonment or postpone- 
ment of the movement to Manassas, he finally 
consented to its postponement. 

At noon on the tenth of March the cavalry 
advance reached the enemy's lines at Centreville, 
passing through his recently occupied camps and 
works, and finding still burning heaps of mili- 
tary stores and much valuable property. 

Immediately after being assigned to the com- 
mand of the troops around Washington, I or- 
ganized a secret service force, under Mr. E. J. 
Allen, a very experienced and efficient person. 
This force, up to the time I was relieved from 
command, was continually occupied in procuring 
from all possible sources information regarding 
the strength, positions, and movements of the 
enemy. 

All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, 
and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines 
from the front, were carefully examined, first by 
the outpost and division commanders, and then 
by my chief of staff and the Provost-Marshal 
General. Their statements, taken in writing, and 
in many cases under oath, from day to day, for 
a long period previous to the evacuation of Ma- 
nassas, comprised a mass of evidence which, by 
careful digests and collations, enabled me to es- 
timate with considerable accuracy the strength 
of the enemy before us. Summaries showing 
the character and results of the labors of the 
secret service force accompany this report and 
I refer to them for the facts they contain, and as 
a measure of the ignorance which led some jour- 
nals at that time and persons in high office un- 
wittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, 
and to delude the country with quaker gun sto- 
ries of the defences and gross understatements 
of the numbers of the enemy. 

The following orders were issued for the ex- 
amination of persons coming from the direction 
of the enemy : 

[Circular.] 

HE.tnQPARTERS ARMY OF THB POTOMAC, ( 

Washington, December 16, ISCl. ( 

The Major-Gen eral Commanding directs that 
hereafter all deserters, prisoner.=;, spies, "contra- 
band.-^," and all other persons whatever coming 
or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall 
be taken immediately to the quarters of the com- 
mander of the division M'ithin whose lines they 
may come or be brought, without previous ex- 
amination b}'- any one, except so far as may be 
necessary for the officer commanding the ad- 
vance-guard to elicit information regarding his 
particular post ; that the division commander ex- 
amine all such persons himself, or delegate such 
duty to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no 



540 



REBELLIOX RECORD, 1862-63. 



other persons to hold any communication with 
them; that he tlien immediately send them, with 
a sulHcicnt <;;iiaid, to tlie provost-marshal in this 
citv for furtlier examination and safe keepinj^, 
and that stringent orders he given to all guards 
having such persons in charge not to hold any 
communication with them whatever; and fur- 
ther, that the information elicited from such per- 
sons shall be immediately communicated to the 
Majnr-ncneral Commanding, or to the chief of 
statf, and to no other person whatever. 

Tlie .Major-Gencral Commanding further directs 
that a sutlicicnt guard be placed around every 
telegraph station pertaining to this army, and 
that such guards he instructed not to allow any 
person, except the regular telegraph corps, gen- 
eral ofDcers, and such staff-officers as may be 
authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around 
said stations within hearing of the sound of the 
telegraph instruments. 

By command of Major-General McClellan. 

S. Williams, 
Assistant Attjutant-General. 

Headquarters Armt of thk Potomac, ) 
Washington, February 26, 1S62. J 

General Order No. 27. 

All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and 
other persons coming within our lines, will be 
taken at once to the provost-marshal of the near- 
est division, who will examine them in presence 
of the division commander or an officer of his 
staff designated for the purpose. This examina- 
tion will only refer to such information as may 
affect the division and those near it, especially 
those remote from general headquarters. 

As soon as this examination is completed — 
and it must be made as rapidly as possible — the 
person will be sent, under proper guard, to the 
Provost-Marshal General, with a statement of 
his replies to the questions asked. Upon receiv- 
ing him, the Provost-Marshal General will at once 
send him, with his statement, to the chief of staff 
of the army of the Potomac, who will cause the 
necessary examination to be made. The Pro- 
vost-Marshal General,)vill have the custody of all 
such jtersons. Division coiumanders will at once 
communicate to other division commanders all 
information thus obtained which affects them. 

By command of Major-General McClellan. 

S. Williams, 
Assistant Adjutant-General 

In addition to the foregoing orders, the divi- 
sion commanders were instructed, whenever they 
desired to send out scouts toward the enemy, to 
naake known the object at headiiuartiirs, in order 
that I might determine whether we liad the in- 
formation it was proposed to obtain, and that I 
might give the necessary orders to other com- 
manders, so that the scouts should not be mo- 
lested by the guards. 

It will be seen from the report of the chief of 
the secret service corps, dated March eighth, 
that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac, 
at that date, were as follows : 



At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper 
Occoqnan, and vicinity, eighty tliousand men ; at 
Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and 
vicinity, eighteen thousand men ; at Leesburgh 
and vicinity, four thousand five hundred men ; 
in the Shenandoah Valley, thirteen thousand men. 
One hundred and fifteen thousand five hundred 
men. 

About three hundred field guns and from 
twenty-six to thirty siege-guns were with the 
rebel army in front of Washington. The report 
made on the seventeenth of March, after the 
evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, corrobo- 
rates the statements contained in the report of 
the eighth, and is fortified by the affidavits of 
several railroad engineers, constructors, baggage- 
masters, etc., whose opportunities for forming 
correct estimates were unusuallj^ good. Thes* 
affidavits will be found in the accompanying re 
ports of the chief of the secret service corps. 

A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville 
made by Lieutenant McAlister, United States 
engineers, on March fourteenth, 1862, and a sur- 
vey of those at Manassas, made by a party of the 
United States coast survey, in April, 1862, con- 
firmed also my conclusions as to the strength of 
the enemy's defences. Those at Centreville con- 
sisted of two lines, one facing east and the other 
north. The former consisted of seven works, 
namely, one bastion fort, two redoubts, two 
lunettes, and two batteries ; all containing em- 
brasures for forty guns, and connected by in- 
fantry parapets and double caponieres. It ex- 
tended along the crest of the ridge a mile and 
three quarters from its junction with the north- 
ern front to ground thickly wooded and impass- 
able to an attacking column. 

The northern front extended about one and 
one fourth mile to Great Rocky Run, and thence 
three fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, 
impassable ground in the valley of Cub Run. It 
consisted of six lunettes and batteries with em- 
brasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an 
infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillere line 
with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a 
higli hill commanding the rear of all the works 
within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt 
with ten embrasures. 

Manassas Station was defended in all direc- 
tions by a system of detached woi'ks, with plat- 
forms for heavy guns arranged ibr marine car- 
riages, and often connected by infantry parapets. 
This system was rendered complete by a very 
large work, with sixteen embrasures, which com- 
manded the highest of the other works by about 
fifty feet. 

Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred 
to will be found among the maps appended to 
this report. 

From this it will be seen that the positions se- 
lected by the enemy at Centreville and Manas- 
sas were naturally very strong, with impassable 
streams and broken ground, alfording ample pro- 
tection for their Hanks, and that strong lines of 
intrenchments swept all the available ajtproaches. 

Although the history of every former war has 



DOCUMENTS. 



541 



conclusively shown the great advantages which 
are possessed by an army acting on the defensive 
and occupying strong positions, defended by 
heavy earthworlvs ; yet, at the coninienccment 
of this war, but few civilians in our countr}', 
and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a 
just appreciation of the fact. 

Xew levies that have never been in battle can- 
not be expected to advance without cover under 
the murderous fire from such defences, and carry 
them by assault. This is work in which veteran 
troops frequently fixlter and are repulsed with 
loss. Tliat an assault of the enemy's position in 
front of Washington, with the new troops com- 
posing the army of the Potomac, during the win- 
ter of 18G1-''G2, would have resulted in defeat 
and demoralization, was too probable. 

The same army, though inured to war in many 
battles, hard fought a;nd bravely won, has twice, 
under other generals, suffered such disasters as 
it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. My 
letter to the Secretary of War, dated February 
third, 18(32, and given above, expressed the opin- 
ion that the movement to the Peninsula would com- 
pel the enemy to retire from his position at Ma- 
nassas and free Washington from danger. When 
the enemy first learned of that plan, they did 
thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula 
campaign, as at no former period. Northern Vir- 
ginia was completely in our possession, and the 
vicinity of Washington free from the presence of 
the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, 
nor Washington again put in danger, until the 
enemy learned of the orders for the evacuation 
of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's Bar, 
and were again left free to advance northward 
and menace the national capital. Perhaps no 
one now doubts that the best defence of Wash- 
ington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. 

My order for the organization of the army 
corps was issued on the thirteenth of March ; it 
has been given above. 

While at Fairfax Court-House on March 
twelfth, I was informed through the telegraph, 
by a member of my staff, that the following 
document had appeared in the Rational Intelli- 
gencer of that morning : 

[President's War Order No. .3.] 

EXECUTIVB ^^ANSTON, 1 

Washington, March 11, 1862. ) 
Major-General McClellan having personally 
taken the field at the head of the army of the 
Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved 
from the command of the other military depart- 
ments, he retaining command of the department 
of the Potomac. 

Ordered further^ That the departments now 
under the respective commands of Generals Hal- 
leck and Hunter, together with so much of that 
under General Buell as lies west of a north and 
south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, 
Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the 
department of the Mississippi ; and that, until 
otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck liave 
command of said department. 
S. D. 35. 



Ordered also, That the country west of the 
department of the Potomac and east of the dc^ 
partment of the Mississippi be a military depart- 
ment, to be called the Mountain department, and 
that the same be commanded by Major-General 
Fremont. 

That all the commanders of departments, after 
the i-eceipt of this order by them, respectively 
report severally and directly to the Secretary of 
War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports 
will be expected of all and each of them. 

Abkaiiam Lincoln. 

Though unaware of the President's intention 
to remove me from the position of General-in- 
Chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he 
saw fit to make of my services, and so informed 
him in a note on the twelfth of March, in which 
occur these words : 

"I believe I said to you some weeks since, in 
connection with some western matters, that no 
feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever 
prevent me from devoting myself to the service. 
I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, 
and you will find that, under present circum- 
stance, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, 
and that no consideration of self will in an> 
manner interfere with the discharge of my pub- 
lic duties. Again thanking you for the official 
and personal kindness you have so often evinced 
toward me, I am," etc., etc. 

On the fourteenth March a reconnoissance of 
a large body of cavalry with some infantry, under 
command of General Stoneman, was sent along 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to deter' 
mine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, 
force his rear across the Rappahannock, but the 
I'oads were in such condition that, linding it im- 
possible to subsist his men, General Stoneman 
was forced to return after reaching Cedar Run. 

The following despatch from him recites the 
result of this expedition : 

Hbadquarteks, Unmon Mills, ) 
March 16, 1862. f 

We arrived here last evening about dark. We 
got corn for horses ; no provisions for men. Bull 
Run too high to cross. Had we staid an hour 
longer we should not have got here to-day, owing 
to the high water in the streams. Felt the ene- 
my cautiously, and found him in force at Warren- 
ton Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and 
three bodies of infantry on the other side of Ce- 
dar Run. Had we crossed, should not have been 
able to get back for high water. Had three men 
of Fifth cavalry hit driving in enemy's pick- 
ets; one slightly wounded in the head. Enemy 
acted confidently, and followed us some way 
back on the roacl, but did not molest us in any 
way. Enemy's force consisted of Stuart's and 
Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, and some 
infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up 
to Warrenton Junction ; still entire beyond, but 
all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, 
having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars 
running during night before last ; probably bring- 
ing up troops from Rappahannock. Heard of two 



542 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



regTments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in 
impressing the militia and securing forage. Heard 
of a large force of infantry this side of Rappahan- 
nock River, having come up to Warrenton Junc- 
tion from Acquia Creek day before yesterday. 
Bridges all destroyed this side of Rroad Run. 
The aids who take this will give you further par- 
ticulars. 

Very respectfully, etc., 

Geohge Stoneman, 

Brigadier-General Commanding. 

Colonel CoLBURN. 

The main body of the army was, on the fif- 
teenth of March( moved back to the vicinity of 
Alexandria, to be embarked, leaving a part of 
General Sumner's corps at Manassas until other 
troops could be sent to relieve it. Before it was 
withdrawn a strong reconnoissance, under Gen- 
eral Howard, was sent toward the Rappahannock, 
the result of which appears in the following des- 
patch : 

Warrenton Jdnction, Marcli 29, 1S62. 

Express just received from General Howard. 
He drove the enemy across the Rappahannock 
bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and 
near the Rappahannock River. 

The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. 
There was skirmishing during the march, and a 
few shots exchanged by the artillery, without 
any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not 
known. General Howard will return to this camp 
to-morrow morning. 

E. V. Sumner, 

Brigadier-General. 

General S. Williams. 

The lino of the Rappahannock and the Manassas 
Gap Railroad was thus left reasonably secure from 
menace by any considerable body of the enemy. 

On the thirteenth of March a council of war was 
assembled at Fairfax Court-House, to discuss the 
military status. The Presidefit's Order Number 
Three, of March eighth, was considered. The 
following is a memorandum of the proceedings of 
the council : 

IIbadqoarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
I'airfAx CoUKT-HonsE, March 13, 1862. ) 

A council of the generals commanding army 
corps, at the headquarters of the army of the I'o- 
tomac, were of the opinion — 

I. That the enemy having retreated from Ma- 
nassas to Gordonsvillc, behind the Rappahannock 
and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals com- 
manding army corps that the operations to be car- 
ried on will be best undertaken from Old Point 
Comfort, between the York and James Rivers : 
Provided, 

1st. That the enemy's vessel, Mcrrimac, can be 
neutralized. 

2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient 
for an immediate transfer of the force to its new 
base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria 
to niove down the Potomac ; and, 

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to 
silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries 
«>n the York River. 



4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington 
shall be such as to give an entire feeling of secur- 
ity for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) 

H. If the foregoing cannot be, the armj^ should 
then be moved against the enemy, behind the 
Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, 
and the means for reconstructing bridges, repair- 
ing railroads, and stocking them with materials 
sufficient for supplying the army, should at 
once be collected, for both the Orange and Alex- 
andria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. 
(Unanimous.) 

N. B.— That with the forts on the right bank of 
the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the 
left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the 
Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would 
suffice. (Ke3^es, Hcintzelman, and McDowell.) 
A total of forty thousand men for the defence of 
the city would suffice. (Sumner.) 

This was assented to by myself, and immedi- 
ately communicated to the War Department. The 
following reply was received the same day : 

War Department, March 13, 1862. 
The President having considered the plan of 
operations agreed upon by yourself and the com- 
manders of army corps, makes no objection to the 
same, but gives the following directions as to its 
execution : 

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as 
shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall 
not repossess himself of that position and line of 
communication. 

2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

3. Move the remainder of the force down the 
Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Mon- 
roe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at 
all events, move such remainder of the army at 
once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. 

Edwin M. Staxton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General George B. McClellan. 

My preparations were at once begun in accord- 
ance with these directions, and on the sixteenth 
of March the following instructions M'cre sent to 
Generals Banks and Wadsworth : 



HBADQ0ARTBE3 AilMT OF THE POTOMAC, 

March '. ' 



'. Potomac, ( 
10, 1S02. ( 

Sir : You will post your command in the vicin- 
ity of ^fanassas, intrench j'ourself strongly, and 
throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. 

Your first care will be the rebuilding of the 
railway from Washington to Manassas, and to 
Strasburgh, in order to open your communica- 
tions with the valley of the Shenandoah. As 
soon as the Manassas Gap Railway is in running 
order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four re- 
giments, with two batteries, at or near the point 
where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Some- 
thing like two regiments of cavalry should be left 
in that vicinity to occupy Winchester and thor- 
oughly scour the country south of the railway and 
up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through 
Chester Gap, which might perhaps be advanta- 
geously occupied by a detachment of infantry, well 



DOCUMENTS. 



543 



intrencherl. Block-houses should be built at all 

the railway briflges. Occupy by grand guards 
Warrenton Junction and Warrcnton itself, and 
also some little more advanced point on the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad, as soon as the railway 
bridge is repaired. 

Great activity should be observed by the cav- 
alry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, 
another regiment of cavalry will be at your dis- 
posal, to scout toward the Occoquan, and proba- 
bly a fourtli toward Leesburgh. 

To recapitulate, the most important points 
which should engage your attention are as fol- 
lows : 

1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vi- 
cinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, 
and another force, (a brigade,) also well intrench- 
ed, near Strasburgh. 

2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. 

3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to 
the front. 

4. Grand guards at "Warrenton Junction and 
in advance, as far as the Rappahannock, if pos- 
sible. 

5. Gieat care to be exercised to obtain full and 
early information as to the enemy. 

6. The general object is to cover the line of 
the Potomac and Washington. 

The above is communicated by command of 
Major-Gencral McClcIlan. 

S. Williams, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Major-General N. P. Banks, 

Commanding Fifth Corps, Array of the Potomac. 

Headqoartebs Armv of thr Potomac, ) 
March 16, 1862. f 

Sir : The command to which you have been 
assigned, by instructions of the President, as 
Military Governor of the District of Columbia, 
embraces the geographical limits of the District, 
and will also include the city of Alexandria, the 
defensive works south of the Potomac, from the 
Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of 
Fort Washington. 

I inclose a list of the troops and of the de- 
fences embraced in these limits. 

General Banks will command at Manassas 
Junction, with the divisions of Williams and 
Shields, composing the Fifth corps, but you 
should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in your 
front, carefully guard the approaches in that 
quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced- 
guards. You will use the same precautions on 
either flank. 

All troops not actually needed for the police 
of Washington and Georgetown, for the garri- 
sons north of the Potomac, and for other indi- 
cated special duties, should be moved to the 
south side of the river. 

In the centre of your front you should post the 
main body of your troops, and propci- propor- 
tions at suitable distances toward your right and 
left flanks. Careful patrols will be made, in or- 
der thoroughly to scour the country in front, 
from rigiit to left. 

It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain 



the forts and their armaments in the best possi- 
ble order, to look carefully to the instruction and 
discipline of their gari'isons, as well as all other 
troops under your command, and, by frequent 
and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment 
of these ends. 

The care of the railways, canals, depots, 
bridges, and ferries within the above-named lim- 
its, will devolve upon you, and you are to insure 
their security and provide for their protection by 
every means in your power. You will also pro- 
tect the depots of the public stores and the 
transit of stores to troops in active service. 

By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour 
the neighboring country, south of the Eastern 
Branch, and also on your right, and you will use 
every possible precaution to intercept mails, 
goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the 
enemy's lines. 

The necessity of maintaining good order with- 
in your limits, and especially in the capital of 
the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. 

You will forward and facilitate the movement 
of all troops destined for the active part of the 
army of the Potomac, and especially the transit 
of detachments to their proper regiments and 
corps. 

The charge of the new troops arriving in 
Washington, and of all troops temporarily there, 
will devolve upon you. You will form them into 
provisional brigades, promote their instruction 
and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. 
Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, com- 
position, and equipment, by every opportunity. 

Besides the regular reports and returns, which 
you will be required to render to the Adjutant- 
General of the army, you will make to these 
headquarters a consolidated report of your com- 
mand, every Sunday morning, and monthly re- 
turns on the first day of each month. 

The foregoing instructions are communicated 
by command of Major-General McClellan. 

S. Williams, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Brigadier-General J. S. Wadsvvohtii, 

Military Governor of the District of Columbia. 

The Secretary of War had expressed a desire 
that I should comnuinicate to tlie War Depart 
ment my designs with regard to the employment 
of the army of the Potomac in an official form. 
I submitted, on the nineteenth of March, the fol 
lowing : 

Headqparters Army of the Potomac, ) 
Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862. ( 

Sir : I have the honor to submit the following 
notes on the proposed operations of the active 
portion of the army of the Potomac. 

The proposed plan of campaign is to assume 
Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, tak- 
ing the line of Yorktown and West-Point upon 
Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond 
beipg the objective point. It is assumed that 
the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk 
and the whole of Virginia ; also, that we shall 
fight a decisive battle between West-Point and 
Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will 



544 



REBELLION llECORD, 1862-63. 



concentrate all their available forces, understand- 
ing, as they will, that it involves the fate of tlioir 
cause. It therefore follows — 

1st. That we should collect all our available 
forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintain- 
ing perfect connnunication between our columns. 
2d. That no time should be lost in reaching 
the field of battle. 

The advantages of the peninsula between York 
and James rivers are too obvious to need ex- 
planation ; it is also clear that West-Point should 
as soon as possible be reached, and used as our 
main depot, that we may have the shortest line 
of land transportation for our supplies, and the 
use of the York Kivcr. 

There are two methods of reaching this point — 
1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as 
a base, and trusting to the roads for our sup- 
plies, at the same time landing a strong corps as 
near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the 
rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown ; then 
to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, 
in all probability involving a delay of weeks per- 
haps. 

2d. To make a combined naval and land at- 
tack upon Yorktown, the first object of the cam- 
paign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive 
results. To accomplish this, the navy should at 
once concentrate upon the York River all their 
available and most powerful batteries : its re- 
duction should not in that case require many 
hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the 
York, under cover of the navy, directly upon 
"VVest-Point, immediately upon the fall of York- 
town, and we could at once establish our new 
base of operations at a distance of some twenty- 
five miles fi'om Kichmond, with every facility for 
developing and bringing into play the whole of 
our available force on either or both banks of 
the James. 

It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- 
solute necessity of the full cooperation of the 
navy as a part of this programme. Without it 
the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, 
and we may be forced to carry in front several 
strong positions which by their aid could be turn- 
ed without serious loss of either time or men. 

It is also of first impoi'tance to bear in mind 
the fiict already alluded to, that the capture of 
Richmond necessarily involves tlie prompt full of 
Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if 
successful, as the beginning of the campaign, 
facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by 
the demoralization of the rel)el troops involved, 
and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be 
obliged to undertake the ca{)ture of Richmond by 
the same means which would have accomplished 
it in the beginning, having meanwhile aftbrded 
the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive 
arrangements, for they would Avell know, from 
the moment the army of the Potomac changed its 
Ikisc to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its 
ultimate object. 

It may be summed \^^ in a few words, that, 
for the prompt success of this campaign, it is ab- 
Bolutely necessai'y that the navy should at once 



throw its whole available force, its most powerful 
vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most 
important point — there the knot to be cut. An 
immediate decision u])on the subject-matter of 
this communication is highly desii'able, and seems 
called for by the exigencies of the occasion. 

I am, sir, very respectfully', your obedient ser- 
vant, George B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

In the mean time the troops destined to form 
the active army were collected in camps conve- 
nient to the points of embarkation, and every 
preparation made to eml^ark them as rapidly as 
possible when the transports were ready. 

A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, 
while still encamped near Alexandria, I met the 
President, by appointment, on a steamer. He 
tliere informed me that he had been strongly 
pressed to take General Blenker's division from 
my command and give it to Genei-al Fremont. 
His Excellency was good enough to suggest seve- 
ral reasons for not taking Blenker's division from 
me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, 
and was extremely gratified by his decision to 
allow the division to remain with the army of the 
Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I 
received, on the thirty-first, the following note : 

Executive Mansion, | 

Washingto.v, March 31, 1SG2. ) 

My Dear Sir : This morning I felt constrained 
to order Blenker's division to Fremont, and I 
write this to assure j^ou that I did so with great 
pain, understanding that you would wish it other- 
wise. If you could know the full pressure of the 
case, I am confident that you would justify it, 
even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the 
Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases. 
Yours, very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

Major-General McClellan. 

To this I replied, in substance, that I regreted 
the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thou- 
sand troops which had been counted upon in 
forming my plan of campaign, but as there w.a.<; 
no remedy, I would yield, and do the best I could 
without tliem. In a conversation with the Pres- 
ident a few hours afterward I repeated verbally 
the same thing, and expressed my regret that 
Blenker's division had been given to General 
Fremont from any pressure other than the re- 
quirements of the national exigency. I was par- 
tially relieved, however, by the President's posi- 
tive and emphatic assurance that I might be 
confident that no more troops beyond these ten 
thousand should in any event be taken from me, 
or in any way detached from my command. 

At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by 
the enemy, Jackson was at Wincliester, our forces 
occupying Charlestown, and Shieids's reaching 
Bunker Hill on tlie eleventh. On the morning of 
the twelfth, a brigade of General Banks's troops, 
under General Hamilton, entered Winclicster, the 
enemy having left at five o'clock the evenirg be- 



DOCUMENTS. 



545 



fore, his rear-guard of cavalry leaving an hour 
before our advance entered the place. The ene- 
my having made his preparations for evacuation 
some days before, it was not possible to intercept 
his retreat. On the thirteenth the maijs of IJanks's 
corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity 
of Winchester, the enemy being in the rear of 
Strasburgh. 

On the nineteenth General Shields occupied 
Strasburgh, driving the enemy twenty miles south 
to Mount Jackson. 

On the twentieth the first division of Banks's 
corps commenced its movement toward Manassas, 
in compliance with my letter of instructions of 
the sixteenth. 

Jackson probably received information of this 
movement, and supposed that no force of any 
consequence was left in the vicinity of Winches- 
ter, and upon the falling back of Shields to that 
place, for the purpose of enticing Jackson in pur- 
suit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon 
ensued a skirmish on the twenty-second, in which 
General Shields was wounded, and an affair at 
Winchester on the twenty-third resulting in the 
defeat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly 
a§ the exhaustion of our troops and the difficulty 
of obtaining supplies permitted. It is presumed 
that the full reports of the battle of Winchester 
were forwarded direct to the War Department 
by General Banks. 

It being now clear that the enemy had no in- 
tention of returning by the Manassas route, the 
following letter of April first was written to Gen- 
eral Banks : 

HBADQU.tRTERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, ) 

O.v Board the Commobore, April 1, ISGi. j 
General : The change in afl[\iirs in the valley 
of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a cor- 
responding departure, temporarily at least, from 
the plan we some days since agreed upon. 

In my arrangements I assume that you have 
with you a force amply sufficient to drive Jack- 
son before you, provided he is not reenforced 
largely. I also assume that you may find it im- 
possible to detach any thing toward Manassas 
for some days, probably not until the opei-ations 
of the main army have drawn all the rebel force 
toward Richmond. 

You are aware that General Sumner has for 
some days been at Manassas Junction with two 
divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regi- 
ments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to 
the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy 
the railway bridge at Rappahannock Station, on 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Since that 
time our cavalry have found nothing on this 
side the Rappahannock in that direction, and it 
seems cK'ar that we have no reason to fear any 
return of the rebels in that quarter. Their move- 
ments near Fredericksburgh also indicate a final 
abandonment of that neighborhood. I doubt 
whether Johnston will now reenforce Jackson 
with a view of offensive operations. The time 
is probably passed when he could have gained 
any thing by doing so. I have ordered in one of 
Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late Sum- 



ner's) to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker's 
has been- detached from the army of the Potomac 
and ordered to report to (Jeneral P'remont. 

Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junc- 
tion to-day. Geary is at Wliite Plains. 

Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered 
out, and are now on the way to relieve the two 
regiments of Sumner. 

Four thousand infantry and one battery leave 
Washington at once for Manassas. Some three 
thousand more will move in one or two days, and 
soon after some three thousand additional. 

I will order Blenker to march on Strasburgh 
and to report to you for temporary duty, so that 
should you find a large force in your front you 
can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. 
Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report 
to the Adjutant-General oi the arra}^ for orders ; 
but keep him until you are sure what you have 
in front. 

In regard to your own movements, the most 
important thing at present is to throw Jackson 
well back, and then to assume such a position as 
to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as 
the railway communications are reestablished it 
will be probably important and advisable to move 
on Staunton, but this would require secure com- 
munications, and a force of from twenty-five 
thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. 
It should also be nearly coincident with my own 
move on Richmond, at all events not so long be- 
fore it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on 
you, and then return on mo. I fear that you 
cannot Vje ready in time, although it may come in 
very well with a force less tlian that I have men- 
tioned, after the main battle near Richmond. 
When General Sumner leaves Warrenton Junc- 
tion, General Abercrombie will be placed in im- 
mediate command of Manassas and Warrenton 
Junction, under your general orders. Please in- 
form me frequently by telegraph and otherwise 
as to the state of things in your front. 
I am very truly yours, 

George B. McClellan, 

Miijor-General Commanding. 

Major-General N. P. Banks, 

Commanding Fifth Corps. 

P. S. — From what I have just learned, it would 
seem that the regiments of cavalry intended for 
Warrenton Junction have gone to Harper's Ferry. 
Of the four additional regiments placed under 
your orders, two should as promptly as possible 
move by the shortest route on AVarrcnton Junc- 
tion. 

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, George B.McCi.ellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

This letter needs no further explanation than 
to say that it was my intention, had the opera- 
tions in that quarter remained under my charge, 
either to have resumed the defensive position 
marked out in the letter of March sixteenth, or 
to have advanced General Banks upon Staunton 
as might in the progress of events seem advisable. 

It is to be remembered that when I wrote the 



5t6 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



preee'lin;' and following letters of April first I 
had no expectation of being relieved from the 
ch!ir"-e of the operations in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, the President's War Order No. 3 giving no in- 
timation of such an intention, and that so far as 
reference was made to final operations after driv- 
ing Jackson back and taking such a position as 
to"prevent his return, no positive orders were 
given in the letter, the matter being left for future 
consideration, when the proper time arrived for a 
decision. 

From the following letter to the Adjutant-Gen- 
eral, dated April first, 1802, it will be seen that 
I left for the defence of the national capital and 
its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 
seventy-three thousand four hundred and fifty-six 
men, with one hundred and nine pieces of light 
artillery, including the thirty-two pieces in AVash- 
ington alluded to, but not enumerated in my let- 
ter to the Adjutant-General. It will also be seen 
that I recommended other available troops in New- 
York (more than four thousand) to be at once 
ordered forward to reenforce them. 

riEAnQn.^RTKRS Armt of the Potomac, ) 
Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. ) 

General : I have to request that you will lay 
the following communication before the Hon. Sec- 
retary of War. 

The appro.ximate numbers and positions of the 
troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are as 
follows : 

General Dix has, after guarding the railroads 
jnder his charge, sufficient to give him five thou- 
sand for the defence of Baltimore, and one thou- 
sand nine hundred and eighty-eight available for 
the Eastern shore, AnnajioHs, etc. Fort Delaware 
is very well garrisoned by about four hundred 
men. 

The garrisons of the forts around Washington 
amount to ten thousand six hundred men ; other 
disposable troops now with General Wadsworth 
about eleven thousand four hundred men. 

The troops employed in guarding the various 
railways in Maryland amount to some three 
thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men. 
These it is designed to relieve, being old regi- 
ments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send for- 
ward to Manassas. 

General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with 
a force, which, including Colonel Geary, at White 
Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will 
amount to some seven thousand seven hundred 
and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery. 

I have the honor to request that all the troops 
organized for service in Pennsylvania and New- 
York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be 
(tnlered to Washington. I learn from Governor 
Curtin that there are some three thousand five 
hundred men now ready in Pennsylvania. This 
force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. 
Four thousand men from (ieneral Wadsworth T 
desire to be ordered to Manassas. Tliese troops, 
with tlic railroad guards above alluded to, will 
make up a force under the command of General 



Abercrombie of something like eighteen thousand 
six hundred and thirty-nine men. 

It is my design to push General Blenker's di- 
vision from Warrenton upon Strasburgh. He 
should remain at Strasburgh long enough to allow 
matters to assume a definite form in that region 
before proceeding to his ultimate destination. 

The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will 
thus, including Blenker's division, ten thousand 
and twenty-eight strong, with twenty-four pieces 
of artillery ; Banks's Fifth corps, which embraces 
the command of General Shields, nineteen thou- 
sand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with 
forty-one guns, some three thousand six hundred 
and fifty-two disposable cavalry, and the railroad 
guards, about two thousand one hundred men, 
amount to about thirty-five thousand four hun- 
dred and sixty-seven men. 

It is designed to relieve General Hooker by 
one regiment, say eight hundred and fifty men, 
being, with some five hundred cavahy, one thou- 
sand three hundred and fifty men on the Lower 
Potomac. 
To recapitulate : At Warrenton there 

is to be, 7780 men 

At Manassas, say, 10,859 '^ 

In the valley of the Shenandoah, .... 35,467 " 
On the Lower Potomac, 1,350 " 

In all, 55,456 " 

There would thus be left for the garrisons and 
the front of Washington, under General Wads- 
worth, some eighteen thousand, inclusive of the 
batteries under instruction. The troops organ- 
izing or ready for service in New-York, I learn, 
will probably number more than four thousand. 
These should be assembled at Washington, sub- 
ject to disposition where their services may be 
most required, 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
George B. McClei.lan, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Brig.-General L. Thomas, 

Adjutant-General United States Army. 

The following letter from General Barry shows 
that thirty-two (32) field-guns, with men, horses, 
and equipments, were also left in Washington 
City when the army sailed. These were the bat- 
teries under instruction referred to above : 

Headquarters Inspector of Artii.i.krt, ) 
Washington, December 1 6, 1362. } 

General : It having been stated in various 
public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chand- 
ler, of Michigan, in his place in the United States 
Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion 
of the testimony of Brigadier-General Wads- 
worth, Military Governor of Washington, before 
the joint Senate and House committee on the 
conduct of the M'ar, that Major-General McClellan 
had left an insufficient force for the defence of 
VV^ashington, and not a gun on wheels. 

T liave to contradict this charge as follows : 
From ofiicial reports made at the time to me, 
(the Chief of Artillery of the army of the Poto- 



DOCUMENTS. 



547 



mac,) and now in my possession, by the com- 
manding officer of the light artillery troops left 
in camp in the city of Washington by your or- 
ders, it appears that the following named field 
batteries were left: 

Battery C, First New-York artillery, Captain 
Barnes, two guns ; battery K, First New-York 
artillery, Captain Crounse, six guns ; battery L, 
Second New-York artillery. Captain Robinson, 
six guns ; Ninth New-York independent battery, 
Captain Monzordi, six guns ; Sixteenth New-York 
independent battery. Captain Locke ; battery A, 
Second battalion New- York artillerj^. Captain 
liogan, six guns ; battery B, Second battalion 
New-York artillery, Captain McMahon, six guns ; 
total of batteries, thirty-two guns. 

With the exception of a few horses which 
could have been procured from the quai-termas- 
ter's department in a few hours, the batteries 
were all fit for immediate service, excepting the 
Sixteenth New-York battery, which having been 
previously ordered, on General Wadsworth's ap- 
plication, to report to him for special service, was 
unequipped with either guns or horses. 

I am, General, very respectfully, 
Y'^our obedient servant, 

AY. F. Bakrt, 
Brif:.-Gen. Inspector of Artillery United States Army. 

Major-General McClellan, 

United States Army. 

It is true that Blenker's division, which is in- 
cluded in the force enumerated by me, was un- 
der orders to reenforce General Fremont, but the 
following despatch from the Secretary of War, 
dated March thirty-first, 18G2, will show that I 
was authorized to detain him at Strasburgh until 
matters assumed a definite form in that region, 
before proceeding to his ultimate destination ; in 
other words, until Jackson was disposed of. And 
had he been detained there, instead of moving 
on to Harper's Ferry and Franklin, under other 
orders, it is probable that General Banks would 
have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself 
obliged subsequently to retreat to W^illiamsport. 

War Department, I 

Washington, D. C, ^rarcll 31, 1S62. j 

The order in respect to Blonker is not designed 
to hinder or delay the movement of Richardson, 
or any other force. He can remain wherever you 
desire him as long as required for your move- 
ments, and in any position you desire. The or- 
der is simply to place him in position for reen- 
forcing Fremont, as soon as your dispositions will 
permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry by such 
route and at such time as j'ou shall direct. State 
your own wishes as to the movement, when and 
how it shall be made. 

Edwix M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General McClellan. 

Without including General Blenker's division, 
there were left si.xtv-seven thousand four hun- 
dred and twenty-eight men and eighty-five pieces 
of light artillery, wliich, under existing circum- 
stances, 1 deemed more than adequate to insure 



the perfect security of Washington against any 
force the enemy could bring against it, for the 
following reasons: 

The light troops I had thrown forward under 
General Stoneman in pursuit of the i-ebcl army, 
after the evacuation of Manassas and Ccntreville, 
had driven their rear-guard across Cedar Run, 
and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's corps 
had forced them beyond the Rappahannock. 
They had destroyed all the railroad bridges be- 
hind them, thereby indicating that they did not 
intend to return over that route. Indeed, if they 
had attempted such a movement, their progress 
must have been slow and difficult, as it would 
have involved the reconstruction of the bridges ; 
and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry 
patrols well out to the front, to give timely no- 
tice of any approach of the eneni)', had been 
strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of 
cavalry for this express purpose,) they could not 
by any possibility have reached Washington be- 
fore there would have been ample time to con- 
centrate the entire forces left for its defence, as 
well as those at Baltimore, at any necessary 
point. 

It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the 
authorities, that the movement of the army of 
the Potomac would have the effect to draw off 
the hostile army from Manassas to the defence 
of their capital, and thus free Washington from 
menace. This opinion was confirmed the mo- 
ment the movement commenced, or rather as 
soon as the enemy became aware of our inten- 
tions ; fbr with the exception of Jackson's force 
of some fifteen thousand, which his instructions 
show to have been intended to operate in suph 
a way as to prevent McDowell's corps from being 
sent to reenforce me, no rebel force of any mag- 
nitude made its appearance in front of Washing- 
ton during the progress of our operations on the 
Peninsula ; nor until the order was given for my 
return from Harrison's Landing was Washing- 
ton again threatened. 

Surrounded, as Washington was, with numer- 
ous and strong fortifications, well garrisoned, it 
was manifest that the enemy could not aftbrd to 
detach from his main army a force sufficient to 
assail them. 

It is proper to remark, that just previous to 
my departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my Chief 
of Staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time 
held staff relations with His Excellency the Pres- 
ident and the Secretary of War, to submit to him 
a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the 
defence of Washington, and the positions in 
which I designed posting them. General Hitch- 
cock, after glancing his eye over the list, ob- 
served that he was not the judge of what was 
rccjuired for defending the capital ; that General 
McClellan's position was such as to enable him 
to understand the subject much better than he 
did, and he presumed tliat if the force designated 
was, in his judgment, suificient, nothing more 
would be required. He was then told by tho 
Chief of Staff that I would be glad to have his 
opinion, as an old and experienced officer; to 



'5d8 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63, 



this he replied, that as T had had the entire con- 
trol of the defences for a long time, I was the 
best judge of what was needed, and he declined 
to give anj^ othc" expression of opinion at that 
time. 

On the second of April, the day following my 
departure for Fort Monroe, Generals Hitchcock 
and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of 
AVar to examine and report whether the Presi- 
dent's instructions to me, of March eighth and 
thirteenth had been complied with ; on the same 
day their report was submitted, and their deci- 
sion was — 

That the requirement of the President, that 
this city (AVashington) shall be left entirely se- 
cure, has not been fully complied with. 

The President, in his letter to me on the ninth 
of April, says: "And now allow me to ask, do 
you realljr think T should permit the line from 
Richmond, ria Afanassas Junction, to this cit_v, 
to be entirely open, except what resistance could 
be presented by less than twenty thousand un- 
organized troops." 

In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Tho- 
mas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there 
was no danger of an attack from the direction of 
Manassas, in these words: "In regard to occu- 
pying Afanassas Junction, as the enemy have de- 
stroyed the railroads leading to it, it maybe fair to 
assume that they have no intention of returning 
for the reoccupation of their late position, and 
therefore no large force would be necessary to 
hold that position." 

That, as remarked before, was precisely the 
view I took of it, and this was enforced by the 
subsequent movements of the enemy. 

In another paragraph of the report it is stated 
that fifty-five thousand men was the number con- 
sidered adcqilate for the defence of the capital. 
That General McClellan, in his enumeration of 
the forces left, -had included Banks's army corps, 
operating in the Shenandoah Valley, but whether 
this coi'ps should be regarded as available for the 
protection of Washington, they decline to express 
an opinion. 

At the time this report was made, the only en- 
emy on any approach to Washington was Jack- 
son's force, in front of J>anks in the Shenandoah 
Vallc}'', with the Manassas Gap Railroad leading 
from this vallc}' to AVashington ; and it will be 
admitted, I ])resume, that Banks, occupying the 
Shenandoah A^alley, was in the best position to 
defend not only that approach to Washington, 
but the roads to Harper's Kerry and above. 

The number of troops left by me for the defence 
of AVashington, as given in my letter to the Ad- 
jutant-Cieneral, were taken from the latest olficial 
returns of that date, and these, of course, consti- 
tuted the most trustworthy and authentic source 
from which such information could be obtained. 

Another statement made by General Hitchcock 
before the " Committee on the Conduct of the 
War," in reference to this same order, should be 
noticed. He was asked the following question : 
"Do you understand now that the movement 
ma<le by General AlcClellan to Fort Monroe, and 



up the York River, was in compliance with the 
recommendation of the council of generals com- 
manding corps, and held at Fairfax Court-House 
on the thirteenth of Alarch last, or in violation 

of it r 

To which he replied as follows : " I have con- 
sidered, and do now consider, that it was in vio- 
lation of the recommendation of that council in 
two important particulars ; one particular being 
that portion of this report which represents the 
council as agreeing to the expedition by way of 
the Peninsula, 2T'onded the rebel steamer Merri- 
mac could first be neutralized. That important 
provision General McClellan disregarded." 



The second particular alluded to by General 
Hitchcock was in reference to the troops lelt for 
the defence of AVashington, which has been dis- 
posed of above. 

In regard to the steamer Merrimac, I have also 
stated that, so far as our operations on York River 
were concerned, the power of this vessel was neu- 
tralized. I now proceed to give some of the evi- 
dence which influenced me in coming to that 
conclusion. 

Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, 
Mr. AA^atson, Assistant Secretary of AVar, was sent 
by the President to Fort Monroe to consult with 
Flag-OfBcer Goldsborough upon this subject. The 
result of that consultation is contained in the fol- 
lowing extract from the evidence of Admiral Golds- 
borough before the " Committee on the Conduct 
of the AVar," namely: "I told Mr. AA'atson, As- 
sistant Secretary of War, that the President might 
make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac 
going up York River ; that she could never get 
there, for I had ample means to prevent that." 

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the 
Nav3% testifies before the committee as follows : 

" General McClellan expected the navy to neu- 
tralize the Merrimac, and I promised that it should 
be done." 

General Keyes, commanding Fourth army corps, 
testifies as follows before the committee : 

" During the time that the subject of the change 
of base was discussed, I had refused to consent to 
the Peninsula line of operations until I had sent 
word to the Navj' Department and asked two 
questions : First, whether the Alerrimac was cer- 
tainly neutralized, or not? Second, whether the 
navy was in a condition to cooperate eiHciently 
with the army to break through between York- 
town and Gloucester Point ? To both of these, 
answers were returned in the affirmative; that is, 
the Merrimac was neutralized, and the navy was 
in a condition to cooperate efficiently to break 
through between Yorktown and Gloucester 
Point." 

Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed 
Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the United 
States corps of engineers, to visit Manassas Junc- 
tion and its vicinity for the purpose of determin- 
ing upon the defensive works necessary to enable 
us to hold that place with a small force. The ao 
companying letters from Colonel Alexander will 



DOCUMENTS. 



549 



show what steps were taken by him to carry into 
effect this important order. 

I regret to say that those who succeeded me in 
command of tiie region in front of Washington, 
whatever were the fears for its safety, did not 
deem it neccssarj' to carry out ray phms and in- 
structions to them. Had Manassas been phiced in 
condition for a strong defence, and its communi- 
cations secured as recommended by Colonel Al- 
exander, the result of (Jeneral Pope's campaign 
would probably have been different. 

Washington, D. C, April 2, 1S62. 
SiK : You will proceed to Manassas at as early 
a moment as practicable and mark on the ground 
the works for the defence of that place, on the posi- 
tions which I indicated to you yesterday. You 
will find two carpenters, experienced in this kind 
of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on 
Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of the Trea- 
sury extension. 

The general idea of the defence of this position 
is, to occupy the fringe of elevation which lies 
about half-way between Manassas depot and the 
junction of the railroad, with a series of works 
open to the rear, so that they may be commanded 
by the work hereafter to be described. 

There will be at least four of these works, three 
of them being on the left of the railroad leading 
from Alexandria, at the positions occupied by 
the enemy's works. The other on the right of 
this road, on the position we examined yesterday. 
The works of the enemy to the north of this lat- 
ter position, numbered One and Two, on Lieuten- 
ant Corastock's sketch, may also form a part of 
the front line of our defence ; but the sides of 
those works looking toward Manassas Station 
should be levelled, so that the interior of the 
works may be seen from the latter position. 

Embrasures should be arranged in all these 
works for field-artillery. The approaches should 
be such that a battery can drive into the works. 
The number of embrasures in each battery will 
depend upon its size and the ground to be com- 
manded. It is supposed there will be from four 
to eight embrasures in each battery. 

The other works of the enemy looking toward 
the east and south may be strengthened so as to 
afford sutticient defence in these directions. The 
work Number Three in Lieutenant Comstock's 
sketch may be also strengthened and arranged 
for field-artillery, when time will permit. This 
work is in a good position to cover a retreat, 
which would be made down the valley in which 
tlie railroad runs toward Bull Run. 

At Manassas Station there should be a fort con- 
structed. The railroad will pass through this 
fort, and the depot, if there should be one built, 
should be placed in its rear. This latter work 
should be regarded as the key to the position. It 
should be as large as the nature of the ground 
will permit. 

By going down the slopes, which are not steep, 
it may be made large enough to accommodate 
two thousand or three thou.sand men. The top 
of the position need not be cut away ; it will be 



better to throw up the earth into a large traverse, 
which may also be a bomb-proof Its profile 
should be strong, and its ditches should be flank- 
ed. It should receive a heavy armament of twen- 
ty-four or thirt}^-two-pounders, with some rifled 
(Parrott) twenty or tliirty-poundcrs. Its guns 
sliould command all the exterior works, so that 
these works could be of no use to the enemy, 
should he take them. In accommoda'ing the 
fort to the ground this consideration should not 
be lost sight of 

After tracing these works on the ground, you 
will make a sketch emljracing the whole of them, 
showing their relative positions and size. This 
sketch should embrace the junction of the rail- 
roads and the ground for some distance around 
the main work. It need not be made with ex- 
treme accuracy. The distances may be paced, 
or measured, with a tape-line. The bearings may 
be taken by compass. 

Having located the works and prepared your 
sketch, you will report to Captain Frederick E. 
Piime, of the corps of engineers, who will fur- 
nish you the means of construction. 

It is important that these works should be 
built with the least possible delay. You will, 
therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. 

Very respectfully, j'our obedient servant, 

B. S. Al.EXANDRK, 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Aid-do-Camp. 

Captain Fred. R. Munthek, Present. 

Washington, April C, 1862. 

Sir : I inclose you herewith a copy of the in- 
structions which I gave to Captain Munther, in 
reference to the defences of ilanassas. 

As there has been a new department created, 
(that of the Rappahannock,) it is possible that 
you and I, as well as General McClellan, are re- 
lieved from the further consideration of this sub- 
ject at the present time. 

I will, however, state for your information, 
should the subject ever come before you again, 
that in my opinion the communication with Ma- 
nassas by land should be secured. 

To effect this in the best manner, so far as my 
observations extended, I think the bridge over 
Bull Run, near Union Mills, and just above the rail- 
road bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly re- 
paired, and that a small work, or two oi- three 
open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent 
heights to protect it as well as tlie railroad liridge. 

The communication by land would then be 
through or near Centreville, over the road used 
by the enemy. 

I write this for fear something should detain 
me here ; but I hope to leave here to join you 
to-morrow. My health is much improved. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

B. S. At.exandkr, 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Aid-de-Camp. 

Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, 

Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac. 

I may be permitted also to mention that the 
plans (also unexecuted by my successor) indi- 
♦itcd in my letter of instructions to GcneraJ 



/S.jO 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. 



Rank';. (l:Ueil March si.xtccnth, 18f.2, forintrerch- 
inp ('llt••^te^ Cap and the point wheru the .Manas- 
sas Riiilroail crosses the Shenaiuloali, were for the 
purp'i-e of preventing: even the attempt of such 
a mill a< that of Jiiek.son in the month of May 
followinfj. 

MILITAKV ISriDKSTS OF TIIK FIUST PKKIOn. 

Before taking up the liistory of the cmbarka- 
lion anrl Peniiisiihi cainpai<rn. 1 should remark 
that (hirin;.' tlie fall anil winter of ISCl-'Of?, while 
the nrmy of the Potomac was in position in front 
.if Wasliinpton, reconnoissances were made from 
time to time, and .skirmishes frequently occurred, 
which were of n;reat imi)ortance in the education 
of the troops, accnstominfr them to the presence 
"if the enemy, and .irivin;; them confidence under 
tire. There" were many instances of individual 
i^allantry displayed in tliese affairs ; the reports 
of them will he found among the documents 
which accompany this report. 

One of the most brilliant of these affairs -was 
that which took place at Drainsville, on Decem- 
ber twentieth, 1861, when the Third brigade of 
.Mct'all's division, under Brigadier-General E. 0. 
('. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed and pur- 
sued four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, 
and a battery of six pieces. 

The operations of ]}rigadicr-Gcneral F. W. 
Lander on the Tjjper Potomac, during the months 
of January and Februar}', 18(12, frustrated the 
Hitcmpts of General Jackson against the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad, Cumberland, etc., and 
obliged him to fall back to Winchester. His 
constitution wa.s impaired by the hardships he 
had experienced, and on the second March the 
fearless General Lander expired, a victim to the 
excessive fatigue of the campaign. 

SECOND PERIOD. 

CHAPTER I. 

TriK council composed of the four corps com 
manders, organized by the President of the United 
States, at its meeting on the thirteenth of March, 
adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations 
for the movement of the army of the Potomac 
upon Ilichmond. For the prompt and successful 
execution of the projected operation, it was re- 
garded by all as necessary that the whole of the 
four corps should be emjdoyed, with at least the 
addition of ten thousand men drawn from the 
forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, that po- 
sition and its dependencies being regarded as am- 
ply protected by the naval lorce in its ncighbor- 
liood, and the advance of the main army up the 
Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a 
small garrison. 

In addition to the land forces, the cooperation 
of the navy was desired in the projected attack 
upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, 
as well as in controlling the York and James Riv- 
ers for the pnitfction of our (lanks, and the use 
of the transports bringinfj; supplies to the army. 
NVith these exi)ecti\tions, and for reasons stated 
elsewhere in this report, my original plan of 



moving by Urbana and "West-Point was aban- 
doned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base 
adopted. In the arrangements for the transport- 
ation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the 
vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous 
maiidy at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation 
of Manassas and the batteries of the Lower Poto- 
mac by the enemy, it became more convenient to 
eml)ark the troops and material at Alexandria, 
and orders to that effect were at once given. 

In making the preliminary arrangements for 
the movement, it was determined that the First 
corps, General McDowell's, should move as a unit 
first, and eifect a landing either at the Sand-box, 
some four miles south of Yorktown, in order to 
turn all the enemy's defences at Ship Point, How- 
ard's Bridge, Big Bethel, etc., or else, should ex- 
isting circumstances render it prefeiable, land on 
the (ilouccster side of the York River, and move 
on We.st-Point. 

The transports, however, arrived slowly and 
few at a time. In order, therefoie, to expedite 
matters, I decided to embark the army by divi- 
sions, as transports arrived, keeping army corps 
together as much as much as po.^sible, and to 
collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In dctermin- 
ins; the order of embarkation, convenience and ex- 
pedition were especially consulted, except that the 
First corps was to be embarked last, as I intend- 
ed to move it in mass to its point of disembarka- 
tion, and to land it on either bank of the York, 
as might then be determined. 

On the seventeenth of March Plarailton's divi- 
sion, of the Third corps, embarked at Alexandria 
and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with the following 
orders : 

■W.^smuoTON, D. C, Jlarch 17, 18(52. 

You will, on your arrival at Fort ilonroe, re- 
port to General AYool and request him to assign 
you ground for encamping your division. You 
will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders 
from General McClellan. Should General Wool 
require the services of your division in repelling 
an attack, you will obey his orders and use every 
effort to carry out his views. 

R. B. Marcy, 

General 0. S. Hamilton, Chief of staff. 

CommandiDg Division. 

On the twenty-second of March, as soon as 
transportation was ready, (lencral Fitz-John 
Porter's division, of the same corps, embarked. 
General Ilcintzclman was ordered to accompany 
it, under the following instructions : 

He.\.DQIJ.*RTERS ArMT of TITE PoTOMAC, ) 

SEMiSARr, March 22, 1S62. f 

General: Upon the disembarkation of Por- 
ter's division at Fort Monroe, I ha -e ^o request 
that you will move your two divisions. Porter's 
and Hamilton'.s, some three or four miles out 
from the Fort to find good cuvmping places, where 
wood and water can be readily obtained, and 
where your positions will be good in a defensive 
point of view. Y''ou may find it advisable to 
place one division on or near the road loading to 
Yorktown from Newport News — the other upon 



DOCUMENTS. 



551 



that leadiiig to Yorktown direct from Fort Mon- 
roe. If you lind tliut the nature of the country 
will permit easy coinnmnicaliou and mutual sup- 
port between the two divisions, it will be best to 
place one on each road. It will bo best to re- 
main pretty near the Fort for the present, in or- 
der to iiive the impression that our object is to 
attack Xorfolk rather tiian Yorktown. You will 
do well, however, to push strong reconnoissanccs 
well to the front to ascertain the position of the 
enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- 
ble, reiinforce you by the Third division of your 
corps, and it is probable that a part or the whole 
of the Fourth corps will also move from Fort 
Monroe. This will probably be deterunned be- 
fore your disembarkation is completed, and you 
Trill be informed accordingly. 

My desire would be to make no important 
move in advance until we are fully prepared to 
follow it up and give the enemy no time to re- 
cover. 

The Quartermaster of your corps will receive 
detailed instructions in regard to land transport- 
ation from (ieneral Van Vliet. 

It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with 
the least possible delay, and have it prepared for 
an advance. I have directed extra clothing, am- 
munition, etc., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so 
that all deficiencies may be supplied without 
delay. 

Please report to nie frequently and fully the 
condition of things on the new field of oper- 
ations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to 
the enemy. 

Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, 
and endeavor to send out spies. 
I am very truly, yours, 

Geo. B. McClrllan, 

-Major-General CoDimandlng. 

Brigadier-General S. P. IIeintzelman, 

Commanding Third Corps. 

The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly 
as transports could be supplied. 

On the first of Api'il I embarked with the 
headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and 
reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 
second. 

In consequence of the delay in the arrival of 
the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small 
portion of the cavahy had arrived, and the artil- 
lery reserve had not yet completed its disem- 
barkation. 

I found there the Third Pennsylvania cavalry 
and the Fifth regular cavalry ; the Second regu- 
lar cavahy and a portion of the First had ar- 
rived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had 
arrived that it was not possiljle to move Casey's 
division at all for several daj^s, while the other 
divisions were obliged to move with scant sup- 
pHes. 

As to the force and position of the enemy, the 
information then in our possession was vague 
and untrustworthy. Jluch of it was obtained 
from the stafF-ofliccrs of General Wool, and was 
simply to the effect that Yorktown was surround- 
ed by a continuous line of earth-works, with 



strong water-batteries on the York Kivcr, and 
garrisoned by not less than fifteen thousand 
troops, under connnand of General J. B. Magru- 
der. Maps, Avhicli had been pre|)ared by the 
topographical engineers under General Wool's 
command, were furnished me, in which the War- 
wick River was represented as flowing parallel 
to, but not crossing, the road from Newport 
News to AVilliamsburgh, making the so-called 
Mulberry Island a real island ; and we had no 
information as to the true course of the A\'arwick 
acrofis the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line 
of works which it covered. 

Information which t had collected during the 
winter placed General Magruder's connnand at 
from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men, 
independently of General Iluger's force at Nor- 
folk, estimated at about fifteen thousand. 

It was also known that there were strong de- 
fensive works at or near Williamsburgh. 

Knowing that General linger could easily 
spare some troops to roeenforce Yorktown, that 
he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army 
of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the 
James and York Rivers to the same point, I pro- 
posed to invest that tov.-n without dela}'. 

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. 
Topographical Engineers, attached to General 
Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several 
months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the de- 
sign. It was also an object of primary import- 
ance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown l)efore the 
enemy was reenforced sufficiently to enable him 
to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, How- 
ard's Bridge, Ship Point, etc., on the direct road 
to Yorktown and Young's ^lills, on the road 
from Newport News. This was the more ur- 
gent, as it was now evident that some days must 
elapse before the First corps could arrive. 

Every thing possible was done to hasten tho 
disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery, and 
wagons in the harbor ; and on the third tlie or- 
ders of march were given for tho following day. 

There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity 
on the third, ready to move, two divisions of the 
Third corps, two divisions of the Fourth corps, 
and one division of the Second corps, and Sykes's 
brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's 
artillery reserve, and the regiments of cavalry be- 
fore named, in all about fifty-eight thousand men 
and one hundred guns, besides the division of 
artiller3^ 

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 
Second and Third corps had not arrived, and 
Casey's division of the Fourth corps was unable 
to move for want of wagons. 

Before I left Washington an order had been 
issued by the War Depar'.meiit placing Fort 
Monroe and its dependencies under my control, 
and authorizing me to draw from the troops un- 
der General Wool a division of about ten thou- 
sand men, which was to be assigned to the First 
corps. 

During the night of the third I received a 
telegram from the Adjutant-General of the army, 
stating that, by the President's order, I was d'e- 



552 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



prived of all control over General Wool and the 
troops under his command, and forbidden to de- 
tach an}' of his troops without his sanction. 

This order left me without an}' base of opera- 
tions under ray own control, and to this day I 
am ignorant of the causes which led to it. 

On m,y arrival at Fort Monroe the James River 
was declared by the naval authorities closed to 
the operations of their vessels by the combined 
influence of the enemj-'s batteries on its banks 
and the confederate steamers Merrimac, York- 
town, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-Officer 
Goldsborough, then in command of the United 
States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it 
(and no doubt justly) as his highest and most 
imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Mer- 
rimac ; and as he designed using his most pow- 
erful vessels in a contest with her, he did not 
feel able to detach to the assistance of the army 
a, suitable force to attack the water-batteries at 
Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contra- 
ry to what had been previously stated to me, and 
materially affected my plans. 

At no time during the operations against York- 
town was the navy prepared to lend us any ma- 
terial assistance in its reduction until after our 
land-batteries had partially silenced the works. 

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, 
to drive before me or capture the enemy on the 
Peninsula, open the James River, and press on 
to Richmond before he should be materially re- 
enforced from other portions of the territory. 
As the narrative proceeds, the causes will be de- 
veloped which frustrated these apparentlj^ well- 
gi'ounded expectations. 

I determined then to move the two divisions 
of the Fourth corps by the Newport News and 
Williamsburgh road, to take up a position be- 
tween Yorktown and Williamsburgh, while the 
two divisions of the Third corps moved direct 
from Fort ^[onroe upon Yorktown ; the reserves 
moving so as to support either corps as might 
prove necessarj\ I designed, should the works 
at Yorktown and Williamsburgh offer a serious 
resistance, to land the First corps, reenforced if 
necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the 
Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West-Point, 
in order to take in reverse whatever force the 
enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel 
him to abandon his positions. 

In the commencement of the movement from 
Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encoun- 
tered from the want of precise topographical in- 
formation as to the country in advance. Correct 
local maps were not to be found, and the coun- 
tr}'', though known in its general feature, we 
found to be inaccurately described in essential 
particulars in the only maps and geographical 
memoirs or papers to which access could be had. 
Erroneous courses to streams and roads were 
frequently given, and no dependence could be 
placed on the information thus derived. This 
difficulty has been found to exist with respect to 
most portions of the State of Virginia, through 
which my military operations have extended. 
Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved 



the only trustworthy sources of information. 
Negroes, however truthful their reports, pos- 
sessed or were able to communicate very little 
accurate and no comprehensive topographical in- 
formation. 

On the third the following orders were given 
for the movement of the fourth : 

" Porter s and Hamilton's divisions and Aver- 
ill's cavalry of the Third corps, and Sedgwick's 
division of the Second corps, under Brigadier- 
General Heintzelman, commanding Third corps, 
will move to-morrow in the following order: 
Porter's division with Averill's cavalry at six 
A.M., over the Newmarket and New-Bridges to 
Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. This division 
will send forward to the batteries where the Ship 
Point roads intersects the main Yorktown road a 
sufficient force to hold that point, and cut off the 
garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The whole 
division may be used for this purpose if necessa- 
ry, and if possible the batteries should be occu- 
pied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of 
the division not necessary for this purpose will 
encamp at Howard's Bridge. 

" Hamilton's division will march at seven a.m. 
by the New-Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will 
encamp on Howard's Creek. 

"Sedgwick's division will march at eight a.m. 
b}'' the Newmarket Bridge, taking the direct road 
to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's 
Bridge. 

"Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding Fourth 
corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's divi- 
sion at six A.M., (Smith's division in advance,) 
by the James River road. The Fifth regular 
cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will 
move with Smith's division, which will encamp 
at Young's Mills, throwing forward at least one 
brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. 
Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's Creek. 

"The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry 
will move at half-past eight a.m., by the New- 
market Bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will en- 
camp. On the march it will keep in rear of 
Sedgwick's division." 

The following is an extract from the order is- 
sued on the fourth for the march of the fifth : 

"The following movements of the army will 
be carried out to-morrow, (fifth :) 

"General Keyes will move forward Smith's 
division at six a.m., via Warwick Court-House 
and the road leading near the old ship-yard, to 
the 'Half-way House' on the Y''orktown and Wil- 
liamsburgh road. 

" General Couch's division will march at six 
A.M., to close up on General Smith's division at 
the 'Half-way House.' 

" General Keyes's command will occupy and 
hold the narrow dividing ridge near the ' Half- 
way House,' so as to prevent the escape of the 
garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent reen- 
forcements being thrown in. 

" General Heintzelman will move forward Gen- 
eral Porter's two rear brigades at si.x a.m., upon 
the advanced-guard, when the entire division will 
advance to a point about two and three quarter 



DOCUMENTS. 



553 



miles from Yorktown, where the road turns ab- 
ruptly to the north, and where a road comes in 
fi'om Warwick Court-House. 

" General Hamilton's division will move at six 
A.M., and follow General Porter's division, camp- 
ing as near it as possible. 

"General Sedgwick's division will march at 
five A.M. as far as the Warwick road, which 
enters the main Yorktown road near Doctor 
Powers's house, and will await further orders. 

"The reserve will march at six a.m. upon the 
main Yorktown road, halting for further orders 
at Doctor Powers's house ; the infantry leading, 
the artillery following next, and the cavalry in 
rear. 

" General Sedgwick's division will, for the pre- 
sent, act with the reserve, and he will receive 
orders from headquarters." 

In giving these orders of march for the fourth 
and fifth, it was expected that there would be 
no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the 
advance of the Third corps beyond that point 
would force the enemy to evacuate the works at 
Young's Mills, while our possession of the latter 
would make it necessary for him to abandon 
those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance 
thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in 
our possession, together with its garrison, unless 
the}^ abandoned it promptly. The result an- 
swered the expectation. 

During the afternoon of the fourth. General 
Keyes obtained information of the presence of 
some five thousand to eight thousand of the ene- 
my in a strong position at Lee's ^lills. The na- 
ture of that position in relation to the Warwick 
not being at that time understood, I instructed 
General Iveyes to attack and carry this position 
upon coming in front of it. 

Earh' in the afternoon of the fifth the advance 
of each column was brought to a halt, that of 
Hcintzelman (Porter's division) in front of York- 
town, after overcoming some resistance at Big 
Bethel and Howard's Bridge ; that of Keyes 
(Smith's division) unexpectedly before the ene- 
my's works at Lee's Mills, where the road from 
Newport News to Williamsburgh crosses War- 
wick River. 

The progress of each column had been retard- 
ed by heavy rains on that day, which had made 
the roads almost impassable to the infantry of 
Keycs's column, and impassable to all but a 
small portion of the artillery, while the ammuni- 
tion, provisions, and forage could not be brought 
up at all. 

When General Keyes approached Lee's Mills 
his left tlank was exposed to a sharp artillery 
fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and 
upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found 
it altogether stronger than was expected, unap- 
proachal)le by reason of the Warwick lliver, and 
incapable of being carried by as.sault. 

The troops composing the advance of each 
column were, during the afternoon, under a 
warm artillery fire, the sharp shooters even of 
the right column being engaged when covering 
reconnoissances. 



It was at this stage and moment of the cam- 
paign that the following telegi-am was sent to 
me : 

Adjutant-General's Office. I 
April 4, 1S62. ) . 

By direction of the President, General McDovir- 
ell's army corps has been detached from the force 
under your immediate command, and the CJen- 
eral is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. 
Letter by mail. L. Thomas, 

Adjutant-General. 

General McClellan. 

The President having promised in an inter- 
view following his order of March thirty-first, 
withdrawing Blenker's division of ten thousand 
men from my command, that nothing of the sort 
should be repeated — that I might rest assured 
that the campaign should proceed, with no fur- 
ther deductions from the force upon which its 
operations had been planned — I may confess 
to having been shocked at this order, which, 
with that of the thirty-first ultimo and that of 
the third, removed nearly sixty thousand men 
from my command, and reduced my iOrce by 
more than one third after its task had been as- 
signed ; its operations planned ; its fighting be- 
gun. To me the blow was most discouraging. 
It frustrated all my plans for impending opera- 
tions. It fell when I was too deeply committed 
to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing 
operations which had been begun. It compelled 
the adoption of another, a different and a less effect- 
ive plan of campaign. It made rapid and bril- 
liant operations impossible. It was a fatal error. 

It was now, of course, out of my power to turn 
Yorktown by West-Point. I had, therefore, no 
choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I 
best could with the force at my command. 

Reconnoissances made under fire on that and 
the following day determined that the sources of 
the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com- 
manded by its guns, while that stream, for some 
distance from its mouth on the James River, was 
controlled by the confederate gunboats ; that the 
fords had been destroyed by dams, the approach- 
es to which were generally through dense forests 
and deep swamps, and defended by extensive 
and formidable works ; that timber felled for 
defensive purposes, and the flooding of the roads, 
caused by the dams, had made these works ap 
parently inaccessible and impossible to turn ; 
that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed and 
garrisoned, and connected with the defences of 
the Warwick by forts and intrcnchments, the 
ground in front of which was swept by the guns 
of Yorktown. It was also ascertained that the 
garrisons had beer., and were daily being reon 
forced by troops from Norfolk and the army 
under General J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains 
made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and 
delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition, and 
supplies, while storms prevented for sevei-al days 
the sailing of transports from Hampton Roads, 
and the establishment of depots on the creeks of 
York River, near the army. 

The ground bordering the Warwick Piiver is 



654 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



covered by very dense and extensive forests, the 
dearinp;s heinj; small and few. This, with the 
comparative flatness of the country, and the 
alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, 
rendered thorough reconnoissanccs slow, danger- 
ous, and difficult, yet it was impossible otherwise 
to determine whether an assault was anywhere 
practicable, or whether the more tedious but 
sure operations of a siege must be resorted to. 
I made, on the sixth and seventh, close per- 
gonal reconnoissanccs of the right and left of the 
enemy's positions, which, witli information ac- 
quired alread}^, convinced me that it w;is best to 
prepare for an assault by the preliminary em- 
ployment of heavy guns, and some siege opera- 
tions. Instant assault would have been simple 
folly. On the seventh I telegraphed to the Presi- 
dent as follows : 

Headquarters Arm? of the Potomac, ) 
April 7, 1S62. f 

Your telegram of yesterday is received. In 
reply, I have the honor to state that my entire 
force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) 
eighty-five thousand men. General "Wool's com- 
mand, as you will observe from the accompany- 
ing ordei", has been taken out of my control, al- 
though he has most cheerfully co5perated with 
rae. The only use that can be made of his com- 
mand is to protect my communications in rear 
of this point. At this time only fifty-three 
thousand men have joined me, but they are 
coming up as rapidly as my means of transpor- 
tation will permit. 

Please refer to my despatch to the Secretary 
of War to-night, for the details of our present 
Hituation. Geo. B. McClellax, 

Mnjor-General. 

To the President, "Washington, D. C. 
On the same day I sent the following : 

IIkadquarters Armv of the Potomac, ! 

Is FRCST 



Armv of the Potomac, | 
<T OF Yorktown, V 

April 7, 1SC2— 7 p.m. j 



Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while 
I was absent, examining the enemy's right, which 
I did pretty closely. 

The whole line of the AVarwick, wlifch really 
heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly de- 
fended by detached redoubts and other fortifica- 
tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The 
api)ro:iches, except at Yorktown, are covered by 
the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at 
most, two passages, both of which are covered 
by strong batteries. It will be necessary to re- 
sort to tlio use of heavy gun.s, and some siege 
operations, before we assault. All the prisoners 
state that (iencral J. E. Johnston arrived at 
Yorktown yesterday with strong reenforccments. 
Tt seems clear that "l shall have the whole force 
of the enemy on my hands — probably not less 
than (1()0,OUU) one hundred thousand men, and 
probably more. In consequence of the loss of 
Mlcnker's division and the First corps, my force is 
po.ssibly less than that of the enem}', while they 
have all the advantage of position. 

I am under great obligations to you for the 



offer that the whole force and material of the 
Government will be as full}' and as speedily un- 
der my command as heretofore, or as if the new 
departments had not been created. 

Since mj' arrangements were made for this 
campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand :nen 
have been taken from my command. Since my 
despatch of the fifth instant, five divisions have 
been in close observation of the enemJ^ and fre- 
quently exchanging shots. "\Yhen my present 
command all joins, I shall have about (85,000) 
eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a 
large force must be taken for guards, scouts, etc. 
AYith this army I could assault the enemy's works, 
and perhaps carry them ; but were I in possession 
of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my 
numbers, I should have no fears as to the result. 

Under the circumstances that have been de- 
veloped since we arrived here. I feel fully impress- 
ed with the conviction that here is to be fought 
the great battle that is to decide the existing con- 
test. I shall, of course, commence the attack as 
soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do 
all in my power to carry the enemy's works, but 
to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty 
requires, in my judgment, that I should, if pos- 
sible, have at least the whole of the First corps to 
land upon the Severn River and attack Gloucester 
in the rear. 

My present strength will not admit of a detach- 
ment sufficient for this purpose, without material- 
ly impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag- 
Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong 
for his available vessels, unless I can' turn Glou- 
cester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter and 
one of the commander of the gunboats here. 
Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-GeacraL 

Hon. E. M. Stantox, 

Secretary of War. 

I had provided a small siege train and moderate 
supplies of intrenching tools for such a contin- 
gency as the present. Immediate steps were 
taken to secure the necessary additions. While 
the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining 
the character and strength of 'all the defences, 
and the configuration of the ground in front of 
Yorktown, in order to determine the point of at- 
tack and to develop the approaches, the troops 
were occupied in opening roads to the depots es- 
tablished at the nearest available pouits, on 
branches of York River. Troops were brought to 
the front as rapidly as possible, and on the tenth 
of Ajjril the army was posted as follows: 

Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, 
Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, in front of 
Y''orktown, extending in the order named, froni 
the mouth of AYormley's Creek to the Warwick 
road, opposite Winn's Mills. Sumner's corps — 
Sedgwick's division only having arrived — on the 
left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick 
and opposite to AYinn's Mills works. Keyes's 
corps, (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) 
on the left of Sedgwick, f;icing the works at the 
one-gun battery, Lee's Mills, etc., on the west 
bank of the Warwick. Sumner, after the sixth 



DOCUMENTS. 



555 



of April, commanded the left wing, composed of 
his own and Kcyos's corps. 

Throughout the preparations for, and during 
the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under 
General Iveyes, and afterward the left wing, un- 
der General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the 
character of the obstacles presented b}' the War- 
wick, and the enemj' intrenched upon the right 
bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcom- 
ing tl em and breaking that line of defence, so as 
to gain possession of the road to Williamsburgh, 
and cut off Yorktown from its sujiports and sup- 
plies. The forces under General Ileintzelman 
were engaged in similar efforts upon the works 
between Winn's Mills and Yorktown. General 
Keycs's report of the sixteenth of April, inclosing 
reports of brigade commanders engaged in recon- 
noissances up to that day, said: "That no part of 
his (the enemy's line opposite his own) line, so 
far as discovered, can be taken by assault with- 
out an enormous waste of life." , 

Reconnoissances on the right flank demonstrat- 
ed the fact that the Warwick was not passable in 
that direction, except over a narrow dam, the 
approaches to which were swept by several bat- 
teries, and intrenchments which could be filled 
quickly with supports sheltered by the timber 
immetUately in rear. 

General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the army 
of th'e Potomac, whose position entitled his opin- 
ions to the highest consideration, expressed the 
judgment that those formidable works could not, 
with any rdasonable degree of certainty, be carried 
by assault. General Keyes, commanding Fourth 
army corps, after the examination of the enemy's 
defences on the left, before alluded to, addressed 
the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United 
States Senate, and gave me a cop3^ Although 
not strictl}^ olScial, it describes the situation at 
that time in some respects so well, that I have 
taken the liberty of introducing it here : 

IlEADQaARTERS PnURTII ARMY CoRPS, I 

Warwick Court-Hoosb, Va., April 7, 1S62. ) 

Mv Deak Senator : The plan of campaign on 
this line was made with the distinct understand- 
ing that four army corps should be employed, 
and that the navy should cooperate in the taking 
of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) sup- 
port us on our left by moving gunboats up James 
River. 

To-day I have learned that the First corps, 
which by the President's order was to embrace 
four divisions, and one division (lilenker'sj of the 
Second corps, liave been withdrawn altogether 
from this line of operations, and from the army 
of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am in- 
formed, the navy has not the means to attack 
Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up 
James River, for fear of the Merrimac. 

The above plan of campaign was adopted unan- 
imously by Major-General McDowell and Bri- 
gadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, 
and was concurred in by Major-Gcneral McClel- 
lan, who fii'st proposed Urbana as our base. 

This army being reduced by forty-live thousand 



troops, some of them among the best in the ser- 
vice, and without the support of the navy, the 
plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any 
resemblance to the one T voted for. 

I command the James River column, and I left 
my camp near Newport News the morning of the 
fourth instant. I only succeeded in getting my 
artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, 
and one of my divisions had not all arrived in 
camp the day I left, and for the want of trans- 
portation has not yet joined me. So you will 
observe that not a day was lost in the advance, 
and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapid- 
ly, that many of our animals were twenty-four 
and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. 
But notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, 
we were stopped by a line of defence nine or ten 
miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks, 
erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream, 
or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one 
terminus being Yorktown, and the other ending 
in the James River, which is commanded by the 
enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all 
around with bastioned works, and on the water 
side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy 
are afraid to attack either. 

The approaches on one side are generally though 
low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground,over roads 
which we are obliged to repair or to make before 
we can get forward our carriages. The enemy 
is in great force, and is constantly receiving re- 
enforcements from the two rivers. The line in 
front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever 
opposed to an invading force in any country. 

You will, then, ask why I advocated such a 
line for our operations ? My reasons are few, 
but I think good. 

With proper assistance from the navy we could 
take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on both 
rivers we could beat any force opposed to us on 
Warwick River, because the shot and shell from 
the gunboats would nearly overlap across the 
Peninsula ; so that if the enemy should retreat — - 
and retreat he must — -he would have a long way 
to go without rail or steam transportation, and 
every soul of his army must fall into our hands 
or be destroyed. 

Another reason for my supporting the new 
base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, 
would furnish water transportation nearly to 
Richmond. 

Now, supposing we succeed in breaking 
through the line in front of us, what can we do 
next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy 
retains command of James River, and we do not 
first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible 
for us to subsist this arm}' three marches beyond 
where it is now. As the roads are at present, it 
is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist 
it in the position it now occupies. 

You will see, therefore, by what I have said, 
that the force originally intended for the capture 
of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I 
thought the foiu" army corps necessary when I 
supposed the navy would cooperate, and when I 
judged of the obstacles to be encountered by 



556 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



what I learned from maps and the opinions of 
officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from 
all other sources, how much more should I think 
the full complement of troops requisite now that 
the navy cannot cooperate, and now that the 
strength of the enemy's lines and the number of 
his guns and men prove to be almost immeasur- 
ably greater than I had been led to expect. The 
line in front of us, in the opinion of all the mili- 
tary men here, who are at all competent to judge, 
is one of the strongest in the world, and the force 
of the enemy capable of being increased bevond 
the numbers we now have to oppose to him. 
Independently of the strength of the lines in 
front of us, and of the force of the enemy be- 
hind them, we cannot advance until we get com- 
mand of either York River or James River. Tlie 
efficient cooperation of the navy is, thei'cfore, 
absolutely essential, and so I considered it when 
I voted to change our base from the Potomac to 
Fort Monroe. 

An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown ; and 
if several strong gunboats could be sent up 
James River also, our success will be certain and 
complete, and the rebellion will soon be put 
down. 

On the other hand, we must butt against the 
enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great 
waste of time, life, and material. 

If we break through and advance, both our 
flanks will be assailed from two great water- 
courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies 
would give out, and the enem}', equal if not supe- 
rior in numbers, would, with the other advan- 
tages, beat and destroy this army. 

The greatest master of the art of war has said, 
'* that if you would invade a country successfully 
you must have one line of operations, and one 
army, under one general." But what is our con- 
dition ? The State of Virginia is made to con- 
stitute the command, in part or wholly, of some 
six generals, namely: Fremont, Banks, McDow- 
ell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the 
scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. 

The great battle of the war is to come off here. 
If we win it, the rebellion will be crushed — if we 
lose it, the consequences will be more horrible 
than I care to tell. The plan of campaign I voted 
for, if carried out with the means proposed, M'ill 
certainly succeed. If any part of the means 
proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due 
to myself to say that our success will be uncer- 
tain. 

It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of 
the First corps to have a separate department, 
and as this letter advocates his return to General 
McClcllan's command, it is proper to state that I 
am not at all influenced by personal regard or 
dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were 
to credit all the oj)inions which have been poured 
into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my 
present fine command, I owe much to General 
McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. 
But I have disregarded all such officiousness, 
and I have from last July to the present day sup- 
ported General McClellan, and obeyed all his or- 



ders with as hearty a good-will as though he had 
been my brother or the friend to whom I owed 
most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and 
so long as he is my commander. And I am not 
desirous to displace him, and would not if I coidd. 
He left Washington M'ith the understanding that 
he was to execute a definite plan o.f campaign 
with certain prescribed means. The plan was 
good and the means sufficient, and without mod- 
ification the enterprise was certain of success. 
But with the reduction of force and means, the 
plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, 
with means insufficient for certain success. 

Do not look upon this communication as the 
offspring of despondency. I never despond ; 
and when you see me working the hardest, you 
may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. 
I am working now to my utmost. 

Please show this letter to the President, and I 
should like also that Mr. Stanton should know 
its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as 
soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect 
respect, Your most obedient servant, 

E. D. Kevks, 

Prigaflier-General, Commanding Fourth Army Corps. 

Hon. Iij.if.HARRis, 

U. S. Senate. 

On the seventh of April, and before the arri- 
val of the divisions of Generals Hooker, Rich- 
ardson, and Casey, I received the following des- 
patches from the President and Secretary of War : 

WAsniNGTON, April 6, 1362 — 3 p.m. 
Yours of eleven a.m. to-day received. Secre- 
tary of War informs me that the forwarding of 
transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's bri- 
gade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, 
interfered with. You now have over one hun- 
dred thousand troops with you, independent of 
General Wool's command. I think you better 
break the enemy's line from Yorktown to War- 
wick River at once. This will probably use time 
as advantageously as you can. 

Abraham Lincolx. 

President. 

Genera, G. B. McClellan. 

WASHiNGins, April 6, ISG'2 — 2 p.m. 

The President directs me to say that your des- 
patch to him has been received. General Sum- 
mer's corps is on the road to join you, and will 
go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's divi- 
sion is now on the advance toward Manassas. 
Tliere is no means of transportation here to send 
it forward in time to be of service in your present 
operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the 
power of the Government shall be done to sus- 
tain you as occasion may require. 

E. M. Stanton, 

General G. B. McClellan. Secretary of War. 

By the ninth of April I had acquired a pretty 
good knowledge of the position and strength of 
the enemy's works, and the obstacles to be over- 
come. On that day I received the following let- 
ter from the President : 



DOCUMENTS. 



557 



■WASHiSGTOif, April 9, 1362. 

My Dear Sir: Your despatches, complaining 
that 3'ou arc not properly sustained, while they 
do not offend me, do pain me very much. 

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you 
before you left here, and you know the pressure 
under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui- 
esced in it — certainly not without reluctance. 

After you left, I ascertained that less than 
twenty thousand unorganized men, without a 
single field battery, were all you designed to be 
left for the defence of Washington and Manassas 
Junction, and part of this even was to go to Gen- 
eral Hooker's old position. General Banks's 
corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was 
diverted and tied up on the hue of Winchester 
and Strasburgh, and could not leave it without 
again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or 
would present, when McDowell and Sumner 
should bo gone, a great temptation to the enemy 
to ttu'n back from the Rappahannock and sack 
Washington. My implicit order that Washington 
should, by the judgment of all the commanders 
of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been 
neglected. It was precisely this that drove me 
to detain McDowell. 

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your 
arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junc- 
tion : but when that arrangement was broken up, 
and nothing was substituted for it, of course I 
was constrained to substitute something for it 
myself. And allow tne to ask, do you really 
think I should permit the line from Richmond, 
via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely 
open, except what resistance could be presented 
by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops ':* 
This is a question which the country will not al- 
low mo to evade. 

There is a curious mystery about the number 
of troops now with you. When I telegraphed 
you on the sixth, saying you had over a hundred 
thousand with you, I had just obtained froni the 
Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, 
from your own returns, making one hundred and 
eight thousand then with you and en route to 
you. You now saj'' you will have but eighty- 
five thousand when all en route to you shall have 
reached j'ou. How can the discrepancy of twen- 
ty-three thousand be accounted for? 

As to General Wool's command, I understand 
it is doing for you precisely what a like number 
of your own would have to do if that command 
was away. 

I suppose the whole force which has gone for- 
ward for you is with you by this time. And if 
so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike 
a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain 
upon you — that is, he will gain faster by fortifi- 
cations and reenforcements than you can by re- 
enforcements alone. And once more let me tell 
you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a 
blow. I am powerless to help this, You will 
do me the justice to remember I always insisted 
that going down the bay in search" of a field, in- 
stead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only 

Sur. Doc. 36. 



shifting, and not surmounting, a difBculty ; that 
we would find the same enemy, and the same or 
equal intrencluiients, at either place. The coun- 
try will not fiiil to note, is now noting, that the 
present hesitation to move upon an intrenched 
enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 

I beg to assure you that I have never written 
you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feed- 
ing than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sus- 
tain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, 
I consistently can. But you must act. 

Yours, very truly, 

A. Lincoln. 

Major-General McClellan. 

With great deference to the opinions and wish- 
es of His Excellency, the President, I most re- 
spectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I 
have presented and those contained in the ac- 
companying letter of General Keyes, with the 
reports of General Barnard and other officers, as 
furnishing a reply to the above letter. His Ex- 
cellency could not judge of the formidable char- 
acter of the works before us as well as if he had 
been on the ground ; and whatever might have 
been his desire for prompt action, (certainly no 
greater than mine,) I feel confident if he could 
have made a personal inspection of the enemy's 
defences, he would have forbidden me risking the 
safety of the army and the possible successes of 
the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an ad- 
vantageous and formidable position, which, evev. 
if successful, could not have been followed up 
to any other or better result than would have 
been reached by the regular operations of a siege. 
Still less could I forego the conclusions of my 
most instructed judgment for the mere sake of 
avoiding the personal consequences intimated in 
the President's despatch 

The following extracts from the report of the 
Chief Engineer (Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard) 
embody the result of our reconnoissances, and 
give, with some degree of detail, the character 
and strength of the defences of Yorktown and 
the Warwick, and some of the obstacles which 
the army contended against and overcame. 

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL BARNARd's REPORT. 

The accompanying drawing (Map No. 2) gives 
with accurac}^ the outline and armament of the 
fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the de- 
tached works immediately connected with it. 

The three bastioned fronts, looking toward our 
approaches, appear to have been earliest built, 
and have about fifteen feet thickness of parapet 
and eight feet to ten feet depth of ditch, the width 
varying much, but never being less at top of scai'p 
than fifteen feet — I think generally much more. 

The works extending around the town, from 
the western salient of fronts just mentioned, ap- 
pear to have been finished during the past win- 
ter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 
eighteen feet thickness of parapet, and generally 
ten feet depth of ditch. 

The water-battei'ies had generally eighteen feet 
parapet, the guns in barbette. 



553 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Thov were (as well as all the works mention- 
ed) carefully constructed with well-made sod re- 
vetments. 

There were numerous traverses between the 
guns, and ample mu,a;azines; how sufficient in 
bomh-proof qualities I am unable to say. 

The two hrst guns of the work on the heights 
bear upon the water as well as the land, and were 
of heavy calibre. 

TIk- list herewith gives all the guns m position, 
or for wliich there were emplacements. The va- 
cant emplacements were all occupied before the 
evacuation by siege-guns, rifled four and a half- 
inch twenty-four pounders, and cighteen-pound- 
ers. 

In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there 
were found one eight-inch columbiad, one forty- 
two pounder, and one eiglit-inch siege howitzer ; 
the two former in barbette. The sketch will show 
the emplacements for guns on field and siege- 
carriages ; making, I think, with the foregoing, 
twenty-two. Two of these M^ere placed behind 
traverjics, with embrasures covered by blindages. 

The two external redoubts, with the connecting 
parapets, formed a reentrant with the fronts of 
attack, and all the guns bore on our approaches. 

It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches 
were swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, 
nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them 
the most formidable guns known. Besides that, 
two thirds of the guns of the water-batteries and 
all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right bat- 
teries, though under disadvantageous circum- 
stances. 

The ravine behind which the left of the York- 
town fronts of attack was placed was not very 
difficidt, as the heads formed depressions in front 
of their lelt, imperfectly seen by their fire, and 
from which access could bo had to the ditches ; 
but we could not be sure of the fact before the 
evacuation. The enemy held, by means of a slight 
breastwork and rifle-trenches, a position in ad- 
vance of the heads of these ravines as far forward 
as the burnt house. 

The ravines which head between the Yorktown 
fortifications and the exterior works are deep and 
intricate. Tlie}'' were tolei'ably well seen, how- 
ever, by the works which run westwardly Irom 
the Yoi'ktown works, and which were too numoi"- 
ous and complicated to be traced on pa])er. 

Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, ap- 
pears to have been built at an early period. 

The external connection between this work was 
first a rille-trench, probably afterward enlarged 
into a parapet, with external ditch and an cm- 
placement for four guns in or near the small re- 
dan in the centre. 

Behind this they had constructed numerous 
epaulements,with connecting boyaus not fully ar- 
ranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended 
probably to protect their camps and reserves 
against tlie destructive effects of om* artillery. 

From the "red redoubt" these trenches and 
cpaulemcnts ran to the woods and rivulet which 
forms one head of the Warwick, and continue al- 
most without break to connect with the works at 



Wynn's Mill. This stream, just mentioned, what- 
ever be its name, (the term " Warwick," accord- 
ing to some, applying only to the tidal channel 
from the James River up as high as Lee's Mill,) 
was inundated by a number of dams from near 
where its head is crossed by the epaulements men- 
tioned down to Lee's ilill. 

Below Lee's Mill the Warwick follows a tortu- 
ous course through salt marshes of two hundred 
yards or three hundred yards in width, from 
which the land rises up boldly to a height of 
thirty or forty feet. 

The first group of works is at Wynn'.s Mill, 
where there is a dam and bridge. The next is 
to guard another dam between Wynn's ami Lee's 
Mills ; (this is the point attacked by General 
Smith on the sixteenth ultimo, and where Lieu- 
tenant I\Ierrill was wounded; the object of the 
attack was merely to prevent the further construc- 
tion of works and feel the strength of the posi- 
tion.) A work, of what strength is not known, 
was at the sharp angle of the stream just above 
Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works was at 
Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. 

From Lee's Mill a line of works extends across 
Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. 

At Southal's Landing is another formidable 
group of works, and from here, too, they extend 
apparently across to the James River. 

These groups of field-works were connected by 
rifle-trenches or parapets for nearly the whole 
distance. 

They are far more extensive than may be sup- 
posed from the mention of them I make, and every 
kind of obstruction which the country affords, 
such as abatis, marsh, inundation, etc., was skil- 
fully used. The line is certainly one of the most 
extensive known to modern times. 

The country on both sides of the Warwick, from 
near Yorktown down, is a dense forest with few 
clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impaa- 
sable during the heavy rains we have constantly 
had, except where our own labors had corduroy- 
ed them. 

If we could have broken the enemy's line across 
the isthmus we would have invested Yorktown, 
and it must, with its garrison, have soon fillen 
into om- hands. It was not deemed practicable, 
coiisiilering the strength of that line and thedifB- 
culty of handling our forces, (owing to the im- 
practicable character of the country,) to do so. 

If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy 
out of that place, the enemy's lino was no longer 
tenable. This we could do by siege operations. 
It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the re- 
duction of the place by assault. 

The plan of the approaches and their defences 
as deteiMuined upon and finally executed is exhi- 
bited on tlic accompanying map, (No. — . ) It 
was, in words, to open the first parallel as near 
as possible to the works of the enemy, and under 
its protection to establish almost simultaneously 
batteries along the whole front, extending from 
York liiver on the right to the Warwick on the 
left, a chord of about one mile in length. The prin- 



DOCUMENTS. 



659 



cips' approaches were directed against the east 
end of the main work, whicli was most heavily 
armed and bore both on the water and land, and lay 
between W'orniley's Creek and York River. There 
also wci'e jjlaced the most of tlie batteries design- 
ed to act against the land front to enfilade the 
water-batteries, and to act upon Gloucester. 

I designed at the earliest moment to open si- 
multaneously with several batteries, and as soon 
a.s the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of 
land between Wormley's Creek and the Warwick, 
were crippled and their fire kept down, to push 
the trenches as far forward as necessary and to 
assault Yorktown and the adjacent works. 

The approaches to the batteries, the necessary 
bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been 
vigorously pushed to completion by the troops 
under (Jenerals Heintzelman and Sumner, and 
were available for inf-xntry, and in some instances 
for artillery, on the seventeenth of April, when 
the batteries and their connections were com- 
menced, and labor upon them kept up night and 
day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy 
ground and concealed from the view of the enemy 
were early completed and armed, and held ready 
for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as 
the return fire of the enemy would interfere too 
much with the labor on other and more import- 
ant works. The completion of the more exposed 
and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, 
preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. 

It having been discovered that the enemy were 
receiving artillery stores at the wharf in York- 
town, on May first, battery No. One was opened 
with eifect upon the wharf and town. 

On the twenty-second of April General Frank- 
lin, with his division from General McDowell's 
corps, had arrived and reported to me. The gar- 
rison of Gloucester Point had been reenforced 
and the works strengthened ; but as this division 
was too small to detach to the Severn, and no 
more troops could be spared, I determined to act 
on Gloucester by disembarking it on the north 
bank of the York River, imder the protection of 
the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on 
board ship while the necessar}^ preparations were 
made for landing them, and supporting them in 
case of necessity. For a fall account of this labor 
I refer to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. 
Alexander, of the engineer corps, detailed for this 
expedition. 

\Vhilo tlie siege works were being rapidly com- 
pleted, the roads on the left wing necessary for 
communication and advance were opened and cor- 
duroyeil over the marshes, batteries were erected 
to silence the enemy's guns, and drive him from 
his works at Wynn's and Lee's Mills, preparatory 
to the general attack. Active reconnoissances 
were continually going on, and attempts in force 
made to drive the enemy from the banks. 

The result of various reconnoissances made 
under the immediate direction of General W. F. 
Smith, commanding Second division Fourth corps, 
led to the belief that the weakest point of that 
part of tiie enemy's lines, was opposite a field 
where it was ascertained that there was a dam 



covered by a battery known to contain at least 
one gun. 

It was determined to push a strong reconnois- 
sance on this point to silence the enemy's fire, 
and ascertain the actual strength of the position. 
Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitring par- 
ty by a real attack, if fovmd expedient. General 
W. F. Smith was directed to undertake the op- 
eration on the sixteenth of April. lie silenced 
the fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the ex- 
istence of other works previously concealed and 
unknown, and sent a strong party across the 
stream, which was finally forced to retire with 
some loss. Smith intrenched himself in a position 
immediateh'' overlooking the dam and the enemy's 
works, so as to keep them under control, and 
prevent the enemy from using the dam as a 
means of crossing the AYarwick to annoy us. 

Many times toward the end of the month the 
eneni}^ attempted to drive in our pickets, and take 
our rifle-pits near Yorktown, but alwa3-s without 
success. 

As the siege progressed, it was with great dif- 
ficulty that the rifle-pits on the right could be 
excavated and held, so little covering could be 
made against the hot fire of the enemy's artillery 
and infantry. Their guns continued firing up to 
a late hour of the night of the third of May. 

Our batteries would have been ready to open 
on the morning of the sixth May at latest; but 
on the morning of the fourth it was d'.scovered 
that the enemy had already been compelled to 
evacuate his position during the night, leaving 
behind him all his heavy guns, uninjured, and a 
large amount of ammunition and supplies. For 
the details of the labor of the siege I refer to the 
accompanying reports and journals of Brigadier- 
General J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, charged 
with the selections, laying out, and completion 
of the approaches and batteries ; of Brigadier- 
General VYm. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, charged 
with arming and supplying with ammunition all 
the siege and field-batteries ; and of Brigadier- 
General Fitz-John Porter, director of the siege, 
to whom were assigned the guarding of the 
trenches, the assembling and distribution of the 
woi'king parties, etc. etc. 

Pearly in the morning of the fourth, on the ene- 
my's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered 
all the available cavalry force, with four batteries 
of horse artillery, under Brigadier-drcneral Stone- 
man, Chief of Cavalry, in iamiediate pursuit by 
the Yorktown and Williamsl>urgti road, with or- 
ders to harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut 
off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's Mill 
and Williamsburgh road. 

(xencral Heintzelman was directed to send 
Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and 
Williamsburgh road to support General Stone- 
man ; and Smith was ordered to proceed with his 
division upon the Lee's Mill and AV^illiajnsburgh 
road for the same purpose. Afterward, the divi- 
sions of Generals Kearny, Couch, and Casey, were 
put en route — the first on the Yorktown road, 
and the others on the Lee's Mill road. These 
roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of 



500 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Fort Magriider, and are connected by cross-roads 
at several points between Yorktown and Wil- 
liamsburjih. Afti-r these directions had been given, 
(ieneml Sumner (the officer second in rank in the 
arniv of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to 
the front and take immedi,ite cliargc of opera- 
tions until my arrival. 

(General Stoneman moved forward promptl}- 
witli iiis eommiuid, consisting of four batteries of 
horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, 
the First and Sixth United States cavalry, the 
Third Pennsylvania and Eighth Illinois, and Bar- 
ker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition 
until he arrived in front of the enemy's works 
about two miles e:\st of Williumsburgh.^ 

At a point al)out eight miles from Yorktown, 
in accordance with my instructions, he detached 
(Jeneral Emory with Iknson's battery, the Third 
Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Bar- 
ker's squadron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and 
endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, 
to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear-guard 
wliich had taken that route. General Emory had 
some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry 
and a battery under General Stuart, and drove 
them in the direction of Lee's Mill. 

(ieneral Smith having met with obstructions 
in his front, had transferred his column, by a 
cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsburgh 
road, so that General Eniorj', finding no force to 
cooperate with him, was unable to cut off the 
rear-guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a 
circuitous route along the bank of the James 
River. 

The position in which General Stoneman en- 
countered the enemy is about four miles in extent, 
the right resting on College Creek, and the left 
on (Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths of its 
front lieing covered by tributaries of these two 
creeks, ufton which there are ponds. 

The ground between the heads of the boundary 
streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line 
of detached works had been constructed, consist- 
ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre 
with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts 
and epaulements . field-guns. 

The])arapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet 
high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide 
and nine feet deep, tilled with water. The length 
of the interior crest is about six hundred yards. 
The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
small dimensions, having faces of about forty 
yards. Tiie woods in front of the position were 
felled, and the open ground in front of the works 
was dotted with luunerous ride-pits. 

The rn:ids leading from the lower part of the 
Pcninsul-i to Williiimsburgh, one along the York 
River, (ttie Yorktown rowl,) and the other along 
the James, (the [.ce's Mill road,) unite between 
the heads of the tributary streams a short, dis- 
tance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they 
arc commanded, and debouch from the woods 
just before uniting. A branch from the James 
Uiver road leaves it about one and three fourths 
of a mile below Fori Magruder and unites with 
tlio road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburgh, 



which crosses the tributary of College Creek over 
a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just 
in rear of the line of works, binng commanded 
by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at 
about the same distance from Fort Magruder. A 
branch leaves the Y'ork River road and crosses 
the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, and 
passing over the position and through the works 
in its rear, finally enters Williamsburgh ; this 
road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the 
line of the works. 

General Stoneman debouched from the woods 
with his advance-guard, (consisting of a part of 
the First United States cavalry and one section 
of Gibson's battery, under the command of Gen- 
eral Cooke,) and the enemy immediately opened 
on him with several field-pieces from Fort Ma- 
gruder, having the correct range, and doing some 
execution. Gibson's battery was brought into 
position as rapidly as the deep mud would per- 
mit, and returned the fire ; while the Sixth 
United States cavalry was sent to feel the ene- 
my's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, 
which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the 
rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, 
with infantry and artillery, came down upon it, 
whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The 
rear squadron, under command of Captain Saun- 
ders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in 
the most gallant manner. In the mean time the 
enemy was being reenforced by infantry, and the 
ai'tillery fire becoming very hot. General Stone- 
man, having no infontry to carry the works, or- 
dered the withdrawal of the battery. This was 
accomplished with the exception of one piece, 
which could not be extricated from the mud. 
The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, 
but their charges were met by the First United 
States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Gricr, and they were driven back, losing 
several officers and one stand of colors. General 
Stoneman then took a defensive position a short 
distance in the rear of the first, to await the arri- 
val of the infantry. 

The advance of General Smith's column reach- 
ed Skiff's Creek about half-past eleven o'clock, 
and found the bridge over that stream in flames 
and the road impassable. A practicable route to 
the Yorktown road having been discovered, the 
division, by order of General Sumner, moved on 
by that road, and reached General Stoneman's 
position about half-past five o'clock. General 
Sunmer, ariiving with it, assumed command. 

Generals Ileintzelman and Keyes also arrived. 
During the afternoon of the fourth, near the 
Half-way House, the head of General Hooker's 
colunm encountered Smith's division filing into 
the road, and was obliged to halt between three 
and four hours until it had passed. General 
Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake 
Church turned off, by General Heintzclman's di- 
rection, taking a cross-road, and moved out on 
the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with 
General Smith. Marching part of the night, he 
came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the 
morning of the fifth. 



DOCUMENTS. 



561 



General Smith's division having been deployed, 
General Sumner ordered an attack on the works 
in his front; but the lines having been thrown 
into confusion while moving tln-ougli the dense 
forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt for 
that night was abandoned. The troops bivou- 
aclvcd in the woods, and a heavy rain began, 
which continued until the morning of the sixth, 
making the roads, already in very bad condition, 
almost impassable. 

During the morning of the fifth General Sum- 
ner reconnoitred the position in his front, and at 
eleven o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of 
Smith's division, to take possession of a work on 
the enemy's left, which had been found to be un- 
occupied. The remainder of Smith's division oc- 
cupied the woods in front without being actually 
engaged. 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received 
orders during tlie night to march at daylight ; 
but on account of the terrible condition of the 
roads, and other impediments, were not able to 
reacli tlie field until after one o'clock p.ji., at 
whicli time the first brigade of Couch's division 
arrived, and was posted in the centre, on Hooker's 
right. The other two brigades came up during 
the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. 

In the mean time, General Hooker, having re- 
connoitred the enemy's position, began the attack 
at half past seven a.m., and for a while silenced 
the gui s of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground 
in his front ; but the enemy being continually 
reenforced, until their strength greatly exceeded 
his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn 
his left. 

For several hours his division struggled gal- 
lantly against the superior numbers of the ene- 
my. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, 
and between three and four o'clock his ammuni- 
tion began to give out. The loss had been heavy, 
and the exhaustion of tlie troops was very great. 
At this time the division of General Kearny 
came up, who, at nine a.m., had received orders 
to reenforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by 
the greatest exertions, in passing Casey's troops, 
and pushing on to the front through the deep 
mud. General Kearny at once gallantly at- 
tacked, and thereby prevented the loss of an- 
other battery, and drove tlie enemy back at every 
point, enabling General Iloolcer to extricate him- 
self from his position, and withdraw his wearied 
troops. Peck's brigade, of Coucli's division, as 
has been mentioned before, was, immediately on 
its arrival, ordered by General Sumner to deploy 
on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, 
and the attacks of tlie enemy at that point were 
repulsed. General Peck held his position until 
late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by 
the other two brigades of Couch's division, and 
they were in quiet possession of the ground when 
night closed the contest. The vigorous action 
of these troops relieved General Hooker consider- 
ably. General Emorj'' had been left witli his 
command, on tlio night of the fourtii, to guard 
the branch of the Lee's Mill road wliich leads to 
Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the fifth it 



was ascertained that by this route the enemy's 
right could be turned. A request for infantry 
for tliis purpose was made to General Heintzel- 
man, who, late in the afternoon, sent four regi- 
ments and two batteries of Kearny's division — 
the first disposable troops he had — and directed 
General Emory to make tlie attack. Witli these 
reenforcements his force amounted to about three 
tliousand men and three batteries. General Em- 
ory, on account of want of knowledge of the 
ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not 
succeed in tliis movement. It involved some 
risks, but, if successful; might have produced 
important results. 

At eleven a.m., as before mentioned, General 
Smith received orders from General Sumner to 
send one brigade across a dam on our riglit, to 
occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. 
Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. 
He crossed the dam, took possession of tlie first 
redoubt, and afterward, finding the second one 
vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re- 
enforcements to enable him to advance farther 
and take the next redoubt, whicli commanded 
the plain between his position and Fort Magru- 
der, and would have enabled him to take in re- 
verse and cut the communication of the troops 
engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny. 

The enemy soon began to show himself in 
strength before him, and as his rear and right 
flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his 
request for reenforcements. General Smith was 
twice ordered to join him with the rest of his 
division, but each time the order was counter- 
manded at the moment of execution, General 
Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. 
At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeat- 
ed messages for more troops. General Sumner 
sent him an order to fall back to his first posi- 
tion, the execution of which General Hancock 
deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to 
give up the advantage already gained, and fear- 
ing to expose his command by such a movement. 

During the progress of these events I had re- 
mained at Yorktown to complete the ])repara- 
tions for the departure of General Franklin's and 
other troops to AVest-Point by water, and to make 
the necessary arrangements with the naval com- 
mander for his cooperation. 

By pushing General Franklin, well supported 
by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, 
opposite AVest-Point, it was hoped to force the 
enemy to abandon whatever works he might have 
on the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. 
It was of paramount importance that the arrange- 
ments to this end should be promptly made at 
an early hour of the morning. I had sent two 
of my aids (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Ma- 
jor Hammerstein) to observe the operations in 
fiont, with instructions to report to me every 
thing of importance that might occur. I re- 
ceived no information from thrm leading nie to 
suppose that there was any thing occurring of 
more importance than a simple all'air of a rear- 
guard, until about one o'clock p.m., when a des- 
patch arrived from one of them that every thing 



>00 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Port Magnider, and are connected by cross-roads 
at several points between Yorktown and Wil- 
lianisburfrh. AfUr these directions liad been given, 
Oeneml Sumner Cthe ofTicer second in rank in the 
army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to 
the front and take immediiitc charge of opera- 
tions until my arrival. 

(icncral Stoneman moved forward promptly 
witii his command, consisting of four batteries of 
hors.' artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, 
the First and Sixth United States cavalry, the 
Third Pennsylvania and Eighth Illinois, and Bar- 
ker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition 
until he airivcd in front of the enemy's works 
.about two miles cast of Williamsburgh. 

At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, 
in accordance with my instructions, he detached 
(Jeneral Emory with Benson's battery, the Third 
l\>nnsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Bar- 
ker's S([iiuilron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and 
endeavor, with tlic assistance of General Smith, 
to cut olf the portion of the enemy's rear-guard 
wliich hail taken that route. General Emory had 
some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry 
and a battery under General Stuart, and drove 
them in the direction of Lee's Mill. 

(ieneral Smith having met with obstructions 
in his front, had transferred his column, by a 
cross-road, to the Yorktown and ^Villiamsburgh 
road, so that General Emorj% finding no force to 
cooperate with him, was unable to cut off the 
rear-guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a 
circuitous route along the bank of the James 
Uiver. 

The position in which General Stoneman en- 
countered the enemy is about four miles in extent, 
the right resting on College Creek, and the left 
on Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths of its 
front being covered by tributaries of these two 
creeks, upon which there are ponds. 

The ground between the heads of the boundary 
streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line 
of detached works had been constructed, consist- 
ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre 
with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts 
and opaulements . field-guns. 

Tlie|);u-apet of Fort Magruder is about six feet 
high au'l nine feet tliick ; the ditch nine feet wide 
and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length 
of the interior crest is about six hundred 3'ards. 
The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
small dimensions, having faces of about forty 
y.irds. The woods in front of the position were 
felled, and the open ground in front of the works 
was dotted with numerous rille-])its. 

The ro;ids leading from the lower p.art of the 
Peninsul-i to AVillijunsburgh, one along the York 
River, (llie Yorktown roivd,) and the other along 
the .lames, (the Lee's Mill road,) unite between 
the hea<ls of tiie triluitary streams a short dis- 
tance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they 
are commanded, and debouch from the woods 
just before uniting. A branch from the James 
iviver road leaves it about one and three fourths 
of a mile below Fort .Magruder and unites with 
tlic road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburgh, 



which crosses the tributary of College Creek over 
a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just 
in rear of the line of works, b(;ing commanded 
by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at 
about the same distance from Fort Magruder. A 
branch leaves the Y'ork River road and crosses 
the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, and 
passing over the position and through the works 
in its rear, finally enters Williamsburgh ; this 
road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the 
line of the works. 

General Stoneman debouched from the woods 
with his advance-guard, (consisting of a part of 
the First United States cavalry and one section 
of Gibson's battery, under the command of Gen- 
eral Cooke,) and the enemj'' immediately opened 
on him with several field-pieces from Fort Ma- 
gruder, having the correct range, and doing some 
execution. Gibson's batter}^ was brought into 
position as rapidity as the deep mud would per- 
mit, and returned the fire ; while the Sixth 
United States cavalry was sent to feel the ene- 
my's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, 
which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the 
rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, 
with infantry and artillery, came down upon it, 
whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The 
rear squadron, under command of Captain Saun- 
ders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in 
the most gallant manner. In the mean time the 
enemy was being reenforced by infantry, and the 
artillery fire becoming very hot. General Stone- 
man, having no infantry to carry the works, or- 
dered the withdrawal of the battery. This was 
accomplished with the exception of one piece, 
which could not be extricated from the mud. 
The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, 
but their charges were met by the First United 
States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing 
several officers and one stand of colors. General 
Stoneman then took a defensive position a short 
distance in the rear of the first, to await the arri- 
val of the infantry. 

The advance of General Smith's column reach- 
ed Skiff's Creek about half-past eleven o'clock, 
and found the bridge over that stream in Hames 
and the road impassable. A practicable route to 
the Yorktown road having been discovered, the 
division, by order of General Sumner, moved on 
by that road, and reached General Stoneman's 
position about half-past five o'clock. General 
Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command. 

Generals Ileintzelman and Keyes also arrived. 
During the afternoon of the fourth, near the 
ILalf-way House, the head of General Hooker's 
column encountered Smith's division filing into 
the road, and was obliged to halt between three 
and four hours vmtil it had passed. General 
Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake 
Church turned off, by General Heintzelman's di- 
rection, taking a cross-road, and moved out on 
the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with 
General Smith. Marching part of the night, he 
came in siglit of Fort Magruder early in the 
morning of the fifth. 



DOCUMENTS. 



561 



General Smith's division having been deployed, 
General Sumner ordered an attack on the works 
in his front ; but the lines having been thrown 
into confusion while moving through the dense 
forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt for 
that night was abandoned. The troops bivou- 
acked in the woods, and a heavy j-ain began, 
which continued until the morning of the sixth, 
making the roads, already in very bad condition, 
almost impassable. 

During the morning of the fifth General Sum- 
ner reconnoitred the position in his front, and at 
eleven o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of 
Smith's division, to take possession of a work on 
the enemy's left, which had been found to be un- 
occupied. The remainder of Smith's division oc- 
cupied the woods in front without being actually 
engaged. 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received 
orders during the night to march at daylight ; 
but on account of the terrible condition of the 
roads, and other impediments, were not able to 
reach the field until after one o'clock p.m., at 
which time the first brigade of Couch's division 
arrived, and was posted in the centre, on Hooker's 
right. The other two brigades came up during 
the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. 

In the mean time, General Hooker, having re- 
connoitred the enemy's position, began the attack 
at half -past seven a.m., and for a while silenced 
the gui s of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground 
in his front ; but the enemy being continually 
reenforced, until their strength greatlj' exceeded 
his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn 
his left. 

For several hours his division struggled gal- 
lantly against the superior numbers of the ene- 
my. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, 
and between three and four o'clock his ammuni- 
tion began to give out. The loss had been heavy, 
and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. 
At this time the division of General Kearny 
came up, who, at nine a.m., had received orders 
to reenforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by 
the greatest exertions, in passing Casey's troops, 
and pushing on to the front through the deep 
mud. General Kearny at once gallantly at- 
tacked, and thereby prevented the loss of an- 
other batter}', and drove the enemy back at everj^ 
point, enabling General Hooker to extricate him- 
self from his pos-ition, and withdraw his wearied 
troops. Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as 
has been mentioned before, was, immediately on 
its arrival, ordered by General Sumner to deploy 
on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, 
and the attacks of the enemy at that point were 
repulsed. General Peck held his position until 
late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by 
the other two brigades of Couch's division, and 
they were in quiet po.ssession of the ground when 
night closed the contest. The vigorous action 
of these troops relieved (;!eneral Hooker consider- 
ably. General Emor}'- had been left with his 
command, on the night of the fourth, to guard 
the branch of the Lee's Mill road wliich leads to 
Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the fifth it 



was ascertained that by this route the enemy's 
right could be turned. A request for infantry 
for this purpose was made to General Heintzel- 
man, who, late in the afternoon, sent four regi- 
ments and two batteries of Kearny's division — 
the first disposable troops he had — and directed 
General Emory to make the attack. Witli these 
reenforcements his force amounted to about three 
thousand men and three batteries. General I']m- 
ory, on account of want of knowledge of the 
ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not 
succeed in this movement. It involved some 
risks, but, if successful; might have produced 
important results. 

At eleven a.m., as before mentioned, General 
Smith received orders from General Sumner to 
send one brigade across a dam on our right, to 
occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. 
Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. 
He crossed the dam, took possession of t!ie first 
redoubt, and afterward, finding the second one 
vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re- 
enforcements to enable him to advance further 
and take the next redoubt, which commanded 
the plain between his position and Fort ilagru- 
der, and would have enabled him to take in re- 
verse and cut the communication of the troops 
engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny. 

The enemy soon began to .show himself in 
strength before him, and as his rear and right 
flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his 
request for reenforcements. General Smith was 
twice ordered to join him with the rest of his 
division, but each time the order was counter- 
manded at tlie moment of execution, General 
Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. 
At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeat- 
ed messages for more troops. General Sumner 
sent him an order to fall back to his first posi- 
tion, the execution of which General Hancock 
deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to 
give up the advantage already gained, and fear- 
ing to expose his command by such a movement. 

During the progress of these events I had re- 
mained at Yorktown to complete the ))repara- 
tions for the departure of General Fi-anklin's and 
other troops to West-Point by water, and to make 
the necessary arrangements with the naval com- 
mander for his cooperation. 

B}^ pusliing General Franklin, well supported 
by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, 
opposite West-Point, it was hoped to force tlie 
enemy to abandon whatever works he might have 
on the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. 
It was of paramount importance that the arrange- 
ments to this end should be promptly made at 
an early hour of the morning. I had sent two 
of my aids (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzcr and Ma- 
jor Hammerstein) to observe the operations in 
front, with instructions to report to me every 
tiling of importance that might occur. I re- 
ceived no information from tlirm leading me to 
suppose that there was any thing occurring of 
more importance than a simple alfair of a rear- 
guard, until about one o'clock p.m., wiicn a des- 
patch arrived from one of them that ever}' thing 



564 



KEBELLION" RECORD, 1862-Bb. 



ford thff river and occupy the opposite heights. 
This was promptly done on the twentieth, and 
reconnoissances were at once pushed out in ad- 
vance. 

These troops were directed to throw up de- 
fences in an advantageous position to secure our 
left flank. General Ilcintzelinan's corps was 
thrown forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge 
immediately rebuilt. 

I a the mean time our centre and right were 
advanced to the river above, and on the twenty- 
fourth we carried the village of Mechanicsville, 
driving the enemy out with our artillery, and 
forcing tlR'in across the bridge, which they de- 
stro3'ed. General Naglee on the same day dis- 
lodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of 
the "Seven Pines," on the Bottom's Bridge road, 
and our advance on the left secured a strong po- 
sition near that place. 

All the information obtained from deserters, 
negroes, and spies, indicated that the enemy oc- 
cupied in force all the approaches to Richmond 
from the east, and that he intended to dispute 
every step of our advance beyond the Chicka- 
hominy, and the passage of the stream opposite 
our right. That their army was superior to ours 
in numbers, did not admit of a doubt. Strong 
defences had been constructed around Richmond. 

Impressed by these facts with the necessity of 
strengthening the army for the struggle, I did 
not fail to urge repeatedly upon mj^ superiors the 
importance of reenforcing the army of the Poto- 
mac with every disposable man, in order to in- 
sure the success of our attack upon the rebel 
capital. 

On the tenth of May I telegraphed as follows : 

Camp at Ewell's Farm, 
Three Miles beyond Williamsburgh, 
May 10, 1S62— 5 a.m. 

From the information reaching me from every 
source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will 
meet us with all his force on or near the Chicka- 
hominy. The}^ can concentrate many more men 
than T have, and are collecting troops from all quar- 
ters, especially well-disciplined troops from the 
South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards 
have much reduced our numbers and will con- 
tinue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army with 
whatever force I may have, but duty requires me 
to in-ge that every effort be made to reenforce me 
without delay with all the disposable troops in 
Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all 
our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great 
battle now impending, and to make it decisive. 

Tt is possible that the enemy may abandon 
Riclunond without a serious struggle ; but I do 
not believe he will, and it would be unwise to 
count upon any thing but a stubborn and des- 
perate defence— a life-and-death contest. I see 
no other hope for him than to fight this battle, 
ami we must win it. I shall fight them what- 
ever their force may be, but I ask for every man 
that the department can send me. No troops 
•ihould now be left unemployed. Those who en- 
tertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon 
Richmond without a struggle, arc, in my judg- 



ment, badly advised, and do not comprehend n 
their situation, which is one requiring desperate l' 
measures. 

I beg that the President and Secretary will 
maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing 
undone to comply with my request. If I am 
not reenforced, it is probable that I will be 
obliged to fight nearly double my numbers 
strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be 
at all possible for me to bring more than (70,000) 
seventy thousand men upon the field of battle. 
George B. McCLELL.ix, 

Major-Generai Commanding. 

Hon. Edwin M. St.vnton, 

Secretary of War. 

On the fourteenth of May I sent the following 
telegram to the President: 

Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 1S62. 

I have more than twice telegraphed to the Sec- 
retary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the 
enemy were concentrating all their available force 
to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that 
such ought to be their policy. I have received 
no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I 
beg leave to repeat their substance to your Ex- 
cellency, and to ask that kind consideration 
which you have ever accorded to my representa- 
tions and views. All ray information from every 
source accessible to me establishes the fixed pur- 
pose of the rebels to defend Richmond against 
this army by offering us battle with all the troops 
they can collect from east, west, and south, and 
my opinion is confirmed by that of all my com- 
mamiers whom I have been able to consult. 

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have 
much weakened my force, and will continue to 
do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against 
the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the 
utmost, and with them I must attack in position, 
probablj^ intrenched, a much larger force, per- 
haps double m}^ numbers. It is possible that 
Richmond may be abandoned without a serious 
struggle; but the enemy are actually in great 
strength between here and there, and it would be 
unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon 
any thing but a stubborn and desperate resist- 
ance. If thejr should abandon Richmond, it may 
well be that it is done with the purpose of mak- 
ing the stand at some place in Virginia south or 
west of there, and we should be in condition to 
press them without delay. The confederate lead- 
ers must employ their utmost efforts against this 
army in Virginia, and they will be supported by 
the whole body of their military otficer.s, among 
whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, 
as there is also very little among the higher class 
of citizens in the seceding States. 

I have found no fighting men left in this Pe- 
ninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing 
foe. 

Even if more troops than I now have should 
prove unnecessary for purposes of military occu- 
pation, our greatest display of imposing force in 
the capital of the rebel government will have the 
best moral effect. I most respectfully and ear- 



DOCUMENTS. 



565 



nestly urge upon your Excellency that the op- 
portunit}' has come for striking a fatal blow at 
the enemies of the Constitution, and I bog that 
you will cause this army to be reenforced with- 
out delay by all the disposable troops of the Gov- 
ernment. I ask for every man that the War De- 
partment can send me. Any commander of the 
reenf(ircements whom j^our Excellency may de- 
signate will be acceptable to me, whatever expres- 
sion I may have heretofore addressed to you on 
that subject. 

I will fight the enemy whatever their force 
may be, with whatever force I may have ; and I 
firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our 
triumph should be made decisive and complete. 
The soldiers of this army love their government, 
and will fight well in its support. You may rely 
upon them. They have confidence in me as their 
General, and in you as their President. Strong 
reenforcements will at least save the lives of 
manj- of them. The greater our force the more 
perfect will be our combinations, and the less our 
loss. 

For obvious reasons I beg you to give imme- 
diate consideration to this communication, and 
to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your 
final determination. 

George B. McCleli.an, 

Major-General. 

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 

To which, on the eighteenth of May, I received 
this reply ; 

AVashingtos, May 18 — 2 p.m. 

General: Your despatch to the President, 
asking reenforcements, has been received and 
carefully considered. 

The President is not willing to uncover the 
capital entirely; audit is believed that even if 
this were prudent, it would require more time to 
effect a Junction between your army and that of 
the Uappahannock by the way of the Potomac 
and York River, than by a land march. In or- 
der, therefore, to increase the strength of the at- 
tack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, 
General McDowell has been ordered to march 
upon that city by the shortest route. lie is or- 
dered, keeping himself always in position to save 
the capital from all possible attack, so to operate 
as to put his left wing in communication with 
your right wing, and you are instructed to co- 
operate so as to establish this communication as 
soon as possible bj^ extending your right wing to 
the north of Richmond. 

It is believed that this communication can be 
safely established either north or south of the 
Pamunkey River. 

In any event, you will be able to prevent the 
main body of the enemy's forces from leaving 
Riciimond, and falling in overwhelming force 
upon (jicneral McDowell. He will move with be- 
tween thirty-five (35,000) and forty thousand 
(40,000) men. 

A copy of the instructions to General McDow- 
ell arc with this. Tiic specific task assigned to 



his command has been to provide against any 
danger to the capital of the nation. 

At your earnest call for reenforcements, he is 
sent forward to cooperate in the reduction of 
Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not 
to uncover the city of Washington, and you will 
give no order, either before or after your junc- 
tion, which can put him out of position to cover 
this city. You and he will communicate with 
each other by telegraph or otlierwise, as fre- 
quently as may be necessary for sufficient coop- 
eration. When General McDowell is in position 
on your right, his supplies must be drawn from 
^V'est-Point, and you will instruct your statr-offi- 
cers to be prepared to supply him by that route. 

The President desires that General McDowell 
retain the command of the department of the 
Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he 
moves forward. 

By order of the President. 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General George B. McClellan, 
Commanding Army of tlie Potomac, before lUchraoncl. 

It will be observed that this order rendered it 
impossible for me to use the James River as a 
line of operations, and forced me to establish our 
depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Rich- 
mond from the north. 

I had advised, and preferred, that reenforce- 
ments should be sent by water, for the reasons 
that their arrival would be more safe and cer- 
tain, and that I would be left free to rest the 
army on the James River whenever the navigation 
of that stream should be opened. 

The land movement obliged me to expose my 
right in order to secure the junction ; and as the 
order for General McDowell's march was soon 
countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which 
the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated 
the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell 
joined me by water, I could have approached 
Richmond by the James, and tlius avoided the 
delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chick- 
ahominy, and would have had the army massed 
in one body instead of being necessarily divided 
by that stream. 

The following is a copy of the instructions to 
General McDowell : 

\y.\R Department, I 

Wasuingto.v, Jliiy IT, 1SG2. \ 

General : Upon being joined by General 
Shields's division, you will move upon Richmond 
by the general route of the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburgh Railroad, cooperating with the forces 
under General McClellan, now tlireatening Rich- 
mond from the line of the Pannuikcy and York 
rivers. 

While seeking to establisii as soon as possible 
a comnnmication between your left wing and the 
right wing of General McClellan, you will liola 
yourself always in such position as to cover the 
capital of the nation against a sudden dash of 
any large body of the rebel forces. 

(ieneral McClellan will be furnished with a 
coi)y of these instructions, and will be directed 



566 



REBELLIOX RECORD, 1862-63. 



to hold himself in readiness to establish com- 
munication with your left wing, and to prevent 
the main body of the enemy's army from leaving 
Richmond, and throwing itself upon your col- 
umn, before a junction of the two armies is 
effected. 

A copy of his instructions in regard to the 
employment of your force is annexed. 

By order of the President. 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

General !McD5wt:i,i,, 

Commanding Department of Rappahannock. 

Having some doubts, from the wording of the 
foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authori- 
ty over the troops of General McDowell, and as 
to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, 
on the twentj^-first of May I sent this despatch : 



Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp sear Tunstall's 

May 21, 1S62- 



OF THE Potomac, | 
l's Station, Va., V 

2—11 P.M. ) 



Your despatch of yesterday, respecting our 
Kituation and the batteries of Fort Darling, was 
received while I was absent with the advance, 
where I have been all this day. I have cora- 
uiunicated personally' with Captain Goldsborough, 
and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels 
can do nothing \\-ithout cooperation on land, 
which I will not be in condition to afford for sev- 
eral days. Circumstances must determine the 
■ proprietj' of a land attack. 

It rained again last night, and rain on this soil 
soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army 
transportation. I personally crossed the Chick- 
ahominy to-day at Bottom's Bridge ford, and 
went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half 
a mile in front. I have three regiments on the 
other bank guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. 
Keyes's corps is on the New-Kent road, near 
Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman is on the same 
road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on 
the railroad, connecting right with left. Stone- 
man, with advanced-guard, is within one mile of 
New-Bridge. Franklin with two divisions, is 
about two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's 
division, with the reserves of infantry and artil- 
lery, is within supporting distance. Headquar- 
ters will probably be at Coal Harbor to-morrow, 
one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges 
over the Chickahominy are destroyed. The ene- 
my are in force on every road leading to Rich- 
mond, within a mile or two west of the stream. 

Their main body is on the road from New- 
Bridge, encamped along it for four or five miles, 
spreading over the open ground on both sides. 
Johnston's headquarters are about two miles be- 
yond the bridge. 

All accounts report their numbers as greatly 
exceeding our own. The position of the rebel 
forces, the declaration of the confederate author- 
ities, the resolutions of the Virginia Legislature, 
the action of the city government, the c-onduct 
of the citizens, and all other sources of informa- 
tion accessible to mc, give positive assurance that 
our approach to Richmond involves a desperate 
battle between the opposing armies. 



All our divisions arc moving toward tlic foe. 
I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack 
them according to my best judgment, and in 
such manner as to employ my greatest force. 

I regret the state of things as to General Mc- 
Dowell's command. We must beat the enemy 
in front of Richmond. One division added to 
this army for that effort would do more to pro- 
tect AVashington than his whole force can possi- 
bly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels 
arc concentrating from all points for the two bat- 
tles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still, 
most respectfully, suggest the policy of our con- 
centrating here by movements on water. I have 
heard nothing as to the probabilities of the con- 
templated junction of McDowell's force with 
mine. I have no idea when he can start, what 
are his means of transportation, or when he may 
be expected to reach this vicinit3\ I fear thert 
is little hope that he can join me overland in 
time for the coming battle. Delays on my part 
will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoral- 
ization. This region is unhealthy for Northern 
men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our 
soldiers may become discouraged. At present 
our numbers are weakening from disease, but 
our men remain in good heart. 

I regret also the configuration of the depart- 
ment of the Rappahannock. It includes a por- 
tion even of the city of Richmond. I think that 
my own department should embrace the entire 
field of military operations designed for the cap- 
ture and occupation of that citj''. 

Again, I agree with your Excellency that one 
bad general is better than two good ones. 

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your 
orders of the seventeenth instant, addressed to 
myself and General McDowell. If a junction is 
effected before we occupy Richmond, it must 
necessarily be cast of the railroad to Fredericks- 
burgh and within my department. This fact, 
my superior rank, and the express language of 
the sixty-second article of war, will place his 
command under my orders, unless it is other- 
wise specially directed by your E.xcellency ; and 
I consider that he will be under my command, 
except that I am not to detach any portion of 
his forces, or give any orders which can put him 
out of position to cover Washington. If I err in 
my construction, I desire to be at once set right 
Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am 
for an increase of force, that the marclf of Mc- 
Dowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest 
route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, 
as to any interposition b}^ it, as completely as its 
movement by water. The enemy cannot advance' 
by Fredericksburgh on Washington. } 

Should they attempt a movement, which to 
me seems utterly improbable, their route would 
be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that 
the extent of my authority over McDowell may 
be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and 
conflicting views may produce some of those in- 
jurious results which a divided command has so 
often caused. I would respectfully suggest that 
this danger can only be surely guarded against 



DOCUMENTS. 



56? 



by explicitly placinj; General McDowell under 
my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me 
strictly responsible for the closest observance of 
your Instructions. I hope, Mr. Pi^sident, that 
it is not necessary for me to assure you that 
your instructions would be observed in the ut- 
most good faith, and that I have no personal feel- 
ings wliich could influence me to disregard them 
in ar.y particular. 

I believe that there is a great struggle before 
this army, but I am neither dismayed nor dis- 
couraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much 
as I can, but in any event I shall fight it witli all 
the skill, caution, and determination that I pos- 
sess, and I trust that the result may either obtain 
for me the permanent confidence of my Govern- 
ment, or that it may close my career. 

George B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

President of the United States. 

On the twenty-fourth I received the following 
reply : 

May 24, 18G2.— (From Washington, 24th.) 

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last 
evening. Shields's command is there, but it is 
so worn that he cannot move before Monday 
morning, the twentj^-sixth, (2Cth.) ^Ye have so 
thinned our line to get troops for other places that 
it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a 
probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantrj^, 
two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks 
in some peril. 

The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, 
now opposing General McDowell's advance, have, 
as their line of supply and retreat, the road to 
Richmond. 

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement 
against Anderson, you could send a force from 
your right to cut otf the enemy's supplies from 
Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge across the 
two (2) forks of the Pamunkey and intercept the 
enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now 
opposed to you from receiving an accession of 
numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men ; 
and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you 
will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addi- 
tion to the one you now have. Can you not do 
this almost as well as not, while you are build- 
ing the Chickahominy bridges ? McDowell and 
Shields both say they can, and positively will, 
move Monday morning. / wish you to move cau- 
tiously and safely. 

You will have command of McDowell, after he 
joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long 
despatch to us of the twenty-first, (21st.) 

A. Lincoln, 

President. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

This information that McDowell's corps would 
naarch for Fredericksburgh on the following Mon- 
day, (the twenty-sixth,) and that he would be un- 
der my command, as indicated in my telegram of 
the twenty-first, was cheering news, and I now felt 
confident that we would on his arrival be sufiB- 



cicntly strong to overpower the large array con- 
fronting us. 

At a later hour on the same day I received th* 
following : 

May 24, 1802.— (Prom Washington, 4 p.m.) 

In consequence of General Banks's critical po- 
sition, I have been compelled to suspend General 
McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy 
are making a desperate push upon Harper's Fer- 
ry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's 
force, and part of General McDowell's, in their 
rear. A. Lincoln, 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 



President. 



From which it will be seen that I could not 
expect General McDowell to join me in time to 
participate in immediate operations in front of 
Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to 
the President that I would make my calculations 
accordingly. 

It then only remained for me to make the best 
use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail my- 
self of all artificial auxiliaries to compensate as 
much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I 
concurred fully with the President in the injunc- 
tion contained in his telegram of the twenty- 
fourth, that it was necessary with my limited 
force to move " cautiously and safely." In view 
of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, 
and the liability of its bottom-land to sudden in- 
undation, it became necessary to construct be- 
tween Bottom's Bridge and Mechanics ville eleven 
(11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with ex- 
tensive log-way approaches. 

The entire army could probably have been 
thro^vn across the Chickahominy immediately 
after our arrival, but this would have left no force 
on the left bank to guard our communications or 
to protect our right and rear. If the communi- 
cation with our supply depot had been cut by the 
enemy, with our army concentrated upon the 
right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of 
water as it was for many days after our arrival, 
the bridges carried away, and our means of trans- 
portation not furnishing a single day's supplies 
in advance, the troops must have gone without 
rations, and the animals without forage, and the 
army would have been paralyzed. 

It is true I might have abandoned my commu- 
nications and pushed forward toward Richmond, 
trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and 
the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of 
supplies ; but the approaches were fortified, and 
the town itself was surrounded with a strong line 
line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length 
of time to reduce than our troops could have dis- 
pensed with rations. 

Under these circnmstances, I decided to retaiu 
a portion of the army on the left bank of the river 
until our bridges were completed. 

It will be remembered that the order for the 
cooperation of General McDowell was simply su.s- 
pcnded, not revoked, and therefore I was not at 
liberty to abandon the northern approach. 

A very dashing and successful reconnoissanco 



568 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



was made near New-Bridge, on the twenty-fourth 
of May, by Lieutenant Bowen, topozrapiiical en- 
gineers, escorted by the Fourth Michigan volun- 
teers and a squadron of the United States caval- 
ry, commanded, respectively, by Colonel Wood- 
bury and Captain Gordon. 

Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, 
and with little loss drove it back upon its brigade, 
killing a large number and capturing several pris- 
oners. Great credit is due to the staff-oflBcers, 
as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gordon, 
and their commands, for theii- conduct on this 
occasion. 

The work upon the bridges was commenced at 
once, and pushed forward with great vigor; but 
the rains, which from day to day continued to 
full, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a 
greater height than had been known for twenty 
years. 

This demolished a great amount of our labor, 
and our first bridges, with their approaches, 
which were not made with reference to such ex- 
treme high water, were carried off or rendered 
impassable. We were obliged, with immense la- 
bor, to construct others, much longer, more ele- 
vated, and stable ; our men worked in the water, 
exposed to the enemy's fire from the opposite 
bank. 

On the twenty-fifth of May I received the fol- 
lowing telegram. 

Washixgtos, May 2.5, 1S62. 

Your despatch received. General Banks was 
at Strasburgh with about six thousand (6000) 
men, Shields having been taken from him to swell 
a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, 
and the rest of his force scattered at various 
places. On the twenty-third r23d) a rebel force 
of seven (7) to ten thousand (10,000) fell upon 
one regiment and two companies guarding the 
bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely ; 
crossed the Shenandoah, and on the twenty- 
fourth, (24th,) yesterday, pushed on to get north 
of IJanks on the road to Winchester. General 
Banks ran a race with them, beating them into 
Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a 
battle ensued between the two forces, in which 
General Banks was beaten back into full retreat 
toward Martinsburgh, and probably is broken up 
into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap 
Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now 
near Front Royal with ten thousand (10,000) 
troops, following up and suppoi'ting, as I under- 
stand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that 
another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, 
following on in the same direction. Stripped 
bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to pre- 
vent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Fer- 
ry or above. McDowell has about twenty thou- 
sand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of 
Port Royal ; and Fremont, who was at Franklin, 
is moving to llarrisonburgh ; both these move- 
ments intended to get in the enemy's rear. 

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered 
through hereto Harper's Feny; the rest of his 
forces remain for the present at Fredcricksburgh. 
We arc sending such regiments and dribs from 



here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's 
Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, call- 
ing in militia from the adjacent States. We also 
have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's 
Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at 
that point. This is now our situation. 

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, 
we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions 
of something like this, and no unwillingness to 
sustain you, has always been my reason for with- 
holding McDowell's forces from you. 

Please understand this, and do the best you 
can with the forces you have. 

A. LiXCOLN, 

Major-General McClellan. President. 

On the twenty-fifth the following was also re- 
ceived : 

Washington, May 25, 1362 — 2 p.m. 

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force 
to drive General Banks before him ; precisely in 
what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening 
Lecsburgh, and Geary on the Manassas Gap Rail- 
road, from both north and south ; in precisely 
what force we cannot tell. I think the movement 
is a general and concerted one, such as would not 
be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very 
desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time 
is near when you must either attack Richmond 
or give up the job, and come to the defence of 
Washington. Let me hear from you instantly. 

A. Lincoln, 

Major-General McClellax. President. 

To which I replied as follows : 

Coal Harbor, May 25, 1S62. 

Telegram received. Independently of it, the 
time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. 
The object of the movement is probably to pre- 
vent reenforcements being sent to me. All the 
information obtained from balloons, deserters, 
prisoners, and contrabands, agrees in the state- 
ment that the mass of the rebel troops are still 
in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to 
defend it. I have no knowledge of Banks's po- 
sition and force, nor what there is at ^lanassas ; 
therefore cannot form a definite opinion as to the 
force against him. 

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 
six miles of Richmond; the others on this side 
at other crossings within same distance, and ready 
to cross when bridges are completed. 

G. B. McClellax, 

Major-General Commanding. 

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 

President. 

On the twenty-sixth I received the following: 

Washington, May 2G, 1862—12.40 a.m. 
We have General Banks's official report. He 
has saved his army and baggage, and has made a 
safe retreat to the river, and is probabl}' safe at 
Wiiliamsport. He reports the attacking force at 
fifteen thousand, (15,000.) 

A. LiNCOLr,, 

Major-General McClellan. President. 



DOCUMENTS. 



569 



On the twenty-sixth I received the following : 
Washington, Jlay 26, 1862. 

Can you not cut the Acqnia Creek Railroad ? 
Also, what impression have you as to intrenched 
works for you to contend with in front of Rich- 
mond ? Can you get near enough to throw shells 
into the city ? A. Lincoln, 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. President. 

On the same day I sent the following : 

Coal Harbor, May 26, 1S62. 
Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three 
places between Hanover Court-IIouse and the 
Chickahominy. AVill try to cut the other. I do 
not think Richmond intrcnchments formidable ; 
but am not certain. Hope very soon to be with- 
in shelling distance. Have railroad in operation 
from AVhite House to Chickahominy. Hope to 
have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. 
Nothing of interest to-day. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 

President. 

The interruption of the railroad, here referred 
to, was effected by the command of Brigadier- 
General Stoneman, and was intended to prevent 
the enemy from drawing supplies by that route, 
or from sending reenforcements to Anderson or 
Jackson. 

At ten A.M. I sent also the following despatch : 

Telegrams of last night received. I am glad 
to know afiairs are not so bad as might have 
been. I would earnestly call j-our attention to 
my instructions to General Banks of March six- 
teenth, to General Wadsworth of the same date, 
and to my letter of April first, to the Adjutant- 
General. I cannot but think that a prompt re- 
turn to the principles there laid down would re- 
lieve all probability of danger. I will forward 
copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance 
of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction 
to Fredericksburgh. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 

President. 

Later on the twenty-sixth I sent the following : 

Camp Near New-Bridge, I 
May 26, 1SC2— 7-30 p.m. J 

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. 
We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, pre- 
paratory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, 
I feel forced to take every possible precaution 
against disaster, and to secure my flanks against 
the probably superior force in front of me. My 
arrangements for to morrow are very important, 
and if successful, will leave me free to strike on 
the return of the force detached. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

His Excellencj', A. Lincoln, 

President. 

On the same day T received intelligence that 
a very considerable force of tiie enemy was in 



the vicinity of Hanover Gourt-House, to the right 
and rear of our armj^, thus threatening our com- 
munications, and in a position either to reenforce 
Jackson, or to impede McDowell's junction, 
should he finally move to unite with us. On the 
same day I also received information from Gen- 
eral McDowell, through the Secretary of War, 
that the enemy had fallen l)ack from Fredericks- 
burgh toward Richmond, and that General Mc- 
Dowell's advance was eight miles south of the 
Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dis- 
lodge or defeat this force, independently even of 
the wishes of the President, as expressed in his 
telegram of the twenty-sixth. I intrusted this 
task to Brigadier-General Fitz-John Porter, com- 
manding the Fifth corps, with orders to move at 
daybreak on the twenty-seventh. 

Through a heavy rain and over bad roads, that 
officer moved his command as follows : 

Brigadier-General W. H. Emory led the ad- 
vance, with the Fifth and Sixth regiments United 
States cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 
Second United States artillery, taking the road 
from New-Bridge via Mechanics ville, to Hanover 
Court-House. 

General MoreU's division, composed of the 
brigades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, 
with Berdan's regiment of sharp-shooters, and 
three batteries, under Captain Charles Griffin, 
Fifth United States artillery, followed on the 
same road. 

Colonel G. K. Warren, commanding a provi- 
sional brigade, composed of the Fifth and Thir- 
teenth New-York, the First Connecticut artillery, 
acting as infantry, the Sixth Pennsylvania cav- 
alry, and Weeden's Rhode Island battery, moved 
from his station at Old Church by a road run- 
ning to Hanover Court-House, parallel to the 
Pamunkey. 

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles 
through the mud and rain. General Emory, at 
noon, reached a point about two miles from Han- 
over Court-House where the road forks to A.sh- 
land, and found a portion of the enemy formed 
in line across the Hanover Court-House road. 

General Emory had, before this, been joined 
by the Twenty -fifth New-York (of Martinsdale's 
brigade) and Berdan's sharp-shooters; these 
regiments were deployed with a section of Ben- 
son's battery, and advanced slowly toward the 
enemy until reenforced by General Butterfield 
with four regiments of his brigade, when the 
enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of 
his guns being captured by the Seventeenth 
New-York, under Colonel Lansing, after having 
been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. 
The firing here lasted al)0ut an hour. The cav- 
aliy and Benson's battery were immediately or- 
dered in pursuit, followed by MoreU's infantry 
and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's 
brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed 
by repairing bridges, etc., now arrived, too late 
to participate in this affair ; a portion of this 
command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy 
bridges, and c.iptured quite a number of prison- 
ers ; the remiinder followed MoreU's division. 



570 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



In the mean time General Martindale, with the 
few remaining regiments of his brigade and a 
section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland 
road, and found a "force of the enemy's infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery, in position near Beake's 
Station,' on the Virginia Central Railroad; he 
soon forced them to retire toward Ashland. 

The Twenty-fifth New-York having been or- 
dered to rejoin him, General Martindale was di- 
rected to form his brigade and move up the rail- 
road to rejoin the rest of the command at Hano- 
ver Court-House. 

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but re- 
mained with the Second Maine, afterward joined 
by the Twenty-fifth New-York, to guard the rear 
of the main column. 

The enemy soon returned to attack General 
Martindale, who at once formed the Second Maine, 
Twenty-fifth New-York, and a portion of the 
Fony-fourth New- York, with one section of Mar- 
tin's'battcry, on the New-Bridge road, facing his 
own position of the morning, and then held his 
ground for an hour against large odds until re- 
enforced. 

General Porter was at Hanover Court-House, 
near the head of his column, when he learned 
that the rear had been attacked by a large force. 
He at once faced the whole column about, re- 
called the cavalry sent in pursuit toward Ash- 
land, moved the Thirteenth and Fourteenth New- 
York and Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's 
assistance, pushed the Ninth Massachusetts and 
Sixty-second Pennsylvania, of McQuade's bri- 
gade, through the woods on the right, (our origi- 
nal left,) ami attacked the flank of the enemy, 
while Butterfield, with the Eighty-third Pennsyl- 
vania and Sixteenth Michigan, hastened toward 
the scene of action by the railroad, and through 
the woods, further to the right, and completed 
the rout of the enemy. During the remainder 
of this and the following day our cavalry was 
active in the pursuit, taking a number of pris- 
oners. 

Captain Harrison, of the Fifth United States 
cavalry, with a single company, brought in as 
prisoners two entire companies of infiintry with 
their arms and ammunition. A part of Rush's 
Lancers also captured an entire company with 
tiieir arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs were, 
some two hundred of the enemy's dead buried 
by our troops, seven hundred and thirty prison- 
ers sent to the rear, one twelve-pound howitzer, 
one caisson, a large number of small arms, and 
two railroad trains, captured. 

Our loss amounted to fifty-three killed, three 
hundred and forty-four wounded and missing. 

The force encoimtered and defeated was Gen- 
eral Branch's division, of North-Carolina and 
Georgia troops, supposed to have been some nine 
thousand strong. Their camp at Hanover Court- 
House was taken and destroyed. 

Having reason to believe that General Ander- 
son, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I 
ordered General Sykes's division of regulars to 
move on the twenty-eighth from New-Bridge to- 



ward Hanover Court-House, to be in position to 
support General Porter. They reached a point 
within three miles of Hanover Court-House, and 
remained there until the evening of the twenty- 
ninth, when they retui'ned to their original camp. 

On the twenty-eighth General Stoneman's com- 
mand of cavalry, horse artillery, and two regi- 
ments of infantry, were also placed under Gen- 
eral Porter's orders. 

On the same day I visited Hanover Court- 
House, whence I sent the following despatch : 

Hanover Court-House, May 28 — 2 p.m. 

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glo- 
rious victory ; too much credit cannot be given 
to his magnificent division and its accomplished 
leader. The rout of the rebels was complete; 
not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are 
constantl)^ coming in ; two companies have this 
moment arrived with excellent arms. 

There is no doubt that the enemy arc concen- 
trating every thing on Richmond. I will do my 
best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether 
I can. 

It is the policy and duty of the Government 
to send me by water all the well-drilled troops 
available. I am confident that Washington is 
in no danger. Engines and cars in large num- 
bers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's 
command. 

I may not be able to cut them off, but will try ; 
we have cut all but the Fredericksburgh and 
Richmond Railroad. The real issue is in the 
battle about to be fought in front of Richmond- 
All our available troops should be collected here, 
not raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. 
It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is 
before us; if any regiments of good troops re- 
main unemployed, it will be an irreparable fault 
committed. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Having ascertained the state of affairs, in- 
structions were given for the operations of the 
following day. 

On the twenty-eighth a party under Major 
Williams, Sixth United States cavalry, destroy- 
ed the common road bridges over the Pamunkey, 
and Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the 
South-Anna. 

On the twenty-ninth he destroyed the Freder- 
icksburgh and Richmond railroad bridge over the 
South-Anna, and the turnpike bridge over the 
same stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover the 
movement of Major Williams, General Emory 
moved a column of cavalry toward Ashland, 
from Hanover Court-House. The advance of 
this column under Captain Chambliss, Fifth Uni 
ted States cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out 
a party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad 
bridge over Stony Creek, broke up the railroad 
and telegraph. 

Another column of all arms, under Colonel 
Warren, was sent on the same day by the direct 



DOCUMENTS. 



571 



road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after 
General Emory's column had retired, capturing 
a small party there. 

General Stoneman on the same day moved on 
Ashland by Leach's Station, covering well the 
movements of the other columns. 

The objects of the expedition having been ac- 
complished, and it being certain that the First 
corps would not join us at once, General Porter 
withdrew his command to their camps with the 
main army on the evening of the twenty -ninth. 

On the night of the twenty-seventh and twen- 
ty-eighth I sent the following despatch to the 
Secretary of War : 

Headquarters Army op the Potomac, ( 

Camp near New-Bridge, May 28, 1862—12.30 a.m. ( 

Porter has gained two complete victories over 
superior forces, yet I feci obliged to move in the 
morning with reenforcements to secure the com- 
plete destruction of the rebels in that quarter. 
In doing so, I run some risk here, but I cannot 
help it. The enemy are even in greater force 
than I had supposed. I will do all that quick 
movements can accomplish, but you must send 
me all the troops j'ou can, and leave to me full 
latitude as to choice of commanders. It is ab- 
solutel}' necessary to destroy the rebels near 
Hanover Court-House before I can advance. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

lion E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

In reply to which, I received the following 
from the President : 

Washington, May 28, 1862. 

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's vic- 
tory ; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I 
am puzzled to know why the Richmond and 
Fredericksburgh Railroad was not seized again, as 
you say you have all the raih'oads but the Rich- 
mond and Fredericksburgh. I am puzzled to see 
how, lacking that, you can have any, except the 
scrap from Richmond to West-Point. The scrap 
of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Han- 
over Junction, without more, is simph^ nothing. 
That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on 
Richmond, I think, cannot be certainly known to 
you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs 
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's 
and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown 
to day. General King telegraphs us from Fred- 
ericksburgh that contrabands give certain infor- 
mation that fifteen thousand left Hanover Junc- 
tion Monday morning to reiinforcc Jackson. I 
am painfully impressed with the importance of 
the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I 
can consistently with my view of due regard to 
all points. A. Lincoln. 

Major-General McClellan. 

At six P.M. of the twenty-ninth I sent the Sec- 
retary of War the following despatch : 

Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, ) 
May 29, 1S62— 6 P.M. f 

General Porter has gained information that 
General Anderson left his position in vicinity of 



Fredericksburgh at four a.m. Sunday, with the 
following troops : First South-Carolina, Colonel 
Hamilton ; one battalion South-Carolina rifles ; 
Thirty-fourth and Thirty-eighth North-Carolina ; 
Forty-fifth Georgia ; Twelfth, Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth South-Carolina; Third Louisiana; 
two batteries of four guns each, namely, Letch- 
er's Virginia and Mcintosh's South-Carolina bat- 
teries. General Anderson and his command pass- 
ed Ashland yesterday evening en route for Rich- 
mond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges 
over the telegraph road which they travelled. 
This information is reliable. It is also positively 
certain that Branch's command was from Gor- 
donsville, bound for Richmond, whither they 
have now gone. 

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that 
there is no rebel force between Fredericksburgh 
and Junction. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Generat 

Hon E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

The following was also sent on the same day : 

Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, ) 
May 29, 1862. f 

A detachment from General F. J. Porter's 
command, under Major Williams, Sixth cavalry, 
destroyed the South-Anna railroad bridge at about 
nine a.m. to day ; a large quantity of confederate 
public property was also destroyed at Ashland 
this morning. R. B. Marcy, 

Chief of Staff. 

Hon E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

In reply to which the following was received : 

Washington, May 29, 1862. 

Your despatch as to the South- Anna and Ash- 
land being seized by our forces this morning is 
received. Understanding these points to be on 
the Richmond and Fredericksburgh Railroad, I 
heartily congratulate the country, and thank 
General McClellan and his army for their seiz- 
ure. A. Lincoln. 

General R. B. Makcy. 

On the thirtieth I sent the following : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, J 
May 30, 1862. f 

From the tone of your despatches, and the 
President's, I do not think that you at all appre- 
ciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. 
It has entirely relieved my right flank, which 
was seriously threatened ; routed and demoral- 
ized a considerable portion of the rebel forces ; 
taken over seven hundred and fifty prisoners ; 
killed and wounded large numbers ; one gun, 
many small arms, and much baggage taken. It 
was one of the handsomest things in the war, 
both in itself and in its results. Porter has re- 
turned, and my army is again well in hand. 
Another day will make the probable field of bat- 
tle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that 
there is nothing in front of McDowell at Freder- 
icksburgh. I regard the burning of South-Anna 



572 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



bridges as the least important result of Porter's 
movement. G. B. McClkllan, 

Major-General. 

Hon E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

The results of this brilliant operation of Gen- 
eral Porter were the dispersal of General Branch's 
division, and the clearing of our right flank and 
rear. It M'as rendered impossible for the enemy 
to communicate by rail with Fredericksburgh, or 
with Jackson Tia Gordonsville, ex6ept by the 
very circuitous route of Lynchburgh, and the 
road was left entirely open for the advance of 
McDowell had he been permitted to join the 
army of the Potomac. His withdrawal toward 
Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and 
fatal error ; he could do no good in that direc- 
tion, while, had he been permitted to carry out 
the orders of May seventeenth, the imited forces 
would have driven the enemy within the im- 
mediate intrenchmcnts of Richmond before Jack- 
son could have returned to its succor, and prob- 
ably would have gained possession promptly of 
that place. I respectfully refer to the reports of 
General Porter and his subordinate commanders 
for the names of the officers who deserve especial 
mention for the parts they took in these affairs, 
but I cannot omit here my testimony to the 
energy and abilitj^ here displayed by General 
Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly 
due the successes there gained. 

On the twentieth of May, a reconnoissance was 
ordered on the south side of the Chickahominy 
toward James River. This was accomplished 
by B)igadier-General H. M. Naglcc, who crossed 
his brigade near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed 
forward to within two miles of James River with- 
out serious resistance, or finding the enemy in 
force. The rest of the Fourth corps, commanded 
by General E. D. Kcyes, crossed the Chicka- 
hominy on the twenty-third of May. 

On the twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twen- 
ty-sixth, a very gallant reconnoissance was push- 
ed by General Naglee, with his brigade, beyond 
the Seven Pines, and on the twenty-fifth the 
Fourth corps was ordered to take up and fortify 
a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. 
The order .was at once obeyed ; a strong line of 
rifle-pits opened, and an abatis constructed a 
little in the rear of the point where the Nine-Mile 
road comes into the Williamsburgh i-oad. 

On the same day General Heintzelman was 
ordered to cross with his corps, (the Third,) and 
take a position two miles in adva,nce of Bottom's 
Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak 
Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the 
left wing of the armj\ Being the senior officer 
on that side of the river, he was placed in com- 
mand of both corps, and ordered to hold the 
Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw 
the troops from the crossings of White Oak 
Swamp unless in an emergency. 

On the twenty-eighth, General Keyes was or- 
dered to advance Casey's division to Fair Oaks, 
on the Williamsburgh road, some three quarters 
of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving 



General Conch's division at the line of rifle-pits. 
A new line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt foi 
six field-guns were commenced, and much of the 
timber in front of this line was felled on the two 
days following. The picket-line was establish- 
ed, reaching from the Chickahominy to White 
Oak Swamp. 

On the thirtieth, General Heintzelman, repre- 
resenting that the advance had met with sharp 
opposition in taking up their position, and that 
he considered the point a critical one, requested 
and obtained authority to make such dispositions 
of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. 
He immediately advanced two brigades of Kear- 
ny's division about the fourth of a mile in front 
of Savage's Station, thus placing them within 
supporting distance of Casey's division, which 
held the advance of the Fourth corps. 

On the tliirtieth, the troops on the south side 
of the Chickahominy were in position as follows: 
Casey's division on the right of the Williams- 
burgh road, at right angles to it, the centre at 
Fair Oaks ; Couch's division at the Seven Pines ; 
Kearny's division on the railroad, from near 
Savage's Station toward the bridge ; Hooker's 
division on the borders of White Oak vSwamp. 
Constant skirmishing had been kept up between 
our pickets and those of the enemy ; while these 
lines were being taken up and strengthened, 
large bodies of confederate troops were seen im- 
mediately to the front and I'ight of Casey's po- 
sition. 

Dui'ing the day and night of the thirtieth of 
May a very violent storm occurred, the rain fixll- 
ing in torrents rendered work on the rifle-pits 
and bridges impracticable ; made the roads almost 
impassable, and threatened the destruction of the 
bridges over the Chickahominy. 

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable position 
in which we were placed, and the possibility of 
destroying that part of our army which was ap- 
parently cut off from the main body by the rap- 
idly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force 
(grand divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, 
Longstreet, and G. W. Smith) upon the i:)Osition 
occupied by Casey's division. 

It appears from the official reports of General 
Keyes and his subordinate commanders that at 
ten o'clock a.m. on the thirty-first of May an aid- 
dc-camp of General J. E. Johnston was cap- 
tured by General Naglce's pickets. But little 
information as to the movements of the enemy 
was obtained from him, but his presence so near 
our lines excited suspicion and caused increased 
vigilance, and the troops were ordered by Gen- 
eral Keyes to be under arms at eleven o'clock. 
Between eleven and twelve o'clock it was report- 
ed to General Casey that the enemy wei'e ap- 
proaching in considerable force on the Williams- 
bui-gh road. At this time Casey's division was 
disposed as follows : Naglee's brigade extend- 
ing from the Williamsburgh road to the Gar- 
nelt Field, having one regiment across the rail- 
road ; General Wcssel's brigade in the rifle-pits, 
and General Palmer's in the rear of General 
Wcssel's ; one battery of artillery in advance with 



DOCUMENTS. 



573 



General Naglee; one battery in rear of rifle-pits 
to the right of the redoubt ; one battery in rear 
of the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed 
in the redoubt. General Couch's division, hold- 
ing the second line, had General Abercrombie's 
brigade on the right, along the Nine-Mile road, 
with two regiments and one battery across the 
railroad near Fair Oaks vStation ; General Peck's 
brigade on the right, and General Devens's in the 
centre. 

On the approach of the enemy, General Casey 
sent forward one of General Palmer's regiments 
to support the picket-line, but this regiment gave 
way without making much, if any, resistance. 
Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pickets 
were driven in. General Keyes ordered General 
Couch to move General Peck's brigade to occupy 
the ground on the left of the Williamsburgh road, 
which had not before been occupied by our forces, 
and thus to support General Casej^'s left, where the 
first attack was the most severe. The enemy now 
came on in heavy force, attacking General Casey 
simultaneously in front and on both flanks. Gen- 
eral Keyes sent to General lleintzelman for reen- 
forccments, but the messenger was delayed, so 
that orders were not sent to Generals Kearny 
and Hooker until nearly three o'clock, and it 
was ntarly five p.m. when Generals Jameson and 
Berry's brigades of General Kearny's division 
arrived on the field. General Birney M'as or- 
dered up the railroad, but by General Kearny's 
order halted his brigade before arriving at the 
scene of action. Orders were also despatched 
for General Hooker to move up from White Oak 
Swamp, and he arrived after dark at Savage's 
Station. 

As soon as the firing was heard at headquar- 
ters, orders were sent to General Sunmer to get 
his command under arms and be ready to move 
at a moment's warning. His corps, consisting of 
Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, 
was encamped on the north side of the Chicka- 
hominy, some si. ^ miles above Bottom's Bridge ; 
each division had thrown a bridge over the stream 
opposite to its own position. 

At one o'clock General Sumner moved the two 
divisions to their respective bridges, with instruc- 
tions to halt and await further orders. At two 
o'clock orders were sent from headquarters to 
cross these divisions without delay, and push 
them rapidly to General Heintzelman's support. 
This order was received and communicated at 
half-past two, and the passage was immediately 
commenced. In the mean time General Naglee's 
brigade, with the batteries of General Casey's di- 
vision, which General Naglee directed, struggled 
gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits 
against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. 
They were reenforced by a regiment from Gen- 
eral Peck's brigade. The artillery under com- 
mand of Colonel G. D. Bailey, First New-York 
artillery, and afterward of General Naglee, did 
good execution on the advancing column. The 
left of this position was, however, soon turned, 
and a sharp cross-fire opened upon tlic gunners 
and men in the rifle-pits. Colonel Bailey, Major 
S. D. 37. 



Van Valkenberg, and Adjutant Ramsey, of the 
same regiment, were killed ; some of the guns in 
the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was 
driven back upon the position occupied by Gen- 
eral Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessol 
and Palmer, with the reenforcements which had 
been sent them from General Couch, had also 
been driven from the field with heavy loss, and 
the whole position occupied by General Casey's 
division was taken by the enemy. 

Previous to this time General Keyes ordered 
General Couch to advance two regiments to re- 
lieve the pressure upon General Casey's right 
flank. In making this movement. General Couch 
discovered large masses of the enemy pushing to- 
ward our right, and crossing the railroad, as well 
as a heavy column which had been held in re- 
serve, and which was now making its way toward 
Fair Oaks Station. General Couch at once en- 
gaged this column with two regiments ; but, 
though reenforced by two additional regiments, 
he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed be- 
tween him and the main body of his division. 
With these four regiments and one batter)- Gen- 
eral Couch fell back about half a mile toward the 
Grapevine bridge, where, hearing that General 
Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle fac- 
ing Fair Oaks Station, and prepared to hold the 
position. 

Generals Berry and Jameson's brigades had by 
this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. 
General Berry was ordered to take possession of 
the woods on the left, and push forward so as to 
have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This 
movement was executed brilliantly. General Ber- 
ry pushing his regiments forward through the 
M'oods until their lifles commanded the left of the 
camp and works occupied by General Casej^'s di- 
vision in the morning. Their fire on the pursu- 
ing columns of the enemy was verj^ destructive, 
and assisted materially in checking the pursuit 
in that part of the field. He held his position in 
these woods against several attacks of superior 
numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the en- 
emy from the main body, he fell back toward 
White Oak Swamp, and by a circuit brought his 
men into our lines in good order. 

General Jameson, with two regiments, (the 
other two of his brigade having been detached — 
one to General Peck and one to General Birney,) 
moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Wil- 
liamsburgh road, and succeeded for a time in 
keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large 
numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of 
his line, he too was forced to retreat through the 
woods toward White Oak Swamp, and in that 
way gained camp under cover of night. 

Brigadier-General Devens, who had held tht; 
centre of (Jencral Couch's division, had made re- 
peated and gallant eflbrts to regain portions of the 
ground lost in front, but each time was driven 
back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle-pits 
near Seven Pines. 

Meantime General Sumner had arrived with the 
advance of his corps. General Sedgwick's division, 
at the point held by General Couch with four re- 



514 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



giments and one battery. The roads leading from 
the bridge were so miry that it was only by the 
greatest exertion General Sedgwick had been able 
to get one of his batteries to the front. 

The leading regiment (First Minnesota, Colonel 
Sully) was innnediately deployed to the right of 
Couch, to protect the flank, and the rest of the 
division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery 
near the centre, in an angle of the woods. One 
of General Couch's regiments was sent to open 
oommunication with General Heintzelman. No 
sooner were these dispositions made than the en- 
emy came in strong force and oi)encd a heavy fire 
along the line. He made several charges, but 
was each time repulsed with great loss by the 
steady fire of the inGmtry and the splendid prac- 
tice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's 
fire for a considerable time, General Sumner or- 
dered five regiments (the Thirty-fourth New- York, 
Colonel Senter; Eighty-second New- York, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Iludson ; Fifteenth Massachusetts, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball ; Twentieth ilassa- 
chusetts. Colonel Lee; Seventh Michigan, Major 
Richardson — the three former of General Goi-- 
man's brigade, the two latter of General Dana's 
brigade) to advance and charge with the bayonet. 
This charge was executed in the most brilliant 
Tnanner. Our troops, springing over two fences 
which were between them and the enemy, rushed 
upon his lines, and drove him in confusion from 
that part of the field. Darkness now ended the 
battle for that day. 

During the night dispositions were made for its 
early i-enewal. General Couch's division, and so 
much of General Casey's as could be collected to- 
gether, with General Kearny's, occupied the rifle- 
pits near Seven Pines. General Peck, in falling 
back on the left, had succeeded late in the after- 
noon in ralh'ing a considerable number of strag- 
glers, and was taking them once more into the 
action, when he was ordered back to the intrench- 
ed camp b}"^ General Kearny. General Hooker 
brought up his division about dark, having been 
delayed by the heaviness of the roads and the 
throng of fugitives from the field, through whom 
the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports 
he " was obliged to force his way with the bay- 
onet." The division biouvackcd for the night in 
rear of the right of the rille-pits, on the other side 
of the railroad. General Richard.son's division 
also came upon the field about sunset. He had 
attempted the passage of the Chickahorainy by 
the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so 
far destroyed that he was forced to move Crener- 
als Howard and Meagher's brigades with all his 
artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, 
while General French's brigade, with the utmost 
difiBculty, crossed by the other. General Sedg- 
wick's division, with the regiments under General 
Couch, held about the same position as when the 
fight ceased, and General Richardson on his ar- 
rival was ordei'ed to place his division on the left 
to coimect with General Kearny ; General 
French's brigade was posted along the railroad, 
\nd Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades in 
second and thu'd lines. All his artillery had been 



left behind, it being impossible to move it forward 
through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry 
pushed toward the field, but during the night the 
three batteries of the division were brought to the 
front. 

About five o'clock on the morning of the first 
of June, skirmishers and some cavalry of the en- 
emy were discovered in front of General Richard- 
son's division. Captain Pettit's batter}^, (B, First 
New-York,) having come upon the ground, threw 
a few shells among them, when they dispersed. 
There was a wide interval between General Rich- 
ardson and General Kearny. To close this. Gen- 
eral Richardson's line was extended to the left 
and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarce- 
ly had they gained the position, when the enemy 
appearing in large force from the woods in front, 
opened a heavy fire of musketry at short-range 
along the whole line. He approached very raii- 
idly with columns of attack formed on two roads 
which crossed the railroad. These columns were 
supported by infantry in line of battle on each 
side, cutting General French's line. He threw 
out no skirmishers, but appeared determined to 
carry all before him by one crushing blow. For 
nearly an hour the first line of General Richard- 
son's division stood and returned the fire, the 
lines of the enemy being reenforced and relieved 
time after time, till finally General Howard was 
ordered with his brigade to go to General French's 
assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, 
and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased 
and his whole line fell back on that part of the 
field. On the opening of the firing in the morn- 
ing. General Hooker pushed forwaixl on the rail- 
road with two regiments, (Fifth and Sixth New- 
Jersey,) followed by General Sickles' s brigade. 
It was found impossible to move the artillery of 
this division from its position on account of the 
mud. On coming near the woods, which were 
held by the enemy in force. General Hooker found 
General Birney's brigade. Colonel J. Hobart Ward 
in command, in line of battle. He sent back to 
hasten General Sickles's brigade, but ascertained 
that it had been turned off to the left by General 
Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that 
direction. He at once made the attack with the 
two New-Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel 
Ward to support him with General Birney's bri- 
gade. This was well done, our troops advancing 
into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing 
the enemy before them for more than an hour of 
hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was 
then ordered by General Hooker with the Fifth 
and Sixth New-Jersey, Third Maine, and Thirt}'- 
eighth and Fortieth New-York, and the enemy 
fled in confusion, throwing down arms and even 
clothing in his flight. General Sickles, having 
been ordered to the left, foi'ined line of battle on 
both sides of the Williamsburgh road and ad- 
vanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deploy- 
ed in the woods in front of him ; after a brisk in- 
tercliange of musketry-fire while crossing the open 
ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the 
timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to 
flight. 



DOCUMENTS. 



575 



On the right the enemy opened fire after half 
an hour's cessation, which was promptly respond- 
ed to by General Richardson's division. As^ain 
the most vigorous efforts were made to break our 
line, and again they were frustrated by the steady 
courage of our troops. In about an hour Gen- 
eral Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring 
in their lire at close-range, which threw the line 
of the enemy back in some confusion. This was 
followed up by a bayonet-charge led by General 
French in person, with the Fifty-seventh and Six- 
ty-sixth New- York, supported by two regiments 
sent by General Heintzelman, the Seventy-first 
and Seventy-third New-York, which turned the 
confusion of the enemy into precipitated flight. 
One gun captured the previous day was retaken. 

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines 
held by them on the thirty-first before the at- 
tiick. On the battle-field there wcre.found many 
of our own and the confederate wounded, arms, 
caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, 
abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state of 
the roads and impossibility of manoeuvring artil- 
lery prevented further pursuit. On the next morn- 
ing a reconnoissance was sent forward, which 
pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within 
five miles of Richmond ; but again the impossi- 
bility of forcing even a few batteries foi"ward pre- 
cluded our holding permanently this position. 
The lines held previous to the battle were there- 
fore resumed. General J. E. Jolmston reports 
loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and G. W. 
Smith's divisions at four thousand two hundred 
and eighty-three; General D. H. Hill, who had 
taken the advance in the attack, estimates his 
loss at two thousand five hundred ; which would 
give the enemy's loss six thousand seven hundred 
and eighty-three. Our loss was, in General Sum- 
ner's corps, one thousand two hundred and twen- 
ty-three ; General Ileintzelman's corps, one thou- 
sand three hundred and ninety-four ; General 
Keyes's corps, three thousand one hundred and 
twenty — total, five thousand seven hundred and 
thirty-seven. 

Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon 
the field of battle, on the thirty-first of May, Gen- 
eral Heintzelman, the senior corps commander 
present, was in the immediate command of the 
forces engaged. The first information I received 
that the Ijattle was in progress was a despatch 
from liim stating that Casey's division had given 
way. During the night of the thirty-first I re- 
ceived a despatch from him, dated forty-five min- 
utes past eight p.m. in which he says: "lam 
just in. When I got to the front the most of 
General Casey's division had dispersed. . . . 
The rout of General Casey's men had a most dis- 
piriting effect on the troops as they came up. I 
saw no reason why we should have been driven 
back." 

This official statement, together with other ac- 
counts received previous to my arrival upon the 
battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division had 
given way without making proper resistance, 
caused me to state, in a telegram to the Secretary 
of War on the first, that this division " gave way 



unaccountably and discreditably." Subsequent 
investigations, however, greatly modified the im- 
pressions first received, and I accordingly advised 
the Secretary of War of this in a despatch on the 
fifth of June. 

The official reports of Generals Keycs, Casey, 
and Naglee* show that a very considerable portion 
of this division fought well, and that the brigade 
of General Naglee is entitled to credit for its gal- 
lantry. This division, among the regiments of 
which were eight of comparatively new troops, 
was attacked by superior numbers ; yet, accord- 
ing to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack 
"for three hours before it was reenforced." A 
portion of the division was thrown into great con- 
fusion upon the first onslaught of the enemy ; 
but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Col- 
onel Bailey, and other offiiceivs, who boldly went 
to the front and encouraged the inen by their 
presence and example, at this critical juncture, 
rallied a great part of the division, and" thereby 
enabled it to act a prominent part in this severely 
contested battle. It therefore affords me great 
satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained 
in my first despatch, and I cordially give my in- 
dorsement to the conclusion of the division com- 
mander, " that those parts of his command which 
behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." 

On the thirty-first, when the battle of Fair 
Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges 
nearly completed ; but the rising waters flooded 
the log-way approaches and made them almost 
impassable, so that it was only by the greatest 
efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps and 
participated in that hard-fought engagement. 
The bridges became totally useless after this 
corps had passed, and others on a more per- 
manent plan were commenced. 

On my way to headquarters, after the battle 
of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge 
where General Sumner had taken over his corps 
on the day previous. At the time General Sum- 
ner crossed this was the only available bridge 
above Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach 
from the right bank for some four hundred yards 
submerged to the depth of several feet, and on 
reaching the place where the bridge had been, I 
found a great part of it carried away, so that I 
could not get my horse over, and was obliged to 
send him to Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, as 
the only practicable crossing. 

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville 
bridges, were also overflowed, and both of them 
were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries establish- 
ed upon commanding heights on the opposite side. 
These batteries were supported by strong forces 
of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their 
front, which would have made it necessary, even 
had the approaches been in the best possible con- 
dition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with 
but little prospect of success, before a passage 
could have been secured. 

The only available means, therefore, of uniting 
our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Rich- 
mond soon after the battle, was to march the 

* See these Reports, pages 72-82 Docs., Vol. V. Rkb. Rec. 



576 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



troops from Meclianicsville, and other points, on 
the left bank of the Chjckahonnny down to Bot- 
tom's Bridge, and thence over the Willianisburgh 
road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance 
of about twentj'-three (23) miles. Ln the con- 
dition of the roads at that time this march could 
not have been made with artillery in less than 
t\vo days, by which time the enemy would have' 
been secure within his intrcnchments around 
Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two 
wings of the army in time to make a vigorous 
pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of over- 
taking him before he reached Kichmond, only five 
miles distant from the field of battle, is simply 
absuixl, and was, I presume, never for a moment 
seriously entertained by any one connected with 
the army of the Potomac. An advance, involv- 
ing the separation of the two wrings by the im- 
passable Chickahominy, would have exposed each 
to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position 
already gained, and completed our crossings as 
rapidly as possible. 

In the mean time the troops at Fair Oaks were 
directed to strengthen their positions by a strong 
line of intrcnchments, which protected them 
while the bridges were being built, gave security 
to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and 
offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster. 

On the second of June I sent the following des- 
patch : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
New-Bridge, June 2, 1SG2— lO.SO a.m. ) 

Our loft is everywhere advanced considerably 
beyond tlic positions it occupied before the bat- 
tle. I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy 
will tall sufficiently to enable mo to cross the 
right. We have had a terrible time with our 
communications — bridges and causeways, built 
with great care, having been washed away b}^ the 
sudden freshets, leaving us almost cut off from 
communication. All that human labor can do is 
being done to accomplish our purpose. 

Please regard the portion of this relating to 
condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it 
would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. 
I do not yet know our loss ; it has been very 
heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desperate. 
Our victory complete. I expect still more fight- 
ing before we reach Richmond. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Hon. E. M. StaKTON, Miioor-Qeneral. 

Secretary of War. 

On the same day I received the following from 
the Secretary of War : 

Wasuington, June 2, ISG'2. 

Your telegram has been received, and we are 
gi'catly rejoiced at your success — not only in it- 
self, but because of the dauntless spirit and cour- 
age it displays in your troops. You have re- 
ceive!, of course, the order made yesterday in 
respect to Fortress Monroe. The ol^ject was to 
place at your command the disposable force of 
that depai-tment. The indications are that Fre- 
mont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and 
as suoti as he is disposed of anotlier large body 
of troops will be at your service. 



The intelligence from Ilalleck shows that the 
rebels are fleeing, and pursued in force, from 
Corinth. All interest now centres in your oper- 
ations, and full confidence is entertained of your 
brilliant and glorious success. 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 
Major-General McClellan. 

On the third I received the following from the 
President : 

WAsniNGTO.N-, June 3, 1S62. 

With these continuous rains, I am very anxious 
about the Chickahominy — so close in your rear, 
and crossing j'our line of communication. Please 
look to it. Abkahaji Lincoln, 

President, 

Major-General McClellan. 
To which I replied as follows : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
New-Bridge, June 3, 1S62. f 

Your despatch of five p.m., just received. As 
the Chickahominy has been almost the only ob- 
stacle in my way for several days, your Excellen- 
cy may rest assured that it has not been over- 
looked. Every effort has been made, and will 
continue to be, to perfect the communications 
across it. Nothing of importance, except that it 
is again raining. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

A. Lincoln, 

President, Washington. 

My views of the condition of our army on the 
fourth are explained in the following despatch to 
the President : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
New-Bridge, June 4, 1S63. ) 

Terrible rain, storm during the night and 
morning — not yet cleared off. Chickahominy 
flooded, bridges in bad condition. Are still hard 
at work at them. I have taken every possible 
step to insure the security of the corps on the 
right bank, but I cannot reenforce them here 
until my bridges arc all safe, as my force is too 
small to insure my right and rear, should the 
enemy attack in that direction, as the}' may pro- 
bably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. 
Our loss in the late battle will probal)ly exceed 
(5000) five thousand. I have not yet full returns. 
On account of the effect it might have on our 
own men and the enemy, I request that you will 
regard this information as confidential for a few 
days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy 
was very considerably greater ; they were terri- 
bly punished. 1 mention these facts now merely 
to show you that the army of the Potomac has 
had serious work, and that no child's pla}' is be- 
fore it. 

You must make your calculations on the sup 
position that I have been correct from the be 
ginning in asserting that the serious oppositioi 
was to be made here. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding 

A. Lincoln, 

President. 



DOCUMENTS. 



577 



And in the following to the Secretary of War, 
on the same day : 

Headquarters Armt op the Potomac, | 
Nkw-Bkidge, June 4, ISG'2. j 

Please inform me at once what roiinforcements, 
if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Mon- 
roe or "White House within the next three days, 
and when each regiment may be expected to ar- 
rive. It is of the utmost importance that I should 
know this immediately. The losses in the battle 
of the thirty -first and first will amount to (7000) 
seven thousand. Regard this as confidential for 
the present. 

If I can have (5) five new regiments for Fort 
Monroe and its dependencies, I can draw (3) 
three more old regiments from there safelJ^ I 
can well dispose of four more raw regiments on 
m_v communications. I can well dispose of from 
(15) fifteen to (20) twenty well-drilled regiuaents 
among the old brigades in bringing them up to 
their original eflective strength. Recruits are es- 
pecially necessary for the regular and volunteer 
batteries of artillery, as well as for the regular and 
volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses 
in our last battle, I trust that I will no longer be 
regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at 
least one more desperate battle to fight. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Staxton, 

Secretary of War. 

Also in my despatch to the Secretary of War, 
on the fifth : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
New-Bridge, June 5, 18G2. ) 

Rained most of the night ; has now ceased, 
but is not clear. The river still very high and 
troublesome. Enemy opened with several bat- 
teries on our bridges near here this morning ; 
our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced 
them, though some firing still kept up. The 
rain forces us to remain in statu quo. With 
great difficulty a division of infantry has been 
crossed this morning to support the troops on 
the other side, should the enemy renew attack. 
I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us 
rather weak here. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

On the fifth the Secretary telegraphed me as 
follows : 

Wasuisgtom, June 5, 1SG2 — S.30 p.m. 
I will send you five (5) new regiments as fast 
as transportation can take them ; the first to 
start lo-niorrow from Baltimore. I intend send- 
ing you a part of McDowell's force as soon as it 
can return from its trip to Front Royal, probably 
as many you want. Tke order to ship the new 
regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. 
1 suppose that they may be sent directly to the 
B'ort. Please advise me if this be as you desire. 
Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General McClellan. 



On the seventh of June I telegraphed as fol- 
lows: 

Headquarters .\rmt of thk Potomac, I 
JuncT, 1S62 — 1.40 p.m. ) 

In reply to your despatch of two p.m. to-day, 
I have the honor to state that the Chickahominy 
River has risen so as to flood the entire bottom's 
to the depth of three and four feet. I am push- 
ing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the 
men are working night and dav-, up to their 
waists in water, to complete them. 

The whole face of the country is a perfect bo"', 
entirely impassable for artillery, or even cavalry, 
except directly in the narrow roads, which ren- 
ders any general movement, either of this or the 
rebel army entirely out of the question until we 
have more favorable weather. 

I am glad to learn that you are pressing for- 
ward reenforcements so vigorously. 

I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward 
and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches 
here and the ground will admit the passage of 
artillor}^ I have advanced my pickets about a 
mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets, and 
securing a very advantageous position. 

The rebels have several batteries established, 
commanding the debouches from two of our bridg- 
es, and fire upon our working parties continuall}^ 
but as yet they have killed but very few of our 
men. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

.\s I did not think it probable that any reen- 
forcements would be sent me in time for the ad- 
vance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing 
despatch that I should be ready to move when 
General McOall's division joined me ; but I did 
not intend to be understood by this that no more 
reenforcements were wanted, as will be seen from 
the following despatch : 

June in, 1S63— 3.30 p.m. 

I have again information that Beauregard has 
arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow 
him. No great reliance — perhaps none what- 
ever — can be attached to this ; but it is possible, 
and ought to be their policy. 

I am completely checked bj' the weather. The 
roads and fields are literally impassable for .artil- 
lery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy 
is in a dreadful state; we have another rain- 
storm on our hands. 

I shall attack as soon as the weather and 
ground will permit; but there will be a delay, 
the extent of which no one can foresee, for the 
season is altogether abnormal. 

In view of these circumstances, I present for 
your consideration the propriety of detaching 
largely from lialleck's army to strengthen this ; 
for it would seem that Ilalleck has now no large 
organized force in front of him, while we have. 
If this cannot be done, or even in connection 
with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a 
heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If 
but the one can be done, it would better conform 
to military p)-inciplcs to strengthen this army. 



578 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. 



And even although the rccnforcemcnts might not 
arrive in se;v<on to take part in the attack upon 
RichiniHifl. the moral effect would be great, and 
they ^^•'nlUl furnish valuable assistance in ulterior 
movements. 

I wish to be distinctly under.*tood that when- 
ever the weather permit.^ I will attack with 
whatever force I may have, although a larger 
force would enable me to gain much more decis- 
ive results. 

I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent 
forward by water at once, without waiting for 
his artillerv and cavalrv. 

If General . Prim returns tia Washington, 
please converse with him as to the condition of 
ainiiri here. Geo. B. McClellax, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Hon. E. M. STA>rTOJf, 

Secretary of War. 

Our work upon the bridges continued to be 
pushed forward vigorously until the twentieth, 
during which time it rained almost every day, 
and the exposure of the men caused much sick- 
ness. 

On the eleventh the following was received 
from the Secretary of War : 

Washisgtos, June 11, 1S62. 

Your despatch of three thirty, (3.30.) yester- 
day, has been received. I am fully impressed 
with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art 
or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striv- 
ing to the uttermost to render you every aid in 
the power of the Government. Your suggestions 
will be inmiediately communicated to General 
Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to 
them. At last advice he contemplated sending . 
a column to operate with Mitchel against Chat- j 
tanooga. and thence upon East-Tennessee. Buell j 
reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a criti- '• 
cal coudition, demanding immediate attention, j 
Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's j 
force is with him at Okolona. McCall's force j 
was reported yesterday as having embarked, and 
on its way to join you. It is intended to send 
the residue of McDowell's force also to join you 
as speedily as possible. 

Fremont had a hard fight, day before yester- 
day, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight 
miles from Harrisonburgh. He claims the victo- 
ry, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear 
that a strong force is operating with Jackson for 
the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. 
I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies. 

Be assured. General, that there never has been 
a moment when ray desire has been otherwise 
than to aid vou with my whole heart, mind, and 
strength, since the hour we first met ; and what- 
ever (.'thers may .say for their own purposes, you 
have never luul, and never can have, any one 
more truly your friend, or more anxious to sup- 
port you, or more joyful than I .shall be at the 
success which I have no doubt will soon be 
achieved by your arms. 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretory of War. 

Major-Gcneral G. B. McCLELLji.N. 



On the twelfth and thirteenth General McCall's 
division arrived. 

On the thirteenth of June, two squadrons of 
the Fifth United States cavalry, under the com- 
mand of Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover 
Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by 
a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about 
one thousand five hundred men, with four guns. 
They pushed on toward our depots, but at some 
distance from our main body, and, though pursued 
very cleverly, made the circuit of the amiy, repass- 
ing the Chickahomlny at Long Bridge. The burn- 
ing of two schooners laden with forage, and four- 
teen Government wagons, the desh'uction of some 
sutler's stores, the killing of several of the guard 
and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little 
damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little ecZai, 
were the precise results of this expedition. 

On the fourteenth I sent the following to the 
Secretary of War : 

Headquabtehs Army of the Potomac, ) 
Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1S62 — midnight. ) 

All quiet in every direction. The stampede of 
last night has passed away. Weather now very 
favorable. I hope two days more will make the 
ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as 
the bridges are completed and the ground fit for 
artillery to move. At the same time I would be 
glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. 
I can use several new regiments to advantage. 

It ought to be distinctly understood that Mc- 
Dowell and his troops are completely under my 
control. I received a telegram from him request- 
ing that McCall's division might be placed so as 
to join him immediately on his arrival. 

That request does not breathe the proper spirit. 
Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of 
so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in 
such circumstances as those in which I am now 
placed, General McDowell should wish the gen- 
eral interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of 
increasing his command. 

If I cannot fnlly control all his troops, I want 
none of them, but would prefer to fight the bat- 
tle with what I have, and let others be responsi- 
ble for the results. 

The department lines should not be allowed to 
to interfere with me; but General McD., and all 
other troops sent to me, should be placed com- 
pletely at my disposal, to do with them as I think 
best In no other way can they be of assistance 
to me. I therefore request that I may have en- 
tire and full control. The stake at issue is too 
great to allow personal considerations to be en- 
tertained ; you know that I have none. 

The indications are, from our balloon recon- 
noissances and fi'om all other sources, that the 
enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in num- 
bers, and determined to fight desperatelv. 

G. B. McClellan, 
Major-General Commanding, 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

On the twentieth the following was communi- 
cated to the President : 



DOCUMENTS. 



579 



Headqfarteiss Armt of the Potomac, ) 
Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862 — 2 p.m. f 

Your Excellency's despatch of (11) eleven a.m. 
received, also that of General Sigol. 

I have no doubt that Jackson _has been reen- 
forced from here. There is reason to believe 
that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined 
Lee's army, with a brigade or division from 
Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from 
Goldsboro. There is not the slightest reason to 
suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Rich- 
mond ; he is daily increasing his defences. I find 
him. everywhere in force, and every reconnois- 
sance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel 
ray way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great 
are the difficulties of the country; by to-morrow 
night the defensive works, covering our position 
on this side of the Chickahominy, should be com- 
pleted. I am forced to this by my inferiority in 
numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possi- 
ble numbers into action, and secure the army 
against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. 
I would be glad to have permission to lay before 
your E.xcellency, by letter or telegraph, my views 
as to the present state of military atl'airs through- 
out the whole country. In the mean time I would 
be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers 
and position, of the troops not under my com- 
mand, in Virginia and elsewhere. 

Geokge B. McClellan, 

Miijor-General Commanding. 

His Excellency, A. Lincolx, 

President. 

T« which I received this reply : 

Washingtok, June 21,1S62 — 6 p.m. 
Your despatch of yesterday, two (2) p.m., was 
received this morning. If it would not divert 
too much of your time and attention from the 
army under your immediate command, I would 
be glad to have your views as to the present state 
of military afluirs throughout the whole countrj', 
as you say you would be glad to give them. I 
would rather it should be b}^ letter than by tele- 
graph, because of the better chance of secrecy. 
As to the numbers and positions of the troops not 
under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, 
even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can- 
not, I would rather not transmit either by tele- 
graph or letter, because of the chances of its reach- 
ing the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with 
you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I can- 
not well leave here. A. Lixcolv, 

President. 

Major-General George B. McClellax. 

To which I sent the following reply : 

Camp LtscoLS, June 22 — 1 p.m. 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your telegram of eight p.m. yesterday. Un- 
der the circumstances, as stated in your des- 
patch, I perceive that it will be better at least to 
defer, for the present, the communication I de- 
sired to make. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Oeneral Commanding. 

His EJxcellencj the President. 



All the information I could obtain, previous to 
the twenty-fourth of June, regarding the move- 
ments of General Jackson, led to the belief that 
he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving 
I reenforcements from Richmond via Lynchburgh 
and Stanton ; but what his ptn-poses" were did 
not appear until the date specified, when a young 
man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appear- 
ance, was brought in by our scouts from the di- 
rection of Hanover Court-House. He at first 
stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from 
Colonel Kenly's Maryland regiment, captured 
at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to 
be a deserter from Jackson's command, which ho 
left near Gordonsville on the twenty-first. Jack- 
son's troops were then, as ho said, moving to 
Frederickshall, along the Virginia Central Rail- 
road, for the purpose of attacking my rear on 
the twenty-eighth. I inmiediately desp:itched 
two trust}^ negroes to proceed aloi^g the railroad 
and ascertain the truth of the statement. They 
were unable, however, to got beyond Hanover 
Court-Houso, where they encountered the ene- 
my's pickets, and were forced to turn back with- 
out obtaining the desired information. On that 
da}- I sent the following despatch : 

Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, } 
June 24, ls62 — 12 p.m. ) 

A very peculiar case of desertion has just oc- 
curred from the enemy. The party states that 
he left Jackson, Wliiting, and Ewell, (fifteen bri- 
gades,) at Gordonsville on the twenty first; that 
they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it 
was intended to attack my rear on the t\A-enty- 
eighth. I would be glad to learn, at your ear- 
liest convenience, the most exact information 
you have as to the position and movements of 
Jackson, as well as the sources from which your 
information is derived, that I may the better 
compare it with what I have. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

The following is his reply : 

Washington, June 25, 1S62. 

We have no definite information as to the 
numbers or position of Jackson's force. General 
King yesterday reported a deserter's statement 
that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty 
thousand men. Some reports place ten thou- 
sand rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville ; oth- 
ers, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrison- 
burgh, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported 
rumors that Western Virginia was threatened ; 
and General Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to 
New-Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The 
last telegram from Fremont contradicts this ru- 
mor. The last telegram from Banks says the 
enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray ; 
the people decline to give any information of hi.s 
whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the 
evidence is strong that for some purpose the ene- 
my is circulating rumors of Jackson's ailvancc 
in various directions, with a view to conceal the 
real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is 
at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are 



580 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



at Middletown, appear to have any acccurate 
knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted 
to the department yesterday, purported to be 
dated Gordonsville on the fourteenth (14th) in- 
stant, stated that the actual attack \yas designed 
for AV'ashington and Baltimore as soon as you 
attacked Richmond, but that the report was to 
be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, 
in order to mislead. This letter looked very 
much like a blind, and induces me to suspect 
that Jackson's real movement now is toward 
Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is cer- 
tainly designed, like the numerous rumors put 
afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while 
the Avarning of the deserter to you may also be 
a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. 
I will transmit to 3^ou any further information 
on tins subject that may be received here. 

Edwin M. Stantox, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-Gcncral McClellan. 

On the twenty-fifth, our bridges and intrench- 
ments being at last completed, an advance of 
our picket-line of the left was ordered, prepara- 
tory to a general forward movement. 

Immediately in front of the most advanced re- 
doubt on the Williamsburgh road was a large 
open field ; beyond that, a swampy belt of tim- 
ber, some five hundred j'ards wide, which had 
been disputed ground for many days. Further 
in advance was an open field, crossed by the 
Williamsburgh road and the railroad, and com- 
manded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. 

It was decided to push our lines to the other 
side of these woods, in order to enable us to as- 
certain the nature of the ground, and to place 
Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in position to 
support the attack intended to be made on the Old 
Tavern, on the twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh, 
by General Franklin, by assailing that position 
in the rear. 

Between eight and nine o'clock, on the morn- 
ing of the twenty-fifth, the advance was begun 
by General Ileintzelman's corps. The enemy 
were found to be in strong force all along the 
line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but 
by sunset our object was accomplished. The 
troops engaged in this affair were the whole of 
Heintzelman's corps. Palmer's brigade of Couch's 
division of Reyes's corps, and a part of Richard- 
son's division of Sumner's corps. For the de- 
tails I refer to the report of General Heintzel- 
man. 

The casualties (not including those in Palm- 
er's brigade, which have not been reported) were 
as follows: officers killed, one; wounded, four- 
teen ; missing, one ; enlisted men killed, fifty ; 
wounded, three hundred and eighty-seven ; miss- 
ing, sixty-three ; total, five hundred and sixteen. 

The following telegrams were sent to the Sec- 
retary of War, during the day, from the field of 
operations: 

Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862 — 1.30 p.m. 
We have advanced our pickets on the left con- 
siderablv under sharp resistance. Our men be- 



haved very handsomely. Some firing still con- 
tinues. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton. 

Redoitbt No. 3, June 25, 1862—5.15 p.jl 

The enemy are making a desperate resistance 
to the advance of our picket's lines. Kearny's 
and one half of Hooker's are where I want them. 

I have this moment reenforced Hooker's right 
with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope 
in a few minutes to finish the work intended for 
to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The 
enemy are fighting well also. This is not a bat- 
tle ; merely an affiiir of Heintzelman's corps, sup- 
ported by Keyes, and thus far all goes w^ell. We 
hold every foot we have gained. 

If we succeed in what we have undertaken, 
it will be a very important advantage gained. 
Loss not large thus f;u\ The fighting up to this 
time has been done by General Hooker's divi- 
sion, which has behaved as usual — that is, most 
splendidly. 

On our right, Porter tas silenced the enemy's 
batteries in his front. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Redoubt No. 8, June 25, 1862 — 5 p.m. 

The affliir is over, and we have gained our 
point fully, and with but little loss, notwith- 
standing the strong opposition. Our men have 
done all that could be desired. The affair was 
partially decided by two guns that Captain De 
Russy brought gallantly into action under very 
difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven 
from the camps in front of this place, and is now 
quiet. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding, 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Also on the same day, the following ; 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
Ca.mp L/Incoln, June 25, 1S62 — 6.15 p.m. ) 

I have just returned from the field, and find 
your despatch in regard to Jackson. 

Several contrabands, just in, give information 
confirming the supposition that Jackson's ad- 
vance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and 
that Beauregard arrived, with strong reenforce- 
ments, in Richmond, yesterday. 

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my 
right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two 
hundred thousand, (200,000,) including Jackson 
and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against 
vastly superior odds if these reports be true. 
But this army will do all in the power of men to 
hold their position and repulse any attack. 

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but 
feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I 
have not failed to represent repeatedly the ne- 
ce.-^sity of reenforccments, that this was the de- 
cisive point, and that all the available means of 
the Government should be concentrated here. I 
will do all that a general can do with the splen- 



DOCUMENTS. 



5R1 



did army I have the honor to command, and, if 
it is destroj^ed by overwhelming; nunibei-s, can at 
least die with it and share its fate. But if the 
result of the action which will probably occur 
to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, 
the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoul- 
ders ; it must I'est where it belongs. 

Since I commenced this I have received addi- 
tional intelligence, confirming the supposition in 
regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's 
arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, 
and no'\v go to the other side of the Chickahomi- 
ny to arrange for the defence on that side. I 
feel that there is no use in again asking for re- 
enforcements. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

The report of the chief of the " secret service 
corps," herewith forwarded, and dated the twen- 
ty-sixth of June, shows the estimated strength 
of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of 
Yorktown, to have been from one hundred thou- 
sand to one hundred and twenty thousand. The 
same report puts his numbers, on the twenty- 
sixth of June, at about one hundred and eighty 
thousand, and the specific information obtained 
regarding their organization warrants the belief 
that this estimate did not exceed his actual 
strength. It will be observed that the evidence 
contained in the report shows the following or- 
ganizations, namely : Two hundred regiments of 
infantry and cavahy. including the forces of Jack- 
son and Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of 
independent troops ; five battalions of artillery ; 
twelve companies of infantry and independent 
cavalry, beside forty-six companies of ailillery ; 
amounting, in' all, to from forty to fiftj'- brigades. 
There were undoubtedly many others whose 
designations we did not learn. 

The report also shows that numerous and 
heavy earth-works had been completed for the 
defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of 
these were mounted some two hundred guns. 

On the twenty-sixth, the day upon which I 
had decided as the time for our final advance, 
the enem}'- attacked our right in strong force, and 
turned my attention to the protection of our com- 
munications and depots of supply. 

The event was a bitter confirmation of the 
military judgment which had been reiterated to 
my superiors from the inception and through 
the progress of the Peninsula campaign. 

I notified the Secretary of War in the follow- 
ing despatch : 

IlKADQtTARTERS ArJIT flF THE PoTOM^C, ) 

Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1S6'2 — 1'2 m. f 
I have just heard that our advanced cavalry 
pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are 
being driven in. It is probably Jackson's ad- 
vanced-guard. If this be true, you may not hear 
from me for some days, as my communications 
will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a 
difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate meas- 
ures, and will do my best to out-manoeuvre, out- 
wit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not believe 



reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if 
3'ou learn that my communications are cut off, 
and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. 
Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the 
hopes you formerly placed in me. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Major-GeneraL 

Secretary of War. 

IlEADQPAr.TERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, I 

Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1S62— 2.30 p.m. ) < 
Your despatch and that of the President re- 
ceived. Jackson is driving in my pickets, etc., 
on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is 
impossible to tell where reenforccments ought to 
go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- 
proaching battle. It will probably be better that 
they should go to Fort ^lonroe, and thence ac- 
cording to state of affairs when they arrive. 

It is not probable that I can maintain tele- 
graphic communication more than an hour or 
two longer. G. B. McClellan, 

lUajor-GeneraL 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

On the same day I received the following des- 
patches from the Secretary of War : 

Washington, June 25, 1862—11.20 p.m. 

Your telegram of fifteen minutes past six has 
just been received. The circumstances that have 
hitherto rendered it impossible for the Govern- 
ment to send j'ou any more reenforccments than 
has been done, have been so distinctly stated to 
you by the President that it is needless for me to 
repeat them. 

Every effort ha.s been made by the President 
and myself to strengthen you. King's division 
has reached Falmouth, Shields's division and 
Rickett.s's division are at Manassas. The Presi- 
dent designs to send a part of that force to aid 
you as speedily as it can be done. 

E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

Washington, June 26, 1862—6 p.m. 

Arrangements are being made as rapidly as 
possible to send you five thousand (.jOOO) men 
as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to 
Alexandria and embarked, which can be done 
sooner than to wait for transportation at Freder- 
icksburgh. They will be followed by more, if 
needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force 
will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and 
will operate promptly in your aid by land. Noth- 
ing will be spared to sustain you, and I have un- 
doubting f\iith in your success. Keep mc ad- 
vised fully of your condition. 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

But five thousand of the reenforccments spoken 
of in these communications came to the arm}' of 
the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's 
Bar, after the seven days. 

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Rich- 
mond, to provide for the contingency of our com 



582 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63, 



raunications with the depot at the White House 
being severed by the enemy, and at the same 
time to be prepared for a change of the base of 
our operations to James River, if circumstances 
should render it advisable, I had made arrange- 
ments more than a week previous (on the eigh- 
teenth) to have transports with supplies of pro- 
visions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, 
sent up James River. They reached Harrison's 
Landing in time to be available for the army on 
its arrival at that point. Events soon proved 
this change of base to be, though most hazard- 
ous and difficult, the only prudent course. 

In order to relieve the troops of the vSixth 
corps, on the nineteenth of June General Rey- 
nolds's and General Seymour's brigades, of Gen- 
eral McCall's division, -(Pennsylvania reserves,) 
were moved from Gaines's farm to a position on 
Beaver Dam Creek, General Meade's brigade 
being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm. 
One regiment and a battery were thrown for- 
ward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, 
and a line of pickets extended along the Chicka- 
hominy River between the Mechanicsville and 
Meadow bridges. As has been already stated, I 
received, while engaged on the twenty -fifth in di- 
recting the operations of Heintzelman's corps, 
information which strengthened my suspicions 
that Jackson was advancing with a large force 
upon our right and rear. On this day General 
Casey, at the White House, was instructed to 
prepare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive 
works were ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early 
on the twenty-fifth General Porter was instructed 
to send out reconnoitring parties toward Hanover 
Court-House to discover the position and force 
of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the 
Tolopatamoy as far as possible. 

Up to the twenty-sixth of June the operations 
against Richmond had been conducted along the 
roads leading to it from the east and north-east. 
The reasons (the President's anxiety about cov- 
ering Washington from Fredericksburgh, Mc- 
Dowell's promised cooperation, partial advance, 
and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the 
(•hoicc of this line of approach, and our continu- 
ance upon it, have been attended to above. 

Tlie superiority of the James River route, as a 
line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need 
exposition. My own opinion on that subject had 
been early given, and need not be repeated here. 
The dissipation of all hope of the cooperation by 
land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be 
occupied in the defence of AVashington, their in- 
ability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an 
opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to 
my right, and to the long line of supplies from 
the White House to the Chickahominy, and for- 
ced an immediate change of base across the Pen- 
insula. To that end, from the evening of the 
twenty-sixth, every energy of the army was 
bent. Such a change of base, in the presence of 
a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult 
undertakings in war. I was confident of the 
valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew 
hat it cou Id be trusted equally to retreat or ad- 



vance, and to fight the series of battles now in- 
evitable, whether retreating from victories or 
marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had 
no doubt whatever of its ability, even against 
superior numbers, to fight its way through to the 
James River, and get a position whence a success- 
ful advance upon Richmond would be again pos- 
sible. Their superb conduct through the next 
seven days justified my faith. 

On the same day General Van Vliet, Chief 
Quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by 
my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, Quar- 
termaster at the White House, as follows: "Run 
the cars to the last moment, and load them with 
provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon 
you have with subsistence, and send them to 
Savage's Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If 
you are obliged to abandon White House, burn 
every thing that you cannot get off. You must 
throw all our supplies up the James River as 
soon as possible, and accompany them yourself 
with all your force. It will be of vast import- 
ance to establish our depots on James River 
without delay if we abandon White House. I 
will keep you advised of every movement so long 
as the wires work ; after that you must exercise 
your own judgment." 

All these commands were obeyed. So excel- 
lent were the dispositions of the dilTerent officers 
in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, 
and so timely the warning of the approach of the 
enemy, that almost evciy thing was saved, and 
but a small amount of stores destroyed to pre- 
vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 

General Stoneman's communications with the 
main army being cut off, he fell back upon the 
White House, and thence to Yorktown, when 
the White House was evacuated. 

On the twenty-sixth, orders were sent to all 
the corps commanders on the right bank of the 
Chickahominy' to be prepared to send as many 
troops as they could spare on the following day 
to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by 
the appended telegrams. General Franklin re- 
ceived instructions to hold General Slocum's di- 
vision in readiness by daybreak of the twenty- 
seventh, and if heavy firing should at that time 
be heard in the direction of General Porter, to 
move at once to his assistance without further 
delay. 

At noon on the twenty-sixth the approach of 
the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow 
bridge, was discovered by the advance pickets at 
that point, and at half-past twelve p.m. they were 
attacked and driven in. All the pickets were 
now called in, and the regiment and battery 
at Mechanicsville withdrawn. 

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in 
rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's 
and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were 
moved forward and deployed on the right of Mc- 
Call's division, toward Shady Grove church, tc 
cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, 
however, were warmly engaged, though two of 
Gi-iffin's regiments relieved a portion of Rey- 
nolds's line just at the close of the action. 



DOCinilENTS. 



583 



The position of our troops was a strong one, 
extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam 
Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and 
the right in thick woods beyond the u|)per road 
from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower 
or river road crossed the Creek at Ellison's Mills. 
Se3'mour's brigade held the left of the line from 
the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in 
woods and partly in clear ground, and Key- 
nolds's the right, principally in the woods and 
covering the upper road. The artillerj' occupied 
positions commanding the roads and the open 
'ground across the Creek. 

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the 
position generally prepared with a care that great- 
ly contributed to the success of the day. The 
passage of the creek was difficult along the whole 
front, and impracticable for artillery, except by 
the two roads where the main eflbrts of the ene- 
my were directed. 



At three p.m. he formed his line of battle, rap- 
idly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked 
«ur whole line, making at the same time a deter- 
mined attempt to force the passage of the upper 
road, which was successfully resisted by General 
Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced 
to retire with very heavy loss. 

A rapid artilleiy lire, with desultory skirmish- 
ing, was maintained along the whole front, while 
the enemy massed his troops for another effort 
at the lower road about two hours later, which 
was likewise repulsed by General Seymour, with 
heavy slaughter. The tiring ceased, and the ene- 
my retired about nine p.m., the action having 
lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. 
But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were en- 
gaged on this day. The portion of the enemy 
encountered weie chiefly from the troops on the 
right bank of the river, who crossed near Mead- 
ow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. 




I Reynolds's Brigade, 1 

A. Pennsylvania Reserves, ■< Meade's Brigade, VMcCall's Division. 

( Seymour's Brigade, ) 

B. Griffin's Brigade — Morell's Division. 
Berdan's Sliarp-shooters — Morell's Division. * 

C. Enemy's Column of Attaclc 



The information in my possession soon after 
the close of this action convinced me that Jack- 
Ron was really approaching in large force. The 
position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so suc- 
cessfully defjjnded, had its right flank too much 
in the air, and was too far from the main army 
to make it available to retain it longer. I there- 
fore determined to send the heavj' guns at Ho- 
gan's and Gaines's houses over the Ciiickahomi- 
ny diiring the night, with as many of the wagons 
of the Fifth corps as possible, and to withdraw 
the corps itself to a position stretching around 



the bridges, where its flanks would bo reasona- 
bly secure, and it would be within supporting 
distance of the main army. General Porter cxr- 
ried out my orders to that effect. 

It was not advisable at that time, even had it 
been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth corps ti> 
the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a 
movement would have exposed the rear of the 
army, placed as between two fires, and enablo<i 
Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement 
to James River, by crossing the Chickahominy 
in the vicinity of Jones's Bridge before we could 



* See Vol V. RjKBaLUOH Rueoan, page 23T Doct. 



584 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



roach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined 
then to resist Jackson with the Fifth corps, reen- 
forced hy all our disposable troops in the new 
position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover 
the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and 
to give time for the arrangements to secure the 
adoption of the James River as our line of sup- 
plies in lieu of the Pamunkey. 

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons 
having been removed to the right bank of the 
Ohickahominy, the delicate operation of withdraw- 
ing the troops from Beaver Uam Creek was com- 
menced shortly before daylight, and successfully 
executed. 

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the jBrst 
to leave the groimd ; Sej'^mour's brigade covered 
the rear with the horse batteries of Captains 
Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was 
so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the 
preceding day so complete, that although the en- 
emy followed the retreat closely, and some skir- 
mishing occurred, he did not appear in front of 
of the new line in force till about noon of the 
twenty-seventh, when we were prepared to re- 
ceive him. 

About this time General Porter, believing that 
General Stoneman would be cut off from him, 
aent him orders to fall back on the White House, 
and afterward rejoin the army as best he could. 

On the morning of the twentj^-seventh of June, 
during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechan- 
icsville to the selected position already mentioned. 
General Porter telegraphed as follows : 

" I hope to do without aid, though I request that 
Franklin, or some other command, be held ready 
to rcenforce me. The enemy are so close that I 
expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to 
have a portion in position to cover the retreat. 
This is a delicate movement, but relying on the 
good qualities of the commanders of divisions and 
brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new 
line." 

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was 
followed. 

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during 
the entire night to remove the heavy guns and 
wagons, some of the siege-guns were still in po- 
sition at Gaines's House after sunrise, and were 
finally hauled off by hand. The new position of 
tlie Fifth corps was about an arc of a circle, cov- 
ering the approaches to the bridges M'hich con 
nected our right wing with the troops on the op- 
posite side of the river. 

Morell's division held the left of the line in a 
strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines's 
Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent 
to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our 
artillery on both sides of the river, and extending 
into open ground on the right toward New-Coal 
Harbor. In this line General Buttertield's brigade 
held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined 
his right, and General Griffin, still further to the 
right, joined the left of General Sykes's division, 
which, partly in w'oods and partly in open ground, 
extended in the rear of Coal Harbor. 

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own 



regiments. McCall's division having been en- 
gaged on the day before, was formed in a second 
line in the rear of the first, Meade's brigade on the 
left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds's brigade 
on the right, covering the approaches from Coal 
Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, 
and Seymour's in reserve to the second line, still 
further in rear. General P. St. George Cooke, 
with five companies of the Fifth regular cavalry, 
two squadrons of the First regular, and three 
squadrons of the Sixth Pennsylvania cavalry, 
(lancens,) was posted behind a hill in rear of 
the position, and near the Chickahominy, to aid 
in watching the left flank and defending the slope 
to the river. 

The troops were all in position by noon, with 
the artillery on the commanding ground, and in 
the intervals between the divisions and brigades. 
Besides the division batteries, there were Rob- 
ertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from the 
artillery reserve ; the latter posted on the right 
of Sykes's division, and the former on the ex- 
treme left of the hue, in the valley of the Chick- 
ahominy. Shortly after noon the enemy were 
discovered approaching in force, and it soon be- 
came evident that the entire position was to be 
attacked. His skirmi.shcrs advanced rapidly, and 
soon the firing became heavy along our whole 
front. At two p.m.. General Porter asked for re- 
enforcements. Slocum's division of the Sixth 
corps was ordered to cross to the left bank of the 
river, by Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his 
support. 

General Porter's first call for reenforcements, 
through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor 
his demand for more axes, through the sanie offi- 
cer. 

By three p.m. the engagement had become so 
severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior 
in numbers, that the entire second iine and re- 
serves had been moved forward to sustain the 
first line against repeated and desperate assaults 
along our whole front. 

At half-past three p.m. Slocum's division reach- 
ed the field and was immediately brought into 
action at the weak points of our line. 

On the left the contest was for the strip of 
woods, running almost at right angles to the 
Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or be- 
tween that and Gaines's house. The enemy sev- 
eral times charged up to this wood, but were each 
time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars, 
of Sykes's division, on the right, also repulsed 
several strong attacks. 

But our own loss under the tremendous fire 
of such greatly superior numbers was very se- 
vere, and the troops, most of whom had been 
under ai'ms more than two days, vrere rapidly 
becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men 
constantly l^rought against them. 

When General Slocum's division arrived on 
the ground it increased General Porter's force to 
some thirty-five thousand, who were probably 
contending against about seventy thousand of 
the enemy. The line was severely pressed in 
several points, and as its being pierced at any 



DOCDMENTS. 



585 



one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable 
for General Porter, wlio was required to hold his 
position until night, to divide Slocum's division, 
and send parts of it, even single regiments, to 
the points most threatened. 

About tive P.M., General Porter having report- 
ed his position as critical, French's and I.rcagher's 
brigades, of Richardson's division, (Third corps,) 
were ordered to cross to his support. The ene- 
my attacked again in great force at six p.m., but 
failed to break our lines, though our loss was 
ver}^ heavy. 

About seven p.m. they threw fresh troops 
against General Porter with still greater fury, 
and finally gained the woods held b}' our left. 
This reverse, aided by the confusion that follow- 
ed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of 
tlie Fifth cavalry, and followed as it was by more 
determined assaults on the remainder of our 
lines, novv outflanked, caused a general retreat 
from our position to the hill m rear overlooking 
the bridge. 

French's and Meagher's brigades now appear- 
ed, driving before them the stragglers who were 
thronging toward the bridge. 

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, 
and by their example, as well as by the steadi- 
ness of their bearings reanimated our own troops 
and warned the enemy that reenforcements had 
ai'rived. It was now dusk. The enemy, already 
repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, 
and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed 
to follow up their advantage. This gave an op- 
portunity to rally our men behind the brigades 
of Generals French and Meagher, and the}" again 
advanced up the hill ready to repulse another 
attack. During the night our thin and exhaust- 
ed regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and 
by the following morning, all had reached the 
other side of the stream. The regular inflxntry 
formed the rear-guard, and about six o'clock on 
the morning of the twenty-eighth, crossed the 
river, destroying the bridge behind them. 

Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and 
missing was very heavy, especially in officers, 
many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken 
prisoners while gallantly leading on their men or 
rallying them to renewed exertions. 

It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers 
lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the 
series of battles which followed each other in 
quick succession, and in which the whole army 
was engaged. No general returns were made 
until after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, 
when the losses during the whole seven days 
were estimated together. 

Although we were finally forced from our first 
line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven 
back, yet the objects sought for had been obtain- 
ed. The enemy was held at bay. Our siege- 
guns and material were saved, and the right 
wing had now joined the main body of the army. 

The number of guns captured by the enemy 
at this battle was twenty-two, three of which 
were lost by being run ofl' the bridge during the 
final withdrawal. 



Great credit is due for the efficiency and brav- 
ery with which this important arm of the service 
(the artillery) was I'uught, and it was not until 
the last successful charge of the enemy that 
the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or 
struck down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, 
Kanahan's, and Grimm's batteries took position 
during the engagement in the front of General 
Smitii's line on the right bank of the stream, 
and with a battery of siege-guns, served by the 
First Connecticut artillery, helped to drive back 
the enemy in front of General Porter. 

So threatening were the movements of the 
enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy, that 
it was impossible to decide until the afternoon 
where the real attack would be made. Large 
forces of infimtry were seen during the day near 
the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threat- 
ening demonstrations were frequently made along 
the entire line on this side of the river, which 
rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force 
in position to meet them. 

On the twenty-sixth a circular was sent to the 
corps commanders;, on the right bank of the riv- 
er, asking them how many of their troops could 
be spared to reenforce General Porter, after re- 
taining sufficient to hold their positions for twen- 
ty-four hours. 

To this the following replies were received : 

Headquarters ThiUd Corps, | 
June 2G — i p.m. j 

I think I can hold the intrenchments with four 
brigades for twenty-four hours. That would 
leave two brigades disposable for service on the 
other side of the river, but the men are so tired 
and worn out that I fear they would not be in a 
condition to fight after making a march of any 
distance. ... S. P. IIeintzelman, 

Brigailier-GeueraJ. 

General R. B. Marcy. 

Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 
twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, had indicated that 
the enemy was in large force in front of Gene- 
rals Hooker and Kearny, and on the Chailes 
City road, (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger,) and 
General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on 
the night of the twenty-fifth, that he could not 
hold his advanced position without reenforce- 
ments. 

General Keyes telegraphed : 

" As to how many men will be able to hold 
this position for twenty-four hours, I must an- 
swer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong a* 
ever in front, it having at all times appeared 
to me that our forces on this flank are small 
enough." 

On the morning of the twenty-seventh, the 
following despatch was sent to General Sumner : 

IIeadquartbhs An»r of thk Potomac, ( 
June 27—8.45 a.m. ) 

General Smith just reports that six or eight 

regiments have moved down to the woods in 

front of General Sumner. R. B. Makcy, 

Cliief of SUflF. 

General E. V. Sumnkr, 

Commanding Second Army Corj)S. 



580 



REBELLION RBCORD, 18G2-63. 



At eleven o'clock a.m. General Sumner tele- 
graphed as follows : 

" The enemy threaten an attack on my right, 
near Smith." 

At half-past twelve p.m. he telegraphed : 

" Sharp shelling on both sides." 

At forty-five minutes past two p.m. : 

"Sharp mu.sketry tiring in front of Burns ; we 
are replying ^\-ith 'artillery and infantry. The 
man on 'the lookout reports some troops drawn 
up in line of battle about opposite my right and 
Smith's left ; the number cannot be made out." 

In accordance with orders given on the night 
of the twenty-sixth, General Slocum's division 
commenced crossing the river to support Gen- 
eral Porter soon after daybreak on the morning 
of the twenty-seventh ; but as the firing in front 
of General Porter ceased, the movement was sus- 
pended. At two P.M. General Porter called for 
reenforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 
■twenty-five minutes past three p.m. sent him the 
following : 

" Slocum is now crossing Alexander's Bridge 
with his whole command ; enemy has commenced 
an infantry attack on Smith's left ; I have order- 
ed down Sumner's and Ileintzelman's reserves, 
and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. 
Go on as you have begun." 

During the day the following despatches were 
received, which will show the condition of affairs 
on the right bank of the Chickahominy : 

June 27, 1S62. 
General Smith thinks the enemy arc massing 
■ heavy columns in the clearings to the right of 
James Garnett's house, and on the other side of 
the river opposite it. Three regiments are re- 
ported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's 
front. The arrangements are very good, made 
by Smith. W. B. Fkankmn, 

Brigadier-General. 

Colonel A. V. Colburn, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Afterward he telegraphed : 

"The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's 
left with infantry. I know no details." 

Afterward the following : 

" The enemy has opened on Smith from a bat- 
Icry of three pieces to the right of the "White 
House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith 
thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon 
them tliat will .silence them." 

Afterward (at lifty minutes past five p.m.) the 
following was sent to General Keyes: 

" Please send one brigade of Couch's division 
to these headquarters, without a moment's delay. 
A staff-ofticer will be hero to direct the brigade 
where to go." 

Subscfiuently the following was sent to Gen- 
erals Sumner and franklin : 

" Is there any si^^n of the enemy being in force 
in your front ? Can you spare any more force 
to be sent to General Porter? Answer at once." 

At fifteen minutes past five p.m. the following 
was received from General Franklin : 



" I do not think it prudent to take any more 
troops from here at present." 

General Sumner replied as follows : 

" If the General desires to tru.st the defence of 
my position to my front line alone, I can send 
French with three regiments, and Meagher with 
his brigade, to the right ; every thing is so un- 
certain, that I think it would be hazardous to 
do it." 

These two brigades were sent to reenforce 
General Porter, as has been observed. 

At twenty-five minutes past five p.m. I sent 
the following to General Franklin : 

" Porter is hard pressed ; it is not a question 
of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possi- 
bly maintain your position until dark with two 
brigades ? I have ordered eight regiments of 
Sumner's to support Porter ; one brigade of 
Couch's to this place. 

"Ileintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sum- 
ner. If possible, send a brigade to support Por- 
ter. It should follow the regiments ordered from 
Sumner." 

At thirty-five minutes past seven p.m. the fol- 
lowing was sent to General Sumner : 

" If it is possible, send another brigade to re- 
enforce General Smith ; it is said three heavy 
columns of infantry are moving on him." 

From the foregoing despatches it will be seen 
that all disposable troops were sent from the 
right bank of the river to reenforce General Por- 
ter, and that the corps commanders were left 
with smaller forces to hold their positions than 
they deemed adequate. To have done more, 
even though Porter's reverse had been prevent- 
ed, would have had the still more disastrous 
result of imperilling the whole movement across 
the Peninsula. 

The operations of this day proved the numeri- 
cal superiorit}' of the enemy, and made it evident 
that while he had a large army on the left bank 
of the Chickahominj'-, which had already turned 
our right, and was in position to intercept the 
communications with our depot at the White 
House, he was also in large force between our 
army and Richmond ; I therefore efi"ected a junc- 
tion of our forces. 

This might probably have been executed on 
either side of the Chickahominy ; and if the con- 
centration had been effected on the left bank, it 
is possible we might, with our entire force, have 
defeated the enemy there ; but at that time they 
held the roads leading to the "White House, so 
that it would have been impossible to have sent 
forward supply trains in advance of the army in 
that direction, and the guarding of those trains 
would have seriousl}' embarrassed our operations 
in the battle ; we would have been compelled to 
fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. 
Moreover, we would at once have been followed 
by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of 
the river oi)erating upon our rear, and if, in the 
chances of war, we had been ourselves defeated 
in the effort, we would have been forced to fall 
back to the White House, and probably to Fort 



DOCUMENTS. 



587 



llonroe ; and, as both our flanks and rear would 
then have been entirely exposed, our entire sup- 
ply train, if not the greater part of the army it- 
self, might have been lost. 

The movements of the enemy showed that 
they expected this, and, as they themselves ac- 
knowledged, they were prepared to cut ofi' our 
retreat in that direction. 

I therefore concentrated all our forces on the 
right bank of the river. 

During the night of the twenty-sixth and morn- 
ing of the twenty-seventh, all our wagons, heavy 
guns, etc., were gathered there. 

It may be asked, why, after the concentration 
of our forces on the right bank of the Chicka- 
hominy, with a large part of tlie enemy drawn 
away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I 
did not, instead of striking for James River, 
fifteen miles below that place, at once march 
directly on Richmond. 

It will be remembered that at this juncture 
the enemy was on our rear, and there was every 
reason to believe that he would sever our com- 
munications with the supply depot at the White 
House. 

We had on hand but a limited amount of 
rations, and if we had advanced directly on 
Richmond, it would have required considerable 
time to carry the strong works around that place, 
during which our men would have been desti- 
tute of food ; and even if Richmond had fallen 
before our arms, the enemy could still have 
occupied our supply communications between 
that place and the gunboats, and turned the 
disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the 
enemy had concentrated all his forces at Rich- 
mond during the progress of our attack, and we 
had been defeated, we must in all probability 
have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. 

The battles which continued day after day in 
the progress of our flank movement to the James 
River, with the exception of the one at Gaines's 
Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing 
engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive 
of all. 

On the evening of the twenty-seventh of June 
I assembled the corps commanders at my head- 
quarters, and informed them of my plan, its rea- 
sons, and my choice of route and method of exe- 
cution. 

General Keyes was directed to move his corps, 
with its artillery and baggage, across the White 
Oak swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions 
on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the 
passage of the other troops and trains. 

This was executed on the twenty-eighth by 
noon. Before daybreak on the twenty-eighth I 
went to Savage's Station, and remained there 
during the day and night, directing the with- 
•irawal of the trains and supples of the army. 

Orders were given to the different commanders 
to load their wagons with ammunition and pro- 
visions, and the necessary baggage of the oflBcers 
and men, and to destroy all property which could 
not be transported with the army. 

Orders were also given to leave with those of 



the sick and wounded who could not be trans- 
ported, a proper complement of surgeons and at- 
tendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and 
medical stores. 

The large herd of two thousand five hundred 
beef-cattle was, by the Chief Commissary, Colonel 
Clarke, transferred to the James River without 
loss. 

On the morning of the twenty-eighth, while 
General Franklin was withdrawing his command 
from Golding's fjirm, the enemy opened upon 
General Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, 
from the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on 
the opposite side of the Chickahominy ; and 
shortly afterward two Georgia regiments attempt- 
ed to carry the works about to be vacated, but 
this attack was repulsed by the Twenty-third 
New-York and the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania 
volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's bat- 
tery. 

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak 
swamp during the day and night, and took up 
positions covering the roads leading from Rich- 
mond toward White Oak swamp and Long Bridge. 
McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 
twenty-eighth, to move across the swamp and 
take a proper position to assist in covering the 
remaining troops and trains. 

During the same night the corps of Sumner 
and Heintzelman, and the division of Smith, 
were ordered to an interior line, the left resting 
on Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the 
right, so as to cover Savage's Station. 

General Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, 
was ordered to Savage's Station, in reserve. 

They were ordered to hold this position until 
dark of the twenty-ninth, in order to cover the 
withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back 
across the swamp and unite with the remainder 
of the army. 

On the twenty-eighth I sent the following to 
the Secretary of AV'^ar : 

IIeadqdabters Armt of the Potomac, ) 
Savage's Station, June 23, 1^62 — 12.20 a.m. ( 

I now know the full history of the day. On 
this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed 
several strong attacks. On the left bank our men 
did all that men could do, all that soldiers could 
accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly 
superior number.s, even after I brought my last 
reserves into action. The loss on both sides is 
terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most 
desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants 
of my men behave as men. Those battalions 
who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are 
still in the best order. M}- regulars were superb ; 
and I count upon what are left to turn another 
battle, in company with their gallant comrades 
of the volunteers. Had I twenty thou.sand 
(20,000) or even ten thousand (10,000) fresh 
troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond ; 
but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be. 
glad to cover my retreat and save the material 
and personnel of tlie army. 

If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved 
our honor, and no one need blush for the army 



588 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because 
my force was too small. 

I au;ain repeat that I am not responsible for 
this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general 
who feels in his heart the loss of every brave 
man wlio has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. 
I sti.l hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do 
this the (Jovernment must view the matter in the 
same earnest light that T do. You must send 
me very large reenfoi-coments, and send them at 
once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chick- 
ahominy, and think I can withdraw all our ma- 
terial. Please understand that in this battle we 
have lost nothing but men, and those the best 
we have. 

In addition to what T have already said, I only 
wish to say to the President that I think he is 
wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I 
said that my force was too weak. I merely in- 
timated a truth which to-day has boon too plain- 
ly proved. If, at this instant, I couM dispose of 
ten thousand (10,000) fresh men, I could gain 
the victory to-morrow. 

I know that a few thousand more men would 
have changed this battle from a defeat to a vic- 
tory. As it is, the Government must not and 
cannot hold me responsible for the result. 

I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too 
many dead and wounded comrades to feel other- 
wise than that the Government has not sustained 
this army. If you do not do so now, the game is 
lost. 

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that 
I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons 
in Washington. 

You have done your best to sacrifice this army. 
G. B. McClellan. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton. 

The headquarters camp at Savage's Station 
was broken up early on the morning of the twen- 
ty-ninth, and Tnoved across White Oak swamp. 
As the essential part of this day's operation was 
the passage of the trains across the swamp, and 
their protection against attack from the direction 
of New-Market and Richmond, as well as the 
immediate and secure establishment of our com- 
munications with the gunboats, T passed the da}' 
in examining the ground, directing tlie posting 
ijf troops, and securing the uninterrupted move- 
ment of tlie trains. 

In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes 
to move during the night to James River, and 
occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, 
to secure our extreme left flank. 

General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, 
and prolong the line toward the right. The 
trains were to be pushed on toward James River 
in rear of these corps, and jjlaced under the pro- 
tection of the gunboats as they arrived. 

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry 
curly this day on the Quaker Road showed that 
his efforts were about to lie directed toward im- 
peding our progress to the river, and rendered 
my presence ia that quarter necessary. 



BATTLE OF ALLEN S FARM. 

General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks 
on June twenty-ninth, at daylight, and marched 
his command to Orchard Station, halting at Al- 
len's Field, between Orchard and Savage's Sta- 
tion. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick 
were formed on the right of the railroad, facing 
toward iilchmond, Richardson holding the right, 
and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman'? 
corp.s. The first line of Richardson's division 
was held by General French, General Caldwek 
supporting in the second. A log building in 
front of Ric'nardson's division was held by Colo- 
nel Brooks with one regiment, (Fifty-third Penn- 
sylvania volunteers,) with Ilazzard's battery on 
an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear of 
Colonel I5:ooks's command. 

At nine a.m. the enemy commenced a furious 
attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but 
were I'epulsed. The left of General Richardson 
was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain 
to carry the position of Colonel Brooks. Cap- 
tain Ilazzard's battery, and Pettit's battery, 
which afterward replaced it, were served with 
great effect, while the Fifty-third Pennsylvania 
kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, 
compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The 
enemy renewed the attack three times, but were 
as often repulsed. 

BATTLE OF SAVAGE's STATION. 

General Slocum arrived at Savage's Station at 
an early hour on the twenty-ninth, and was or- 
dered to cross White Oak swamp and relieve 
General Keyes's corps. As soon as General 
Keyes was thus relieved, he moved toward James 
River, wliich he reached in safety, with all his ar- 
tillery and baggage, early on the morning of the 
thirtieth, and took up a position below Turkey 
Creek bridge. 

During the morning General Franklin heard 
that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, 
was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, 
and advancing toward Savage's Station. He 
communicated this information to General Sum- 
ner, at Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division 
to Savage's Station. A little after noon General 
Sumner united his forces with those of General 
Franklin, and assumed command. 

I had ordered General Heintzelman, with his 
corps, to hold the ^yilliamsburgll road until 
dark, at a point where were several field-works, 
and a skirt of timber between these works and 
the railroad ; but he fell back before night, and 
crossed White Oak swamp at Brackett's Ford. 

General Sumner in his report of the battle of 
Savage's Station says: 

" When the enemy appeared on the Williams- 
burgh road I could not imagine why General 
Heintzelman did not attack him, and not till 
some time afterward did I learn, to my utter 
amazement, that General Heintzelman had left 
the field, and retreated with his whole corps 
(about fifteen thousand men) before tlie action 
commenced. This defection might have been 



DOCUMENTS. 



589 



•ttended with the most disastrous consequences ; 
and iiltlioiinh we beat the enemy signally and 
drove him from the field, M'e should certainly 
have given him a more crushing blow if (leneral 
Heintzelman had been there with his corps." 

Ciieneral Heintzelman in his report of the op- 
erations of liis corps says : 

"(^n the night of the twent3^-eighth of June I 
received orders to withdraw the troops of my 
corps from the advanced position they had taken 
on the twenty-fifth of June, and to occupy the 
intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map 
was sent me, showing the positions General 
Sumner's and General Franklin's corps would 
occupy. 

" About sunrise the next day our troops slowly 
fell back to the new position, cautiously followed 
by the enemv, taking possession of our camps 
as soon as wo left them. 

" From some misapprehension General Sumner 
held a more advanced ]iosition than was indicated 
on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space 
of about three fourths of a mile between the 
right of his corps and General Smith's division 
of General Franklin's corps. 

" At eleven a.m. on the twenty-ninth the enemy 
commenced an attack on General Sumner's 
troops, a few shells falling within my lines. 
Late in the forenoon reports reached me that the 
rebels were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, 
only a mile and a half from Savage's Station. I 
sent several cavalry reconnoissances, and finally 
was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came 
to my headquarters, when I learned of the inter- 
val between his left and General Sumner's right, 
in which space Dr. Trent's house is ; also that 
the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across 
the Chickahominy, and were advancing. 

" I rode forward to see General Sumner, and 
met his troops falling back on the Williamsburgh 
road through my lines. General Sumner in- 
formed me that he intended to make a stand at 
Savage's Station, and for me to join him to de- 
termine upon the position. 

" This movement of General Sumner's uncover- 
ing my right flank, it became necessary for me 
to at once withdraw my troops. . . . 

"I rode back to find General Sumner. After 
some delay, from the mass of troops in the field, 
I found him, and learned that the course of ac- 
tion had been determined on ; so l returned to 
give the necessary orders for the destruction of 
the railroad cars, auununition, and provisipns 
still remaining on the ground. 

" The whole open space near Savage's Station 
was crowded with troops — -more tlian I supposed 
could be brought into action judiciously. An 
aid from the Commanding General had in the 
morning reported to me to point out a road across 
the White Oak swamp, starting from the left of 
General Kearny's position and leading by Brack- 
ett's Ford. . . . 

Sup. Doc. S8 



" The advance of the column reached the Charles 
City road at half-past six p.ji., and the rear at 
ten P.JI., without accident." 

The orders given by me to Generals Sumnw, 
Heintzelman, and Franklin, were to hold the po- 
sitions assigned them until dark. As stated by 
General Heintzelman, General Sunnier did not 
occupy the designated position ; but, as he was 
the senior officer present on that side of the 
White Oak swamp, lie may have thought that 
the movements of the enemy justified a devia- 
tion fi'om the letter of the orders. It a])pears 
from his report that he assumed command of all 
the troops near Savage's Station, and dolermined 
to resist the enemy there; and that he gave Gen- 
eral Heintzelman orders to hold the same posi- 
tion as I had assigned him. 

The aid sent by me to General Heintzelman 
to point out the road across the swamp was to 
guide him in retiring after dark. 

On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and 
Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of 
battle in the large open field to the left of the 
railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, 
and the right extending down to the railroad. 
General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood 
to the left of the field, where he did excellent 
service, receiving a wound, but retaining his com- 
mand. 

General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the 
woods on the right and front. At four p.m. the 
enemy commenced his attack in large force by 
the ^Villiamsburgh road. It was gallantly met 
by General Burns's brigade, supported and reen- 
forced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the 
New-York Sixty-ninth, Hazzard's and Pettit's 
batteries again doing good service. Osborn's 
and Bramhall's batteries also took part effective- 
ly in this action, which was continued with great 
obstinacy until between eight and nine p.m., 
when the enemy were driven from tlie field. 

Immediately after the battle the orders were 
repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross 
White Oak swamp, which was accomplished dur 
ing the night in good order. By midnight all 
the troops were on the road to White Oak swamp 
bridge. General French, with his brigade, acting 
as rear-guard, and at five a.m. on the thirtieth 
all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed. 

On the afternoon of the twenty -ninth I gave to 
the corps commanders their instructions for the 
operations of the following day. As stated be- 
fore. Porter's corps was to move forward to 
James River, and, with the corps of General 
Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey 
Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus 
covering the Charles City road to llichmond, 
opening communication with the gunboats, and 
covering the passage of the supply-trains, which 
were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon 
Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were 
pressed onward, and posted so as to guard the 
approaches from Richmond, as well as the cross- 
ings of the White Oak swamp, over which the 
army had passed. General Franklin was ordered 
to hold the passage of White Oak swamp bridge, 



690 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that 
point. His coiiunand consisted of his own corps, 
with General Richardson's division and General 
Naglee's brigade placed under his orders for the 
occasion. General Slocum's division was on the 
right of the Charles City road. 

On the morning of the thirtieth I again gave 
to the corps commanders within reach instruc- 
tions for posting their troops. I found that, not- 
withstanding all the efforts of my personal staff 
and other officers, the roads were blocked by 
wagons, and there was great difficulty in keep- 
ing the trains in motion. 

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward 
on the twenty-eighth to reconnoitre the roads had 
neither returned nor sent me any reports or 
guides. Generals Keyes and Porter had been 
delayed — one by losing the road, and the other 
by repairing an old road — and had not been able 
to send any information. We then knew of but 
one road for the movement of the troops and our 
immense trains. 

It was therefore necessary to post the troops 
in advance of this road as well as our limited 
knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to 
cover the movement of the trains in the rear. 

I then examined the whole line from the swamp 
to the left, giving final instructions for the post- 
i"g of the troops and the obstructions of the 
roads toward Richmond, and all. corps com- 
manders were directed to hold their positions 
until the trains had passed, after which a more 
concentrated position was to be taken up near 
Jan es River. 

Our force was too small to occupy and hold 
the entire line from the White Oak swamp to the 
river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by 
a movement across the lower part of the swamp, 
or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. 
Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhaust- 
ed and required rest in a more secure position. 

I extended my examinations of the country as 
far as Ilaxall's, looking at all the approaches to 
Malvern, which position I perceived to be the 
key to our operations in this quarter, and was 
thus enabled to expedite very considerably the 
pas.sage of the trains, and to rectify the positions 
of the troops. 

Every thing being then quiet, I sent aids to 
the ditl'erent corps commanders to inform them 
what I had done on the left, and to bring me in- 
formation of the condition of affairs on the right. 
I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and having 
made arrangements for instant communication 
from Malvern by signals, went on board of Cap- 
tarn Rodgers's gunboat, lying near, to confer 
with him in reference to the condition of our 
.supply vessels, and the state of things on the 
river. It was his opinion that it would be ne- 
cessary for the army to fall back to a position 
below City l>oint, as the channel there was so 
near the soutliern shore that it would not be pos- 
sible to bring up the transports, should the ene- 
my occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his 
opinion, the nearest suiUible point. ' Upon the ter- 
mination of this interview I returned to Malvern 



Hill, and remained there until shortly before day^ 

light. 

BATTLE OF " NELSON's FARm" OR "gLENDALE." 

On the morning of the thirtieth. General Sum- 
ner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's divi- 
sion to Glendale, (" Nelson's Farm.") General 
McCall's division (Pennsylvania reserves) was 
halted during the morning on the New-Market 
road, just in advance of the point where the road 
turns off to Quaker Church. This line was 
formed perpendicularly to the New-Market road, 
with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on 
the left, and Reynolds's brigade, commanded by 
Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the Fifth Pennsylva- 
nia, in reserve ; Randall's regular battery on the 
right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the 
centre, and Deidrich's and Kanahan's batteries 
of the artillery reserve on the left — all in front 
of the infantry line. The country in General 
McCall's front was an open field, intersected to- 
ward the right by the New-Market road, and a 
small strip of timber parallel to it ; the open 
front was about eight hundred yards, its depth 
about one thousand yards. 

On the morning of the thirtieth. General Heint- 
zelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to 
be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that 
road and the Charles City road. General Slo- 
cum's division was to extend to the Charles City 
road. General Kearny's left to connect with Gen- 
eral Slocum's left. General McCall's position 
was to the left of the Long Bridge road, in con- 
nection with General Kearny's left. General 
Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Be- 
tween twelve and one o'clock the enemy opened 
a fierce Cannonade upon the divisions of Smith 
and Richardson, and Naglee's brigade, at White 
Oak swamp bridge. This artillery fire was con- 
tinued by the enemy through the day, and he 
crossed some infantry below our position. Rich- 
ardson's division suffered severely. Captain 
Ayres directed our artillery with great effect 
Captain Hazzard's batterj', after losing many 
cannoneers, and Captain Hazzard being mortally 
wounded, was compelled to retire. It was re- 
placed by Pettit's battery, which partially si- 
lenced the enemy's guns. 

General Franklin held his position until after 
dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their 
attempts to cross the White Oak swamp. 

At two o'clock in the day the enemy were re- 
ported advancing in force by the Charles City 
road, and at half-past two o'clock the attack was 
made down the road on General Slocum's left, 
but- was checked by his artillery. After this the 
enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions 
of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General 
McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was 
compelled to retire. 

General McCall, in his report of the battle, 
says : 

" About half-past two my pickets were driven 
in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, 
without loss on our part. 



I 



DOCUMENTS. 



591 



*'At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a 
regiment on the left centre and another on the 
right centre to feel for a weak point. They were 
under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly ad- 
vanced, hut were both driven back — on the left 
by the Twelfth regiment, and on the right by the 
Seventh regiment. 

'■ For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly 
here. ... At last the enemy was compelled 
to retire before the well-directed musketry lire of 
the reserves. The (Jerman batteries were driven 
to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. 
It was, however, of little avail, and they were 
soon after abandoned by the cannoneers." . . . 

" The batteries in front of the centre were 
boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedi- 
ly forced back." . . . 

"Soon after this a most determined charge 
was made on Randall's battery by a full brigade, 
advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in 
perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges 
had, I have stated, been previously made on 
Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments 
without success, they having recoiled before the 
storm of canister hurled against them. A like 
result was anticipated by Randall's battery, and 
the Fourth regiment was requested not to fire 
until the battery had done with them. 

" Its gallant commander did not doubt his abil- 
ity to repel the attack, and his guns did, indeed, 
mow down the advancing host, but stul the gaps 
were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run 
to the very muzzle of his guns. 

" It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were 
in his battery before the guns could be removed. 
Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limber- 
ed, had their horses killed and wounded and 
were overturned on the spot, and the enemy, 
dashing past, drove the greater part of the Fourth 
regiment before them. 

" The left company, (B,) nevertheless, stood its 
ground, with its Captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did, 
likewise, certain men of other companies. I had 
ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check 
them, but with only partial success. 

"There was no running. But my division, re- 
duced by the previous battles to less than six 
thousand, (6000,) had to contend with the divi- 
sions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two 
of the strongest and best among many of the con- 
federate ai-ray, numbering that day eigliteen thou- 
sand or twenty thousand men, and it was reluct- 
antly compelled to give way before heavier force 
accumulated upon them." 

General Heintzelman states that about five 
o'clock P.M. (jieneral McCall's division was attack- 
ed in large force, evidently the principal attack ; 
that in less than an hour the division gave way, 
and adds : " General Hooker being on his left, 
by moving to his right, repulsed the rebels in the 
handsomest manner with great .slaughter. Gen- 
era] Sunmer, who was with General Sedgwick in 
McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artiUerj 



and infantry in driving back the enemy. They 
now renewed their attack with vigor on General 
Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy 
loss." 



This attack comnoenced about four p.m., and 
was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost 
determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's 
battery, directed with great piecision, firinic 
double charges, swept them back. The whole 
open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled 
with the enemy ; each repulse brought fresh 
troops. The third attack was only repulsed by 
the rapid volle}^s and determined charge of the 
Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half 
of the Thirty-seventh New-York volunteers. 

General McCall's troops soon began to emerge 
from the woods into the open field. Several bat- 
teries M-ere in position and began to fire into the 
woods over the heads of our men in front. Cap- 
tain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of 
General Sumner's artillery with orders to shell 
the woods. General Burns's brigade was then 
advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him 
back ; other troops began to return from the 
White Oak swamp. Late in the day, at the call 
of General Kearny, General Taylor's first New- 
Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to 
occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted 
position, a battery accompanying the brigade. 
They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly 
after gave up the attack, contenting themselves 
with keeping up a desultory firing till late at 
night. Between twelve and one o'clock at night 
General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his 
corps, and soon after daylight both of his divi- 
sions, with General Slocum's division and a por- 
tion of General Sumner's command, reached Mal- 
vern Hill. 

On the morning of the thirtieth, General Sum- 
ner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly 
to Glendale, and upon a call from General Frank- 
lin for reenforcements, sent him two brigades, 
which returned in time to participate and render 
good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen- 
eral Sumner says of this battle : 

" The battle of Glendale was the most severe 
action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About three 
o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a 
furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy 
was routed at all points and driven from the 
field." 

Tlie rear of the supply trains and the reserve 
artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 
four P.M. At about this time the enemy began 
to appear in General Porter's front, and at five 
o'clock advanced in large force against his left 
flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of 
timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern 
Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he 
attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concen- 
trated fire of about thirty guns was biought to 
bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire 
of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to 
retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel 



592 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Warren. The gunboats rendered tnosl efficient 
aid at this time, and helped to diive buck the 
enemy. 

It was very late at night before my aids return- 
ed to give me the results of the day's fighting 
along tlie whole line, and the true position of af- 
fur-s. AVhilo waiting to hear from General Frank- 
lin, before sending orders to Generals Suumei- 
and IJeintzehnan, I received a message from tlie 
latter that General Franklin was falling back ; 
whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn of my staff, 
with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to 
order in Generals Sumner and Ilcintzclman at 
once. He had not gone far when he met two 
oflicers sent fiom General Franklin's headquar- 
ters with thii infoiination that he was falling back. 
Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and 
lleintzelinan to fill back also, and definite in- 
structions were given as to tlie movement which 
was to commence on the right. The orders met 
these troops already en route to ^lalvern. In- 
structions were also sent to General Franklin as 
to the route he was to follow. 

General r>arnard then received full instructions 
for posting the troops as they arrived. 

I then returned to Ilaxall's, and again left for 
Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by 
several general officers, I once more made the 
entire circuit of the position, and then returned 
to Ilaxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers 
to select the final location for the army and its 
depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious 
fighting conmienced, and after riding along the 
lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about 
the right, remained in that vicinity. 

liATTLE OF MALVERN niLL. 

The position selected for resisting the further 
advance of the enemy on the first of July was 
with the left and centre of our lines resting on 
Malvern Hill, while the right curved backward 
through a wooded country towai'd a point below 
Ilaxall's on James River. Malvern Hill is an 
elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three 
fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, 
and with several converging roads running over 
it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, 
and the ground slopes graduall}^ toward the north 
and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for 
artillery in tliose directions. Toward the north- 
west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a 
ravine which extends to James River. From the 
position of tlie enemy his most obvious line of 
attaclv would come from the direction of Rich- 
mond and Wliite Oak swamp, and would almost 
of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, 
therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing 
the troops and collecting the ])riiicipal part of the 
artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line, 
(Syke.s's division on tlie left, Morell's on the 
right,) witli llie artillery of his two divisions ad- 
vantageously posteil, and the artillery of the re- 
serve so disposed on the high grovmvl that a con- 
centrated fire of .some sixty guns could be brought 
to bear on any point in liis front or left. Colonel 
Tylttv also had, with great exertion, succeeded in 



getting ten of his siege-guns in position on the 
higlicst point of the hill. 

Couch's division was placed on the right of 
Porter ; next came Kearn}' and Hooker ; next 
Sedgwick and Richardson ; next Smith and Slo- 
cum ; tlien the remainder of Kcyes's corps, ex- 
tending by a backward curve nearlj' to the river. 
The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in re- 
serve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's 
position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown 
to the left on the low ground to protect that 
flank from any movement direct fi-om the Rich- 
mond road. The line was very strong along the 
whole front of the open plateau, but from thence 
to the extreme right the troops were more de- 
ployed. This formation was imperative, as an 
attacli would probably be made upon our left. 
The right was rendered as secure as possible by 
slashing the timber and b}^ barricading the roads. 
Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla 
on James River, placed his gunboats so as to 
protect our flank, and to command the approach- 
es from Richmond. 

Between nine and ten a.m. the enemy com- 
menced feeling along our whole left wing, with 
his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right 
as Hooker's division. 

About two o'clock a column of the enemy was 
observed moving toward our right, within the 
skirt of wc^ds in front of Heintzelman's corps, 
but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- 
ments were at once made to meet the anticipated 
attack in t'nat quarter, but, though the column 
was long, occupying more than two hours in 
passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard 
of. The presumption is, that it retired by the 
rear, and participated in the attack afterward 
made on our left. 

About three p.m. a heavy fire of artillery open- 
ed on Kearny's left and Couch's division, speed- 
ily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on 
Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with 
good effect by our own, and the infantry of 
Couch's division remained lying on the ground 
until the advancing column was witliin short 
musket-range, when they sprang to their feet 
and poured in a deadly volley which entirely 
broke tlie attacking force and drove them in dis- 
order back over their own ground. This advan- 
tage was followed up until we had advanced the 
right of our line some seven or eight hundred 
yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, 
giving us a stronger position and a better fire. 

Sliortly after four o'clock the firing ceased 
along tlie whole front, but no disposition was 
evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw 
fi'om the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been 
detached from Richardson's division, was station- 
ed upon Couck's right by General Porter, to 
whom he had been ordered to report. The whole 
line was surveyed by the General, and every 
thing held in readiness to meet the coming at- 
taclv. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened 
upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength 
of his artillery, and at once began pushing for- 
ward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Bri- 



DOCUMENTS. 



593 



gade after brigade, formed under cover of the 
woods, started at a run to cross the open space 
and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of 
our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our 
infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to 
shelter, and covered the ground with tlieir dead 
and wounded. In several instances our infantry 
withheld their fire until the attacking column, 
which rushed through the storm of canister and 
shell from our artillery, had reached within a few 
3'ards of our lines. They then poured in a single 
volley and dashed forward M'ith the bayonet, 
capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the 
routed columns in confusion from the field. 

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were ac- 
cumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher 
and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as 
soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw 
any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelmau's 
troops, to reenforce that part of the line and hold 
the position. These brigades relieved such regi- 
ments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as 
had expended their ammunition, and batteries 
from the reserve were pushed forward to replace 
those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the 
enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position 
so tenaciously defended ; but, despite his vastly 
superior numbers, his repeated and desperate 
attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and dark- 
ness ended the battle of ^ralvern Hill, though it 
was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery 
ceased its fire. 

During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers 
added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, 
by throwing shell among his reserves and ad- 
vancing columns. 

As the army in its movement from the Chicka- 
hominy to Harrison's Landing was continually 
occupied in marching by night and fighting by 
day, its commanders found no time or opportu- 
nity for collecting data which would enable them 
to give exact returns of casualties in each en- 
gagement. The aggregate of our entire losses 
from the twent3'-sixth of June to the first of 
July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at 
Harrison's Landing, to be as follows : 

List of the killed, icounded, and missing in the 
army of the Potomac from the twenty -sixth of 
June to the first of July, 18G2, inclusive. 



Corps. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


Ag'gate. 


1st. McCaU's division,* 


253 
1S7 
1S9 
69 
620 
245 

'ig 


1240 

1076 

1051 

507 

2460 

1313 

2 

60 


1531 

843 

S33 

201 

11 93 

1179 

21 

97 


3,074 
2,111 
2,073 
777 
4,273 
2,737 
23 


8(1. Heiiitzelman's, 

4Ui. Keyes's, 


6th. Pianklin'8, 




176 






Total, ... 


1582 


7709 


5953 


15,249 



Although the result of the battle of Malvern 
was a complete victory, it was, nevertheless, 



* Pennsylvania reserves. 



necessary to fall back still fmthcr, in order to 
reach a point wliere our supplies could be brought 
to us with certainty. As before stated, in the 
opinion of Captain Kndgers, commanding the gun- 
l)()at flotilla, this coul.i only be done below City 
Point ; concurring in his opinion, I selected 
Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. 
The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, 
and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the 
transports immediately. 

The greater portion of the transportation of the 
army having been started for Harrison's Land- 
ing during the night of the thirtieth of June and 
first of July, the order for the movement of the 
troops was at once issued upon the final repulse 
of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order pre- 
scribed a movement by the left and rear. Gen- 
eral Reyes's corps to cover the mananivre. It 
was not carried out in detail as regards the divi- 
sions on the left, the roads being somewhat block- 
ed by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch 
were not able to move out as early as had been 
anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to 
place a rear-guard between his command and the 
enemy. Colonel Averill, of the Third Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry was intrusted with tin:; delicate 
duty. He had under his command his own regi- 
ment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade 
of regular infantry and one battery. By a judi- 
cious use of the resources at his conunand he de- 
ceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal 
of the left wing without being attacked, remain- 
ing himself on the previous day's batlle-fieid 
until about seven o'clock of the second of July. 
Meantime General Keycs, having received his 
orders, commenced vigorous preparations for 
covering the movement of the entire army and 
protecting the trains. It being evident tliat the 
immense number of wagons and artillery carria- 
ges pertaining to the army could not move with 
celerity along a single road, (Jeneral Keyes took 
advantage of every accident of the ground to 
open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. 
He made preparations for obstructing the roads, 
after the army had passed, so as to jirevent any 
rapid pursuit, destroying ctfectually Turkey 
Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other 
roads and approaches temporarily impassable by 
felling trees across them. He kept the trains 
well closed up, and directed the march so that 
the troops could move on each side of the roads, 
not obstructing the passage, but being in good 
position to repel an attack from an\' quarter. 
His dispositions were so successful that, to use 
his own words : " I do not think uiore vehicles or 
more public property were abandoned on the 
march from Turkey Bridge than would have 
been left, in the same state of the roads, if the 
army had been moving toward the enemy in- 
stead of away from him. And when it is under- 
stood that the carriages and tcims belonging to 
this army, stretcheil out in one line, would extend 
not far from forty miles, the energy and caution 
necessary for their safe withdrawal from tlie pres- 
ence of an enemy, vastly sui)erior in numbers, 
will be appreciated." The last of the wagouH 



s^ 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



did not reach the site selected at Harrison's Bar 
until after dark on the third of July, and the 
rcar-giiiard did not move into their camp until 
every tiling was secure. The enemy followed 
up with a small force, and on the third threw a 
few shells at the rear-guard, hut were quickly 
dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the 
gunboats. 

Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes 
for the skill and energy which characterized his 
performance of the important and delicate duties 
intrusted to his charge. 

High praise is also due to the officers and men 
of the First Connecticut artillery. Colonel Tyler, 
for the manner in which they withdrew all the 
heavy guns during the seven days, and from Mal- 
vern'llill. Owing to the crowded state of the 
roads the teams could not be brought within a 
couple of miles of the position, but these energetic 
soldiers removed the guns by hand for that dis- 
tance, leaving nothing behind. 

THIKD PERIOD. 

On the first of July I received the following 
from the President : 

Washington, July 1, 18G2 — 8.80 p.m. 

It is impossible to reenforce you for your pres- 
ent emergency. If we had a million of men we 
could not get them to you in time. We have not 
the men to send. If you are not strong enough 
to face the enemy, j^ou must find a place of secu- 
rity, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your 
ground if you can, but save the army at all events, 
even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still 
have strength enough in the country and will 
bring it out. A. Lincoln. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

In a despatch from the President to me, on the 
second of July, he says: 

"If you think you are not strong enough to 
take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. 
Try just now to save the army, material and per- 
sonnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive 
again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen 
States offer me a levy of three hundred thousand, 
which I accept." 

On the third of July the following kind des- 
patch was received from the President : 

[Extract.] 
Washington, July 8, 1862—3 p.m. 
Yours of half-past-fivc 3'esterday is ju.st receiv- 
ed. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and 
men, have done the bestj'ou could. All accounts 
say better fighting was never done. Ten thou- 
sand thanks for it. 

A. Lincoln. 
Major-Gencral G. B. McClellan. 

On the fourth I sent the following to the Pres- 
ident: 

IlEADQtIAItTKRS ArmY OF THR POTO.XAC, I 
IlAHKisuN'ti ll.Mt, J.vMKs KivKK. July 4, 1S6'2. ( 

I. have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your despatch of the second instant. 



I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor 
to give my men the repose they so much require. 

After sending my communication on Tuesday, 
the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a 
fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they 
were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their 
attack succeeded, the consequences would have 
been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the 
hard fighting which had continued from the after- 
noon of the twent3'-sixth ultimo, in a daily series 
of engagements wholly unparalleled on this con- 
tinent for determination and slaughter on both 
sides. 

The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enor- 
mous. That of the ' enemy certainly greatest 
On Tuesday morning, the first, our army com- 
menced its movement from llaxall's to this point, 
our line of defence there being too extended to 
be maintained by our weakened forces. Our 
train was immense, and about four p.m. on the 
second a heavy storm of rain began, which con- 
tinued during the entire day and until the fore- 
noon of yesterday. 

The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, 
and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole 
army, men and material, was finally brought safe 
into this camp. 

The last of the wagons reached here at noon 
yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but 
the army preserved its inorale^ and M'ould have 
repelled any attack which the enemy was in con- 
dition to make. 

W^e now occupy a line of heights, about two 
miles from the James, a plain extending from 
there to the river ; our front is about three miles 
long ; these heights command our whole position, 
and must be maintained. The gunboats can ren- 
der valuable support upon both flanks. If the 
enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground 
as we best may, and at whatever cost. 

Our positions can be carried only by over 
whelming numbers. The spirit of the army i« 
excellent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, 
and the soldiers exhibit the best results of di.s- 
cipHne. Our position is by no means impregna- 
ble, especially as a morass extends on this side 
of the liigh ground from our centre to the James 
on our right. The enemy may attack in vast 
numbers, and if so, our front will be the scene of 
a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be deci- 
sive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, 
wounded, and prisoners. 

I cannot now approximate to any statement of 
our losses, but we were not beaten in any conflict 

The enemy were unable, by their utmost efforts, 
to drive us fi-om any field. Never did such a 
change of base, involving a retrograde movement, 
and under incessant attacks from a most deter- 
mined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so 
little of disorder. We have lost no guns except 
twenty-five on the field of battle, twenty-one of 
which were lost by the giving way of McCall's 
division, under the onset of superior numbers. 

Our communications by the James River are 
not secure. There are points where the enemy 
can establish themselves with cannon or musket- 



DOCUMENTS. 



595 



ry and command the river, and where it is not 
certain that our gunboats can drive them out. 
In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I 
will still make every effort to preserve, at least, 
the personnel of the arm}', and the events of the 
last few days leave no question, that the troops 
will do all that their country can ask. Send 
such reenforcements as you can ; I will do what 
r can. We are shipping our wounded and sick 
and landing supplies. The Navy Department 
should cooperate with us to the extent of its re- 
sources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power 
in the kindest and most efficient manner. 

When all the circumstances of the case are 
known, it will be acknowledged by all competent 
judges that the movement just completed by this 
army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Un- 
der the most difficult circumstances we have pre- 
served our trains, our guns, our material, and, 
above all, our honor. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

The President. 

To which I received the following reply : 

WA3HINQT0N, July 5, 1862 — 9 i.M. 

A thousand thanks for the relief j'^our two des- 
patches, of twelve and one p.m. yesterday, gave 
me. Be assured the heroism and skill of your- 
self and officers and men is, and forever will be, 
appreciated. 

If you can hold your present position we shall 
hive the enemy yet. A. Lincoln. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan, 
Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

The following letters were received from His 
Excellency the President : 

War Department, I 

Washington City, D. C, July 4, 1S02. ) 

I understand your position as stated in j'our 
letter, and by General Marcy. To rcenforce you 
so as to enable you to resume the offensive with- 
in a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. 
In addition to that arrived and now arriving from 
the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I sup- 
pose,) and about ten thousand, I hope, you will 
have from Burnside very soon, and about live thou- 
sand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how 
I can send you another man within a month. 
Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the 
present, must be your only care. Save the army, 
iivst, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, 
by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, 
must be the judge as to which you will attempt, 
and of the moans for effecting it. I but give it 
as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats 
and the reenforcements mentioned above, you 
can hold your present position ; provided, and 
so long as you can keep the James Iliver open 
below you. If you are not tolerably confident 
you can keep the James River open, you had 
better remove as soon as possible. I do not re- 
member that you have expressed any ajjprehen- 
sion as to the danger of having your communi- 



cation cut on the river below you, yet I do not 
suppose it can have escaped your attention. 
Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln. 

Major-General McGlellan. 

P. S. — If at any time you feci able to take tho 
offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. 

A. L. 

The following telegram was sent on the sot- 
enth : 

HBAnqnARTRRS Army of TrtB Potomac, | 
Berkeley, July 7, 1S62— S..30 a.m. (" 

As boat is starting, I have only time to ac- 
knowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. 
Enemy have not attacked. My position is very 
strong, and daily becoming more so. If not at- 
tacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I havo 
been anxious about my communications. Had 
long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Golds- 
borough last night; he is confident he can keep 
river open. He should have all gunboats possi- 
ble. Will see him again this morning. My men 
in splendid spirits and anxious to try it again. 

Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, 
and don't lose confidence in this army. 

G. B. McClkllan, 

A. Lincoln, Major-Oenei-al. 

President. 

While General-in-Chief, and directing tho op- 
erations of all our armies in the field, \ had be- 
come deeply impressed with the importance of 
adopting and carrying out certain views regard- 
ing the conduct of the war, which, in my judg- 
ment, were essential to its objects and its suc- 
cess. 

During an active campaign of three months in 
the enemy's country, these were .so fully con- 
firmed that I conceived it a duty, in the criticid 
position we then occupied, not to withhold a 
candid expression of the more important of these 
views from the Commander-in-(yliief, whom tho 
Constitution places at the head of the armies and 
navies, as well as of the government of the na- 
tion. 

The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. 
Lincoln : 

IlKAnQnARTERS ArMT OK THB PoTOMAC, I 

Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. ) 
Mk. President: You havo been fully informed 
that the rebel army is in the front, with the pur- 
pose of overwhelming us by attacking our posi- 
tions or reducing us by blocking our river com- 
munications. I cannot but regard our condition 
as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos- 
sible contingencies, to lay before your Excellen- 
cy, for your jjrivate consideration, my general 
views concerning the existing state of the rebel- 
lion, althougli they do not strictly relate to the 
situation of tliis army, or strictly come within 
the scope of my official duties. These views 
amount to convictions, and are deeply impres.sed 
upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never 
be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions 
and self-government. The Constitution and the 
Union must be preserved, whatever may be tho 



696 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession 
i.s successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be 
seen in the future. Let neither military disas- 
ter, political faction, nor foreign war shake your 
settled i)U7-pose to enforce the equal operation of 
the laws of the United States upon the people 
of every State. 

The time has come when the Government must 
determine upon a civil and military policj'', cov- 
erinp; the whole }i;round of our national trouble. 

The responsibility of dctermininsr, declai-in^^, 
and Kuppoi'ting such civil and military policy. 
and of directing the wliole course of national 
affiiirs in regard to the rebellion, must now be 
assumed and exercised by j'ou, or our cause will 
be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even 
for the present terrible exigency. 

This rebellion has assumed the character of a 
war ; as such it should be regarded, and it should 
be conducted upon ttie highest principles known 
to Christian civilization. It should not be a war 
looking to the subjugation of the people of any 
State, in any event. It should not be at all a 
war upon population, but against armed forces 
and political organizations. Neither confiscation 
of property, political executions of persons, ter- 
ritorial organization of States, or forcible aboli- 
tion of slavery should be contemplated for a mo- 
ment. 

In prosecuting the war, all private property 
and unarmed persons should be strictly pro- 
tected, subject only to the necessity of military 
operations ; all private property taken for mili- 
tary use should be paid or receipted for ; pillage 
and waste sliould be treated as high crimes ; all 
unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and of- 
fensive demeanor by the military toward citizens 
promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not 
be tolerated, except in places where active hos- 
tilities exist; and oaths, not required by enact- 
ments, constitutionally made, should be neither 
demanded nor received. 

Military government should be confined to the 
preservation of public order and the protection 
of political right. Military power should not be 
allowed to interfere with the relations of servi- 
tude, either liy supporting or impairing the 
authority of the master, except for repressing 
disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, 
under the act of Congress, seeking military pro- 
tection, should receive it. The riglit of the (Jov- 
ernmcnt to appropriate permanently to its own 
service claims to slave labor, should be asserted, 
and the right of the owner to compensation there- 
for should be recognized. This i)rinciplc might 
be extended, upon grounds of military necessity 
and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, 
thus working manumission in sucii State ; and in 
Missouri, perhaps in Western \'irginia also, and 
possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of 
such a measure is only a question of time. A 
.system of policy thus constitutional, and per- 
vaded by the infiuences of Christianity and free- 
dom, would receive the support of "almost all 
truly loyal men. would deejily impress the rebel 
masses and all foreign nations, and it mi"ht be 



humbly hoped that it would commend itself to 
the favor of the Almighty. 

Unless the principles governing the future con- 
duct of our struggle shall be made known and 
approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces 
will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radi- 
cal views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly 
disintegrate our present armies. The policy of 
the Government must be supported by concen- 
trations of military power. The national forces 
should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of 
occupation, and numerous armies, but should be 
mainly collected into masses, and brought to 
bear upon the armies of the confederate States. 
Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political 
structure which the}' support would soon cease 
to exist. 

In carrying out any system of policy which 
you may form, you will require a commander-in- 
chief of the army, one who possesses your confi- 
dence, understands your views, and who is com- 
petent to execute j^our orders, by directing the 
military forces of the nation to the accomplish- 
ment of the objects by you proposed. I do not 
ask that place for myself I am willing to serve 
you in such po.sition as you may assign me, and 
I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate serv- 
ed superior. 

I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I 
hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written 
this letter with sincerity toward you and fron» 
love for my country. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

Georoe B. McClellan, 

JIiijor-General Commanding 

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 

President. 

I telegraphed to the President on the eleventh 
as follows : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
Berkeley, July 11, 1862 — .3 p.m. ) 

We are very strong here now, so far as defen- 
sive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us 
strong enough to advance and try it again. All 
in fine spirits. Geokge B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

A. Lincoln, 

President. • 

These telegrams were sent on the twelfth, sev- 
enteenth, and eighteenth, to His Excellency the 
President : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
Berkeley, July 12, 1802 — 7.15 a.m. j 

Hill and Longstreet crossed into New-Kent 
( Jounty, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant 
wiuit road they afterward took, but will know 
shortly. 

Nothing else of interest since last despatch. 
Rain ceased, and every thing quiet. Men rest- 
ing well, but beginning to be impatient for an- 
otiier fight. 

1 am more and more convinced that this army 
ought not to be withdrawn from here, but prompt- 
ly rcenforced and thrown again upon Richmond. 
If we have a little more than half a chance, we 
can take it. 



DOCDMEXTS. 



597 



I dread the effects of any retreat upon the 
morale of the men. 

George !>. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 
A. LiNCOLX, 

President. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
Berkelky, July 17, 1802 — S a.m. f 

I have consulted fully with (icneral Burnside, 
and would commend to your favorable consider- 
ation the General's plan for bringing (7) seven 
additional regiments from North-Carolina, by 
leaving Newborn to the care of the gunboats. 
It appears manifestly to be our policy to concen- 
trate here every thing we can possibly spare fi-om 
less important points, to make sure of crushing 
the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to 
be the most important point in rebeldoin. Noth- 
ing should be left to chance here. I would 
recommend that General Burnside, with all his 
troops, be oi-dered to this army, to enable it to 
assume the offensive as soon as possible. 

Geokge B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

A. LiMcoi-x, 

President. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
Berkeley, July 18, ISO'2 — 3 a.m. ) 

No change worth reporting in the state of 
affiiirs. Some (20,000j twenty thou.sand to (25,- 
000) tvventy-Hve thousand of the enemy at Peters- 
burgh, and others thence to Richmond. 

Those at Petersburgh say they are part of 
Beauregard's army. New troops arriving ria 
Petersburgh. Am anxious to have determina- 
tion of Government that no time may be lost in 
preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, 
and perfect unity of action necessary. 

George B. McClellan, 

, -r Mai or-General Commanding. 

A. Lincoln, 

President. 

The following was telegraphed to General Hal- 
leck on the twenty -eighth : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
Berkeley, July 28, 1S02— S a.m. j 

Nothing especially new except corroboration 
of report.^ that reenforcements reaching Rich- 
mond from South. It is not confirmed that any 
of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is 
more and more firm that here is the defence of 
Washington, and that I should be at once reen- 
forced by all available troops to enable me to ad- 
vance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army 
and the cause. I am confident of that. 

George B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. TV. Halleck, 

Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D.C. 

On the thirtieth, I sent the following to the 
General-in-Chief: 

Headquarters Army of tok Potomac, 1 
Berkeley, July 30, 1862 — 7 a.m. | 

I hope that it may soon be decided what is to 
be done by this army, and that the decision may 



be to reenforce it at once. AVe are losing much 
valuable time, and that at a moment when energy 
and decision arc sailly needed. 

George B. McClellan, 

Major-Genoral. 
Major-General IT. W. Halleck, 

Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 

About half an hour after midnight, on the morn- 
ing of August first, the enemy brought some light 
batteries toCoggin's Point and the Coles House, 
on the right l)ank of James River, directly oppo- 
site Harrison's Li^nding, and opened a heavy 
fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was 
continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when 
tliey were driven back by tlie fire of our guns ; 
this affair was reported in the following despatch : 



iRMY OF TRE POTOMAC, I 
y, August 2, l5t)2 — S A.M. ( 



Hbadquarters Army of tre Potomac, 

Berkeley, 



Firing of night before la,st killed some ten (10) 
men and wounded about (15) fifteen. 

No harm of the slightest consequence done to 
the shipping, although several were struck. Sent 
party across river yesterday to the Coles House, 
destro^'ed it, and cut down the timber ; will com- 
plete work to-day, and also send party to Cog- 
gin's Point, which I will probably occupy. I will 
attend to your telegraph about pressing at once ; 
will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I 
will stir these people up. I need more cavalry ; 
have only (3700) three thousand seven hundred 
for duty in cavalry division. 

Adjutant-General's office forgot to send Sykes's 
commission as Major-General, with those of other 
division commanders • do me the favor to hurry 
it on. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Washington, D. C. 

To prevent another demonstration of this char- 
acter, and to insure a debouche on the south bank 
of the James, it became necessary to occupy Cog- 
gin's Point, which was done on the third, and the 
enemy, as will be seen from the following des- 
patch, driven back toward Petersburgh : 

Headquarters Army of ttiv. Potomac, ) 
Bekkeley, Augusts, 1SG2— 10p.m. f 

Coggin's Point was occupied to-day, and tim- 
ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I 
went over the ground myself, and found that Du- 
ane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, 
which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
labor, so as to make it a formidable tefc de pont, 
covering the landing of a large force. 

I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of con- 
trabands to-morrow^ The position covers the 
Coles House, which is directly in front of West- 
over. We have now a safe debouche on the south 
bank, and are secure against midnight cannonad- 
ing. A few thousand more men would place us 
in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the 
enemy very nuich. 

I sent Colonel Averill this morning with throe 
hundred (300) cavalry to examine tlie country 
on the south side of the James, and try to catch 
some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is on the 



5d8 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



■main road from Pctersburgh to Suffolk, and some 
five (5) miles from Coles House. He found a cav- 
alry force of five hundred and fifty (550) men, at- 
tackc<l them at once, drove in their advance-guards 
to their camp, where we had a sharp skirmish, 
and drove them off in disorder. 

He burned their entire camp, with their com- 
missary and quartermaster's stores, and then re- 
turned and recrosscd the river. He took but (2) 
two prisoners, had one man wounded by a ball, 
and one by a sabre-cut. 

Captain Mcintosh made a handsome charge. 
The troops engaged were of the (5th) Fifth regu- 
lars, and the (3d) Third Pennsylvania cavalry. 

Colonel Averill conducted this affair, as he does 
every thing he undertakes, to my entire satisfac- 
tion. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-Gcneral H. W. TIai.leck, 

Commanding United States Army, Washington, D. C. 

On the first of August I received the following 
despatches : 

WASuniOTOK, July 30, 1S62— 8 p.m. 

A despatch just received from General Pope 
says that deserters report that the enemy is mov- 
ing .south of James River, and that the force in 
Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed 
in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the 
case. H. W. Hai-i,eck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

WASmNGTOJJ, July 30, 1SC2— 8 p.m. 
In order to enable you to move in any direc- 
tion, it is necessary to relieve you of your sick. 
The Surgeon-General has, therefore, been direct- 
ed to make arrangements for them at other places, 
and the Quartermaster-General to provide trans- 
portation. I hope you will send them away as 
quickly as pos.sible, and advise me of their re- 
moval. 11. W. Halleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

It is clear that the General-in-Chief attached 
some weight to the report received from General 
Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the 
order in regard to the removing the sick contem- 
plated an offensive movement rather than a re- 
treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams 
just given, from which to form an opinion as to 
^ the intentions of the Government. 

The following telegram strengthened me in that 
belief: 

WASHiNGToy, July 31, 1SC2— 10 a.m. 

General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy 
is reported to be evacuating Richmond, and fall- 
ing back on Danville and Lynchburgh. 

II. W. Halleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

In occupj'ing Coggin's Point, as already de- 
scribed, I was influenced by the necessity of pos- 
ses.sing a secure dcbouche on the south of the 
James, in order to enable me to move on the 



communications of Richmond in that direction, 
as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight can- 
nonades. 

To carry out General Ilalleck's first order, of 
July thii'tieth, it was necessary first to gain pos- 
session of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by 
the enemy, apparently in some little force, and 
controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its 
temporary occupation, at least, was equally ne- 
cessary in the event of a movement upon Peters- 
burgh, or even the abandonment of the Peninsu- 
la. General Hooker, with his own division, and 
Plcasanton's cavalry, was therefore directed to 
gain possession of Malvern Ilill on the night of 
the second of August. 

lie failed to do so, as the following despatch 
recites : 

Headquarters Akmt of the Potomac, ( 
Bebkelky, August 3, 1S62— 10.20 a.m. ( 

The movement undertaken up the river last 
night failed on account of the incompetency of 
guides. 

The proper steps have been taken to-day to rem- 
edy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-morrow 
night to carry out your suggestions as to press- 
ing, at least to accomplish the first indispensable 
step. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commaadin^ 

Major-General Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

On the fourth General Hooker was reenforced 
by General Sedgwick's division, and having ob- 
tained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in 
turning Malvern Hill, and di'iving the enemy back 
toward Richmond. 

The following is my report of this affair at the 
time : 

Malvern Hill, August 5, 1SC2— 1 p.m. 

General Hooker, at half-past five this morning, 
attacked a very considerable force of infantry and 
artillery stationed at this place, and carried it 
handsomely, driving the enemy toward Newmar- 
ket, which is four miles distant, and where it is 
said they have a large force. "We have captured 
one hundred prisoners, killed and wounded .sev- 
eral, with a loss on our part of only three killed 
and eleven wounded ; among the latter, two offi- 
cers. 

I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to 
act as circumstances may recjuire. after the re- 
turn of my cavalry reconnoissances. 

The mass of the enemy escaped under the cov 
er of a dense fog ; but our cavalry are still in pur 
suit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many 
more. 

This is a very advantageous position to cover 
an advance on Richmond, and only fourteen and 
three quarter miles distant ; and I feel confident 
that with reenforcements I would march this ar- 
my tlicre in five days. 

I this instant learn that several brigades of the 
enemy are four miles from here on the Quaker 
road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet 
them. 

General Hooker's dispositions were admirable, 



DOCUMENTS. 



5i»d 



and his oiBccrs and men displaj'^ed their usual 
gallantry. GEOufiE B. McClellan, 

Major-Geneial Commanding. 

Major-Gcncral II. W. Halleck, 

Corajnanding United States Army. 

Malvern Hill, August 5, 18G2 — S p.m. 

Since my last despatch Colonel Averill has re- 
turned frinn a reconnoissance, in the direction of 
Savage's Station, toward Richmond. lie encoun- 
tered the Eighteenth Virginia cavalry near White 
Oak swamp bridge, charged and drove them some 
distance towaixl llichtnond, capturing twenty-eight 
men and horses, killing and wounding several. 

Our troops have advanced twelve (12) miles in 
one direction, and seventeen (17) in another, to- 
ward Richmond to-day. ' 

We have sccnred a strong position at Coggin's 
Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which 
will effectually prevent tlie rebels from u.sing ar- 
tillery hereafter against our camps. 

I learn this evening that there is a force of 
twenty thousand men about six miles back fi-om 
this point, on the south bank of the river. What 
their object is, I do not know, but will keep a 
sharp lookout on their movements. 

I am sending otf sick as rapidly as our trans- 
ports will take them. I am also doing every thing 
in my power to can-y out your orders, to push 
leconnoissances toward the rebel capital, and 
hope soon to find out whether the reports regard- 
ing the abandonment of that place are true. 

Geokge B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

To the despatch of one p.m., August fifth, the 
following answer was received : 

Washington, August 6, 1862— S a.m. 
I have no rcenforcements to send you. 

H. W. Halleck, 

Major-Geueral. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

And soon after the following : 

■Washington, August 6, 1862. 
You will immediately send a regiment of cav- 
alry and several batteries of artillery to Burn- 
jiide's command at Acquia Creek. It is reported 
that Jackson is moving north with a very large 
force. H. W. Halleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

On the fourth I had received General Halleck's 
order of the third, (which appears below,) direct- 
ing me to withdraw the army to Acquia, and on 
the same day sent an earnest protest against it. 
A few hours before this. General Hooker had in- 
formed me that his cavalry pickets reported largo 
bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them 
in, and that he would probably be attacked at 
daybreak. 

Under these circumstances I had determined 
to support him ; but as I could not get the whole 



army in position until the ne.xt afternoon, I con- 
cluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram 
from the General-in-Chief, to withdraw General 
Hooker, that there might be the least po.sriible de- 
lay in conforming to General Ilalleck's orders. I 
therefore sent to General Hook or the following 
letter : 

IIeadqijartkrs Armt of thk Potomac, J 
BbiiiKKLKy, August 6, 18C2 — lU r..M. ( 

Mt Dear Genehal : I find it will not be pos- 
sible to get the whole army into position before 
some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be 
too late to support you, and hold the entire posi- 
tion, should the enemy attack in large force at 
daybreak, wliich there is strong reason to sup- 
pose he intends doing. 

Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, it 
will be necessary to abandon the whole of our 
works here, and run the risk of getting back 
here. 

Under advices I have received from Washing- 
ton, I think it necessary for you to abandon the 
position to-night, getting every thing away before 
daylight. 

Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with 
orders to desti'oy the Turkey Creek bridge when 
they are forced back. 

The roads leading into Haxall's from the right 
should be strongly watched, and Haxall's at 
least held by a strong cavalry force and some light 
batteries as long as possible. 

I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to 
your discretion. 

Please signal to the fleet when tlie withdrawal 
is about com})leted. 

Report fre(]uently to these headqviarters. 

General Sanmer was ordered up to support 
you, but will halt where this passes him, and 
will inform you where he is. 

Geouoe B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

General J. Hooker, 

Commanding at Malvern Hill. 

And the following reply was sent to General 
Halleck : 

IlKAnQrARTERS ARMY OP THK POTOMAO, I 

Berkki.ey, August 6, 1SG3— 11.30 p.m. f 

Despatch of to-day received. I have not quite 
(4000) four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry 
division, so that I cannot possibly spare any 
more. 

I really need many more than I now have to 
carry out your instructions. 

The enemy are moving a large force on Malvern 
Hill. In view of your despatches, and the fact 
that I cannot place the whole army in position 
before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to with- 
draw during the night if it i.s possible; if ho 
cannot do so, I must support him. 
. Until this matter is developed I cannot send 
any batteries; I hope I can do so to-morrow if 
transportation is on hand. 

I will obey the order as soon as circumstiinces 
permit. My artillery is none too numerous now. 
I have only been able to send off some (1200) 



600 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



one thousand two hundred sick. No transporta- 
tion. There shall be no delay that I can avoid. 
CiiiOHCK B. McClellan, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Major-Gcneral II. W. IIali.eck, 

Commanding U. S. Army. 

Five batteries, with their horses and equip- 
ments conii)lete, wci'e embarked on the seventh 
and ciglith, simultaneously with General Hook- 
er's operations upon Malvern. 

I despatched a cavalry force imder Colonel 
Avcrill toward Sava;^e's Station, to ascertain if 
the enemy were making any movements toward 
our right flank. 

He found a rebel cavalry regiment near the 
AVhite (»ak swamp bridge, and completely routed 
it, pursuing well toward Savage's Station. 

These important jircliminary operations assist- 
ed my preparations for the removal of the army 
to Acquia Creek ; and the sending off our sick 
and supplies was pushed both day and night as 
rapidly as the means of transportation permitted. 

On the subject of the withdrawal of the army 
from Harri^son's Landing, the following corre- 
spondence passed between the General-in-Chief 
and myself, while the reconnoissances toward 
Richmond were in progress. 

On the second of August I received the fol- 
lowing : 

Washington, August 2, 1862 — .3.45 p.m. 

You have not answered my telegram of July 
thirtieth, eight p.m., about the removalof your 
sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible, and 
telegraph me when they will be out of your way. 
The President wishes an answer as early as pos- 
sible. H. W. Halleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 
To which this reply was sent : 

IlEADQnARTERS ARMY OF THB PoTOMAC, ) 

Bkkkkley, August 3 — 11 p.m. ) 

Your telegram of (2) second is received. The 
answer (to despatch of July thirtieth) was sent 
this morning. 

We have about (12,500) twelve thousand five 
hundred sick, of whom pei'haps (4000) four thou- 
sand might make easy marches. We have here 
the means to transport (1200) one thousand two 
hundi-ed, and will embark to morrow that num- 
ber of the worst cases, with all the means at tlie 
disposal of the Medical Director; the remainder 
could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten 
days. 

It is impossible for me to decide what cases to 
send off, unless I know what is to be done with 
this army. 

Were the disastrous measures of a retreat 
adoi)ted, all the sick who cannot march and fight 
should be despatched by water. 

Should the army advance, many of the sick 
could be of service at the depots. If it is to re- 
main here any length of time, the question as- 
sumes still a ditVereiit phase. 

Until 1 am informed what is to be done, I can- 
not act understundingly or for the good of the 



service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of 
what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to 
accomplish the object in view. 

In the mean time I mMII do all in my power to 
carry out what I conceive to be j'our wishes. 
Geo. B. McClelean, 

Major-General Comroanding. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 
Commanding Army, Washington, D. C. 

The moment I received the instructions for re- 
moving the sick, I at once gave the necessary di- 
rections for carrying them out. 

AVMth the small amount of transportation at 
hand, the removal of the severe cases alone 
would necessai'ily take several days, and, in the 
mean time, I desired information to determine 
what I should do with the others. 

The order required me to send them away as 
quickly as possible, and to notify the General-in- 
Chief icJien they were removed. 

Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 
second of August, not having been advised of 
what the army under my command was expected 
to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved 
at all, I sent the following despatch : 

Headquakters Army of the Potomac, > 
Berkeley, August 3, 1862. j 

I hear of sea-steamers at Fort Monroe ; are 
they for removing my sick ? If so, to what ex- 
tent am I required to go in sending them off? 
There are not many who need go. 

As I am not in any way informed of the in- 
tentions of the (iovernment in regard to this 
army, I am unable to judge what proportion of 
the sick should leave here, and must ask for spe- 
cific orders. G.B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army, Washington. 

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it 
was important that it should be unencumbered 
with any sick, wounded, or other men who 
might at all interfere with its mobility; but if 
the object was to operate directly on Richmond, 
from the position we then occupied, there were 
many cases of slight sickness which would 
speedily be cured, and the patients returned to 
duty. 

As the service of every man would be import- 
ant in the event of a forward otiensive move- 
ment, I considered it to be of the utmost conse- 
(|ucnce that I should know what was to be done. 
It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch 
of eleven p.m. on the third, before receiving the 
following telegram : 

Washington, August 3, 1S62— T.45 p.m. 

I have waited most anxiously to learn the re- 
sult of your forced reconnoissance toward Rich- 
mond, and also whether all your sick have been 
sent away, and I can get no answer to my tele- 
gram. 

It is determined to withdraw your army from 
the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take 
immediate measures to effect this, covering the 
movement the best you can. 



DOCUMENTS. 



601 



Its real object and withdrawal should be con- 
cealed even from your own officers. 

Your matei'ial and transportation should be 
removed first. You will assume control of all 
the means of transportation within your reach, 
and ai)plv to the naval forces for all the assist- 
ance they can render you. You will consult 
freely with the commander of these forces. The 
entire execution of the movement is left to your 
discretion and judgment. 

You will leave such forces as yon may deem 
proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, 
which we must occupy. 

H. W. TLVLLECK, 
Majrvr-General Commamiing United States Army. 
Major-General Geo. B. McClellan. 

I proceeded to obe}'^ this order with all possible 
rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the 
conviction that the withdrawal of the army of 
the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its 
communications had by the cooperation of the 
gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, 
at tliat time, have the most disastrous effect upon 
our cause. 

1 did not, as the commander of that army, al- 
low the occasion to pass without distinctly set- 
ting forth my views upon the subject to the au- 
thorities in the following telegram : 

Heaiiquarters Armt or the Potomac, ) 
Berkkley, August 4, 1862—12 m. ) 

Your telegram of last evening is received. I 
must confess tliat it has caused me the greatest 
pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that 
the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek 
will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will 
be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to 
complete the preparations for so important a 
movement as thi.s, and while they are in prog- 
ress, I beg that careful consideration may be 
given to my statements. 

This army is now in excellent discipline and 
condition. We hold a debouche on both banks 
of the James River, so that we are free to act in 
any direction ; and with the assistance of the 
gunboats, I consider our communications as now 
secure. 

We are twenty-five (25) miles from Richmond, 
and are not likely to meet the enemy in force 
sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched 
fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings 
us practically within ten (10) miles of Richmond. 
Our longest line of land transportation would be 
from this point twenty-five (25) miles, but with 
the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army 
by water during its advance, certainly to within 
twelve (12) miles of Richmond. 

At Acquia Creek we would be seventy-five (75) 
miles from Richmond, with land transportation 
all the way. 

From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about 
seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as impractica- 
l)Ie to withdraw this army and its material, ex- 
cept by land. 

The result of the movement would thus be a 
march of one hundred and forty-five (145) miles 



to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles 
distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the 
powerful aid of the gunboats and water trans- 
portation. ^ 

Add to this the certain demoralization of this 
army which would ensue, the terribly depressing 
effect upon the people of tlie North, and the 
strong probability that it would influence foreign 
powers to recognize our adversaries ; and the.se 
appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my 
imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms 
afforded by our language that this order may be 
rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, 
it may be promptly reenforced to enable it to 
resume the offensive. 

It may be said that there are no reenforce- 
ments available. I point to Burnside's force ; to 
that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict 
defensive in front of Washington and Harper's 
Ferry ; to those portions of the army of the West 
not required for a strict defensive there. Here, 
directly in front of this army, is the heart of the 
rebellion ; it is here that all our resources should 
be collected to strike the blow which will deter- 
mine the fate of the nation. 

All points of secondar}'^ importance elsewhere 
should be abandoned, and every available man 
brought here ; a decided victory here, and the 
military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It 
matters not what partial reverses we may meet 
with elsewhere; here is the true defence of 
Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the 
James, that the fate of the Union should be de- 
cided. 

Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the 
consciousness that T have ever been, and still 
am, actuated solely by the love of my country, 
knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives 
have influenced me from the commencement of 
this war, I do now, what I never did m my life 
before, I entreat that this order ma)^ be rescinded. 
If ray counsel does not prevail, I will with a 
sad heart obey 3"our orders to the utmost of my 
power, directing to the movement, which I 
clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy 
and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. 
Whatever the result may be — and may God 
grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings — I 
shall at least have tlie internal satisfaction that 
I have written and spoken frankly, and have 
sought to do the best in my power to avert dis- 
aster from my country. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Geneial Commanding. 

Major-(<encral H. W. Hallkck, 

Commanding United Stales Army. 

Soon after sending this telegram, I received the 
following, in reply to mine of eleven p.m. of the 

third. 

Washington, August 4, 1S62 — 12.4.") p.ji. 

My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy 
you in regard to future operations ; it was ex- 
pected that you would have sent off your sick, 
as directed, without waiting to know what were 
or would be the intentions of the Government re- 
specting future movements. 

The President expects that the instructions 



602 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-€3. 



which were sent you yesterday, with his approv- 
al, will be carried out with all possible despatch 
and caution. The Quartermaster-General is 
sending to Fort Monroe *J1 the transportation he 
can collect H. W. Halleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 
To which the following is my reply : 

Headquartrrs Armt of the Potomac, J 
Berkeley, August 5, 1S62 — 7 a.m. ) 

Your telegram of yesterday received, and is 

being carried out as promptly as possible. With 

tlie means at my command, no human power 

could have moved the sick in the time you say 

you expected them to be moved. 

Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

My eflForts for bringing about a change of poli- 
cy were unsuccessful, as will be seen from the 
following telegram and letter received by me in 
reply to mine of twelve m. of the fourth : 

Washington, August 5, 1862 — 12 m. 

You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal 
more than I did the necessity of giving it. It 
will not be rescinded, and you will be expected 
to execute it with all possible promptness. It is 
believed that it can be done now without serious 
danger. This may not be so if there should be 
any delay. I will write you my views more 
fully by mail. H. AV. Halleck, 

M.-yor-General Commanding United States Army. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan, 

The letter was as follows : 

Headquarters of the Armt, I 
Washington, August 6, lSli2. f 

General : Your telegram of yesterday was re- 
ceived this morning, and I immediately tele- 
graphed a brief reply, promising to write you 
more fully by mail. 

You, General, certainly could not have been 
more pained at receiving my order than I was at 
the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by 
high officers, in who.se judgment 1 had great con- 
fidence, to make the order immediately on my 
arrival here, but I determined not to do so until 
I could learn your wishes from a personal inter- 
view. And even after that interview I tried 
fcvery means in my power to avoid withdrawing 
your army, and delayed my decision as long as 1 
dared to delay it. 

I assure you. General, it was not a hasty and 
inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more 
anxious thoughts than any other of my life. 
But after full and mature consideration of all the 
pros and com, I was reluctantly forced to the 
conclusion that the order must be issued — there 
was to my mind no alternative. 

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the 
case. 

You and your officers at our interview esti- 
mated the enemy's forces in and around Rich- 



mond at two hundred thousand men. Since 
then, you and others report that they "lave re- 
ceived and are receiving large reenforcements 
from the South. General Pope's army, covering 
Washington, is only about forty thousand. Your 
effective force is only about ninety thou.sand. 
You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Gene- 
ral Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy di- 
rectly between you ready to fall with his supe- 
rior numbers upon one or the other as he may 
elect ; neither can reenforce the other in case of 
such an attack. 

If General Pope's army be diminished to re- 
enforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Penn- 
sylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. 
If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you 
would be too weak to even hold the position you 
now occupy, should the enemy turn round and 
attack you in full force. In other words, the old 
army of the Potomac is split into two part.s, with 
the entire force of the enemy directly between 
them. They cannot be united by land without 
exposing both to destruction, and yet they must 
be united. To send Pope's forces by water to 
the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a 
military impossibility. The only alternative is 
to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point 
by water, say Fredericksburgh, where the two 
armies can be united. 

Let me now allude to some of the objections 
which you have urged : you say that the with- 
drawal from the present position will cause the 
certain demoralization of the army ' which is now 
in excellent discipline and condition.' 

I cannot understand why a simple change of 
position to a new and by no means distant base 
will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, 
unless the officers themselves assist in that de- 
moralization, which I am satisfied they will not 

I'our change of front from your extreme right 
at Hanover Court-House to your present condi- 
tion was over thirty miles, but I have not heard 
that it demoralized your tr(jops, notwithstanding 
the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. 

A new base on the Rappahannock at Frede- 
ricksburgh brings you within about sixty miles 
of Richmond, and secures a reenforcement of 
forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined 
troops. 

The change with such advantages will, I think, 
if properly represented to your army, encourage 
rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, 
you yourself suggested that a junction might bo 
effected at Y'orktown, but that a flank march 
across the isthmus would be more hazardous 
than to retire to Fort Monroe. 

You will remember that Yorktown is two or 
three miles further than Fredericksburgh is. Be- 
sides, the latter is between Richmond and Wash- 
ington, and covers Washington from any attack 
of the enemy. 

The political effect of the withdrawal may at 
first be unfavorable ; but I think the public are 
beginning to understand its necessity, and that 
they will have much more confidence in a united 
army than in its separated fragments. 



DOCUMENTS. 



603 



But you will reply, why not recnforce me here, 
so that I can strike Richmond from my present 
position ? To do this, you said, at our interview, 
that you required thirty thousand additional 
troops. I told you that it was impossible to give 
you so many. You finally thought you would 
have 'some chance' of success with twenty thou- 
sand. But you afterward telegraphed me that 
you would require thirt3--five thousand, as the 
enemy was being largely reenforced. 

If 3'our estimate of the enemy's strength M'as 
correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable ; 
but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new 
troops could be enlisted and organized, which 
would require several weeks. 

To keep your army in its present position until 
it could be so reenforced would almost destroy it 
in that climate. 

The months of August and September are al- 
most fatal to whites who live on that part of 
James River ; and even after you received the re- 
enforcements asked for, you admitted that you 
must reduce Fort Darling and the river-batteries 
before you could advance on Richmond. 

It is by no means certain that the reduction of 
these fortifications would not require considera- 
ble time — perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. 
This delay might not only be fatal to the health 
of your army, but in the mean time General 
Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy 
blows of the enemy without the slightest hope 
of assistance from you. 

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a with- 
drawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, 
I must remark that a largo number of your high- 
est officers, indeed a majority of those whose 
opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly 
in favor of the movement. Even several of those 
who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula 
now advise its abandonment. 

I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, 
by whose advice or for what reasons the army of 
the Potomac was separated into two parts with 
the enemy between them. I must take things as 
I find them. 

I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite 
them. Onl3'^one feasible plan has been presented 
for doing this. If you, or any one else, had pre- 
sented a better plan, I certainly should have 
adopted it. But all of your plans require reen- 
forcements which it is impossible to give you. 
It is \cry easy to a«k for reenforceinents, but it 
is not so easy to give them when you have no 
disposable troops at your command. 

I have written very plainly as I understand the 
case, and 1 hope you will give me credit for hav- 
ing fully considered the matter, although I may 
hav» arrived at very different conclusions from 
your own. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

II. W. IIai.leck, 

Gcrieralin-Chief. 

Major-General G. B. McCi-em,an, 

Ciinimauiiirig, etc., Beikeley, Virjjinia. 

On the seventh I received the following tele- 
gram : 



WASniNfiTON, AufTUst 7, 1863—10 a.m. 

You will immediately report the number of sick 
sent off since you received my order, the num- 
ber still to be shipped, and the amount of trans- 
portation at your disposal — that is, the number 
of persons that can be carried on all the vessels 
which by my order you were authorized to con- 
trol. H. W. Hallkck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

To which I made this reply : 

He.vdquarters Armt of the Potomac, I 
August 7, 1802—10.40 p.m. f 

In reply to your despatch often a.m. to-day, I 
report the number of sick sent oft" since I received 
your order as follows : Three thousand seven 
hundred and forty, including some that are em- 
barked to-night and will leave in the morning. 
The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as 
can be ascertained, five thousand seven hundred. 
The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, 
with their horses, wagons, etc., required most of 
our available boats except the ferry-boats. All 
the transports that can ascend to this place have 
been ordered up ; they will be here to-morrow 
evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there 
are no transports now available for cavalry, and 
will not be for two or three days. As soon as 
they can be obtained I shall send off the First 
New-York cavalry. 

After the transports with sick and wounded 
have returned, including some heavy-draught 
steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this 
point, we can transport twenty-five thousand men 
at a time. AVe have some propellers here, but 
they are laden with commissary supplies and arc 
not available. 

The transports now employed in transporting 
sick and wounded will carry twelve thousand 
well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, 
and of too heavy draught to come here, will carry 
eight thousand or ten thousand infantry. Several 
of the largest steamers have been used for trans- 
porting prisoners of war, and have only become 
available for the sick to-day. 

George B. McClei.lan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General 11. "W. IIalleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

The report of my Chief Quartermaster upon the 
subject is as follows : 

ileadql'artkrs army op the potomac, 
Office of Ciiikf Quartermasteu, Harrison's I.anoino, > 
August 7, ISG'2. ) 

Grneual : T have the honor to return the pa- 
pei's herewith which you sent mc, with the fol- 
lowing remarks : 

We are embarking five batteries of artillery, 
with their horses, baggage, etc., which reijuires 
the detailing of most of our available boats, ex- 
cept the ferry-boats. The medical department 
has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, 
which, if disposable, could carry twelve thou- 
sand men. Besides, there ai"e some heavy-draught 
steamers at Fort Mom-oe that cannot come to this 



604 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



point, but which can carry ciiiht thousand or ten 
tlioiisand infantry. 

I have ordered all >ip licre that can ascend to 
this depot. They will be here to-morrow even- 
ing. As it now is, after the details already made, 
we cannot transport from this place more than 
five thou.sand infantry. 

There are no transports now available for cav- 
alry. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels 
arrive, I could transport ten thousand infantry. 
In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can 
be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from 
Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and 
wounded transports are at my disposal, we can 
transport twenty-live thou.sand at a time. The 
number that can be transported is contingent on 
circumstances referred to. 

Most of the propellers here are laden with 
commissary or other supplies, and most of the 
tugs ai'e necessary to tow off sail craft also laden 
with supplies. 

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient 
servant, Kufus Incjalls, 

Cleneral R. B. MarCT, Chief Quartermaster. 

Cbief of Staff. 

Oil the ninth I received this despatch; 

WA.SHINGTON, August 9, 1863—12.45 p.m. 

I am of the ojHnion that the enemy is massing 
his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burn- 
side, ancl tiiat he expects to cru.sh them and move 
forward lo the I'l'tumac. 

You mii^l send reenforcements instantly to 
Acquia Creek. 

Considering the amount of transportation at 
your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. 
You must move with all possible celerity. 

II. W. IIai-leck, 

Mijor-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 
To which I sent the following reply: 

IlRAnQITARTERS ArMV OF THE FOTOMAC, I 

Berkeley, August 10, lSfi'2 — 3 a.m. f 
Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries 
sent to Burnside took the last available transport 
yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived 
to ship one regiment of cavahy to-day. The sick 
are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There 
has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — 
not an hour's— but every thing has been and is 
being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out 
your orders. G. B. McCi,ei,i,an, 

Miyor-Oeneral Commanding, 

Major-Gcncral H. W. Hai.i.kck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

The following report, made on the same da} 
by the officer then in charge of the transports, 
expo.ses the injustice of the remark in the des- 
patch of the General-in-Chief, that, "considering 
the amount of transportation at your disposal 
your delay is not satisfactor3^" 

AS.SISTANT Quartermaster's Office, | 

Army of the Potomac, > 

Harriso.n's Landino, Va., August 10, 1SC2. j 

Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested 

me to telegraph to you concerning the state and 



capacity of the transports now here. On the 
night of the eighth T despatched eleven steamers, 
principally small ones, and six schooner.s, with 
five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of 
which have yet returned. 

Requisition is made this morning for transpor- 
tation of one thou.'Kind cavalry to Acquia Creek. 
All the schooners that had been chartered for 
carrying horses have been long since discharged, 
or changed into freight vessels. 

A lai-ge proportion of the steamers now here 
are still loaded with stores, or are in tlie floating 
hospital service engaged in removing the sick. 
To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day 
will take all the available steamers now here not 
engaged in the service of the harbor. These steam- 
ers coidd take a large number of infantry, but are 
not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and 
much space is thus lost. Several steamers are 
expected here to-day, and we are unloading 
schooners rapidly ; most of these are not charter- 
ed, but are being taken for the service required, 
at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. 
If 3'ou could cause a more speedy return of the 
steamers sent away from here, it would fjxcilitate 
matters. C. G. Sawtelle, 

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot. 

General M. C. Meigs, 

Quartermaster General United States Army, Washington. 

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were 
very limited, admitting but few vessels at one 
time. These were continually in use as long as 
there were disposable vessels, and the officers of 
the medical and quartermaster's departments, 
with all their available forces, were incessantly 
occupied day and night in embarking and send- 
ing off the sick men, troops, and material. 

Notwithstanding the repeated representations 
I made to the General in-Chief that such were 
the facts, on the tenth I received the following ; 

WAsniNGTON, August 10, 1862 — 12 p.m. 
The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large 
force. They are fighting General Pope to-day ; 
there must be no further delay in your move- 
ments ; that which has already occurred was en- 
tirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily ex- 
plained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and 
telegraph me daily what progress you have made 
in executing the order to transfer your troops. 
H. W.Halleck, 

Miij or- General. 
Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

To which I sent this reply : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac ) 
Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.80 p..m. ) 

Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure 
you again tliat there has not been any unneces- 
sary delaj' in cai'rying out your orders. 

You are probably laboring under some great 
mistake as to the amount of transportation avail- 
ble here. 

I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting 
off our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burn- 
side. 

Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed 



DOCUMEN'm 



605 



the Quartermaster General of the condition of 
our water transportation. From the fact that you 
directed me to keep tlie order secret, I took it for 
gi'anted that you would take the steps necessary 
to provide the requisite transportation. 

A large number of transports for all arms of 
service, and for wagons, should at once be sent 
to Yorktowu and Fort Monroe. 

I shall be ready to move the whole army by 
land the moment the sick are disposed of You 
may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur 
that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize 
the difficulty of the operation proposed. 

The regiment of cavahy for Curnside has been 
in course of embarkation to-day and to-night ; (10) 
ten steamers were required for the purpose ; 
(1258) one thousand two hundred and fifty-eight 
sick loaded to-daj^ and to-night. 

Our means exhausted, except one vessel re- 
turning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which 
will take some (500) five hundred cases of slight 
sickness. 

The present moment is probably not the proper 

one for me to refer to the unnecessary, harsh, and 

unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, 

however, make no difference to my official action. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Mnjor-General Commanding. 

Major-General H. TV. Halleck. 

Coibmanding United States Array. 

On the eleventh this report was made : 

Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, t 
Berkelkt, August 11, 1SC2— ll.yO p.m. f 

The embarkation of (850) eight hundred and 
fifty cavahy, and (1) one brigade of infantiy will 
be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning ; 
(500) five hundred sick were embarked to-da3^ 
Another vessel arrived to-night, and (GOO) six 
hundred more sick are now being embarked. I 
^ill have some (4000) four thousand sick to dis- 
pose of. You have been greatly misled as to the 
amount of transportation at iny disposal. 

Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with 
stores, and others indispensable for service here, 
have been reported to you as available for carry- 
ing sick and well. I am sending off all that can 
be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return 
here. I repeat that I have lost no time in carry- 
ing out your orders. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-Gcneral H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

On the same day I received the following from 
the Quartermaster in charge of the depot : 

Assistant QrARXERMASTEii's Office, 

Army OF the Pdtom 
Harrison's Landi.sg, August 

Colonel : In reply to the communication from 
General Marry, which was referred to me by you, 
I have to state that there are now in this harbor 
no disposable transports not already detailed, 
either for the use of the hospital department, 
for the transportation of tlie First New-York 
cavalry, or for the necessary service of the har- 
bor. 1 think the steamers loading and to be 

Sup. Doc. 39 



l's Office, | 
)tomac, y 
ust 11, 18G2. ) 



loaded with cavahy could take in addition throe 
thousand infantry. These boats are, however, 
directed to leave as fast as they are loaded ; 
some have already started. The embarkation of 
this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, 
and it is not in my power to hurry the matter, 
although I have had several agents of the depart- 
ment and one commissioned ofiicer at the wharf, 
to render all the assistance possible. The entire 
army is this morning turning in, to be stored on 
vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other 
surplus property, and with our limited wharf 
facilities it is impossible, unless the regular is- 
sues of forage, etc., are suspended, to avoid great 
confusion and delay with what is already order- 
ed to be done. Of course, if any infantry is or- 
dered to embark on these cavahy transj)orts, the 
confusion and difficulties will be increased. 

I know of no boats that may be expected here 
to day, except the South America and Fanny 
Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to 
be sent back from Fort Monroe. 

The transports witli the artillery left for Acquia 
Creek on the night of the eighth and the morn- 
ing of the ninth. They were ordered to return 
immediately. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
C. G. Sawtelle, 

Captain and A. Q. .M., Commanding Depot. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Rufl's Ingalls, 

a. I). C. and Cldef Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac 

On the twelfth I received the following : 

Washington, August 12, 1362 — 12 u. 

The Quartermaster-General informs me that 
nearly every available steam ves.sel in the coun- 
try is now under your control. To send more 
from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New-York, 
would interfere with the transportation of arnij'^ 
supplies and break up the channels of travel by 
which we are to bring forward the new troops. 
Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand (l.S,000) 
troops to Acquia Creek in less than two (2) days, 
and his transports were immediately sent back to 
you. All vessels in the James River and the 
Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, 
and it was supposed that (8) eight or (10) ten 
thousand of your men could be trans])orted daily. 

In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet 
of sailing vessels which could be used as tran.s- 
ports. 

The bulk of your material on sliore it was 
thought could be sent to Fort Monroe, covered 
by that part of the army whicli could not get 
water transportation. Such were the views of 
the Government here ; perhaps we were misin- 
formed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be 
explained. Nothing in my telegram was inten- 
tionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so 
unexpected that an explanation was required. 
There has been, and is, the most urgent neces- 
sity for despatch, and not a single moment must 
be lost in getting additional troops in front of 
Washington. II. W. IIalleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-Gcncral G. B. McClellan. 



606 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



I telegraphed the following reply : 

IlEADQnAnTERS AUMT OF THE POTOMAC, I 
liEHKKLEY, AugUSt 12, 1862 — 11 P.M. j 

Your despatch of noon to day received. It is 
positively the fact that no more men could have 
been embarked hence than have gone, and that 
no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your 
orders were received, Colonel Ingalls directed all 
avai'able vessels to come from Monroe. Officers 
havt; been sent to take personal direction. Have 
heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet. 

There are some vessels at Monroe, such as 
Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to 
come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted 
this side New-York. Propose filling Atlantic 
and Baltic with serious cases, for New-York, and 
to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. 
In this way can probably get ofi" the (3400) 
three thousand four hundred sick, still on hand, 
by day after to-morrow night. 

I am sure that you have been misinformed as 
to the availability of vessels on hand. We can- 
not use heavily loaded supply vessels for troops 
or animals ; and such constitute the mass of 
those here, which liave been repi-esented to you 
a.s capable of transporting this army. 

I fear you will find very great delay in embark- 
ing troops and material at Yorktown and Mon- 
roe, both from want of vessels and of fiicilities of 
embarkation ; at least two additional wharves 
should at once be built at each place. I ordered 
two at the latter some (2) two weeks ago, but you 
countermanded the order. 

I learn that wharf accommodations at Acquia 
are altogether inadequate for landing troops and 
supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should 
be lost in remedying this. 

Great delay will ensue there from shallow 
water. You will find a vast deficiency in horse 
transports. We had nearly two hundred when 
we came here ; I learn of only (20) twenty provid- 
ed now \ they carry about (50) fifty horses 
each. More hospital accommodations should be 
provided. We are much impeded here because 
our wharves are used night and day to land cur- 
rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty 
will occur. 

With all the facilities at Alexandria and Wash- 
ington, (6) six weeks about were occupied in em- 
barking this army and its material. 

Burnside's troops are not a fivir criterion for 
rate of embarkation. All his means were in 
hand, his outfit specially prepared for the pur- 
j)0se, and his men habituated to the movement. 

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I 
cannot manufacture vessels. I state tliese diffi- 
uulties from experience, and because it appears 
to me that we have been lately working at cross 
purposes, because you have not been properly 
informed by those around you, who ought to 
know the inherent difliculties of such an under- 
taking. It is not possible for any one to place 
this army where you wish it, ready to move, in 
less than a month. 

If Washington is in danger now, this army 
can scarcely arrive in time to save it ; it is in 



much better position to do so from here than from 
Acquia. 

Our material can only be saved by using the 
whole army to cover it, if we are pressed. If 
sensibly weakened by detachments, the result 
might be the loss of much material and many 
men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow- 
morning. G. B. ^IcClem.an, 

Major-General. 

Major-Gen. II. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

To the reasons given in the foregoing despatch, 
to show why General Burnside's movement from 
Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our op- 
erations, the following may be added : 

He was not encumbered by either sick or 
wounded men. 

He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. 
His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few 
ambulances and officers' horses. 

His baggage was already on the transports, 
where it had remained since his arrival from 
North-Carolina, and his men had only to resume 
their places on board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my des- 
patches of the seventh, tenth, and eleventh, were 
sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms. 

I may also repeat that the vessels used by 
General Burnside had not returned from Acquia 
Cieek when the army left Harrison's Bar. 

It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of 
the foregoing despatch that in order to have a 
more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the 
condition of affairs in the army than I could by 
sending a single despatch by steamer to the near- 
est telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some 
seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for 
a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. 
This I did. 

On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was 
an interruption in the electric current, which ren- 
dered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort 
Monroe, and across the Chesapeake Bay to Cher- 
ry Stone Inlet, on the "eastern shore," where I 
arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent 
the annexed despatches : 

Cherry Stone, August 13, 1SG2— 11.30 p.m. 

Please come to office ; wish to talk to ymi. 
What news from Pope ? 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, VYashington. 

Crerrt Stone Inlet, August 14, 1SG2 — 12.30 a.m 
Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; 
found cable broken, and came here. Please read 
my long telegram. (See above despatch of Au- 
gust twelfth, eleven p.m.) All quiet at camp. 
Knemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. 
No rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's 
Point yesterday. 

Richmond prisoners state that large force with 
guns left Richmond northward on Sunday. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-GeneraL 
Major-General II. W. Halleck, Washington. 

To which the following reply was received : 



DOCUMENTS. 



607 



Washington, August U, 1SG2— 1.40 a.m. 
I have read your despatch. There is no chan,i:;e 
of plans. You will send up j'our troops as rap- 
idly as possible. There is no dilfleulty in land- 
ing them. According to your own accounts, there 
is now no ditHculty in withdrawing your forces. 
Do so with all possible rapidity. 

il. W. IIalleck, 

Major-General. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

Before I had time to decipher and reply to this 
despatch, the telegraph operator in Washington 
informed me that General Halleck had gone out 
of the office immediately after writing this des- 
patch, without leaving any intimation of the fact 
for me, or waiting for any further information as 
to the object of my journey across the bay. As 
there was no possibility of other communication 
with him at that time, I sent the following des- 
patch, and returned to Harrison's Landing : 

Cherry Stone Inlet, August 14, 1SG2 — 1.40 a.m. 
Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. 
I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller con- 
versation with you, after travelling so far for the 
purpose. G. B. McClellan, 

M;yor-General. 

Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. 0. 

On the fourteenth and fifteenth, and before we 
had been able to embark all our sick men, two 
army corps were put in motion toward Fort Mon- 
roe. This was reported in the annexed despatch : 



Headquarters Army of the potomac, 
BiSRKELEV, August 14, 1S02 



POTOMAC, ) 

)G2— 11 P.M. ( 

Movement has commenced by land and water. 
All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every 
thing being done to carry out your orders. I 
don't like Jackson's movements ; he vvill sudden- 
ly appear when least expected. Will telegraph 
fully and understandingly in the morning. 

G. B. McClellan. 

Major-General. 

Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D.O. 

The phrase " movement has commenced," it 
need not be remarked, referred obviously to the 
movement of the main army, after completing the 
necessary preliminary movements of the sick, 
etc. etc. 

The perversion of the term, to which the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief saw fit to give currency in a letter 
to the Secretary of War, should have been here 
rendered impossible by the despatches which 
precede this of the fourteenth, which show that 
the movement really begun immediately after the 
receipt of the ordei" of August fourth. 

The progress made in the movement on the fif- 
teenth wa.s reported in the following despatches : 

Ueauquariers Aiuiy of the Potojuc, I 
August 15, 1S02— 12 M. ( 

Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after 
embarking the remaining brigade of McCall's di- 
vision, with the sick, who are constantly accu- 
mulating, the transports now disposable will be 
all consumed. 

Two of my army corps marched last night and 



this morning en route for Yorktown — one via 
Jones's Bridge, and the other/-;;? Hai-rett's Ferry, 
where we have a pontoon-bridge. The other 
corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads 
are clear ; and [ hope before to-morrow morning 
to have the entire army in motion. 

A report has just been received from my pick- 
ets that the enemy in force is advancing on us 
from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it; 
shall know soon. Should any more tran.sports 
arrive here before my deparkire, and the enemy 
do not show such a force in our front as to re- 
quire all the troops I have remaining to insure 
the safety of the land movement, with its immense 
train, I shall «end every man by water that the 
transports will carry. G. B. McClei-lan, 

Major-GeneraL 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding U. S. A. 

Headquarters Army of the Potom.«c, ( 
Berkeley, Aujjust 15, 1SG2— 1.30 P.M. ) 

The advance corps and trains are fairly started. 
I learn nothing more in relation to reported ad- 
vance of rebels via Jones's Bridge. Shall pu.sh 
the movement as rapidly as possible. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D.C. 

Headquarters Army of tub Potomac, I 
Berkeley, August 15, 1S62— 10 P..M. ) 

Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of 
McCall's division, with its artillciy, is now en route 
for Burnside. AVe have not yet transportation 
sufficient for our sick. I hope we will get it to- 
morrow. 

Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its 
mouth, with his wagons and reserve artillery. 
Ileintzelman at Jones's Bridge with a portion of 
his corps. They will all be up by morning. 

Averill's cavalry on the other side. AU quiet 
thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as 
far as Charles City Court-House before some time 
to-morrow afternoon. 

I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapid- 
ity possible. Wagons will move all night. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 
Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. 

After the commencement of the movement, it 
was continued with the utmost rapidity, until all 
the troops and material were en route both by 
land and water, on the morning of the si.xteenth. 

Latfe in the afternoon of that day, wben the last 
man had di.sappeared from the deserted camp.s, I 
followed with my personal staff in the track of 
the grand army of the Potomac; bidding farewell 
to the scenes still covered with the mai'ks of its 
presence, and to be forever memorable in history 
as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits. 

Previous to the departure of the troops, I had 
directed Captain Duane, of the engineer corps, to 
proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the 
Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that 
point a pontoon-bridge. This was executed prompt- 
ly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunlioats ; 
and an e.xcellent bridge of about two thousand 



608 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



feet in length was ready for the first arrival of 
troops. 

The c;ruater part of the arm}', with its artillery, 
wagon-trains, etc., crossed it rapidly, and in per- 
fect order and safety, so that on the night of the 
seventeenth every thing was across the Chicka- 
hominy, except the rear-guard, which crossed 
early on the morning of the eighteenth, when the 
pontoon-bridge was immediately removed. 

General Poi'tcr's cor{)s, which was the first to 
march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed 
forward rapidly, and on the sixteenth reached 
Williamsljurgli, where I had directed him to 
halt until the entire army was across the Chicka- 
hoin".ny. 

On his arrival at Williara.sburgh, however, he 
received an intercepted letter, which led to the 
belief that General Pope would have to contend 
against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen- 
eral Porter, therefore, very properly took the re- 
sponsibility of continuing his march directly on 
to Newport News, which place he reached on the 
morning of the eighteenth of August, having 
marched his corps sixty miles in the short period 
of three days and one night, halting one day at 
the crossing of the Chickahominy. 

The embarkation of this corps commenced as 
soon as transports were ready, and on the twen- 
tieth it had all sailed for Acquia Creek. I made 
the following report from Barrett's Ferry : 

IlEADQrARTERS ARMT OF THE POTOMAC, j 

Barhett's Fekrv, Chickahominy, > 
August IT, 1SG2— 11 A.M. ) 

Every thing is removed from our camp at Har- 
rison's I?ar. No property nor men left behind. 

The (oth) Fifth corps is at Williamsburgh witli 
all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The C-'u]) 
Third corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge 
to \Villiamsburgh via Diamond Bridge, and has 
probabl}' passed the latter before this hour. Av- 
erill's cavalry watches every thing in that direc- 
tion. 

The mass of the wagons have passed the pon- 
toon-bridge here, and are parked on the other 
side. Peck's wagons are now crossing ; his divi- 
sion will soon be over. Headquarters wagons 
follow Peck's. I hope to have every thing over 
to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. 
May be delayed beyond that time. Came here 
to see Burnside, otherwise should have remained 
with the rear-guard. Thus far all is quiet, and 
not a shot that I know of since we began the 
march. ■ 

I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the 
whole army beyond the Chickahominy. I will 
then begin to forward troops by water as fast as 
transportation permits. 

G. B. AIcCr.Ei.LAN, 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General' H. "W. Halueck, 

Commuiuliuj,' United States Army, WasUington, D. C. 

On the eighteenth and nineteenth, our march 
w-as continued to Williamsburgh and Yorktown, 
and on the twentieth tlie remainder of the army 
wus ready to cml)ark at Yorktown, Fortress Mon- 
roe, and Newport News. 



The movement of the main l)ody of tlie army 
on this march was covered by General Pleasan- 
ton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That 
officer remained at Haxall's until the army had 
passed Charles City Court-House, when he gra- 
dually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he 
proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chick- 
ahominy, after the main body had marched to- 
ward Williamsburgh. Ilis troops were the last 
to cross the bridge, and he desei'ves great credit 
for the manner in which he performed this duty. 

General Averill did a similar service, in the 
same satisfactory way, in covering the march of 
the Third corps. 

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated 
here, I cannot close this part of my report with- 
out giving an expression of my sincere thanks 
and gratitude to the officers and men whom I 
had the honor to command. 

From the commencement to the termination 
of this most arduous campaign, the army of the 
Potomac always evinced the most perfect subor- 
dination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance 
of all the duties required of it. 

The amount of severe labor accomplished by 
this army in the construction of intrenchments, 
roads, bridges, etc., was enormous ; j'ct all the 
work was perfoi'mcd with the most gratifying 
cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
service. 

During the campaign ten severely contested 
and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides 
numerous smaller engagements, in which the 
troops exhibited the most determined enthusi- 
asm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, 
sickness, and even death, witliout a murmur. 
Indeed, they had become veterans in their coun- 
try's cause, and richly deserved the warm com- 
mendation of the Government. 

It was in view of these facts that this seemed 
to me an appropriate occasion for the General-in- 
Chief to give, in general orders, some apprecia- 
tive expression of the services of the army while 
upon the Peninsula, Accordingly, on the eigh- 
teenth I sent him the following despatch : 

Hbadquarters Aumt of the Potomac, ) 
August 18, 1802—11 P.M. f 

Please say a kind word to my army that I can 
repeat to them in general orders in regard to 
their conduct at Yorktown, ^Villiamsburgh, AYest- 
Point, Hanover Court-House, and on the Chicka- 
hominy, as well as in regard to the (7) seven 
days and the recent retreat. 

No one has ever said anj' thing to cheer them 
but myself Say nothing about me. Merely 
give my men and officers credit for what they 
have done. It will do yon much good, and will 
strengthen you much with them if you issue a 
handsome order to them in regard to what they 
have accomplished. They deserve it. 

G. B. McClkli.an, 

Major-Geueral. 
Major-Gcncral IIalleck, "Washington, D. C. 

As no reply was received to this commimica- 
tion, and no order was issued by the General-in- 



DOCUMENTS. 



600 



Chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet 
with his approbation. 

All the personnel and material of the army had 
been transferred from Harrison's Landing to tlie 
different points of embarkation in the very brief 
period of five days without the sliglitest loss or 
damage. Porter's troops sailed from Newport 
News on the nineteenth and twentieth. Ileint- 
zelman's corps sailed from Yorktown on the twen- 
ty-first. On that day I received the following 
telegram from the General-in-Chief: 

Wasiiingion, August 21, 1SC2 — 6 p.m. 

Leave such garrisons in Fortress ^loin-oe, 
Yoi'ktown, etc., as yon may deem proper. They 
will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as pos- 
sible. 

The forces of Burnside and Pope arc hard 
pushed, and recpiire aid as rapidly as you can 
send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. 

By all means see that the troops sent have 
plenty of annnunition. We have no time here 
to supply them. Moreover, they may have to 
fight as soon as they land. 

n. W. Hallkck, 

Majnr-General ComraauJiiig United States Army. 

General McClellan. 

To which the following are replies : 

Headquakters Armv of tub Potomac, ( 
FoKTKKSs Mo.NKOK, August 21, 1802 — 7.80 P.M. j 

Your despatch of (6) six p.m. received. I have 
not lost an hour in sending troops, nor, will \. 
Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of 
liis troops on board to-night. I had already or- 
dered all the ammunition forward. 

I will j)ut headquarters on board ship early 
to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a mo- 
ment's notice. 1 hope that 1 can get off to-mor- 
row. Shall 1 go in person to Aoiuia, or do you 
wish to see me first at Washington 'i If yon 
wish it 1 can prol)abIy ship quite an amount of 
ammunition for other troops than this .army. 
G. B. McClki.lan. 

M:ijor-General. 

Major-Gencral IIalleck, Washington, D. C. 

IlKADQUARTERS ArMV OF THK I'OTnMAC, ) 

Four Mo.NKOK, August 21, 1&02 — 10.20 r.M. | 

I have ample supplies of ammunition for in- 
fantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. 
I can supply any deficiency that may e.\'ist in 
General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled 
field-guns are on band here. 

Tlie forage is the only question for 3'ou to at- 
tend to ; please have that ready for me at Acquia. 
I want many more schooners for cavalry horses ; 
they should have water on hand when they come 
Jiere. 

If you have leisure, and there is no objection, 
please communicate to me fully the state of 
affairs, and your plans. I will then be enabled 
to arrange details understandingly. 

G. B. iMcCl.ELLAN, 

Mujor-General. 
Major-Gcneral 1L\lleck, Washington. 

Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave 
directions for strengthening the defences of York- 



town, to resist any attack from the direction of 
Richmond, and left General Keye.s, with his 
corps, to perform the work, and temporarily gar- 
rison the place. 

1 telegraphed as follows on the twenty-second : 

IlEAnQtIARTERS ArMY OP TUB PoTOMAO, (^ 

KoTR Monroe, August 22, 1S(J2— 2. 1.^ p.m. ) 
Despatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps 
is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sumner's 
corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as 
fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at 
Yin-ktown, putting it in a i)roper state of defence. 
I think that all of Franklin's coips will get off 
to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to- 
morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and 
wagons. G. B. McCm;i,i,'an, 

M:ij()r-Geiieral. 

Major-Gen. IL W. IIalleck, Washington, D. C. 

HEADQnARTBRS ArMT OP TUB POTOMAO, I 

Fort Monroe, Augu.sl 22, 1SG2— a.40 p.m. ) 
Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed 
inunediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The 
new defences are arranged and connnenced. 

I recommend that (5000) live thousand new 
troops be sent immediately to garrison York and 
Gloucester. They should be commanded by an 
experienced general officer, who can discipline 
and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred 
should be artillery. I recommend tliat a new 
regiment, whose colonel is an artillery ofliccr, or 
graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and 
sent there. A similar regiment is al).solutely 
necessary here. G. B. McClicij.an, 

Jlajor-Gfuerul. 
Major-General II. W. IIalleck, 

Ci)mmaniling United Statea Army. 

On the twenty-third Franklin's corps sailed. I 
reported this in the following despatch : 

IInMlQUARTRRS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAC, ) 

Fort JIo.nroe, August 23, 1602— l.:iU p.h. ( 

Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for 
Acquia in about half an hour. No transports yet 
for Sumner's corps. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Ocueral. 

Major-General H. W. IIalleck, 

Commanding United Stales Army. 

On that evening I sailed with my staff for 
Acquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the 
following .morning, reporting as follows: 

IIeadqitartkr» Army of the Potomac, ) 
AuyuiA Creek, August 24, 1S{J2. J 

I have reached here, and respectfully report fo" 
orders. G. B. McClkllan, 

Major-GcneraL 
Major-General IIalleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

I also telegraphed as follows : 

IIradqiiartkrs Army of thb Potomac, ) 
Acquia Chkkk, August 24, 1302 — 2 p.m. | 

Your telegram received. Morell's scouts re- 
port Rappahannock Station burned and al).uidon- 
ed by Pope, without any n(jti(3e to Morell or 
Sykes This was telograi)hed you some hours 
ago. Keynold.s, Reno, and Stevens lire suppos- 



610 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



ed to be with Pope, a^4 nothing can be heard of 
them to-day. Morcll and Sykes are near Morris- 
ville Post-()ffice, watching the lower fords of Rap- 
pahannock, with no troops between there and 
Rappaliannock Station, which is reported aban- 
doned by Pope. 

Please inform me immediately exactly where 
Pope is, and what doing ; until I know that, I 
cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much 
exposed now, and decided measures should be 
taken at once. Until I know what my command 
and position are to be, and M-hether you still in- 
tend to place me in the command indicated in 
your first letter to me, and orally through Gene- 
ral Burnside, at the Chickahominy, I cannot de- 
cide whore I can be of most use. If your deter- 
7nination is unchanged, T ought to go to Alexan- 
dria at once. Please define my position and 
duties. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-Gcneral H. W. Hallock, 

Commanding United States Army. 

To which I received the following reply : 

Washington, August 24, 1S62. 
You ask me for information which I cannot 
give. I do not know either where General Pope 
i.s, or where the enemy in force is. These are 
matters which I have all day been most anxious 
to ascertain. II. W. Hali.eck, 

General-in-CIiief. 
Major-General McClellan. 

On the twenty-sixth I received the following : 

Washington, August 26, 1S62 — 11 a.m. 
There is reason to believe that the enemy is 
moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. 
Ileconnoissances will soon determine. General 
Ileintzclm.'uVs corps was ordered to report to 
General Pope, and Kearny's Avill probably be 
sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't 
draw any troops down the Ra{)pahannock at pre- 
sent ; we shall [)robably want them all in the di- 
rection of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had 
better leave General Burnside in charge at Acquia 
Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great ir- 
regularities are reported there. General Frank- 
lin's corps will march as soon as it receives trans- 
portations. H. W. HAT,r,E(^K, 

Coramander-in-Cliief. 

^Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for 
Alexandria, and reported as follows : 

Alexandria, August 27, 1SC2— S a.m. 
I arrived here last night, and have taken meas- 
ures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that 
proper remedies may be applied. Ju.st received 
a rumor that railway bridge over Bull Run was 
burned last night. G. B. McCi.ellan', 

Major-General, 
ilaj or- General II. W. Halijcok, 

Coinmanding United States Army. 

Ai.KXANDKiA, August 27, 1862—9.40 A.M. 

The town is quiet, although quite full of sol- 
diers, who are said to be chietly convalescents. 



The affiiirs of the quartermaster's department 
are reported as going on well. 

It is said that the Bull's Run bridge will be re- 
paired by to-morrow. The disembarkation of 
Sumner's corps commenced at Acquia yesterday 
afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappa- 
hannock Station earlier that way than from here. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. IIalleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

On the same day I received the following : 

Washington, August 27, 1S62. 
Telegrams from General Porter to General Burn- 
side, just received, say that Banks is at Fayette- 
ville ; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts near AVar- 
renton ; Reno on his right. Porter is marching 
on Warrenton Junction, to reenforce Pope. Noth- 
ing said of Ileintzelman. Porter reports a gen- 
eral battle imminent. Franklin's corps should 
move out by forced marches, carrying three or 
four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as for 
as possible, by railroad. Perhaps you may pre- 
fer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel 
Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out 
troops. Please see him, and give him your di- 
rections. There has been some serious neglect to 
guard the raih'oad, which should be immediately 
remedied. H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General McClellan. 
I replied as follows : 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10 a.m. 

Telegram this moment received. I have sent 
orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his 
corps at once, and to repair here in person to in- 
form me as to his means of transportation. 

Kearny was yesterday at Rappahannock Sta- 
tion ; Porter at Bealton, Kellip, Barnetts, etc. 
Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to- 
day. Williams's Massachusetts cavalry will be 
mostly at Falmouth to-day. 

I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one 
squadi'on Fourth regulars) to scout down Rappa- 
hannock. 

I have sent for Couch's division to come at 
once. As fast as I gain any information I will for- 
ward it, although you may already have it. 

G. B. "McClellan, 

Major-General. 
Major-Gen. II. W. IIalleck, Washington, D. C. 

I also received the following telegrams : 

Washington, August 27, 1S62. 

Direct General Casey to furnish you about five 
thousand of the new troops under his command. 

Take entire direction of the sending out of the 
troops from Alexandria. 

Determine questions of priority in transporta- 
tion, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's 
headquarters are near AV^arrenton Junction, but 
I cannot ascertain the present position of his 
troop.s. II. W. IIalleck, 

General-in-ChJet 

Major-General McClellan. 



DOCUMENTS. 



611 



Washington, August 27, 1S02. 
I can get no satisfactorj'' information from the 
front, either of the enemy or of our troops. 
There seems to have been f^reat ne.i^lect and care- 
lessness about Manassa,s. Franklin's corps should 
march in that direction as soon as possible. A 
competent officer sliould be sent out to take di- 
rection of affiiirs in that vicinity. 

H. W. Hallkck. 

General-in-Chief. 
Major-G eneral McClem, a n. 

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent 
the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman 
and Porter : 

Alexandria, August 27, 1362 — 10.30 a.m. 

Where are you, and what is state of alfairs — 
what troops in your front, right, and left ? Sum- 
ner is now landing at Acquia. Where is Pope's 
left, and what of enemy ? Enemy burned Bull 
Run bridge last night with cavalry force. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General IIeintzelmax, Warrenton. 

Major-General Poktek, Bealton. 

P. S. — If these General Officers are not at the 
places named, nearest operator will please have 
message forwarded. 

I alsp telegraphed to the General-in-Chief as 
follows : 

Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10.50 a.m. 

I have sent all the information I possess to 
Burnside, instructing him to look out well for 
his right flank, between the Rappaliannock and 
Potomac, and to send no trains to Porter without 
an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull 
Run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I 
have sent to communicate with Porter and Heint- 
zelman, via Falmouth, and hope to give you some 
definite information in a few hours. I shall land 
the ne.xt cavalry I get hold of here, and send it 
out to keep open the commnnication between 
Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Ma- 
nassas. Please send me a number of copies of 
the best maps of present field of operations. 1 
can use fifty (50) to advantage. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General IIalleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

Alexandria, August 2T, 1862— 12..'50 a.m. 

In view of Burnside" s despatch, just received, 
would it not be advisable to throw tlie mass of 
Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin 
to Centreville or vicinity ? If a decisive battle 
is fought at AVarrenton, a disaster would leave 
any troops on Lower Rappahannock in a danger- 
ous position. 

They would do better service in front of 
Washington. G. B. McClellav, 

Major-General. 

Major-General Halleck, Washington, U. C. 
Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 12.5 p.m. 

My aid has just returned from General Frank- 
lin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, 
Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He 



gave the order to the next in rank to place the 
corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that 
heavy firing has been heard this morning at 
Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. 
I can find no cavalry to send out on the road.s. 
Are the works garrisoned and ready for defence ? 
G. I}. McI'licllan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General IIalleck, Washington. 

Ai.kxan'dhh, August 27, 1802—12.20 p.m. 

What bridges exist over Bull Run ? Have 
steps been taken to construct bridges for the ad- 
vance of troops to rcenforce Pope, or to enable 
him to retreat if in trouble? 

There should be two gunboats at Acquia Creek 
at once. Shall I pu.sh the rest of Sumner's corps 
here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably 
certain of success ? I have sent to inspect the 
works near here and their garrisons. 

As soon as I can find General Casej", or some 
other commanding officer. I will see to the rail- 
way, etc. It would be well to have them report 
to me, as I do not know where they are. I am 
trying to find them, and will lose no time in car- 
rying out 3'our orders. Would like to see Burn- 
side. G. B. McClellav, 

>L\ior-Ofneral. 

Major-General II. W. IIalleck, Washington. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 1.15 p.m. 

Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for 
(4) four guns without caissons. I can pick up 
no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be 
well to push Sumner's corps here by water as 
rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrange- 
ments for placing the works in front of Wash- 
ington in an efficient condition of defence ? I 
have no means of knowing the enemy's force be- 
tween Pope and ourselves. 

Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, 
effect any useful purpose in front ? 

Should not Burnside take steps at once to 
evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at the same time 
covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who 
may fall back in that direction ? 

I do not see that we have force enough in hand 
to form a connection with Pope, whose exact 
position we do not know. Are we safe in the 
direction of the valley ? 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Genera' 
Major-General IIalleck, Washington. 

Alkxandria, August 27, 1802 — 1.35 p.m. 

I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morn- 
ing to Bull Run Bridge, is either cut to pieces or 
captured. 

That the force against them had many guns, 
and about (-jOOO) five thou.sand infantry, re- 
ceiving reenforcements every minute ; also, that 
Gainesville is in po.s.scssion of the enemy. Please 
send some cavalry out toward Drainsville, via 
Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drains- 
ville, and go as f;ir as they can. If you will give 
me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I 
will ascertain the state of the case. I think our 
policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, 



C12 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possi- 
ble, but not to advance them until they can have 
their artilleiy and cavalry. I have sent for Col- 
onel Tvler to place his artillerymen in the works. 
Is Fort Marcy securely held ? 

'G. B. McClkllan, 

General IIaLLECK. Jlajor-Genenil. 

Alkxanpria, Aucfiist 27, 1SG2— 2.30 p.m. 

Sumner has been ordered to .send here all of 
his corps that are within reach. Orders have 
been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown 
with the least possible delay. But one squadron 
of my cavalry has arrived ; that will be disem- 
barked at once and sent to the front. 

If therq is any cavalry in Washington, it should 
be ordei-ed to report to me at once. 

I still think that we .should first provide for the 
immediate defence of Washington on both sides 
of the Potomac. 

I am not responsible for the past, and cannot 
be for the future, mdess I receive authority to 
dispose of the available troops according to my 
judgment. Please inform me at once what mj'^ 
position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

Alexandria, August 27, 1S62 — 6 p..m. 

I have just received the copy of a despatch 
from General Pope to you, dated ten a.m. this 
morning, in which he says : 'AH forces now sent 
forward should be sent to my right at Gaines- 
ville.' 

I now have at my disposal here about (10.000) 
ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, about 
(2800) two thousand eight hundred of General 
Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's First Con- 
necticut artillery, which I recommend should be 
held in hand for defence of Washington. 

If )'ou wish me to order any part of this force 
to the front, it is in readiness to march at a mo- 
ment's notice to any point you may indicate. 

In view of the existing state of things in our 
front, I have deemed it best to order General 
Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness 
to move, but not to send them off until further 
orders. • G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General IT. W. IIalleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 

On the twenty-eighth I telegraphed as follows : 

IIkadquarters Camp ne^r Alexandria, ( 
August 28, 1802 — I.IO P.M. f 

General Franklin is with me here. I will 
know in a few minutes the condition of artillery 
and cavalry. 

We are not j-et in condition to move ; may be 
by to-morrow morning. 

Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the 
]y an I suggested. I have ordered troops to gar- 
rison the works at TTpton's Hill. They must be 
held at any cost. .\s soon as I can see the way 
to spare them, I will send a cor[)s of good troops 



there. It is the key to Washington, which can- 
not be seriously menaced as long as it is held. 
G. B McClellan, 

Major-General. 
Major-General IIalleck, Washington, D. C. 

I received the following from the General-in- 
Chief: 

Washington, August 2S, 1862. 

I think you had better place Sumner's corps 
as it arrives near the guns, and particularly at 
the Chain Bridge. 

The principal thing to be feared now is a cav- 
alry raid into this city, especially in the night- 
time. 

Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new 
troops for the same object, if you need them. 

Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, half- 
past nine a.m. 5^esterday, that Pope's forces were 
then moving on Manassas, and that Burnsidp 
would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. 

General Collum has gone to Harper's Ferry, 
and I have only a single regular officer for duty 
in the ofRce. 

Please send some of your officers to-day to see 
that every precaution is taken at the forts against 
a raid ; also at the bridge. Please answer. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 
Major-General McClellan. 

On the twenty-ninth the following despatch 
was telegraphed : 

Camp near Alkxandria, | 
August 29, 1862— lO.SO a.m. ( 

Franklin's corps is in motion ; started about 
(fi) six A.M. I can give him but two squadrons 
of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Up- 
ton's Hill, to hold that important point with its 
works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via 
Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has (2) 
two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at 
once whether this meets your approval. I have 
directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, 
to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached, last night, 
two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen 
and JIarcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Acquia. 
If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us 
without any reliable troops in and near Washing- 
ton. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What 
shall be done? No more cavalry arrived ; have 
but (;3) three squadrons. Franklin has but (40) 
forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to 
move more. I do not tiiink Franklin is in con- 
dition to accomplish much if he meets with seri- 
ous resistance. I should not have moved him 
but for your pressing order of last night. What 
have you from Vienna and Drainsville ? 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 
Major-General PIalleck, Washington, D. C. 

To which the following is a reply : 

WA.>iniNt;Tos, August 29, 1862—12 m. 

Upton's Hill arrangement all risiht. We must 
send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast 
as they arrive. 

Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterdny. Fitz- 



DOCUMENTS. 



613 



Husrh Lee was, it is said on good authorit}', in 
Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I 
have nothing from Drainsville. 

H. W. IIalleck, 

Major-General McClELLAN.I GeneraUn-Chief. 

On the same day the following was received 
from His Excellency, the President : 

AVashixgtos, August 29, 1S62— 2.30 p.m. 
What news from direction of Manassas Junc- 
tion ? What generally ? A. Lincoln. 
Major-General ^IcClellan. 

To which I replied as follows : 

Camp nkar Ai.EX.\NnRi.4, I 
August 29, 1S62— 2.45 p.m. ( 

The last news T received from the direction of 
Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that 
the enemy M'cre evacuating Ccntreville and re- 
tiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no 
means reliable. 

I am clear that one of two courses should be 
adopted : First, to concentrate all our available 
forces to open communications with Pope ; sec- 
ond, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and 
at once use all our means to make the capital 
perfectly safe. 

No middle ground will now answer. Tell me 
what ji'ou wish me to do, and I will do all in my 
power to accomplish it. I wish to know what 
my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, 
but will obey whatever orders you give. I only 
ask a prompt decision that I may at once give 
the necessary orders. It will not do to delay 
longer. G. B. McCi>Er,i.AN, 

A. LiXCOr.N, Major-General. 

President, 

And copy to General Halleck. 

To which the following is a reply : 

Washington, August 29, 1S62 — 1.10 p.m. 

Yours of to-day just received. I think j'our 
first alternative, to wit, "to concentrate all our 
available forces to open communication with 
Pope" is the right one, but I wish not to control. 
That I now leave to General IIalleck, aided by 
your counsels. A. Lincoln. 

Major-General McClellan. 

It had been officially reported to me from 
Washington that the enemy, in strong force, was 
moving through Vienna in the direction of the 
Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. 
This report, in connection with the despatch of 
the General-in-Chief on the twenty-eighth, before 
noted, induced me to direct Franklin to halt his 
command near Anandale until it could be deter- 
mined, by rcconnoissances to Vienna and toward 
Manassas, whether these reports were true. Gen- 
eral Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry 
force from Upton's Hill toward Vienna and 
Drainsville in one direction, and toward Fairfax 
Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push [ 
his two squadrons as far toward Manassas as pos- i 
sible, in order to ascertain the true position of, 
the enemy. I 



With the enemy in force at Vienna, and toward 
Lewinsville, it would have been very injudicious 
to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond 
Anandale. It must be renK'ml)ered that at that 
time we were cut off from direct communication 
with General Pope ; that the enemy was, by the 
la.st accounts, at Manas.sas in strong force, and 
that Franklin had only from ten thousand to 
eleven thousand men, with an entirely insuffi- 
cient force of cavahy and artillery. 

In order to represent this condition of affairs in 
its proper light to the General-in-Cliief, and to 
obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraph- 
ed as follows : 

Camp near Alexandria. | 
August 29, lSi;2— 12 m. f 

Have ordered most of the (1 '2th) Twelfth Penn- 
sylvania cavalry to report to General Barnard for 
scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolsville, etc. 

If you apprehended a raid of cavahy on your 
side of river, I had better send a brigade or two 
of Sumner's to near Tcnallytown, where, with 
two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and 
Jlarcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and 
Tenallytown. 

Would it meet your views to post the rest of 
Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Cor- 
coran, whence they can either suppoi-t Cox, Frank- 
lin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown ? 

Franklin has only between (10,000) ten thou- 
sand and (11,000) eleven thousand for duly. 

How far do you wish this force to advance? 
G. B. McGlki.i>an, 

ALijor-Gcneral. 

Major-General IIalleck, "Washington. 

Camp near Alexandria, | 
August 29, 1SG2— 1 p.m. | 

I anxiously await repl}' to my last despatch in 
regard to Sunnier. AVish to give the order at 
once. 

Please authoi-ize me to attach new regiments 
permanently to my old brigades. I can do mucli 
good to old and new troops in that way. I .shall 
endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen 
and Marcy, at least with strong advanced-guards. 
I wish to hold the line througii Prospect Hill, 
Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will 
give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best 
to me with all the troops in this vicinity, includ- 
ing Franklin, who I really tln'nk ought not, under 
present circumstances, to advance l)eyond Anan- 
dale ? G. B. McCi,i:llan, 

M:yor-General. 
General IIalleck. 

On the .same day I received a despatch from the 
General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why T halt- 
ed Franklin in Anandale, to which I replied as 
follows : 

Camp NEAR Al.RXANDRIA, 1 

August 29, 1S02— 10.30 a.m. ( 
By referring to my telegrams of half-past ten 
A.M., twelve M., and one p..ir., together with your 
reply of forty-eight minutes i)ast two p.m., you 
will'see why Franklin's corps halted at .\nandale. 
His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was 
ordered to push on as far as possible toward Ma- 
nassas. 



614 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond 
Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew 
what was at Vienna. 

General Franklin remained here until about 
one P.M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for 
his command. I am responsible for both these 
circumstances, and do not see that either was in 
disobedience to j'our orders. 

Please give distinct orders in reference to Frank- 
lin's movements of to-morrow. I have sent to 
Colonel Ilaupt to push out construction and sup- 
ply-trains as soon as possible. 
"General Tyler to furni.sh the necessary guards. 

I have directed General Banks's supply-trains 
to start out to-night at least as fiir as Anandale, 
with an escort from General Tyler. 

In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire 
definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me 
to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have 
simply exercised the discretion you committed 
to me. G. B. McClell.^n, 

Major-General. 

Major-General PIalleck, Washington, D. 0. 

On the same evening I sent the following des- 
patches : 

Cajtp near Alkxandria, I 

August 2a, 1862—10 p.m. ) 

Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to 
General Franklin to place himself in communica- 
tion with General Pope as soon as possible, and 
at the same time cover the transit of Pope's sup- 
plies. 

Orders have been given for railway and wagon- 
trains to move to Pope with least possible delay. 

I am having inspections made of all the forts 
around the city by members of my staff^ with in- 
structions to give all requisite orders. 

I inspected Worth and Ward myself this even- 
ing ; found them in good order. 

Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as 
to condition of works. 

(;. B. McClellam, 

Major-General. 
Major-Ciorieval IIai,i.i:ck, Washington. 

Camp nkak .^lfxasdria, 1 

Au^tust 20, 1S02— 10 P.M. J 

Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has 
been ordered to march at six o'clock to-morrow 
morning. Sumner has aliout fourteen thousand 
infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's 
brigade of four regiments is here, with two bat- 
teries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fa- 
tigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade of three 
new regiments, but little drilled, is also here ; all 
tbcse troops will be ordered to hold themselves 
ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except 
Franklin's to await further orders. 

If you wish any of them to move toward Ma- 
nassas, please inform me. 

Colonel Wagner, Second New-York artillery, 
has just come in from the front. He reports 
strong infantry and cavahy force of rebels near 
Kan-fax Court-Iioiise. Reports rumors from vari- 
ous sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, 
ure at Manassas. » 



That the enemy, with one hundred and twenty 
thousand men, intend advancing on the forts near 
Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attack- 
ing Washington and Baltimore. 

General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that 
the length of the line of fortifications on this side 
of the Potomac requires two thousand additional 
artillery men, and additional troops to defend in- 
tervals, according to circumstances ; at all events, 
he says an old regiment should be added to the 
force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments distri- 
buted along the lines to give confidence to our 
new troops. I agree with him fully, and think 
our fortifications along the upper part of our line 
on this side the river very unsafe with their pre- 
sent garrisons, and the movements of the enemy 
seem to indicate an attack upon those works. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

General H. W. Halleck, 

General-ia-Cliief United States Army, Wasliington, D. C 



Camp near Alexandria, 
August 30, 



LEXAXDRIA, I 

, 1862— 11.30 A.M. (■ 

Y'^our telegram of nine a.m. received. Ever 
since General Franklin received notice that he 
was to march from Alexandria, he has been en- 
deavoring to get transportation from the quarter- 
master at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been 
told that there was none disposable, and his com- 
mand marched without wagons. After the de- 
parture of his corps, he procured twenty wagons 
to carry some extra ammunition, by unloading 
Banks's supply train. 

General Sumner endeavored, by application 
upon the Quartermaster's department, to get wa- 
gons to carry his reserve ammunition, but with- 
out success, and was obliged to march with what 
he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. 

I have this morning directed that all my head- 
quarter wagons that are landed be at once load- 
ed with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin ; 
but they will not go far toward supplying the 
deficienc}'. 

Eighty-five wagons were got together by the 
quartermasters last night, loaded with subsist- 
ence, and sent forward at one a.m. with an es- 
cort via Anandale. Every effort has been made 
to carry out your orders promptly. The great 
difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the 
greater part of the transportation on hand at 
Alexandria and Washington has been needed for 
current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the 
state of the case as represented to me by the 
quartermasters, and it appears to be true. 

I take it for granted that this has not been 
properly explained to you. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General IIaLLECK, Major-General 

General-in-Chief. 

On the morning of the thirtieth heavy artil- 
lery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax 
Court-House, which I reported to the General-in- 
Chief. 

At eleven a.m. the following telegram waa 
sent : 



DOCUMENTS. 



615 



Camp kkab Alexandria, ) 

August 30, 1^62—11 A.M. f 

Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one brigade 
in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the 
rest via Cohiinbla pike on Anandale and Fairfax 
Court-llouse. 

Is this the route yoxx wish them to take ? He 
and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as 
promptly a» possible. 

Shall Couch move out also when he arrives ? 
G. B. McClellan, 

Miijor-General. 

Major-General Halleck, Washington. 
On the same day I received the following : 

Washington, August 30, 1862 — 1.45 p.m. 
Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, 
must be imniediatel}'' sent forward to Centreville 
for General Pope. It must be done with all pos- 
sible despatch. II. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

General McClellan. 

To which this reply was made : 

Camp near Alexandria, 1 

August 30, 1S62— 2.10 p.m. f 

I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artil- 
lery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance offi- 
cer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I 
have already sent all my headquarters wagons. 
You will have to see that wagons are sent from 
Washington. I can do nothing more than give 
the order that every available wagon in Alexan- 
dria shall be loaded at once. 

The order to the brigade of Sumner that I di- 
rected to remain near Chain Bridge and Tenally- 
town should go from your headquarters to save 
time. I understand you to intend it also to 
move. I have no sharp-shooters except the guard 
around my camp. I have sent off every man 
but those, and will now send them with the train 
as you direct. I will also send my only remain- 
mg squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. 
I can do no more. You now have every man of 
the army of the Potomac who is within my reach. 
G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck. 

At half-past ten p.m. the following telegram 
was sent : 

Camp near Alexandria, ) 

August 30, 1S62— 10.30 p.m. ( 

I have sent to the front all my troops with the 
exception of Couch's division, and have given 
the orders necessary to insure its being disposed 
of as you directed. I hourly expect the return 
of one of my aids, who will give authentic news 
from the field of battle. 

I cannot express to you the pain and mortifi- 
cation I have experienced to-day in listening to 
the distant sound of the firing of my men. As 
I can be of no further use here, I respectfully 
.ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict 
being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to 
go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to 
be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will 
fight none the worse for my being with them, j 



If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the 
command even of my own army, I simply ask to 
be i)crmitted to share their fate on tlic field of 
battle. 
Please reply to this to-night. 

I have been engaged for the last few liours in 
doing what I can to make arrangements for the 
wounded. I have started out all the ambulances 
now landed. As I have sent my (Escort to the 
front, I would be glad to take some of Gregg's 
cavalry with me, if allowed to go. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-GeneraL 
Major-General H. W. ITalleck, 

Commanding United States Army, Wasliington, D. C. 

To which, on the following day, I received this 
answer : 

WAsaiNOTON, August 31, 1SG2— 9.1S a.m. 

I have just seen your telegram of five minutes 
past eleven last niglit. The substance was stated 
to me when received, but I did not know that 
you asked for a reply immediately. I cannot an- 
swer without seeing the President, as General 
Pope is in command, by his orders, of the de- 
partment. 

I think Couch's division should go forward as 
rapidly as possible and find the battle-field. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chlef. 

Major-General McClellan. 
On the same day the following was received : 
Washington, August 81, 1SC2 — 12.4r) p.m. 

The subsistence department are making Fair- 
fax Station their principal depot. It should be 
well guarded. The officer in charge should be 
directed to secure the depot by abatis against 
cavalry. As many as possible of the new regi- 
ments should be prepared to take the field. Per- 
haps some more should be sent to the vicinity of 
Chain Bridge. H. W. Halleck, 

General-ia-Ohief. 

Major-General McOLellan. 

At half-past two p.m. the following despatch 
was telegraphed : 

Camp kbar Alexandria, ) 
August 31, 1S02— 2.30 p.m. J 

Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my pro- 
vost and headquarters guard and other troops. 
I have requested (4) four more companies to be 
sent at once, and the precautions you direct to bo 
taken. 

Under the War Department order of yesterday 
I have no control over any thing except my staff, 
some one hundred men in my camp here, and the 
few remaining near Fort Monroe. I have no con- 
trol over the new regiments — do not know where 
they are, or any thing about them, except those 
near here. Their commanding officers and those 
of the works are not under me. 

Where I have seen evils existing under my eye 
I have corrected them. I think it is the business 
of General Casey to prepare the new regiments 
for the field, and a matter between him and Gen- 
eral Barnard to order others to the vicinity of 



616 



EEBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my 
command, and by the War Department order I 
have no right to give them orders. 

G. B; McClellan, 

Major-General. 
General IIalleck, "Washington. 

To vrhich the following is an answer : 

Washington, August 31, 1862— 10.7 p.m. 

Since receiving your despatch, relating to com- 
mand, I have not been able to answer any not 
of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order 
as published, but will write to you in the morn- 
ing. You will retain the command of every thing 
in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to 
Pope's army in the field. 

I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with 
your ability and experience. I am entirely tired 
out. H. W. IIalleck, 

Oeneral-in-Chief. 

General McClellan. 

The order referred to in the preceding despatch 
was as follows : 

War Department, August 30, 1862. 

The following are the commanders of the ar- 
mies operating in Virginia ; 

General Burnside commands his own corps, 
except those that have been temporarily detached 
and assigned to General Pope. 

General McClellan commands that portion of 
the army of the Potomac that has not been sent 
forward to General Pope's command. 

General Pope commands the army of Virginia 
and all the forces temporarily attached to it. All 
the forces are under the command of Major-Gen- 
eral Halleck, General-in-Chief 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 

I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the 
above was published by order of the Secretary 
of War. 

At half-past eleven p.m. I telegraphed the fol- 
lowing : 

Camp near Alexandria, ) 
August 31, 1862—11.30 p.m. j 

The squadron of Second regular cavalry that 
1 sent with General Sumner was captured to-day 
about two P.M. some three miles from Fairfax 
Court-Housc, beyond it on the little River pike, 
by Fitz-ITugh Lee, with three thousand cavalry 
and three light batteries. 

I have conversed with the first sergeant, who 
says that when he last saw them they were with- 
in a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that 
road ; this squadron getting there by mistake. 
There is nothing of ours on the right of Ccntre- 
villc but Sumner's corps. There was much ar- 
tillery firing during the day. A relicl major told 
the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our 
entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with 
wagons and stragglers coming toward Alexandria. 

It is clear from the sergeant's account that we 
were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's 
right is entirely exposed. 

I recommend that no more of Coucli's division 



be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought 
here as soon as practicable, and that every thing 
available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, 
including the mass of the troops on the railroad. 
I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this 
time occupied Fairfax Court-House and cut off 
Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via 
Sangster's and Fairfax Station. 

I think these orders should be sent at once. I 
have no confidence in the dispositions made as I 
gather them. To speak frankly — and the occa- 
sion requires it — there appears to be a total ab- 
sence of brains, and I fear the total destruction 
of the army. I have some cavalry here that can 
carry out any orders you may have to send. The 
occasion is grave, and demands grave measures. 
The question is, the salvation of the country. I 
learn that our loss j^esterday amounted to fifteen 
thousand. We cannot afford such losses without 
an object. 

It is my deliberate opinion that the interests 
of the nation demand that Pope should fall back 
to-night if possible, and not one moment is to bo 
lost. 

I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our 
right. Please answer at once. I feel confident 
that you can rely upon the information I give you. 
I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any 
orders you give me. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

General Halleck, Washington. 
To which this reply was received : 

Washington, September 1, 1862 — 1.30 a.m. 

Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday 
morning. Retain remainder of Couch's forces, 
and make arrangements to stop all retreating 
troops in line of works or where you can best 
establish an entire line of defence. My news from 
Pope was up to four p.m. ; he was then all right. 
I must wait for more definite information before 
I can order a retreat, as the foiling back on the 
line of works must necessarily be directed in case 
of a serious disaster. Give me all additional news 
that is reliable. 

I shall be up all night, and ready to act as cir- 
cumstances may require. I am fully aware of 
the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General McClellan. 

FOURTH PERIOD. 

On the first of September I went into Wash- 
ington, where I had an interview with the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief, who instructed me, verbally, to take 
command of its defences, expressly limiting my 
jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, 
and prohibiting me from exercising any control 
over the troops actively engaged in front under 
General Pope. During this interview I suggest- 
ed to the General-in-Chief the necessity of his 
going in person, or sending one of his personal 
staff, to the army under General Pope, for the 
purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of af- 



DOCUMENTS. 



617 



fairs ; he sent Colonel Kelton, his Assistant Ad- 
jutant-General. 

During the afternoon of the same day I receiv- 
ed a message from the General-in-Chief, to the 
effect that he desired me to go at once to his house 
to see the President. 

The President informed me that he had reason 
to believe that the army of the Potomac was not 
cheerfully cooperating with and supporting Gen- 
eral Pope; that he had "always been a friend 
of mine ;" and now asked me, as a special favor, 
to use my influence in correcting this state of 
things. I replied, substantially, that I was con- 
fident that he was misinformed ; that I was sure, 
whatever estimate the army of the Potomac might 
entertain of General Pope, that they would obey 
his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and 
do their whole duty. The President, who was 
much moved, asked me to telegraph to "Fitz- 
John Porter, or some other of my friends," and 
try to do away with any feeling that might exist ; 
adding, that I could rectify the evil, and that no 
one else could. 

I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully 
telegraph to Genei-al Porter, or do any thing else 
in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve 
his anxiety ; upon which he thanked me very 
warmly, assured me that he could never forget 
my action in the matter, etc., and left. 

I then wrote the following telegram to General 
Porter, which was sent to him by the General- 
in-Chief: 

Washington, September 1, 1S62. 

I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, 
and the old army of the Potomac, that you and 
all my friends will lend the fullest and most cor- 
dial cooperation to General Pope, in all the oper- 
ations now going on. The destinies of our 
country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and 
all depends now upon the cheerful cooperation 
of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our 
fate. Sa}' the same thing to my friends in the 
army of the Potomac, and that the last request I 
have to make of them is, that, for their country's 
sake, they will extend to General Pope the same 
support they ever have to me. 

I am in charge of the defences of Washington, 
and am doing all I can to render your retreat 
safe, should that become necessar3^ 

Geo. B. McClellan. 

Major-General Pouter. 

To which he sent the following reply : 

Fairfax ConRT-HousE, 10 a.m., I 
September 2, 1SC2. f 

You may rest assured that all your friends, as 
well as every lover of his country, will ever give, 
as they have given, Vo General Pope their cordial 
cooperation and con.stant support in the execution 
of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, 
and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty. 

F, J. POKTER. 

General GEOiifiE P.. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding, Washington. 

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor 
at any other time, did I think for one moment 



that General Porter had been, or would be, in 
any manner derelict in the performance of his 
duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- 
pression never entered my niind. The despatch 
in question was written purely at the request of 
the President. 

On the morning of the second the President 
and General Halieck came to my house, when 
the President informed me that Colonel Kelton 
had returned from the front; that our all'airs were 
in a bad condition ; that the army was in full re- 
treat upon the defences of Washington ; the roads 
filled with straggler.s, etc. ■ He instructed me to 
take steps at once to stop and collect the strag- 
glers ; to place the works in a proper state of de- 
fence, and to go out to meet and take command 
of the army, when it approached tlie vicinity of 
of the works, then to place the troops in the best 
position — committing every thing to my hands. 

I immediately took steps to carry out these 
orders, and sent an aid to General Pope with the 
following letter : 

Headquarters, Washington, ( 
September 2, 1SC2. ( 

General : General Halieck instructed me to 
report to you the order he sent this morning to 
withdraw your army to Washington, without un- 
necessary delay. He feared that his messenger 
might miss you, and desired to take this double 
precaution. 

In order to bring troops upon ground with 
which they are already familiar, it would be best 
to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it 
may occupy Hall's flill, etc. ; McDowell's, to Up- 
ton's Hill ; Franklin's, to the works in fi-orrt of 
Alexandria ; Heintzelman's, to the s.ame vicinity ; 
Couch, to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the 
Chain Bridge ; Sumner, either, to Fort Albany or 
to Alexandria, as may be most convenient. 

In haste, General, very truly yours, 

Geo. B. McClei.lan, 

Major-General United States Army. 

Major-General John Pope, 

Commanding Army of Viginia. 

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and 
rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the 
advance of McDowell's corp.s, and with it Gene- 
rals Pope and McDowell. After getting what in- 
formation I could from them, I sent the few aids 
at my disposal to the left to give instructions to 
the troops approaching in the direction of Alex- 
andria; and hearing artillery firing in the direction 
of the Vienna and Langiey road, by which the 
corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were return- 
ing, and learning from General Pope that Sum- 
ner was probably engaged, I went, with a single 
aid and three orderlies, by the shortest line to 
meet that cohmm. I reached the column after 
dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where 
I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sunmer's) 
would be able to reach its intended position with- 
out any serious molestation. 

I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and 
Sin'el the positions they were to occupy, sent in- 
structions to General Sumner, and at a late hour 
of the night returned to Washington. 



618 



REBELLION RECORD, 186^-63. 



Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, 
and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the 
troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the 
issuing of the necessary supphes, etc. 

I felt sure on this day that we could repulse 
any attack made by the enemy on the south side 
of the Potomac. 

On the third the enemy had disappeared from 
the front of AVashington, and the information 
which I received induced me to believe that he 
intended to cross the Upper Potomac into Mary- 
land. This materially changed the aspect of af- 
fairs, and enlarged the sphere of operations ; for, 
in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign 
would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent 
the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. 

I therefore, on the third, ordered the Second 
and Twelfth corps to Tenallytown, and the Ninth 
corps to a point on the Seventh street road near 
Washington, and sent such cavalry as was avail- 
able to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and 
Impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that 
vicinity. 

On September fifth, the Second and Twelfth 
corps were moved to Rockville, and Couch's divi- 
sion (the only one of the Fourth corps that had 
been brought from the Peninsula) to Offut's 
Oross-Roads. 

On the sixth, the First and Ninth corps were 
ordered to Leesburgh ; the Sixth corps, and 
Sykes's division of the Fifth corps, to Tenally- 
town. 

On the seventh, the Sixth corps was advanced 
to Rockville, to which place my headquarters 
were moved on the same day. 

All the necessary arrangements for the defence 
of the city, under the new condition of things, 
had been made, and General Banks was left in 
command, having received his instructions from 
me. 

It will be seen from what has preceded that I 
lost no time that could be avoided in moving the 
army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the 
' support of the army of Virginia ; that I spared 
no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops 
at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, 
remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass 
of the army had sailed ; and that, after my ar- 
rival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power 
undone to forward supplies and reenforcements 
to General Pope. I sent, with the troops that 
moved, all the cavalry I could get hold of Even 
my personal escort was sent out upon the line 
of the railway as a guard, with the provost and 
camp-guards at headquarters, retaining less than 
one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, 
invalids, members of bands, etc. All the head- 
quarters teams that arrived were sent out with 
supplies and ammunition, none being retained 
even to move the headquarters camp. The 
squadron that habitually served as my personal 
escort was left at Falmouth with General Burn- 
side, as he was deficient in cavalry. 

I left Washington on the seventh of >Septem- 
ber. At this time it was known that the mass 



of the rebel army had passed up the south side 
of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburgh, 
;>nd that a portion of that army had crossed into 
Maryland ; but whether it was their intention to 
cross their whole force with a view to turn Wash- 
ington by a flank movement down the north 
bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or 
to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, 
at that time, we had no means of determining. 
This uncertainty as to the intentions of the ene- 
my obliged me, up to the thirteenth of Septem- 
ber, to march cautiously and to advance the army 
in such order as continually to keep Washington 
and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to 
hold the troops well in hand so as to be able to 
concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took 
the direction of Pennsylvania ; or to return to 
the defence of AYashington, if, as was greatly 
feared by the authorities, the enemy should be 
merely making a feint with a small force to draw 
off our army, while with their main forces they 
stood ready to seize the first favorable oppor- 
tunity to attack the capital. 

In the mean time the process of reorganization, 
rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects 
of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of 
the Potomac, was rapidly progressing ; the troops 
were regaining confidence, and their former sol- 
dierly appearance and discipline were fast return- 
ing. My cavalry was pushed out continually in 
all directions, and all possible steps were taken 
to learn the positions and movements of the en- 
emy. 

The following table shows the movements of 
the army, from day to day, up to the fourteenth 
of September : (See page 619.) 

The right wing, consisting of the First and 
Ninth corps, under the command of Major-Gen- 
eral Burnside, moved on Frederick ; the First 
corps via Brooksville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, 
and the Ninth corps via Damascus and New- 
Market. 

The Second and Twelfth corps, forming the 
centre, under the command of General Sumner, 
moved on Frederick ; the former via Clarksburgh 
and Urbana, the Twelfth corps on a lateral road 
between Urbana and New-Market, thus main- 
taining the communication with the right wing, 
and covering the direct road from Frederick to 
Washington. The Sixth corps, under the com- 
mand of General Franklin, moved to Buckeys- 
town via Darnestown, Dawsonvillc, and Barnes- 
ville, covering the road from the mouth of the 
Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position 
to connect with and support the centre, should it 
have been necessary (as was supposed) to force 
the line of the Monocacy. 

Couch's division moved by the " river road," 
covering that approach, watching the fords of the 
Potomac, and ultimately following and support- 
ing the Sixth corps. 

The following extracts from telegrams, received 
by me after my departure from Washington, will 
show how little was known there about the ene- 
my's movements, and the fears which were en- 



DOCUMENTS. 



619 



tertained for the safety of the capital. On the 
ninth of September, General Halleck telegraphed 
me as follows : 

"Until wo can get better advices about the 
numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think we 



must be very cautious about stripping, too much, 
the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the 
enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forcea 
and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side 
of the Potomac. Think of this." 





September 4. 


September 6. 


September 9. 


September 10. 


BURNSIDB. 

Niath corps, Reno, 


Seventh street road . . . 
Upton Hill 


Leesburgh 


Bronkville 




First corps, Hooker, 


Leesburgh 






8CMNKR. 

Twelfth corps, Williams, 


Tenallytown 


Rockville 




Damascus. 
Clarksburgh. 

Barnesville. 
Poolesville. 

Rockville. 


Second corps, Sumner, 


Tenallytown 


Rockville 




FRASKUN. 

Sixth corps, Franklin, 


Alex. Seminary 


Tenallytown 






Offut's Cross- Roads . . 
Tenallytown 


Mouth of Seneca 


Sykes's division, 














September H. 


September 12. 


September 13. 


September 14. 


BURNSIDB. 

Ninth corps, Reno, 


New-Market. 


Frederick 


Middleburgh 


South-Mountain. 
South-Mountain. 


First corps, Hooker., 




Ridgeville, New-Mar- 
ket, camp on the 
Monocacy, 

Ijamsville Cross-Roads 
Urbana 




SCUNEK. 

Twelfth corps, Williams 


Damascus 




Second corps, Sumner, 


Clarksburgh 


Frederick 




FRANKLIN. 




LickenwellCross-Road. 


Buckeystown. 

Sicksville 


Burkettsville. 










Urbana 

















Again, on the eleventh of September, General 
Halleck telegraphed me as follows : 

" Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel ? I 
think the main force of the enemy is in your 
front; more troops can be spared from here." 

This despatch, as published by the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the 
General-in-Chief, reads as follows : 

" Why not order forward Porter's corps or 
Sigel's ? If the main force of the enemy is in 
your front, more troops can be spared from 
here." 

I remark that. the original despatch, as re- 
ceived by me from the telegraph opeiator, is in 
the words quoted above, "/ thinlc the main 
force of the eneiny" etc. 

In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, 
on the same daj^ that all the troops that could 
be spared should at once be sent to reenforce me, 
but none came. 

On the twelfth I received the following tele- 
gram from his Excellenoy the President : " Gov- 
ernor Curtin telegraphs me: 'I have advices that 
Jackson is crossing the Potomac at WiUiams- 
port, and probably the whole rebel army will be 
drawn from Maryland.' " The President adds : 
"Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Mar- 
tinsburgh to-day, and positive information from 



Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the 
idea that the enemy is re-crossing the Potomac. 
Please do not let him get off without being hurt." 

On the thirteenth General Halleck telegraphed 
as follows : "Until you know more certainly the 
enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are 
wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of 
the opinion that the enemy will send a small 
column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces 
in that direction, then suddenly move on Wash- 
ington with the forces south of the Potomac and 
those he may cross over." Again, on the four- 
teenth, General Halleck telegraphed me that 
"scouts report a large force still on the Virginia 
side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are ex- 
posing your left and rear." 

Again, as late as the sixteenth, after we had 
the most positive evidence that Lee's entire army 
was in front of us, I received the following : 

War Departmekt, September 16, 1862—12.8 p.m. 
Yours of seven a.m. is this moment received. 
As you give me no information in regard to the 
position of your forces, except that at Sharps- 
burgh, of course I cannot advise. I think, how- 
ever, you will find that the whole force of the 
enemy in your front has crossed the river ; I fear 
now more than ever that they will re-cross at 



620 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. 



Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, 
thus cutting you off from Washington. This 
has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, 
and hence my anxiety on the subject ; a heavy 
rain might prevent it. H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General McClellaj*. 

The importance of moving with all due cau- 
tion, so as not to uncover the national capital 
until the enemy's position and plans were devel- 
oped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; 
and as my troops extended from the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, Avith the ex- 
treme left flank moving along that stream, and 
with strong pickets left in rear to watch and 
guard all the available fords, I did not regard my 
left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it 
appears from the foregoing telegrams that the 
General-in-Chief was of a different opinion, and 
that my movements were, in his judgment, too 
precipitate, not only for the safety of Washing- 
ton, but also for the security of my left and rear. 

The precise nature of these dail3Mnj unctions 
against a precipitate advance may now be per- 
ceived. The General-in-Chief, in his testimony 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
says: "In respect to General McClellan going 
too fast or too slow from Washington, there can 
be found no such telegram from me to him. He 
has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent 
him. I telegraphed him that he was going too 
far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, 
leaving General Lee the opportunity to come 
down the Potomac and get between him and 
Washington. I thought General McClellan 
should keep more on the Potomac, and press 
forward his left rather than his right, so as the 
more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." 

As I can find no telegram from the General-in- 
Chief recommending me to keep my left flank 
nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe 
that when he gave this testimon}'^ he had forgot- 
ten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, 
and had also ceased to remember the fact, well 
known to him at the time, that my left, from 
the time I left Washington, always rested on 
the Potomac, and my centre was continually in 
position to reenforce the left or right, as occasion 
might require. Had I advanced my left flank 
along the Potomac more rapidly than the other 
columns marched upon the roads to the right, I 
should have thrown that flank out of supporting 
distance of the other troops and greatly exposed 
it. And if I had marched the entire army in one 
column along the bank of the river instead of 
upon five different parallel roads, the column, 
with its trains, would have extended about fifty 
miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
advance before the rear could have reached the 
scene of action. Moreover, such a movement 
would have uncovered the communications with 
Baltimore and Washington on our right, and ex- 
posed our right and rear. I presume it will be 
admitted by every military man that it was ne- 
cessary to move the army in such order that it 



could at any time be concentrated for battle ; and 
I am of opinion that this object could not have 
been accomplished in any other way than the 
one employed. Any other disposition of our 
forces would have subjected them to defeat in 
detached fragments. 

On the tenth of September I received from my 
scouts information which rendered it quite proba- 
ble that General Lee's army was in the vicinity 
of Frederick, but whether his intention was to 
move toward Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not 
then known. On the eleventh, I ordered Gene- 
ral BuiTiside to push a strong reconnoissance 
across the National road and the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, toward New-Market, and, if he 
learned that the enemy had moved toward Ha- 
gerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keep- 
ing his troops constantly ready to meet the ene- 
my in force. A corresponding movement of all 
the troops in the centre and on the left was or- 
dered in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville. 

On the twelfth, a portion of the right wing en- 
tered Frederick, after a brief skirmish at the out- 
skirts of the city and in the streets. 

On the thirteenth, the main bodies of the right 
wing and centre passed through Frederick. It 
was soon ascertained that the main body of the 
enemy's forces had marched out of the city on 
the two previous days, taking the roads to Boons- 
boro and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it 
necessary to force the passes through the Catoc- 
tin and South-Mountain ridges, and gain posses- 
sion of Boonsboro and Rohrersville before any 
relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Har- 
per's Ferry. 

On the thirteenth, an order fell into my hands, 
issued by General Lee, which fully disclosed his 
plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid 
and vigorous forward movement. 

The following is a copy of the order referred 
to: 

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 119. 

HEADqnARTERS ArMT of NORTnERS TlEQINIi, ( 

September 9, 1862. f 

The army will resume its march to-morrow, 
taking the Jlagerstown road. General Jackson's 
command will form the advance, and, after pass- 
ing Middletown, with such portion as he may se- 
lect, take the route toward Sharpsburgh, cross 
the Potomac at the most convenient point, and 
by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as 
may be at Martinsburgh, and intercept such as 
may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. 

General Longstreet's command will pursue the 
same road as far as Boonsboro, where it will halt 
with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of 
the army. 

General McLaws, with his own division and 
that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen- 
eral Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will 
take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday 
morning, possess himself of the Marylaml Heights, 
and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's 
Ferry and vicinity. 



DOCUMENTS. 



621 



General Walker, with his division, after accom- 
plishing the object in which he is now engaged, 
will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend 
its right bank to Ijovettsville, take possession of 
Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Fiiday morn- 
ing ; Ke3-s's Ford on his left, and the road be- 
tween the end of the mountain and the Potomac 
on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co6p- 
erate with General McLaws and General Jackson 
in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. 

General 1). H. Hill's division will form the 
rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken 
by the main bod3\ The reserve artillery, ord- 
nance and supply trains, etc., will precede Gene- 
ral Hill. 

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cav- 
alry to accompany the commands of General 
Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the 
main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of 
the army, and bring up all stragglers that may 
have been left behind. 

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, 
and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for 
which they have been detached, will join the 
main body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagers- 
town. 

Each regiment on the march will habitually 
carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, 
for use of the men at their encampments, to pro- 
cure wood, etc. 

By command of General R. E. Lee. 

R. H. Chilton, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 

f Major-Gcneral D. H. Hill, 

Commanding Division. 

In the report of a militarj^ commission, of which 
Major- General 1). Hunter was President, which 
convened at ^Vashington for the purpose of in- 
vestigating the conduct of certain officers in con- 
nection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I 
tind the following : 

" The commission has remarked freely on Colo- 
nel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in 
the service of his country, and it cannot, from 
any motives of delicacy, refrain from censvu'ing 
those in high command when it thinks such cen- 
Euae deserved. 

" The General-ia-Chief has testified that General 
McClellan, after having received orders to repel 
tlic enemy invading the State of Maryland, march- 
ed only six miles per day, on an average, when 
pursuing this invading army. 

"The General-in-Chief also testifies that, in his 
opinion, he could and should liave relieved and 
protected Harper s Ferry, and in this opinion the 
commission fully concur." 

I have been greatly surprised that this com- 
mission, in its investigations, never called upon 
me, nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far 
as I know, upon any officer of the army of the 
Potomac able to give an intelligent statement of 
the movements of that army. But another para- 
graph in the same report makes testimony from 
such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows: 

"By a reference to the evidence it will be seen 
that at the vei-y moment Colonel F'ord abandoned 

Sup. Doc. 40 



Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality 
relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's 
corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of 
his ])osition." 

The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner 
were a part of the army wliich I at that time had 
the honor to connnand, and they were acting un- 
der my orders at Crampton's Gap and elsewhere ; 
and if, as the commission states. Colonel Ford's 
"httle army was in reality relieved" by those 
officers, it was relieved by me. 

I had, on the morning of the tenth, sent the 
following despatch in relation to the command at 
Harper's Ferry : 

Camp near Rocrville, ) 
September 10, 1802—9.45 a.m. ) 

Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I 
understand, with nine thousand troop.s. He can 
do nothing where he is, but could be of great 
service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he 
be ordered to join me by the most practicable 
route. George B. McCi.ellan, 

MaJor-GeneraL 

Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. 
To this I received the following reply : 

There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you 
at present; his only chance is to defend his works 
till you can open communication with him. 

II. W. Halleck, 
Geokge B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

It seems necessary, for a distinct understand- 
ing of this matter, to state that I was directed on 
the twelfth to assume command of the garrison 
of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open com- 
munications with that place, and that when I re- 
ceived this order all communication from the di- 
I'ection in which I was approaching was cut off. 
Up to that time, however, Colonel Miles could, in 
my opinion, have marched his coimnand into 
Pennsylvania, by crossing tiie Potomac at AVil- 
liamsport or above ; and this opinion was con- 
firmed by the fact that Colonel Davis marched 
the cavahy part of Colonel Miles's command from 
Harper's Ferry on the fourteenth, taking the main 
road to Ilagerstown, and he encountered no ene 
my except a small picket near the mouth of the 
Antietam. 

Before I left AYashington, and when there cer- 
tainly could have been no enemy to prevent the 
withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles, I re- 
commended to the proper authorities that the 
garrison of Harper's Fei'ry should be withdrawn 
via Ilagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumber- 
land Valley ; or that, taking )ip the pontoon-liridgo 
and obstructing the railroad bridge, it siiould fall 
back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold out 
to the last. 

In this position it ought to have maintained 
itself for many days. It was not deemed proper 
to adopt either of these suggestions, and when 
the matter was left to my discretion it was too 
late for me to do any thing but endeavoi lO re- 
lieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artil- 
lery to be lired by our advance at frecjucnt inter- 



&22 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



vals as a signal that relief was at hand. This 
was done, and, as I afterward learned, the reports 
of the cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's 
Ferr}-. It was confidently expected that Colonel 
Miles would hold out until we had carried the 
mountain passes, and were in condition to send 
a detachment to his relief The left was there- 
fore ordered to move through Crampton's Pass 
in front of Burkettsville, while the centre and 
right marched upon Turner's Pass in front of 
Middletown. 

It may be asked by those who are not ac- 
quainted M'ith tlie topography of the country in 
the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, in- 
stead of marching his column over the circuitous 
road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and Browns- 
ville, was not ordered to move along the direct 
turnpike to Knoxville, and thence up the river 
to Harper's Ferry. 

It was for the reason that I had received in- 
formation that the enemy were anticipating our 
approach in that direction, and had established 
batteries on the south side of the Potomac which 
commanded all the approaches to Knoxville ; 
moreover the road from that point winds directly 
along the river bank at the foot of a precipitous 
mountain, where there was no opportunity of 
forming in line of battle, and where the enemy 
could have placed batteries on both sides of the 
river to enfilade our narrow approaching col- 
umns. 

The approach through Crampton's Pass, which 
debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of Mary- 
land Heights, was the only one which afforded 
any reasonable prospect of carrying that formi- 
dable position ; at the same time, the troops upon 
that road were in better relation to the main 
body of our forces. 

On the morning of the fourteenth a verbal 
message reached me from Colonel Miles, which 
was the first authentic intelligence I had received 
»s to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. 
The messenger informed me that on the preced- 
ing afternoon Maryland Heights had been aban- 
doned by our troops after repelling an attack of 
the rebels, and that Colonel Miles's entire force 
was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Mary- 
land, Loudon, and Bolivar Heights having been 
abandoned by him, and occupied by the enemy. 
The messenger also stated that there was no ap- 
parent reason for the abandonment of the Mary- 
land Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed 
him to say that he could hold out with certainty 
two days longer. 

I directed him to make his way back, if pos- 
sible, with the information that I was approach- 
ing rapidly, and felt confident I could reheve the 
place. 

On the same afternoon I wrote the following 
letter to Colonel Miles, and despatched three 
copies by three different couriers on different 
routes. I did not, however, learn that any of 
these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry : 

Middletown, September 14, 1862. 

Colonel : The army is being rapidly concen- 



trated here. We are now attacking the pass on 
the Hagcrstown road over the Blue Ridge. A col- 
umn is about attacking the Burkettsville and 
Boonsboro Pass. You may count on our mak- 
ing every effort to relieve you. You may rely 
upon my speedily accomplishing that object. 
Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, 
reoccupy the Maryland Heights with your whole- 
force, if you can do that, I will certainly be 
able to relieve you. As the Catoctin Valley' is 
in our possession, you can safely cross the river 
at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on 
this side of the river is concerned. Hold out to 
the last. George B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Colonel D. S. Miles. 

On the previous day I had sent General Frank- 
lin the following instructions : 

Headquarters Army or the Potomac, | 

CAifP NEAR Frederick, v 

September 13, 1862— 6.20 p.m. j 

General : I have now full information as to 
movements and intentions of the enemy. Jack- 
son has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture 
the garrison at Martinsburgh and cut off Miles's 
retreat toward the West. A division on the 
south side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon 
Heights and cut off his retreat in that direction. 
McLaws with his own command and the division 
of R. 11. Anderson was to move by Boonsboro 
and Rohrersville to cany the Maryland Heights. 
The signal officers inform me that he is now in 
Pleasant Valley. The firing shows that Miles 
still holds out. Longstrcet was to move to 
Boonsboro, and there halt with the reserve 
corps ; D. H. Hill to form the rear-guard ; Stu- 
art's cavalry to bring up stragglers, etc. We 
have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the 
mountains and north of us.. The last I heard 
from Plcasanton he occupied Middletown, after 
several sharp skirmishes. A division of Burn- 
side's command started several hours ago to sup- 
port him. The M'hole of Burnside's command, 
including Hooker's corps, march this evening 
and early to-morrow morning, followed by the 
corps of Sumner and Bank.s, and Sykes's divi- 
sion, upon Boonsboro to carry that position. 
Couch has been ordered to concentrate his divi- 
sion and join you as rapidly as possible. With- 
out waiting for the whole of that division to join, 
you will move at daj-break in the morning by 
JelTerson and Burkettsville upon the road to 
Rohrersville. I have reliable information that 
the mountain pass by this road is practicable for 
artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occu- 
pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as 
practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in 
order to cut off the retreat of or destroy Mc- 
Lavv's command. If you find this pass held by 
the enemy in large force, make all your disposi- 
tions for the attack and commence it about half 
an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass 
on the Hagerstown Pike, where the main body 
will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty 
will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture Mc- 
Laws's command and relieve Colonel Miles. If 



DOCUMENTS. 



62d 



you efTcct this, yon will order him to join yovi at 
once with all his disposable troops, first destroy- 
ing the bridges over the Potomac, if not already 
done, and, leaving a sufficient garrison to pre- 
vent the enemy from passing the ford, you will 
then return by Rohrcrsville on the direct road 
to Boonsboro, if the main column has not suc- 
ceeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take 
the road to Rohrcrsville, to Sharpsburgh and 
Williamsport, in order either to cut off the re- 
treat of Ilill and Longstreet toward the Potomac, 
or prevent the repassage of Jackson. ^ly gen- 
eral idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him 
in detail. I believe I have sufiiciently explained 
my intentions. I ask of you, at this impoi-tant 
moment, all your intellect and the utmost activ- 
ity that a general can exercise. 

Georoe B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-Ocneral W. B. Franklin, 

Commanding Sixth Corps. 

Again on the fourteenth, I sent him the fol- 
lowing : 

Headquarters Armt o? tub Potomac, J 
Khederick, September 14, 1S62— 2 P.M. j 

Your despatch of half-past twelve just received. 
Send back to hurry up Couch. Mass your troops 
and carry Burkettsville at any cost. VV^e shall 
have strong opposition at both passes. As fast 
as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in 
readiness to support you. If j-ou find the enemy 
in very great force at any of these passes let me 
know at once, and amuse them as best 3'ou can 
so as to retain them there. In that event I Mill 
proVjably throw the mass of the army on the pass 
in front of here. If I carry that, it will clear the 
way for you, and you must follow the enemy as 
rapidly as possible. Geo. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General Franklin. 

General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly for- 
ward toward Crampton's Pass, and at about 
twelve o'clock on the fourteenth arrived at Bin-- 
kettsville, immediately in rear of which he found 
the enemy's infantry posted in force on both 
sides of the road, with artillery in strong posi- 
tions to defend the approaches to the Pass. Slo- 
cum's division was formed upon the right of the 
road leading through the Gap, and Smith's upon 
the left. A line formed of Bartlett's andTorbett's 
brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity 
was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the 
enemy at a charge on the right. The enemj^ 
were driven from their position at the base of the 
mountain, where they were protected by a stone 
wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they 
reached the position of their battery on the road, 
well up tlie mountain. There they made a stand. 
They were, however, driven back, retiring their 
artillery in echelon until, after an action of three 
hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy 
hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. 

On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's 
brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the pro- 
tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- 
tain in the same steady manner, driving the 



enemy before them until the crest was carried 
Four hundred prisoners from seventeen diticrent 
organization.s, seven hundred stand of arms, one 
piece of artillery, and three colors, were captured 
by our troops in this brilliant action. It was 
conducted by General Franklin in all its details. 
These details are given in a report of General 
Franklin, herewith submitted, and due credit 
awarded to the gallant otllcers and men engaged. 

The loss in General Franklin's corps was one 
hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and six- 
teen wounded, and two missing. Tlie enemy's 
loss was about the same. The enemy's position 
was such that our artillery could not be used 
with any effect. The close of the action found 
General Franklin's advance in Pleasant Valley on 
the night of the fourteenth, within three and a 
half miles of the Point on Maryland Heights 
where lie might, on the same night or on the 
morning of the fifteenth, have formed a junc- 
tion with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had it 
not been previously wilhdi-awn from Maryland 
Heights, and within six miles of Harper's Ferry. 

On the night of the fourteenth the following 
despatch was sent to General Franklin : 

Bolivar, September 15—1 a.il 

General: ....... 

The Commanding General directs that you oc- 
cupy, with your command, the road from Rohrcrg- 
ville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force 
at Rohrensville to hold that po.sition in case it 
should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- 
boro. Endeavor to open communication with 
Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and 
destroying such of the enem}' as, you may find in 
Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in open- 
ing communication with Colonel Miles, direct 
him to join you with his whole command, with 
all the guns and public property that he can 
carry with him. The remainder of the guns will 
be spiked or destroyed ; the rest of the public 
property will also be destroyed. You will then 
proceed to Boonsboro, which place the Com- 
manding General intends to attack to morrow, 
and join the main body of the army at that place ; 
should you find, however, that the enemy have 
retreated from Boonsboro toward Sharpsburgh, 
you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off 
his retreat. 

By command of Major-General McClellan. 
George D. RL(;GLi:i<, 

Colonel and Aid-dc-Campt 

General Franklin. 

On the fifteenth, the following were received 
from General Franklin : 



At thb foot of 
In Pleasant Vallet, three 

Si 



Mount Pi.basant, ) 

Mtl.KS KKOM KollllERSTILLK, V 

uptemberlS — S.SOa.m. ) 



General: My command started at daylight 
this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed 
up here. General Couch arrived about ten 
o'clock last night. I have ordered one of hia 
brigades and one battery to Rohrcrsville or to 
the strongest point in its vicinity. 'J'he enemy 
is di-awn up in line of battle about two miles to 



624 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I am 
sure that Kohrersville is occupied I shall move 
forward to attack the enemy. This may be two 
hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — 
and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it 
has — it is my opinion that I should be strongly 
reenforced. 

W. B. Franklin, 

Major-General, Commanding Corps. 

General G. B. McClellan. 

September 15 — 11 a.m. 

Genehal : I have received your despatch by 
Captain O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force 
in my front, in two lines of battle stretching 
across the valley, and a large column of artillery 
and infantry on the right of the valley looking 
toward Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me 
two to one. It will of course not answer to pur- 
sue the enemy under these circumstances. I 
shall communicate with Burnside as soon as pos- 
sible. In the mean time I shall wait here until 
I learn what is the prospect of reenforccment. I 
have not the force to justify an attack on the 
force I see in front. I have had a very close 
view of it, and its position is very strong. 

Respectfully, W. B. Fkanklin, 

Major-General. 

General G. B. McClellan, Commanding. 

Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 
eight A.M. on the fifteenth, as the cessation of the 
firing indicated, and General Franklin was order- 
ed to remain where he was to watch the large 
force in front of him, and protect our left and 
rear until the night of the sixteenth, when he 
was ordered to join the main bod_v of the army 
at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to 
Maryland Heights. While the events which 
have just been described were taking place at 
Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and 
right wing, which had united at Frederick on the 
thirteenth, were engaged in the contest for the 
possession of Turner's Gap. 

On the morning of the thirteenth. General 
Pleasanton was ordei'cd to send McReynolds's 
brigade and a section of artillery in the direction 
of Gettj'sburgh, and Rush's regiment toward Jef- 
ferson to communicate with Franklin, to whom 
the Sixth United States cavalry and a section of 
artillery had prcviou.sly been sent, and to pro- 
ceed with the remainder of his force in the direc- 
tion of Middlctown in pin-suit of the enemy. 

After skirmishing with the enemy all the 
morning, and driving them from several strong 
positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South- 
Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy 
in force and apparently determined to defend the 
Pass. He sent back for infantry to General 
Burnside, who had been directed to support 
him, and proceeded to make a reconnoissance of 
the position. 

The South-Mountain is at this point about one 
thousand feet in height, and its general direction 
is from north-east to south-west. The national 
road from Frederick to llagerstown crosses it 



nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, a 
depression which is some four hundred feet in 
depth. 

The mountain on the north side of the turn- 
pike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a 
narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, 
becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the 
north. There are two country roads, one to the 
right of the turnpike and the other to the left, 
which give access to the crests overlooking the 
main road. The one on the left, culled the "Old 
Sharpsburgh road," is nearly parallel to and about 
half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it 
reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends 
off to the left. The other road, called the " Old 
llagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the 
mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and 
bending to the left over and along the first crest, 
enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near 
the summit of the pass. 

On the night of the thirteenth, the positions of 
the different corps were as follows : 

Reno's corps at Middletown, except Rodman's 
division at Frederick. 

Hookei*'s corps on the Monocacy, two miles from 
Frederick. 

Sumner's corps near Frederick. 
Banks's corps near Frederick. 
Sykes's division near Frederick. 
Franklin's corps at Buckeystown. 
Couch's division at Licksville. 
The orders from headquarters for the march on 
the fourteenth were as follows : 

Thirteenth, half-past eleven p.m. — Hooker to 
march at daylight to Middletown. 

Thirteenth, half-past eleven p.m. — Sykcstomove 
at six A.M. after Hooker, on the Middletown and 
llagerstown road. 

Fourteenth, one a.m. — Artillery reserve to fol- 
low S3'kes closeh^ 

Thirteenth, forty -five minutes past eight p.m. — 
Turner to move at seven a.m. 

Fourteenth, nine a.m. — Sumner ordered to take 
the Shookstown road to Middletown. 

Thirteenth, fort3--five minutes past six p.m. — 
Couch ordered to move to JcfTerson with his 
whole division. 

On the fourteenth, General Pleasanton contin- 
ued his reconnoissance. Gibson's battery and af- 
terward Benjamin's battery (of Reno's corps) were 
placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, 
and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position 
in the gap. 

General Cox's division, which had been order- 
ed up to support General Pleasanton, left its 
bivouac, near Middlctown, at six a.m. The First 
brigade reached the scene of action about nine 
a.m., and was sent up the old Sliarpsburgli road 
by General Pleasanton to feel the enemy and as- 
certain if he held the crest on that side in strong 
force. This was soon found to be the caso ; and 
General Cox having arrived with the other bri- 
gade, and information having been received from 
General Reno that the column would be support- 
ed by the whole corps, the division was ordered 
to assault the position. Two twenty-pounder 



DOCUMENTS. 



625 



Parrotts of Simmons's battery and two sections of 
McMullan's battery were left in the rear in posi- 
tion near the turnpike, where they did good ser- 
vice during the day against the enemy's batteries 
in the gap. Colonel Scanimon's brigade was de- 
ployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved 
up the slope to the left of the road with the ob- 
ject of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It 
succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing 
itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the 
enem}-, who was posted behind stone walls and 
in the edges of timber, and the fire of a battery 
which poured in canister and case-shot on the 
regiment on the right of the brigade. Colonel 
Crooke's brigade marched in columns at support- 
ing distance. A section of McMullan's batter}^ 
under Lieutenant Croome, (Idlled while seiwmg 
one of his guns,) was moved up with great diffi- 
culty, and opened with canister at very short 
range on the enemy's infantry, by whom (after 
having done considerable execution) it was soon 
silenced and forced to withdraw. 

One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now de- 
ployed on Scammon's left, and the other two in 
his rear, and they several times entered the first 
line and relieved the regiments in front of them 
when hard pressed. A section of Sumner's bat- 
tery was brought up and placed in the open space 
in the woods, where it did good service during 
the rest of the da}''. 

The enemy several times attempted to retake 
the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each 
time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery 
to a point more to the right, and formed columns 
on both our flanks. It was now about noon, and 
a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about 
two hours, during which the rest of the corps was 
coming up. General Wilcox's division was the 
first to arrive. When he reached the base of the 
mountain. General Cox advised him to consult 
General Pleasanton as to a position. The latter 
indicated that on the right, afterward taken up by 
General Hooker. General Wilcox was in the act 
of moving to occiipy this ground, when he received 
an order from General Reno to move up the old 
Sharpsburgh road and take a position to its right, 
overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were 
detached to support General Cox, at his request. 
One section of Cook's battery was placed in po- 
sition near the turn of the road, (on the crest,) 
and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across 
the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy 
to the right of the road, when the enemy sudden- 
ly opened (at one hundred and fift}^ yards) with 
a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, 
drove olf Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, 
and caused a temporary panic, in which the guns 
were nearly lost. But the Seventy-ninth New- 
York and Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, 
changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out 
to protect the guns with which Captain Cook had 
remained. Order was soon restored, and the di- 
vision formed in line on the right of Cox, and was 
kept concealed as nnichas possible under the hill- 
side until the whole line advanced. It was exposed 
not only to the fire of the battery in front, but 



also to that of the batteries on the other side of 
the turnpike, and lost heavily. 

Shortly before this time Generals Burnsideand 
Reno arrived at the base of the mountain ; and 
the former directed the latter to move up the di- 
visions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the 
crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon 
tlie enemy's position with his whole force as soon 
as he was informed that (Jeneral Hooker (who 
had just been directed to attack on tlie right) was 
well advanced up the mountain. 

General Reno then went to the front and as- 
sumed the direction of affairs, the positions hav- 
ing been explained to him by General Pleasanton. 
Shortly before this time I arrived at the point oc- 
cupied by General Burnside, and my headquar- 
ters were located thereuntil the conclusion of the 
action. General Sturgis had left his camp at one 
P.M., and reached the scene of action about half- 
past three p.m. Clark's battery, of his division, 
was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General 
Reno, and two regiments (Second Maryland and 
Sixth New-Hampshire) were detached by General 
Reno and sent forward a short distance on the 
left of the turnpike. His division was formed in 
rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division was di- 
vided ; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed 
on the extreme left, and Colonel llarland's, under 
General Rodman's personal supervision, on the 
right. 

My order to move the whole lino forward and 
take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was 
executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a 
desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines 
with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed 
and fled. 

Our chief loss was in Wilco.x's division. The 
enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge 
and beyond the reach of our infantry ; but its po- 
sition was made untenable, and it was hastily re- 
moved and not again put in position near us. But 
the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of 
shot and shell. 

General Wilcox praises very highly the conduct 
of the Seventeenth Michigan in this advance — a 
regiment which had been organized scai'cely a 
month, but which charged the advancing enemy 
in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops ; 
and also that of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, 
which bravely met them in front. 

Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis's 
division was moved to the front of WIIco.k's, oc- 
cupying the new ground gained on the further 
side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the 
batteries across the gap. The enemy made an 
effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- 
pulsed by Fairchilds's brigade and Clark's battery. 
At about seven o'clock the enemy made an- 
other effort to regain the lost ground, attacking 
along Sturgi-s's front and part of Co.x's. A lively 
fire was kept up until ncai-ly nine o'clock, several 
charges being made by the enemy and repulsed 
with slaughter, and we finally occupied the high- 
est part of the mountain. 

General Reno was killed just before sunset, 
while making a rcconnoissancc to the front, and 



626 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



the cominarul of the corps devolved upon Gen- 
eral Cox. In General Reno the nation lost one 
of its best general officers. He was a skilful 
soldier, a brave and honest man. 

Tliei'c was no firing after ten o'clock, and the 
troops slept on their arms ready to renew the 
fight at daylight ; but the enemy quietly retired 
from our front during the night, abandoning their 
wounded, and leaving their dead in large numbers 
.scattered over the field. While these operations 
were progressing on the left of the main column, 
the right under General Hooker was actively en- 
gaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the 
morning, and its advance reached the Catoctin 
Creek about one p.m. General Hooker then went 
forward to examine the ground. 

At about one o'clock General Meade's division 
was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. 
The following is the order sent : 

September 14 — 1 p.m. 

General : General Reno requests that a divi- 
sion of 3^ours may move up on the right (north) 
of the main road. General McClellan desires 
you to comply with this request, holding your 
whole corps in readiness to support the move- 
ment, and taking charge of it yourself. 

Sumner's and Banks's corps have commenced 
arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as 
soon as you commence your movement. 

Georce D. Ruggles, 

Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Aid-de-Camp. 

Major-General Hooker. 

Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about two 
o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main 
road on the old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor 
church, where General Hooker was, and deploy- 
ed a short distance in advance, its right resting 
about one and a half mile from the turnpike. The 
enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the 
mountain side, but did no considerable damage. 
Cooper's battery B, First Pennsylvania artillery, 
was placed in position on high ground at about 
half-past three o'clock, and fired at the enemy on 
the slope, but soon ceased by order of General 
Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented 
any further use of artillery by us on this part of 
the field. The First Massachusetts cavalry was 
sent up the valley to the right to observe the 
movements, if any, of the enemy in that direc- 
tion, and one regiment of Meade's division was 
posted to watch the road coming in the same direc- 
tion. The other divisions were deployed as they 
came up. General Hatch's on the left, and Gen- 
eral Ricketts's, which arrived at five p.m., in the 
rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached 
from Hatch's division by General Burnside, for 
the purpose of making a demonstration on the 
enemy's centre, up the main road, as soon as the 
moveuients on the right and left had sufficiently 
progressed. The First Pennsylvania Rifles of 
General Seymour's brigade were sent forward as 
skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found 
that he ^^as in force. Meade was then directed 
to advat\ce his division to the right of the road, 
80 as to outflank them if possible, and then to 



move forward and attack, while Hatch was di- 
rected to take with his division the crest on the 
left of the old Hagerstown road, Ricketts's divi- 
sion being held in reserve. Seymolir's brigade 
was sent up to the top of the slope, on the right 
of the ravine, through which the road runs ; and 
then moved along the summit parallel to the 
road, while Colonel Gallagher's and Colonel 
Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction 
along the slope and in the ravine. 

The ground was of the most difficult character 
for the movement of troops, the hillside being 
very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone 
walls and timber. The enemy was very soon 
encountered, and in a short time the action be- 
came general along the whole front of the divi- 
sion. The line advanced steadily up the mount- 
ain side, where the enemy was posted behind 
trees and rocks, from which he was gradually 
dislodged. During this advance Colonel Gal- 
lagher, Commanding Third brigade, was severely 
wounded ; and the command devolved upon Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Robert Anderson. 

General Meade having reason to believe that 
the enemy were attempting to outflank him on 
his right, applied to General Hooker for reen- 
forcements. General Duryea's brigade of Rick- 
etts's division was ordered up, but it did not 
arrive until the close of the action. It was ad- 
vanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment 
could open fire before the enemy retired and 
darkness intervened. 

General Meade speaks highly of General Sey- 
mour's skill in handling his brigade on the ex- 
treme right, securing by his manoeuvres the great ,. 
object of the movement, the outflanking of the 
enemy. 

While General Meade was gallantly driving 
the enemy on the right, General Hatch's division 
was engaged in a severe contest for the posses- 
sion of the crest on the left of the i-avine ; it 
moved up the mountain in the following order : 
two regiments of General Patrick's brigade de- 
ployed as .skirmishers, with the other two regi- 
ments of the same brigade supporting them. 
Colonel Phelps's brigade in line of battalions in 
mass at deploying distance, General Doubleday's 
brigade in the same order bringing up the rear. 
The Twenty- first New-York having gone straight 
up the slope instead of around to the right, as 
directed, the Second United States sharp-shooters 
was sent out in its place. Phelps's and Double- 
day's brigades were deployed in turn as they 
reached the woods, which began about half up 
the mountain. General Pati'ick with his skir- 
mishers soon drew the fire of the enemy, and 
found him strongly posted behind a fence which _- 
bounded the cleared space on the top of the ;■ 
ridge, having on his front the woods through ^ 
which our line was advancing, and in his rear 
a corn-field full of rocky ledges, which afforded 
good cover to fall back to if dislodged. 

Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced, under a 
hot fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen 
minutes of heavy firing on both sides (in which 
General Hatch was wounded while urging on his 



DOCUMENTS. 



627 



men) the fence was carried by a charsrc, and our 
line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat 
sheltered by the slope of the hill. 

Doublcday's brigade, now under the command 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Iloflman, (Colonel Wain- 
wright having been wounded,) relieved Phcl])S, 
and continued firing for an hour and a half; the 
enemy behind ledges of rocks, some thirty or forty 
paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, 
and attempting to charge on the least cessation 
of our fire. About dusk Colonel Christian's bri- 
gade of Ricketts's division came up and relieved 
Doubleday's brigade, which fell back into line 
behind Phelps's. Christian's brigade continued 
the action for thirty or forty minutes, when the 
enemy retired, after having made an attempt to 
flank us on the left, which was repulsed by the 
Seventy-fifth New-York and Seventh Indiana. 

The remaining brigade of Ricketts's division 
(General Hartsutf's) was moved up in the centre, 
and connected Meade's left with Doublcday's 
right. We now had possession of the summit 
of the first ridge which commanded the turnpike 
on both sides of the mountain, and the troops 
were ordered to hold their positions until further 
orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the 
afternoon General Gibbon, with his brigade and 
one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, Fourth ar- 
tillery,) was ordered to move up the main road 
on the enemj^'s centre. He advanced a regiment 
on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers, 
and followed by the other two regiments in 
double column ; the artillery moving on the road 
until within range of the enemy's guns, which 
were firing; on the column from the gorge. 

The brigade advanced steadily, driving the 
enemy from his positions in the woods and be- 
hind stone walls, until they reached a point well 
up toward the top of the pass, when the enemy, 
having been reenforced by three regiments, 
opened a heavy fire on the front and on both 
flanks. The fight continued until nine o'clock, 
the^enemy being entirely repulsed ; and the bri- 
gade, after having suffered severely, and having 
expended all its ammunition, including even the 
cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued 
to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until 
twelve o'clock, when it was relieved by General 
Gorman's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sum- 
ner's corps, (except the Sixth Wisconsin, which 
remained on the field all night.) General Gib- 
bon, in this- delicate movement, handled his bri- 
gade with as much precision and coolness as if 
upon parade, and the bravery of his troops could 
not be excelled. 

The Second corps (Sumnei^'s) and the Twelfth 
corps (Williams'.s) reached their final positions 
shortly after dark. General Richardson's divi- 
sion was placed near Mount Tabor church, in a 
position to support our right, if necessary ; the 
Twelfth corps and Sedgwick's division bivouack- 
ed around Bolivar, in a position to support our 
centre and left. 

General Sykes's division of regulars and the 
artilery reserve halted for the night at Miildle- 
town. Thus, on the night of the fourteenth the 



whole army was massed in the vicinity of the 
field of battle, in rct^liness to renew the action 
the next day, or to move in jnirsuit of the ene- 
my. At daylight our skirmishers were advanc- 
ed, and it was found that he had retieated dur- 
ing the night, leaving his dead on the field, and 
his wounded uncared for. 

About one thousand five hundred prisoners 
were taken by us during the battle, and the \o•:■>^ 
to the enemy in killed was much gniater than our 
own, and, probably, also in wounded. It i;5 be- 
lieved that the force opposed to us on Turner's 
Gap consisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (fifteen thou- 
sand,) and a part, if not the wliole, of Long- 
street's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's, pro- 
l)ably some thirty thousand in all. 

We went into action with about thitty thou- 
sand men, and our losses amounted to one thou- 
sand five hundred and sixty-eight aggregate, 
(three hundred and twelve killed, one thousand 
two hundred and thirty-four wounded, and twen- 
ty-two missing.) 

On the next day I had the honor to receive the 

following very kind despatch from His Excellency 

the President : 

War DErARTMEST, Washisgtok, I 
September, 15, lsC'2— 2.4r) r.M. ( 

Your despatch of to-day received, (jod bless 
you, and all with you; destroy the rebel army if 
possible. A. Lincoln. 

Major-Gencral McClellan. 



On the night of the battle of South-!Mo\mtain, 
orders were given to the corps conmianders to 
press forward the pickets at early dawn. Thib 
advance revealed the fact that the enemy had left 
his positions, and an immediate pursuit was or- 
dered: the cavalry, under General Pleasanton, 
and the three corps under Generals Sumner, 
Hooker, and i^Iansfield, (the latter of whom had 
arrined that morning and assumed command of 
the Twelfth, Williams's col-i)s,) by the national 
turnpike and Boonsboro ; the corps of (Jenerals 
Burn.,ide and Porter (the latter command at that 
time consisting of but one M'eak division, Syke-s's) 
by the old Sharpsburgh road, and General Frank- 
lin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrcrs- 
ville by a detachment, and endeavor to relicva 
Harper's Ferry. 

Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching 
the road from Boonsboro to Rohrersville to reen- 
force Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburgh, ac- 
cording to circumstances. 

Franklin moved toward Brownsville and found 
there a force of the enemy, uuich superior in 
numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong posi- 
tion to receive him. At this time the cessation 
of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the sur- 
render of that place. 

The cavalry overtook tho enemy's cavalry in 
Boonsboro, made a daring charge, killing and 
wounding a number, and capturing two hundred 
and fifty pi<soners and two guns. 

General Richardson's division of the Second 
corps pressing the rear-guard of the enemy 



628 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



vigor, i)asscd Eoonsboro and Kcedysville, and 
came upon the main body of the enemy, occupy- 
ina; in 1 irire force a strong position a few miles be- 
yond the latter place. 

It had been hoped to engage the enemy during 
the fifteenth. Accordingly, instructions were 
giriii that if the enemy were overtaken on the 
march they should be attacked at once ; if found 
in licavy force and in position, the corps in ad- 
vance should be placed in position for attack, and 
await mj^ arrival. On reaching the advanced posi- 
tion of our troops, I found but two divisions, 
Richardson's and Sykes's, in position ; the other 
troops wei-e halted in the road ; the head of the 
column some distance in rear of Richardson. 

The enemy occupied a strong position on the 
heights, on the west side of Antietam Creek, dis- 
playing a large force of infantry and cavalry, with 
numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on 
our columns as they appeared in sight on the 
Keedysville road and Sharpsburgh tin-npike, which 
fire was returned by Captain Tidball's light bat- 
tery. Second United States artillery, and Pettit's 
battery, First New-York artillery. 

The' division of General Richardson, following 
close on the heels of the retreating foe, halted and 
deployed near Antietam River, on the right of the 
Sharpsburgh road. General Sykes, leading on the 
division of regulars on the old Sharpsburgh road, 
came up and deployed to the left of General Rich- 
ardson, on the left of the road. 

Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by 
four stone bridges — the upper one on the Keedys- 
ville and WilHamsport road ; the second on the 
Keedysville and Sharpsburgh turnpike, some two 
and a half miles below ; the third about a mile be- 
low the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharps- 
burgh road ; and the fourth near the mouth of An- 
tietam Creek, on the road leading from Harper's 
Ferry to Sharpsburgh, some three miles below the 
third. The stream is sluggish, with few and diffi- 
cult fords. After a rapid examination of the posi- 
tion, I found that it was too late to attack that 
day, and at once directed the placing of the bat- 
teries in position in the centre, and indicated the 
l)ivouacs for the diiferent corps, massing them 
near and on both sides of the Sharpsburgh turn- 
pike. The corps were not all in their positions 
until the next morning after sunrise. 

On the morning of the sixteenth, it was dis- 
covered that the enemy had changed the position 
of his batteries. The masses of his troops, how- 
ever, were still concealed behind the opposite 
heiglits. Their left and centre were upon and in 
front of the Sharpsburgh and Ilagerstown turn- 
pike, hidden by woods and irregularities of the 
ground ; their extreme left resting upon a wooded 
emiiicncc near the cross-roads to the north of J. 
Miller's farm ; their left resting upon the Poto- 
mac. Tlieir line extended south, the right rest- 
ing iipon the lulls to the south of Sharpsburgh, 
near Shaveley's farm. 

Tlie bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 
3, near this point, was strongly covered by 
riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, etc., 
and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front 



of this line consisted of undulating hills, their 
crests in turn commanded bj^ others in their rear. 
On all favorable points the enemy's artillery was 
posted and their reserves hidden from view by the 
hills, on which their line of l)attle was formed, 
could manoeuvre unobserved by our army, and 
from the shortness of their line could rapidly re- 
enforce any point threatened by our attack. Their 
position, stretching across the angle formed by 
the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and rear 
protected by these streams, was one of the strong- 
est to be found in this region of country, which 
is well adapted to defensive warfare. 

On the right, near Keedysville, on both sides 
of the Sharpsburgh turnpike, were Sumner's and 
Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the 
turnpike and near the Antietam River, General 
Richardson's division of General Sumner's corps 
was posted. General Sykes's division of General 
Porter's corps was on the left of the turnpike 
and in line with General Richardson, protecting 
the bridge No. 2, over the Antietam. The left 
of the line, opposite to and some distance from 
bridge No. 3, was occupied by General Burn- 
side's corps. 

Before giving General Hooker his orders to 
make the movement which will presently be de- 
scribed, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy 
myself that the troops were properly posted there 
to secure our left flank from any attack made 
along the left bank of the Antietam, as well as 
to enable us to carry bridge No. 3. 

I found it necessary to make considerable 
changes in the position of General Burnside's 
corps, and directed him to advance to a strong 
position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, 
and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge 
carefully. In front of Generals Sumner's and 
Hooker's corps, near Keedsyville, and on the 
ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the 
Antietam, and between the turnpike and Fry's 
house on the right of the road, were placed Cap- 
tain Taft's, Languor's, Von Kleizer's, and Lieu- 
tenant Weaver's batteries of twenty-pounder 
Parrott guns. On the crest of the hill in the 
rear and right of bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's 
three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty- 
pounder batteries. General Franklin's corps and 
General Couch's division held a position in Pleas- 
ant Valley in front of Brownsville, with a strong 
force of the enemj'' in their front. General Mo- 
rell's division of Porter's corps was en route from 
Roonsboro, and General Humphrey's division 
of new troops en route from Frederick, Mary- 
land. About daylight on the sixteenth the ene- 
my opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns 
in position, which was promptly returned ; their 
fire svas silenced for the time, but was frequently 
renewed during the day. In the he.avy fire of 
tlie morning. Major Arndt, commanding First 
battalion First New-York artillery, was mortally 
wounded while directing the operations of his 
batteries. 

It was afternoon before I could move the troops 
to their positions for attack, being compelled to 
spend the morning in reconnoitring the new po- 



DOCUMENTS. 



629 



sition taken up bj the enemy, examining the 
ground, finding fords, clearing the approaches, and 
hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, 
which had been delayed by the rapid march of 
the troops over the few practicable approaches 
from Frederick. These had been crowded by 
the masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery 
pressing on with the hope of overtaking the cne- 
ni}^ before he could form to resist an attack. 
Many of the troops were out of rations on the 
previous day, and a good deal of their ammuni- 
tion had been expended in the severe action of 
the fourteenth. 

My plan for the impending general engagement 
was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of 
Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, 
and if necessary by Franklin's ; and, as soon as 
matters looked favorably there, to move the corps 
of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, 
upon the ridge running to the south and rear of 
Sharpsburgh, and having carried their position, 
to press along the crest toward our right ; and 
whenever either of these flank movements should 
be successful, to advance our centre with all the 
forces then disposable. 

About two P.M. General Hooker, with his corps, 
consisting of General Rickctts's, Meade's, and 
Doubleday's divisions, was ordered to cross the 
Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1, a short 
distance above, to attack and, if possible, turn 
the enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered 
to cross the corps of General Mansfield (the 
Twelfth) during the night, and hold his own (the 
Second) corjJS ready to cross early the next morn- 
ing. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy's 
left a sharp contest commenced with the Penn- 
sylvania reserves, the advance of General Hook- 
er's corps, near the house of D. Miller. The 
enemy were driven from the strip of woods where 
he was first met. The firing lasted until after 
dark, when General Hooker's corps rested on 
their arms on ground won from the eneni3% 

During the night General Mansfield's corps, 
consisting of Generals Williams's and Green's 
divisions, crossed the Antietam at the same ford 
and bridge that General Hooker's troops had 
passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J. PofTen- 
berger, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's 
position. At daylight on the seventeenth, the 
action was couunenced by the skirmishers of the 
Pennsylvania reserves. The whole of General 
Hooker's corps w-as soon engaged, and drove the 
enemy from the open field in front of the first 
line of woods into a second line of woods beyond, 
which runs to the eastn-ard of and nearly par- 
allel to tlie Sharpsburgh and Hagerstown turn- 
pike. 

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops 
advanced the opiiosition became more determined, 
and the number of the enemy greater. General 
Hooker then ordered up the corps of General 
Mansfield, which moved promptly toward the 
scene of action. 

The First division. General Williams's, was de- 
ployed to the right on approaching the enemy ; 
General Crawford's brigade on the right, its right 




tended as far as the burned buildings to the north 
and cast of the white church on the turnpike. 
During the deployment, that gallant veteran Gen- 
eral Mansfield fell mortally wounded, while ex- 
amining the ground in front of his troops. Gen- 
eral Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, was severely 
wounded, while bravely pressing forward his 
troops, and was taken from the field. 

The conunand of the Twelfth corps fell upon 
General Williams. Five regiments of First divi- 
sion of this corps were new troops. One brigade 
of the Second division was sent to support Gen- 
eral Doubleday. 

The One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Penn- 
sylvania volunteers were pushed across the turn- 
pike into the woods beyond J. Miller's house, 
with orders to hold the position as long as possi- 
ble. 

The line of battle of this corps was formed, 
and it became engaged about seven a.m., the at- 
tack being opened by Knapp's, (Pennsylvania,) 
Cothran's, (New-York,) and Hampton's (Pitts- 
burgh) batteries. To meet this attack the ene- 
my had pushed a strong column of troops into 
the open fields in front of the turnpike, while he 
occupied the woods on the west of the turnpike 
in strong force. The woods (as was found by 
subsequent observation) were traversed by out- 
cropping ledges of rock. Several hundred yards 
to the right and rear was a hill which command- 
ed the debouche of the woods, and in the fields 
between was a long line of stone fences, contin- 
ued by breastworks of rails, which covered the 
enemy's infantry from our musketry. The same 
woods formed a screen behind which his move- 
ments were concealed, and his batteries on the 
hill and the rifle-works covered from the fire of 
our artiller}^ in front. 

For about two hours the battle raged with va- 
ried success, the enemy endeavoring to drive our 
troops into the second line of wood, and ours in 
turn to get possession of (he line in front. 

Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the 
eneni}' back into the woods near the turnpike, 
General (ireen with his two brigade.; crossing 
into the woods to the left of the Hunker Church. 
During this conflict (ieneral Crawford, command- 
ing First division after Cieneral AVilliams took 
command of the corps, was wounded and left the 
field. 

General Green being much exposed and apply. 
ing for recnforcements, the Thirteenth New-Jer- 
sey, Twenty-seventh Indiana, and the Third Ma- 
ryland were sent to his support, with a section 
of Knapp's battery. 

At about nine o'clock a.m. General Sedgwick's 
division of General Sumner's corps arrived. Cross- , 
ing the ford previously mentioned, this division 
marched in three cohunns to the support of the 
attack on the enemy's left. On nearing the scene 
of action the cohunns were halted, faced to the 
front, and established by General Sumner in 
three parallel lines by brigade, facing toward the 



630 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



south and west; General Gorman's brigade in 
front, General Dana's second, and General How- 
ard's third, with a distance between the lines of 
some seventy paces. The division was then put 
in motion and moved upon the field of battle, un- 
der fire from the enemy's concealed batteries on 
the hill beyond the roads. Passing diagonally 
to the front across the open space and to the 
front of the First division of General Williams's 
corps, this latter division withdrew. 

Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, 
and driving the enemy before them, the first line 
was met by a heavy fire of musketry and shell 
from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries 
on the hill commanding the exit from the woods ; 
meantime a heavy column of the enemy had suc- 
ceeded in crowding back the troops of General 
Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left 
of Sedgwick's division. By command of General 
Sumner, General Howard faced the third line to 
the rear preparatorj^ to a change of front to meet 
the column advancing on the left ; but this line 
now suffering from a destructive fire both in 
front and on its left, which it was unable to re- 
turn, gave way toward the right and rear in con- 
siderable confusion, and was soon followed by 
the first and second lines. 

General Gorman's brigade, and one regiment 
of General Dana's, soon rallied and checked the 
advance of the enemy on the right. The second 
and third lines now formed on the left of General 
Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive fii-e 
upon the enemy. 

During General Sumner's attack, he ordered 
General Williams to support him. Brigadier- 
General Gordon, with a portion of his brigade, 
moved forward, but when he reached the woods, 
the left of General Sedgwick's division had given 
way ; and finding himself, as the smoke cleared 
up, opposed to the enemy in force with his small 
command, he withdrew to the rear of the batter- 
ies at the second line of woods. As General Gor- 
don's troops unmasked our batteries on the left, 
they opened with canister ; the batteries of Cap- 
tain Cothran, First New-York, and I, First artil- 
lery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff, doing 
good service. Unable to withstand this deadly 
fn-e in front and the musketry fire from the right, 
the enemy again sought shelter in the woods and 
rocks beyond the turnpike. 

During this assault Generals Sedgwick and 
Dana were seriously wounded and taken from 
the field. General Sedgwick, though twice wound- 
ed, and faint from loss of blood, retained com- 
mand of his division for more than an hour after 
his first wound, animating his command by his 
presence. 

About the time of General Sedgwick's advance, 
Genci'al Hooker, while urging on his command, 
was severely wounded in the foot and taken from 
the field, and General Meade was placed in com- 
mand of his corps. General Howard assumed 
command after tJeneral Sedgwick retired. 

The repulse of the enemy offered opportunity 
to rearrange the lines and reorganize the com- 
mands on the right, now more or less in confusion. 



The batteries of the Pennsylvania reserve, on high 
ground, near I. Poffenburger's house, opened fire, 
and checked several attempts of the enemy to es- 
tablish batteries in front of our right, to turn that 
flank and enfilade the lines. 

While the conflict was so obstinately raging 
on the right. General Frencli was pushing his di- 
vision against the enemy still further to the left. 
Tliis division crossed the Antietam at the same 
ford as General Sedgwick, and immediately in his 
rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, 
the division marched about a mile from the ford, 
then facing to the left, moved in three lines to- 
ward the enemy; General Max Weber's brigade 
in front ; Colonel Dwight Morris's brigade of raw 
troops, undrilled, and moving for the first time 
under fire, in the second, and General Kimball's 
brigade in the third. The division was first as- 
sailed by a fire of artillery, but steadily advanced, 
driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and encoun- 
tered the infantry in some force at the group of 
houses on Roulette's Farm. General Weber's 
brigade gallantly advanced with an unwavering 
front and drove the enemy from their position 
about the houses. 

While General Weber was hotly engaged with 
the first line of the enemy. General French re- 
ceived orders from General Sumner, his corps 
commander, to push on with renewed vigor to 
make a diversion in favor of the attack on the 
right. Leaving the new troops, who had been 
thrown into some confusion from their march 
through corn-fields, over fences, etc., to form as 
a reserve, he ordered the brigade of General 
Kimball to the front, passing to the left of Gene- 
ral Weber. The enemy was pressed back to 
near the crest of the hill, where he was encoun- 
tered in greater strength posted in a sunken road 
forming a natural rifle-pit running in a north- 
westerly direction. In a corn-field in rear of this 
road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As 
the line reached the crest of the hill a galling fire 
was opened on it from the sunken road and corn- 
field. Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from 
both lines, and the battle raged along the whole 
line with great slaughter. 

The enemy attempted to turn the left of the 
line, but were met by the Seventh Virginia and 
One Hundred and Thirty-second Pennsylvania 
volunteers and repulsed. Foiled in this, the en- 
emy made a determined assault on the front, but 
were met by a charge from our lines, which drove 
them back with severe loss, leaving in our hands 
some three hundred prisoners and several stand 
of colors. The enemy having been repulsed by 
the terrible execution of the batteries and the 
musketry fire on the extreme right, now attempt- 
ed to assist the attack on General French's divi- 
sion by assailing him on his right and endeavor- 
ing to turn his tlank, but this attack was met and 
checked by the Fourteenth Indiana and Eighth 
Ohio volunteers, and by canister from Captain 
Tompkins's battery, First Rhode Island artillery. 
Having been under an almost continuous fire for 
nearly four hours, and the ammunition nearly ex- 
pended, this division now took position immedi- 



DOCUMENTS. 



631 



ately below the crest of the heij^hts on which 
they had so gallantly foui:;ht, the enemy making 
no attempt to regain their lost ground. 

On the left of General French, General Rich- 
ardson's division was hotly engaged. Having 
crossed the Antietam about half-past nine a.m. 
at the ford crossed by the otiier divisions of Sum- 
ner's corps, it moved on a line neai'ly parallel to 
the Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the 
high grounds overlooking Roulette's house ; the 
Second (Irish) brigade, commanded by General 
ileagher, on the right ; the Third brigade, com- 
manded by General Caldwell, on his left, and the 
brigade commanded by Colonel Brooks, Fifty- 
third Pennsylvania volunteers, in support. As 
the division moved forward to take its position 
on the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery 
against it, but owing to the irregularities of the 
ground did but little damage. 

Meagher's brigade advancing steadilj% soon be- 
came engaged with the enemy posted to the left 
and in front of Roulette's house. It continued 
to advance under a heavy fire nearly to the crest 
of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy 
being posted in a continuation of the sunken road 
and corn-field before referred to. Here the brave 
Irish brigade opened upon the enemy a terrific 
musketry fire. 

All of General Sumner's corps was now en- 
gaged ; General Sedgwick on the right. General 
French in the centre, and General Richardson on 
the left. The Irish brigade sustained its well- 
earned reputation. After suffering terribly in 
oiTicers and men, and strewing the ground with 
their enemies as they drove them back, their am- 
munition nearly expended, and their Command- 
er, General Meagher, disabled by the fall of his 
horse shot under him, this brigade was ordered 
tu give place to General Caldwell's brigade, 
which advanced to a short distance in its rear. 
The lines were passed by the Irish brigade 
breaking by company to the rear, and General 
Caldwell's by company to the front as steadily 
as on drill. Colonel Brooks's brigade now be- 
came the second line. 

The ground over which Generals Richardson's 
and French's divisions were fighting was very 
irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills 
covered with growing corn, inclosed by stone 
walls, behind which the enemy could advance 
unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. 
Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempt- 
ed to gain the right of Richardson's position in 
a corn-field near Roulette's house, where the di- 
vision had become separated from that of Gene- 
ral French's. A change of front by the Fifty- 
second New- York and Second Delaware volun- 
teers, of Colonel Brooks's brigade, under Colonel 
Frank, and the attack made by the Fifty-third 
Pennsj-lvania volunteers, sent further to the 
right by Colonel Brooks to close this gap in the 
line, and the movement of the One Hundred and 
Thirt3--second Pennsylvania and Seventh Vir- 
ginia volunteers of General French's division be^ 
fore referred to, drove the enemy from the corn- 
field and restored the line. 



The brigade of General Caldwell, with deter- 
mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back oppo- 
site the left and centre of this division, but shel- 
tered in the sunken road, they still held our 
forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Colonel 
pjarlow, connnanding the Sixty-first and Sixty- 
fourth New- York regiments oY Caldwell's bri- 
gade, seeing a favorable opportunity, advanced 
the regiments on the left, taking the line in the 
sunken road in flank, and compelled them to 
surrender, capturing over three hundred pris- 
oners and three stands of colors. 

The whole of the brigade, with the Fifty-sev- 
enth and Sixty-sixth New-York regiments of 
Colonel Brooks's brigade, who had moved these 
regiments into the first line, now advanced with 
gallantry, driving the enemy before them in con- 
fusion into the corn-field beyond the sunken 
road. The left of the division was now well ad- 
vanced, when the enemy, concealed by an inter- 
vening ridge, endeavored to turn its left and rear. 

Colonel Cross, Fifth New-Hampshire, by a 
change of front to the left and rear, brought his 
regiment facing the advancing line. Here a spir- 
ited contest arose to gain a commanding height, 
the two opposing forces moving parallel to each 
other, giving and receiving fire. The Fifth gain- 
ing the advantage, faced to the right and deliver- 
ed its volley. The enemy staggered, but rallied 
and advanced desperately at a charge. Being 
retinforced by the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, 
these regiments met the advance by a counter 
charge. The enemy fled, leaving many killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of the 
Fourth North-Carolina, in our hands. 

Another column of the enemy, advancing un- 
der shelter of a stonewall and corn-field, pressed 
down on the right of the division ; but Colonel 
Barlow again advanced the Sixty-fir.st and Sixty- 
fourth New- York against these troops, and with 
the attack of Kimball's brigade on the right, 
drove them from this position. 

Our troops on the left of this part of the line 
having driven the enemy far back, they, with 
reenforced numbers, made a determined attack 
directly in front. To meet this. Colonel Barlow 
brought his two regiments to their position Ib 
line, and drove the enemy through the corn-field 
into the orchard beyond, under a lieavy fire of 
musketry, and a lire of canister from two pieces 
of artillery in the orchard, and a battery further 
to the right, throwing shell and case-shot. This 
advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the 
strong point contended for by the enemy at this 
part of the line, it being a defensible building 
several hundred yards in advance of the sunken 
road. The musketry fire at this point of the line 
now ceased. Hokiing Pipers house, Genera! 
Richardson withdrew the line a little way to the 
crest of a hill, a more advantageous position. 
Up to this time the division was without artil- 
lery, and in the new position suffered severely 
from artillery fire which could not be replied to. 
A section of Robertson's horse battery, com- 
manded by Lieutenant Vincent, Second artillery, 
now arrived on the ground and did excellent scr- 



632 



REBELLION" RECORD, 1S62-63. 



vice. Sii^iscqiiently a liattery of brass guns, 
coinnimulcd by Captain Graham, First artillery, 
arrived, and was posted on the crest of the hill, 
and soon silenced the tvro guns in the orchard. 
A heavy fire soon ensued between the batter}- 
further to the right and our own. Captain Gra- 
ham's battery was bravely and skilfully served, 
but unaljle to reach the enemy, who had rifled 
guns of greater range than our smooth-bores, re- 
tired by order of General Richardson, to save it 
from useless sacrifice of men and horses. The 
brave General was himself mortally wounded 
while personally directing its fire. 

General Hancock was placed in command of 
the division after the fall of General Richardson. 
General ^feagher's brigade, now commanded by 
Colonel Burke, of the Sixty-third New-York, 
having refilled their cartridge-boxes, was again 
ordered forward, and took position in the centre 
of the line. The division now occupied one line 
in close proximity to the enemy, who had taken 
up a position in the rear of Piper's house. Col- 
onel Dwight Morris, with the Fourteenth Con- 
necticut and a detachment of the One Hundred 
and Eighth New-York, of General French's divi- 
sion, was sent by General French to the support 
of General Richardson's division. This command 
was now placed in an interval in the line between 
General Caldwell's and the Irish brigades. 

The requirements of the extended line of bat- 
tle had so engaged the artillery that the applica- 
tion of General Hancock for artillery for the divi- 
sion could not be complied with immediately by 
the Chief of Artillery or the corps commanders 
in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of 
the troops. General Hancock felt confident that 
he could hold his position, although sutfering 
from the enemy's artiller}'. but was too weak to 
attack, as the great length of the line he was 
obliged to hold prevented him from forming more 
than one line of battle, and, from his advanced 
position, this line was already partly enfiladed 
by the batteries of the enemy on the right, which 
were protected from our batteries opposite them 
by the woods at the Dunker Church. 

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some 
of our troops to the left of his position. General 
Hancock ol)tained Hexamer's battery from Gen- 
eral Franklin's corps, which assisted materially 
in frustrating this attack. It also assisted the 
attack of the Seventh Maine, of Franklin's corps, 
which, without other aid, made an attack against 
the enemy's line, and drove in skirmishers who 
were annoj'ing our artillery and troops on the 
right. Lieutenant Woodruff, with battery I, 
Second artillery, relieved Captain Hcxamer, whose 
ammunition M\as expended. The enemy at one 
time seemed to be about making an attack in 
force upon this part of the line, and advanced a 
long column of infjintry toward this division ; 
but on ncaring the position. General Pleasanton 
opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, 
gave a desultory fire, and retieatcd, closing the 
operations on this portion of the field. I return 
to the incidents occurring still turthor to the 
right. 



Between twelve and one p.:«. General Frank- 
lin's corps arrived on the field of battle, having 
left their camp near Crampton's Pass at six a.m., 
leaving General Couch with orders to move with 
his division to occupy Mar^dand Heights. Gen- 
eral Smith's division led the column, followed by 
General Slocum's. 

It was first intended to keep this corps in re- 
serve on the east side of the Antietam, to oper- 
ate on either flank or on the centre, as circum- 
stances might require ; but on neai'ing Keedys- 
ville, the strong opposition on the right, developed 
by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered 
it necessary at once to send this corps to the as- 
sistance of the right wing. 

On nearing the field, hearing that one of our 
batteries, (A,) Fourth United States ai'tillery, 
commanded by Lieutenant Thomas, who occupied 
the same position as Lieutenant VroodrufT's bat- 
tery in the morning, was hotly engaged without 
supports, General Smith sent two regiments to 
its relief from General Hancock's brigade. On 
inspecting the ground, General Smith ordered 
the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, M'ith 
Frank's and Cowen's batteries, First New- York 
artillery, to the threatened position. Lieutenant 
Thomas and Captain Cothran, commanding bat- 
teries, bravely held their positions against the ad- 
vancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill. 
Finding the enemy still advancing, the Third 
brigade, of Smith's division, commanded by Col- 
onel Irwin, Fortj'-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers, 
was ordered up, and passed through Lieutenant 
Thomas's battery, charged upon the enemy, and 
drove back the advance until abreast of the 
Dunker Church. As the right of the brigade 
came opposite the woods it received a destructive 
fire, which checked the advance and threw the 
brigade somewhat into confusion. It formed 
again behind a rise of ground in the open space 
in advance of the batteries. 

General French having reported to General 
Franklin that his ammunition was nearly expend- 
ed, that officer ordered General Brooks, with his 
brigade, to rcenforce him. General Brooks form- 
ed his brigade on the right of General French, 
where they remained during the remainder of 
the day and night, frequently under the fire of 
the enemy's artillery. 

It was soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin 
had fallen back behind the rise of ground that 
the Seventh Maine, by order of Colonel Irwin, 
made the gallant attack already referred to. 

The advance of General Franklin's corps was 
opportnne. The attack of the enemy on this 
position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, 
must have been disastrous, had it succec'dcd in 
piercing the line between Generals Sedgwick and 
French's divisions. 

Geneial Franklin ordered two brigades of Gen- 
eral Slocum's division. General Newton's and 
Colonel Torbeit's, to form in column to assault 
the woods that had been so hotly contested before 
by Generals Sunnier and Hooker. General Bart- 
lett's brigade was ordered to form as a reserve. 
At this time Genei-al Sumner, having command 



iJOCUMENTS. 



633 



on the right, directed further offensive operations 
to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only 
remaining corps available for attack, would peril 
the safety of the whole army. 

General Porter's corps, consisting of General 
Sykes's division of regulars and volunteers and 
(iencral Morell's division of volunteers, occupied 
a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, 
upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburgh, 
and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's 
line. This corps tilled the interval between the 
light wing and General Burnside's command, and 
guarded the main approach from the enemy's 
position to our trains of supply. It was necessary 
to watch this part of our line with the utmost 
vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage 
of the first exhibition of weakness here to push 
upon us a vigorous assault, for the purpose of 
piercing our centre and turning our rear, as well 
as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once 
having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage 
to our rear could have met with but feeble re- 
sistance, as there were no reserves to reenforce 
or close up the gap. 

Toward the middle of the afternoon, proceed- 
ing to the right, I found that Sumner's, Iiookei''s, 
and Mansfield's corps had met with serious loss- 
es. Several general officers had been carried 
from the field severely wounded, and the aspect 
of affairs was any thing but promising. At the 
risk ©f greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two 
brigades from Porter's corps, the only available 
troops, to reenforce the right. Six battalions of 
Sykes's regulars had been thrown forward across 
the Antietam bridge on the main road to attack 
and drive back the enemy's sharp-shooters, who 
were annoying Pleasanton's horse batteries in 
advance of the bridge ; Warren's brigade of Por- 
ter's corps, was detached to hold a position on 
Burnside's right and rear ; so that Porter was 
left at one time with only a portion of Sykes's 
division and one small brigade of Morell's division 
(but little over three thousand men) to hold his 
important position. 

General Sumner expressed the most de(;ided 
opinion against another attempt during that day 
to assault the enemy's position in front, as por- 
tions of our troops were so much scattered and 
demoralized. In view of these circumstances, 
after making changes in the position of some of 
the troops, I directed the different commanders 
to hold their positions, and being satisfied that 
this could be done without the assistance of the 
two brigades from the centre, I countermanded 
the order, which was in course of execution. 

General Slocum's division replaced a portion of 
General Sumner's troops, and positions were se- 
lected for batteries in front of the woods. The 
enemy opened several heavy fires of artillery on 
the position of our troops after this, but our bat- 
teries soon silenced them. 

On the morning of the seventeenth, General 
Pleasanton, with his cavalry division and the 
horse batteries, under Captains Robertson, Tid- 
ball, and Lieutenant Haines, of the Second ar- 



tillery, and Captain Gibson, Third artillery, was 
ordered to advance on the turnpike toward Sharps- 
burgh, across bridge Number 2, and support 
the left of General Sumner's line. The bridge 
being covered by a fire of artillery and sharp- 
shooters, cavalry skirmishers were thrown out, 
and Captain Tidball's battery advanced by piece 
and drove off the sharp-shooters with cani.Kter suf- 
ficiently to establish the batteries above men- 
tioned, which opened on the enemy with effect. 
The firing was kept up for about two hours, when, 
the enemy's fire slackening, the batteries were 
relieved by Randall's and Van Reed's batteries, 
United vStates artillery. About three o'clock 
Tidball, Robertson, and Haines returned to their 
positions on the west of Antietam, Captain Gib- 
son having been placed in position on the east 
side to guard the approaches to the bridge. These 
batteries did good service, concentrating their 
fire on the column of the enemy about to attack 
General Hancock's position, and compelling it to 
find shelter behind the hills in rear. 

General Sykes's division had been in position 
since the fifteenth, exposed to the enemy's artille- 
ry and sharp-shooters. General MorcU had come 
up on the sixteenth, and relieved General Rich- 
ardson on the right of General Sykes. Contin- 
ually, under the vigilant watch of the enemy, 
this corps guarded a vital point. 

The position of the batteries under General 
Pleasanton being one of great exposure, the bat- 
tahon of the Second and Tenth United States in- 
fantry, under Captain Pollard, Second infimtry, 
was sent to his support. Subsequently four bat- 
talions of regular infantry, under Captain Dryer, 
Fourth infantry, were sent across to assist in 
driving off the sharp-shooters of the enemy. 

The battalion of the Second and Tenth infantry, 
advancing far beyond the batteries, comjjelled the 
cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon 
their guns. Few in numbers, and unsupported, 
they were unable to bring them off. The heavy 
loss of this small body of men attests their gal- 
lantry. 

The troops of General Burnside held the left 
of the line opposite bridge Number 3. The at- 
tack on the right was to have been supported 
by an attack on the left. Preparatory to this at- 
tack, on the evening of the sixteenth. General 
Burnside's corps was moved forward and to the 
left, and took up a position nearer the bridge. 

I visited General Burnside's position on the 
sixteenth, and after pointing out to him the pro- 
per dispositions to be made of his troops during 
the day and night, informed him that he would 
probably be required to attack the enemy's right 
on the following morning, and directed him to 
make careful reconnoissances. 

General Burnside's corps, consisting of the di- 
visions of Generals Cox, Wilcox, Rodman, and 
Sturgis, was posted as follows: Colonel Brooks's 
brigade, Cox's division, on the right. General 
Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On the 
left was General Rodman's division, with General 
Scammon's brigade. Cox's division, in support. 



634 



REBELLION" RECORD, 1862-63. 



General Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 

The corps bivouacked in position on the night 
of the sixteenth. 

Early on the morning of the seventeenth, I or- 
dered General Burnside to form his troops, and 
hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in 
his front, and to await further orders. 

At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by 
Lieutenant AV^ilson, topographical engineers, to 
carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the 
heights beyond, and to advance along their crest 
upon Sharpsburgh and its rear. 

After some time had elapsed, not hearing from 
him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had 
been done. The aid returned with the informa- 
tion that but little progress had been made. I 
then sent him back \iith an order to General 
liurnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry 
it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a sec- 
ond time with the report that the bridge was still 
in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I 
directed Colonel Sackett, Inspector-General, to 
deliver to General Burnside my positive order to 
push forward his troops without a moment's de- 
lay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the 
point of the bayonet ; and I ordered Colonel 
Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see 
that the order was executed promptly. 

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was 
carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 
]''ifty-first New-York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Other troops were then thrown over, 
and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy re- 
treating to the heights beyond. 

A halt was then made by General Burnsidc's 
advance until three p.m., upon hearing which, I 
directed one of my aids. Colonel Key, to inform 
(ileneral Burnside that I desired him to push for- 
ward his troops with the utmost vigor, and cany 
the enemy's pcsition on the heights; that the 
movement was vital to our success ; that this 
was a time when we must not stop for loss of life, 
if a great object could thereby be accomplished. 
'I'hat if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to 
inform me so at once, that his troops might be 
witlidrawn and used elsewhere on the field. He 
replied that he would soon advance, and would 
go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy 
on the left would permit. Upon this report, I 
again immediately sent Colonel Key to General 
]»urnside with orders to advance at once, if pos- 
sible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry 
the heights ; repeating that if he considered the 
moveincn,t impracticable, to inform me so, that 
his troops might be recalled. The advance was 
then gallant!)^ resumed, the enemy driven from 
the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a 
portion of llie troops even reached the outskirts 
of Sharpsburgh. By tiiis time it was nearly dark, 
and strong reenforcemcnts just then reaching the 
enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked General 
Burnside's troo])s on their left Hank, and forced 
them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the 
bridge. 

If this important movement had been consum- 
mated two hours earlier, a position would have 



been secured upon the heights, from which our 
batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of 
the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear; 
our victory might thus have been much more 
decisive. 

The following is the substance of General Burn- 
side's operations as given in his report : 

Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm 
the bridge. This bridge, No. 3, is a stone struc- 
ture of three arches with stone parapets. The 
banks of the stream on the opposite side are pre- 
cipitous, and command the eastern approaches to 
the bridge. On the hill-side, immediately by the 
bridge, was a stone fence running parallel to the 
stream ; the turns of the roadway, as it wound 
up the hill, were covered by rifle-pits and breast- 
works of rails, etc. These works, and the woods 
that covered the slopes, were filled with the ene- 
my's riflemen, and batteries were in position to 
enfilade the bridge and its approaches. 

General Rodman was ordered to cross the ford 
below the bridge. From Colonel Crook's position 
it was found impossible to carry the bridge. 

General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail 
from his division for that purpose. He sent for- 
ward the Second Maryland and the Sixth New- 
Hampshire. These regiments made several suc- 
cessive attacks in the most gallant style, but were 
di-iven back. 

The artillery on the left were ordered to con- 
centrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. 
Colonel Crook brought a section of Captain Sim- 
mons's battery to a position to command the 
bridge, The Fifty-first New-York and Fifty-first 
Pennsylvania were then ordered to assault the 
bridge. Taking advantage of a smallspur of the 
hills which ran parallel to the river, they moved 
toward the bridge. From the crest of this spui- 
they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the 
bridge. 

The division followed the storming party, also 
the brigade of Colonel Crook's as a support. The 
enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some five 
or six hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire 
of artillery on the troops in the new position on 
the crest of the hill above the bridge. 

General Rodman's division succeeded in cross- 
ing the ford after a sharp fire of musketry and 
artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, Scam- 
mon's brigade crossing as support. General Wil- 
cox's division was ordered across to take position 
on General Sturgis's right. 

These dispositions being completed about three 
o'clock, the command moved forward, except 
Sturgis's division, left in reserve. Clark's and 
Durell's batteries accompanied Rodman's divi- 
sion ; Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and 
a section of Simmons's battery with Colonel 
Crook's brigade. A section of Simmons's battery 
and Mullenburgh's and McMullan's batteries were 
in position. The order for the advance was obey- 
ed by the troops with alacrity. General AV^ilcox's 
division, with Crook in support, moved up on 
both sides of the turnpike leading from the bridge 
to Sharpsburgh, General Rodman's division, sup- 
i ported by Scaumion's brigade, on the left of Gen- 



DOCUMENTS. 



635 



eral "Wilcox. The enemy retreated before the 
advance of the troops. The Ninth New-York, of 
General Rodman's division, captured one of the 
ejiemj^'s batteries and held it for some time. As 
the command was driving the enemy to the main 
heights on the left of the town, the light division 
of General A. P. Hill arrived upon the field of bat- 
tle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heav}"- artillery 
fire made a strong att^ick on the extreme left. 
To meet this attack the left division diverged from 
the line nf march intended, and opened a gap be- 
tween it and the right. To fill up this it was 
necessary to order the troops fi-om the second 
line. During these movements General Rodman 
was mortally wounded. Colonel Ilarland's bri- 
gade, of General Rodman's division, was driven 
back. Colonel Scammon's brigade, by a change 
of front to rear on his right flank, saved t'ne left 
from bei!ig driven completely in. The fresh 
troops of the enemj^ pouring in, and the accumu- 
lation of artillery against this command, destroy- 
ed all hope of its being able to accomplish any 
thing more. 

It was now nearly dark. General Stnrgis was 
ordered forward to support the left. Notwith- 
standing the hard work in the early part of the 
day, his division moved forward with spirit. 
With its assistance the enemy were checked and 
held at bay. 

The command was ordered to foil back by Gen- 
eral Cox, who connnanded on the field the troops 
engaged in this affair beyond the Antietani. The 
artillery had been well served during the day. 
Night closed the long and desperately contested 
battle of the seventeenth. Nearly two hundred 
thousand men and five Iiundred pieces of artillery 
were for foui-teen hours engaged in this memora- 
ble battle. We had attacked the enemy in a po- 
sition selected by the experienced engineer then 
in person directing their operations. We had 
driven them from their line on one flank, and se- 
cured a footing within it on the other. The army 
of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect 
incident to previous rever.^es, had achieved a vic- 
tory over an adversarj' invested with the prestige 
of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night 
conquerors on a field won by their valor and cov- 
ered with the dead and wounded of the enemy. 

The night, however, brougiit with it grave re- 
sponsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on 
the eighteenth, or to defer it, even with the risk 
of the enemy's retirement, was the question be- 
fore me. ' 

After a night of anxious deliberation and a full 
and careful survey of the situation and condition 
of our army, the strength and position of the cn- 
eni}-, I concluded that tlie success of an attack on 
t'ne eighteenth was not certain. I am aware of 
the fact that, under ordinary circumstances a 
general is expected to risk a battle if he has a rea- 
sonable prospect of success; but at this critical 
juncture I should have had a narrow view of the 
condition of the country had I been willing to haz- 
ard another battle with less than an absolute as- 
surance of success. At tiiat moment— Virginia 
lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded — 



the National cause could afTonl no risks of defeat 
One battle lost, and almost all would have been 
lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it 
pleased, on Washington, Ualtimore, Philadelphia, 
or New-York. It could have levied its supplies 
from a fertile and undevastated country; extort- 
ed tribute from wealthy and populous cities ; and 
nowhere east of the Alleghanies was there another 
organized force able to arrest its march. 

The following are among the considerations 
which led me to doubt the certaintj' of success in 
attaclcing before the nineteenth : 

The troops were greatly overcome by the fa- 
tigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long- 
continued and severely contested battle of the 
seventeenth, together with the long day and night 
marches to which they had been subjected during 
the previous three days. 

The supply-trains were in the rear, and many 
of the troops had sufTcred from hunger. They 
required rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's 
corps, on the right, had, after fighting most val- 
iantly for several hours, been overpowered by 
numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much 
scattered, so that they were for the time some- 
what demoralized. 

In Hooker's corps, according to the return made 
by General Meade, con)manding, there were but 
six thousand seven hundredand twenty-nine men 
present on the eighteenth ; whcrca.s, on the morn- 
ing of the twenty-second, there were thirteen 
thousand and ninety-three men present for duty 
in the same corps, showing that previous to and 
during the battle six thousand three hundredand 
sixtj*-fbur men were separated from their com- 
mand. 

General Meade, in an official communication 
upon this subject, dated September eighteenth, 
1802, says: 

"I inclose a field-retm-n of the corps made this 
afternoon, which I desire you will lay before the 
Commanding General. I am satisfied the great 
reduction in the corps since the recent engage- 
ments is not due solely to the casualties of battle, 
and that a considerable number of men arc still 
in the rear, some having dropped out on (he marclv, 
and many dispersing and leaving yesterday dur- 
ing the fight. I think theelJiciency of the corps, 
so far as it goes, good. 'I'o resist an attack in our 
present strong position 1 think they may be de- 
pended on, and I hope they will perform duty in 
case we make an attack, though I do not think 
their morale is as good for an offensive as a de- 
fensive movement." 

One division of Sumner's corps had also been 
overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and 
demoiali/.ed. It was not deemed l>y its corps 
commander in proper condition to attack the en- 
emy vigorously the next day. 

Some of the new troops on the left, although 
many of them fought well during the battle, and 
are entitled to gi'eat credit, were, at the close of 
the action, driven back, and their morale im- 



pau'e 



On the morning of the eighteenth. General 



636 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



Burnside requested me to send him another divi- 
sion to assist in holding liis position on the other 
side of the Antictain, and to enable liim to with- 
draw his corps if he should be attacked by a su- 
perior force. lie gave me the impression that if 
he were attacked again that morning he would 
not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. 
I vi.sited his position early, determined to send 
General Jilorell's division to his aid, and directed 
that it should be placed on this side of the Antie- 
tam, in order that it might cover the retreat of his 
own corps from the other side of the Antictam, 
should that become necessary, at the same time 
it was in position to reenlorce our centre or right, 
if that were needed. 

Late in the afternoon I found that, although he 
had not been attacked, General Burnside had 
withdrawn his own corps to this side of the An- 
tietam, and sent over MorclFs division alone to 
hold the opposite side. 

A large number of our heaviest and most effi- 
cient batteries had consumed all their ammuni- 
tion on the sixteenth and seventeenth, and it was 
impossible to supply them until late on the fol- 
lowing (lay. 

Sui)plies of provisions and forage had to be 
brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition 
distributed. 

Finally, rcenforcements to the number of four- 
teen thousand men — to say nothing of troops 
expected from Pennsylvania — had not arrived, 
but were expected during the day. 

Tlie eighteenth was, therefore, spent in collect- 
ing the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, re- 
moving the wounded, burying the dead, and the 
necessar}^ pr'eparations for a renewal of the battle. 

Of the rcenforcements, Couch's division, march- 
ing with co-mmendable rapidity, came up into po- 
sition at a late hour in the morning. Humphrey's 
division of new troops, in their anxiety to parti- 
cipate in the battle which was raging, when they 
received the order to march from Frederick at 
about half-past three p.m., on the seventeenth, 
pressed forward during the entire night, and the 
mass of the division readied the army during the 
following morning. Having marched more than 
twenty-three miles after half-past four o'clock on 
the preceding afternoon, tliey were, of course, 
greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refresh- 
ment. Large rcenforcements expected from Penn- 
sylvania never arrived. During the eighteenth, 
orders were given for a renewal of the attack at 
dayliglit on the nineteenth. 

On the night of the eighteenth the enemy, af- 
ter passing troops in the latter part of the day 
from the Virginia shore to their position behind 
Sharpsburgh, as seen by our ollicers, suddenly 
formed the design of abandoning their position, 
and retreating across the river. As their line was 
but a short distance from the river, the evacua- 
tion presented but little difficulty, and was eU'ect- 
ed before daylight. 

About two thousand seven hundred of the en- 
emy's dead were, under the direction of Major 
Davis, Assistant Inspector-(.Icnural, counted and 
bui-ied upon the battle-held of Anliotaiu. A por- 



tion of their dead had been previously buried by 
the enemy. This is conclusive evidence that the 
enemy sustained much gi-eater loss than we. 

Thirteen guns, thirtj^-nine colors, upward of 
fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more 
than six thousand prisonens, were the trophies 
which attest the success of our army in the bat- 
tles of South-Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and An- 
tictam. 

Not a single gun or color was lost bj'^ onr army 
during these battles. (See table, page 637.) 

An estimate of the forces under the confeder- 
ate General Lee, made up by direction of Gene- 
ral Banks, from information obtained by the ex- 
amination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., 
previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows : 

General T. J. Jackson's corps, 24,778 men. 

General James Longstreet's corps, . .23,342 " 

Cieneral D. H. Hill's Second division,15,o25 " 

General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry 0,400 " 

General Ransom's and Jenkins's bri- 
gade 3,000 " 

Forty-six regiments not included in 

above, 18,400 " 

Artillery, estimated at four hundred 

guns, G,000 ". 

Total, 97,445 " 

These estimates give the actual number of men 
present and fit for duty. 

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were 
as follows : 

First corps, 14,856 men. 

Second corps, 18,813 " 

Fifth corps, (one division notarrived,)12,930 " 

Sixth corps 12,300 " 

Ninth corps, 13,819 " 

Twelfth corps. 10,126 " 

Cavalry division, 4,320 " 

Total in action, 87,104 " 

When onr cavalry advance reached the river 
on the morning of the nineteenth, it was discov- 
ereil that nearly all the enemy's forces had cross- 
ed into Virginia during the night, their rear es- 
caping under cover of eight batteries, placed in 
strong positions upon the elevated blufis on the 
oi)posite bank. General Porter, commanding the 
Fifth corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's 
and Barnes's brigades, under General Griffin, to 
cross the river at dark, and carry the enemy's 
batteries. This was gallantly done under the 
fire of the enemy ; several guns, caissons, etc., 
were taken, and their supports driven back half 
a mile. 

The information obtained during the progress 
of this affair indicated that the mass of the ene- 
my had retreated on the Charlestown and Mar- 
tinsburgh roads, toward Wincliester. To verify 
this, and to ascertain how fiir the enemy had re- 
tired, General Porter was authorized to detach 
from his corps, on the morning of the twentieth, 
a reconnoitring party in greater force. This de- 
tachment crossed the river, and advanced about 



DOCUMENTS. 



637 



a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of | loss. This reconnoissance showed that the enc- 
the enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and I my was still in force on the Virginia bank of the 
driven back across the river with considerable ' Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance* 

Tabular Report of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam, on the 
lUh and 17th of Septcmbei; 18G2. 





General 
officers. 


Other offi- 
cers. 


Enlisted Men. 


Aggregate. 


rt 


Corps and Divisions. 




5 

3 


•a 

i 


■a 

•a 

c 

3 

is 


-6 


Wounded. 


to 
S 


■a 

i2 


■a 

■o 
s 

s 
o 


lb 

_g 


U 

a 

c 
a 
t.. 
O 


First corps, Major-General Hooker: 
















ns 

157 
97 


609 
449 


95 

137 

23 


86-J 

IHS 


































569 





















Total, 














348 


20)0 


255 


2610 




















Second corps, Major-General Sumner : 

First division, 




1 

2 

1 


20 


89 


192 
355 

272 


860 
1577 
1271 


24 

321 

203 


212 
355 
293 


9-10 
1.579 
1322 


24 
321 
203 


1136 


Second division, 




Third division, 




21 


50 


1818 






Total, 




4 


41 


89 


819 


3708 


648 


860 


8S0I 


548 


5209 






Fifth corps, Major-General F. J. Porter: 
First division, 
























Second division, 








2 


13 

7 


92 
13 


1 
1 


13 

8 


94 
13 


1 
1 


lOS 








1 


22 










Total, 






1 


2 


20 


105 


2 


21 


107 


2 


180 










Sixth corps, Major-General Franklin : 
















5 
65 


58 
277 


2 
81 


65 


















873 




















Total, 
















70 


»J5 


33 


4S$ 




















Ninth corps, Major-General Burnside : 
First division, 






2 

8 
6 


20 

29 

40 

7 


44 
121 
212 

33 


264 
493 
743 
145 


7 
20 
70 
23 


46 
128 
220 

88 


284 
522 
783 
1.52 


7 
20 
70 
23 


837 


Second division, 






67(» 








1078 








213 










Total, 






22 


96 


410 


1645 


120 


432 


1741 


120 


2298 










Twelfth corps, (General Banks,) Brig.-Gen. 

Williams commanding : 






9 

6 


85 
26 


151 

107 

1 


827 

481 

15 


54 

80 

1 


160 

113 

1 


862 
507 
15 


51 
30 

1 


1076 








650 








17 














Total . 






15 


61 


259 


1323 


85 


274 


1834 


85 


1748 










Major-General Couch's division, 








1 




8 






9 
23 




!) 


Brig.-Gen. Pleasanton, cavalry division,. . . 










5 


2S 




















Grand total, 




4 


79 


249 


1503 


C7S9 


755 


2010 


9116 


1043 


12,-t68 









HEADQnARTERS ArMY OK THE PoTOMAC, ) 

Camp n«ar Sharpsbdrgh, September 29, 1862. J 

Official. 



S. Williams, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



It was reported to me on the nineteenth that 
General Stuart had made his appearance at Wil- 
liamsport with some four thousand cavalry and 
six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand in- 
fantry were marching on the same point from 
the direction of Winchester. I ordered General 
Couch to march at once with his division, and a 
part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Franklin's 
corps, within supporting distance, for the pur- 
pose of endeavoring to capture this force. Gen- 

Sup. Doc. 41 



eral Couch made a prompt and rapid march to 
Williamsport, and attacked the enemy vigorous- 
ly, but they made their escape across the river. 
I despatched the following telegraphic report 
to the General-in-Chief: 

IlEAnQI'ARTrRS ArMY of THR PoTOMAr, I 

SiiARi'.siirrt(;ii, September 19, ISii.!. ( 

T have the honor to report that Maryland is 
entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, 
who has been driven across the Potomac. N» 



638 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



fears need now be entertained for the safety of 
Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's 
Ferry. G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding United States Army. 
On the following day I received this telegram : 

■Washikgton, September 20, 1S62— 2 p.m. 
We are still left entirely in the dark in regard 
to your own movements and those of the enemy. 
Tliis should not be so. You should keep me ad- 
vised of both, so far as you know them. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

JIajor-Gencral G. B. McClellan. 
To which I answered as follows : 

IIeadquartkrs Armt of the Potomac, ) 

NearSharpsburgh, September 20, 1S(V2 — S p.m. ) 

Your telegram of to-day is received. I tele- 
t^aphed you yesterday all I knew, and had noth- 
ing more to inform you of until this evening. 
Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland 
Heights at one p.m. to day. The rest of the army 
is near here, except Couch's division, which is at 
this moment engaged with the enemy in front of 
Williamsport ; the enemy is retiring vm Charles- 
town and Martinsburgh, on Winchester. He last 
night reoccupied Williamsport by a small force, 
but will be out of it by morning. I think he 
has a force of infantry near Shepherdstown. 

I regret that you find it necessary to couch 
every despatch I have the honor to receive from 
you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have 
not yet found leisure to say one word in commenda- 
tion of the recent achievements of this army, or 
even to allude to them. 

I have abstained from giving the number of 
guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, etc., captur- 
ed, until I could do so with some accuracy. I 
hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at 
least an approximate statement. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-Gentral Commanding. 

Major-General Halleck, 

General-in-Chief, Washington. 
On the same day I telegraphed as follows : 

Headquabters Army of the Potomac, 1 
September 20, 1S62. j 

As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side 
of the Potomac, must in a great measure be de- 
pendent for supplies of ammunition and provisions 
upon Richmond, I would respectfully suggest 
that General Banks be directed to send out a 
cavalry force to cut their supply communication 
opposite Washington. This would seriously em- 
barrass their operations, and will aid this army 
materially. G. B. McClellan, 

Miijor-General Commanding. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

.^ Commanding United States Army. 

M.ir3'land Heights were occupied by General 
Williams's corps on this day, and on tlie twenty- 
second General Sumner took possession of Har- 
per's Ferry. 



It will be remembered that at the time I was 
assigned to the command of the forces for the de- 
fence of the national capital, on the second day 
of September, 18G2, the greater part of all the 
available troops wer^ suffering under the dis- 
heartening influences of the serious defeat they 
had encountered during the brief and unfortu- 
nate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers 
were greatly reduced by casualties, their confi- 
dence was much shaken, and they had lost some- 
thing of that ^'■esprit du corps,^^ which is indis- 
pensable to the efficiency of an army. More- 
over, they had left behind, lost, or worn out, the 
greatest part of their clothing and camp equip- 
age, which required renewal before they could 
be in proper condition to take the field again. 
The intelligence that the enemy was crossing 
the Potomac into Maryland was received in Wash- 
ington on the fourth of September, and the army 
of the Potomac was again put in motion, under 
my direction, on the following day, so that but a 
very brief interval of time was allowed to reor- 
ganize or procure supplies. 

The sanguinary battles of South-^Mountain and 
Antietam fought by this army a few days after- 
ward, with the recconnoissances immediately fol- 
lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general 
officers, many regimental and company officers, 
and a large number of enlisted men, amounting 
in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred 
and twenty, (15,220.) Two army corps had 
been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat de- 
moralized in the action on the seventeenth. 

In General Sumner's corps alone, forty-one (41) 
commissioned officers and eight hundred and 
nineteen (819) enlisted men had been killed; 
four (4) general officers, eighty-nine (89) other 
commissioned officers, and three thousand seven 
hundred and eight (3708) enlisted men had been 
wounded, beside five hundred and forty-eight 
(548) missing ; making the aggregate loss in this 
splendid veteran corp.s, in this one battle, five 
thousand two hundred and nine, (5209.) 

In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the 
same engagement amounted to two thousand six 
hundred and nineteen, (2619.) 

The entire army had been greatly exhausted 
'oy unavoidable overwork, i^itiguing marches, 
hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to 
the last battle. 

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into 
Virginia the means of transportation at mj'' dis- 
posal were inadequate to furnish a single day's 
supply of subsistence in advance. 

Many of the troops were new levies, some of 
whom had fought like veterans, but the morale 
of others had been a good deal impaired in those 
severely contested action.s, and they required 
time to recover as well as to acquire the neces- 
sary drill and discipline. 

Under these circumstances I did not feel au- 
thorized to cross the river with the main army 
over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of 
the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force 
on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, 
which was liable at any time to lise above a ford- 



DOCUMEXTS. 



639 



ing stage, between my army and its base of sup- 
ply. 

I teleiiTaphed on the twenty-second to the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief as follows ; 

*'As soon as the exigencies of the service will 
admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It 
is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, 
that the old skeleton regiments should be filled 
up at once, and officers appointed to supply the 
numerous existing vacancies. There are instan- 
ces where captains are commanding regiments, 
and companies are without a single commissioned 
officer." 

On the twentj'-third the following was tele- 
graphed to the General-in-Chief : 

Hkadquartbks Army op the Potomac, ) 

NearSiiepherdstown, > 

September 23, 1SC2— 9,30 a.m. ) 

From several different sources I learn that 
General R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position 
at Leestown, between Shepherdstown and Mar- 
tinsburgh, and that General Jackson is on the 
Opequan Creek, about three miles above its 
mouth, both with large forces. There are also 
indications of heavy reiinforcements moving to- 
ward them from Winchester and Charlestown. 
I have therefore ordered General Franklin to 
take position with his corps at the cross-roads 
about one mile north-east of Bakersville, on the 
Bakersville and Williamsport Road, and General 
Couch to establish his division near Down.sville, 
leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch 
and guard the ford at that place. The fact of the 
enemy's remaining so long in our front, and the 
indications of an advance of rcenforcements, seem 
to indicate that he will give us another battle with 
all his available force. 

As I mentioned to you before, our ai'my has 
been very much reduced by casualties in the re- 
cent battles, and in my judgment all the rcen- 
forcements of old troops that can possibly be dis- 
pensed with around Washington and other places 
should be instantly pushed forward by rail to 
this army. A defeat at this juncture would be 
ruinous to our cause. I cannot think it possible 
that the enemy will bring any forces to bear upon 
Washington till after the question is decided 
here ; but if he should, troops can soon be sent 
back from this army by rail to reenforce the gar- 
rison there. 

The evidence I have that rcenforcements are 
coming to the rebel army consists in tlie fact that 
long columns of dust extending from Winchester 
to Charlestown and from Charlestown in this di- 
rection, and also troops moving this way, were 
seen last evening. This is corroborated by citi- 
zens. General Sumner with his corps and Wil- 
liams's (Banks's) occupies Harper's Ferry and 
the surrounding heights. I think he will be able 
to hold his position till rcenforcements arrive. 

G. B. McCl.F.I.LAN, 

Major-General. 
Major-General IIai.leck, 

Generul-in-Cliicf, Washington. 

On the twenty-seventh I made the following 
report : 



IlEADQnARTr.RS .\RMV OF TIIR POTOMAC, ( 

September 2T, ls6-.'— 10 a.m. ( 

All the information in my possession goes to 
prove that the main body of the enemy is con- 
centrated not far from Mar^insburgh, with some 
troops at Charlestown ; not many in Winches- 
ter. Their movements of late have been an ex- 
tension toward our right and beyond it. They 
are receiving rcenforcements in Winchester, main- 
ly, I think, of conscripts — perhaps entirely so. 

This army is not now in condition to under- 
take another campaign, nor to bring on another 
battle, unless great advantages are offered by 
some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military 
exigencies render it necessary. We arc greatly 
deficient in oflicers. Many of the old regiments 
are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regi- 
ments need instruction. Not a day should be 
lost in filling the old regiments — our main de- 
pendence — and in supplying vacancies among the 
officers by promotion. 

lly present purpose is to hold the army about 
as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and 
watching the river closely, intending to attack 
the enemy should he attempt to cross to this 
side. 

Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us tho 
great advantage of a secure debouche, but we 
cannot avail ourselves of it imtil the railroad 
bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise 
supply a greater number of troops than we now 
have on the Virginia side at that point. When 
the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in 
force, I purpose concentrating the army some- 
where near Harper's Ferry, and then acting ac- 
cording to circumstances, namely, moving on 
Winchester, if from the position and attitude of 
the enemy we are likely to gain a great advan- 
tage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable 
time to the organization of the army and instruc- 
tion of the new troops, preparatory to an advance 
on whatever line may be determined. In any 
event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send 
new regiments at once to the old corps, for pur- 
poses of instruction, and that the old regiments 
be filled at once. I have no fears as to an at- 
tack on Washington by the line of Manassas. 
Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not 
run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear 
while they have the garrison of Washington in 
their front. 

I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt 
in ^laryland should the river remain low for a 
great length of time, and should they receive 
considerable addition to their force. I would be 
glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. 
I am surprised that Sigcl's men should have been 
sent to AVestern Vii'ginia without my knowletigc. 
The last I heard from jon on the subject was 
that they were at my disposition. In tlie last 
battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly supe- 
rior to us in number, and it was only by very 
hard fighting that we gained the advantage wo 
did. As it was, the result was at one period 
very doubtful, and we had all we couM do to win 
the da^-. If the enemy receives considerable re- 



640 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



enforcements and we none, it is possible that I 
may have too much on my hands in tlie next 
battle. ^ly own view of the proper policy to be 
pursued is to retain in Washinj^'ton merely the 
force necessary to garrison it, and to send every 
thing else available to reGnforce this army. The 
railways give us the means of promptly rcenforc- 
ing Washington should it become necessary. If 
I am reenforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take 
mj' own course, I will hold mj'^self responsible 
for the safety of Washington. Several persons 
recently from Richmond say that there are no 
troops tliere except conscripts, and they few in 
number. I hope to give j'ou details as to late 
battles by this evening. I am about starting 
again for Harper's Ferry. G. B. McClkllan, 

Major-General Commandmg. 

Major-General IIalleck, 

General-in-Chief, AVashington. 

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and sup- 
plying the army I began at the earliest moment. 
The different corps were stationed along the river 
in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. 
The great extent of the river-front from near 
Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred 
and fifty miles,) together with the line of the Bal- 
timoi'e and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully 
watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the 
enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Vir- 
ginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning 
the enemy's positions and movements, were made 
frequently, so that our cavalry, which from the 
time we left Washington had performed the most 
laborious service, and had from the commence- 
ment been deficient in numbers, was found to- 
tally inadequate to the requirements of the army. 

This overwork has broken down the greater 
part of the horses ; disease had appeared among 
them, and but a very small portion of our origin- 
al cavalry force was fit for service. 

To such an extent had this arm become re- 
duced, that when General Stuart made his raid 
into Pennsylvania on the eleventh of October 
with two thousand men, I could only mount 
eight hundred men to follow him. 

Harper's Ferry was occcupicd on the twenty- 
second, and in order to prevent a catastrophe 
.similar to the one which had happened to Colo- 
nel Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Boli- 
var, and Loudon Heights to be strongly fortified. 
This was done as far as the tiioe and means at 
our disposal permitted. 

The main army of the enemy, during this time, 
remained in the vicinity of Ma;'tinsburgh and 
Bunker Hill, and occupied itself if) drafting and 
coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, 
forcibly taking their property, where it was not 
voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroy- 
ing railroads. 

On the first day of October, His Excellency the 
President honored the army of the Potomac with 
a visit and remained several days, during which 
he went through the different encamjiments, re- 
viewed the troops, and went over the battle- 
fields of South-Mountain and Antietam. I had 
the opportunity during this visit to describe to 



him the operations of the army since the time it 
left Washington, and gave him my reasons for 
not following the enemy after he crossed the Po- 
tomac. 

On the fifth of October, the division of Gen- 
eral Cox (about five thousand men ) was ordered 
from my command to Western Virginia. 

On the seventh of October I received the fol- 
lowing telegram : 

WASnnJGToy, D. C, October 6, 1S62. 
I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : 
The President directs that j'ou cross the Poto- 
mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him 
south. Your army must move now, while the 
roads are good. If you cross the river between 
the enemy and Washington, and cover the lattei 
bjr your operation, you can be reenforced with 
thirtj'' thousand men. If you move up the val- 
ley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve 
or fifteen thousand can be sent you. The Presi- 
dent advises the interior line between Washing- 
ton and the enemy, but does not order it. He 
is very desirous that your army move as soon as 
possible. You will immediately report what line 
you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river ; 
also to what point the reenforcements are to bo 
sent. It is necessary that the plan of your op- 
erations be positively determined on, before or- 
ders are given for building bridges and repairing 
railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secre- 
tary of War and the General-in-Chief fully con- 
cur with the President in these instructions. 
H. W. Haij.eciv, 

Major-General McClELLAN. Generul-in-Cliiet 

At this time General Averill, with the greater 
part of our efficient cavalry, was in the vicinity 
of Cumberland, and General Kelly, the com- 
manding officer, had that day reported that a 
large force of the enemy was advancing on Colo- 
nel Campbell, at Saint John's River. This obliged 
me to order General Averill to proceed with his 
force to the support of Colonel Campbell, which 
delayed his return to the army for several days. 

On the tenth of October, Stuart crossed the 
river at McCoy's Ferry, with two thousand cav- 
alry and a battery of horse artillery, on liis raid 
into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it 
necessary to use our cavalry against him. This 
exhausting service completely broke down nearly 
all of our cavalry horses, and rendered a remount 
absolutely in'llipensable before we could advance 
on the eneni}'. 

The following were the dispositions of troops 
made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid : 

General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the 
Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly 
down upon tlie north side of the river, with all 
his disposable cavalry, using every exertion to 
get upon the trail of the enemy, and follow it up 
vigorously. 

General Pleasanton, with the remaining cav- 
alry force, was ordered to take the road by Cave- 
town, Harmon's Gap, and Mechanicsville, and 
cut off the retreat of the enemy should he make 
for any of the fords belovr the position of the 



DOCUMENTS. 



641 



main army. His orders were to pursue tliem 
with the utmost rapidity, not to spare his men 
or horses, and to destroy or capture them if pos- 
sible. 

General Crook, at that time commandin.c; Cox's 
division, at Hancock, en route for Western Vir- 
ginia, was ordered to lialt, place his men in cars, 
and remain in readiness to move to any point 
above should the enemy return in that direction, 
keeping his scouts well out on all the roads lead- 
ing from the direction of Chambersburgh to the 
Uj)per Potomac. 

The other commanders between Hancock and 
Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant 
watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to pre- 
vent the escape of the rebels within these limits. 

General Burnside was ordered to send two bri- 
gades to the Monocacy Crossing, there to remain 
in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any 
point on the railroad to which Stuart might be 
aiming, while Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was 
directed to keep his lancers scouting on tlie ap- 
proaches from Chambersburgb, so as to give 
timely notice to the commander of the two bri- 
gades at the Monocacy Crossing. 

General Stoneman, whose headquarters were 
then at Poolesville, occupying with his division 
the different fords on the river below the mouth 
of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his cav- 
alry well out on the approaches from the direc- 
tion of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass 
his troops at any point where the enemy might 
attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. 
He was informed of General Pleasanton's move- 
ments. 

After the orders were given for covering all 
the fords upon the river, I-did not think it possi- 
ble for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the 
capture or destruction of his entire force was 
perfectly certain ; but owing to the foct that my 
orders were not in all cases carried out as I ex- 
pected, he effected his escape into Virginia with- 
out much loss. 

The troops sent by General Burnside to the 
Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving 
the necessary orders to the commander, instead 
of remaining at the railroad crossing, as I di- 
rected, marched four miles into Frederick, and 
there remained until after Stuart had passed the 
railroad, only six miles below, near which point 
it was said he halted for breakfast. 

General Pleasanton ascertained, after his ar- 
rival at Mechanicsvillc, that the enemy were only 
about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty re- 
treat toward the mouth of the Jlonocacy. He 
pushed on vigorously, and, near its mouth, over- 
took them with a part of his force, having march- 
ed sevent3--eight miles in twenty-four hours, and 
having left many of his horses broken down upon 
the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, 
and the firing continued for several hours, dur- 
ing which time he states that he received the 
support of a small portion of General Stoneman's 
command, not sufficient to inflict any material 
damage upon the enemy. 

General Stoneman reports that, in accordance 



with his instructions, he gave all necessary or- 
ders for intercepting the return of the rebels, and 
Colonel Staples, commanding one of his brigades, 
states that he sent two regiments of infontry to 
the mouth of the Jlonocacy, and one regiment 
to White's Ford; that on "the morning of the 
twelfth, about ten o'clock, he, hj General Stone- 
man's order, marched the remaining three regi- 
ments of his command from Poolesville toward 
the mouth of the Monocacy ; that before getting 
into action he was relieved by General Wanl, 
who states that he reported to General Pleasan- 
ton with his command, while the enemy was 
crossing the river, and was informed by him 
(General Pleasanton) that he was too late, and 
nothing could be done then. 

General Pleasanton, in his report of this affair, 
says : " It was at this time that Colonel Ward 
reported to me from General Stoneman's division, 
with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, 
and a section of artillerj-. I told him that his 
command could be of no use, as the enemy had 
then crossed the river. These are the only 
troops, that I knew of, that were in that vicinity, 
and this was the first intimation I received that 
any troops were endeavoring to assist me in cap- 
turing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the 
enemy from crossing at the mouth of the Mono- 
cacy, and drove him to White's Ford, three miles 
below. Had White's Ford been occupied by any 
force of ours previous to the time of tlic occupa- 
tion by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole 
force would have been certain and inevitable. 
With my small force, which did not exceed one 
fourth of the enemy's, it was not practicable for 
me to occupy that ford while the enemy was in 
front." 

It would seem from the report of General 
Stoneman, tliat the disposition he made of his 
troops, previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good 
one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth 
of the Monocacy, and two regiments at White's 
Ford, the latter in the very place whei-e the cross- 
ing was made, and the former only three miles 
ofi-' with a reserve of three regiments at Pooles- 
ville, some six miles distant. General Pleasan- 
ton's report shows that from the time the firing 
commenced until the enemy were across the river 
was about four and a half hours. General Stone- 
man states that he started the reserve from Pooles- 
ville at about nine o'clock, but it appears, from 
the report of General Pleasanton, that it did not 
reach him until half-past one. 

At the time I received the order of October 
sixth, to cross the river and attack the enemy, 
the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a 
large part of our troops were in want of shoes, 
blankets, and other indispensable articles of cloth- 
ing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been 
made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior 
to that date, to relit the army with clothing, as 
well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel 
Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster, who believed that 
the necessary articles could be supplied in about 
three days. Orders were immediately issued to 
the ditlerent commanders who had not already 



642 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



sent in their requisition?;, to do so at once, and all 
the necessary steps were forthwith taken b}^ me 
to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The 
requisitions were forwarded to the proper depart- 
ment at AVashington, and I expected that the ar- 
ticles would reach our depots during the three 
days specified ; but day after day elapsed, and 
only a small portion of the clothing ariived. 
Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from 
\ the quartermasters that they might expect to re- 
ceive their supplies at certain dates, sent the 
trains for them, which, after waiting, were com- 
pelled to return emptj'. Several instances oc- 
curred where these trains went back and forth 
from the camps to the depots, as often as four or 
five different times, without receiving their sup- 
plies, and I was informed by one corps com- 
mander that his wagon train had travelled over 
one hundred and fifty miles, to and from the de- 
pots, before he succeeded in obtaining his cloth- 
ing. 

The corps of General Franklin did not get its 
clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, 
and was moving into Virginia. General Iley- 
nolds's corps was delayed a day at Berlin, to 
complete its supplies, and General Porter only 
completed his on reaching the vicinity of Har- 
per's Ferry. 

I made every exertion in my power, and my 
quartermasters did the same, to have these sup- 
plies hurried forward rapidly ; and I was repeat- 
edly told that they had filled the requisitions at 
Washington, and that the supplies had been for- 
warded. But they did not come to us, and of 
course were inaccessible to the a.-m}''. I did not 
fail to make frequent representation of this con- 
dition of things to the General-in-Chief, and it 
appears that he referred the matter to the Quar- 
termaster-General, who constantly replied that 
the supplies had been promptly ordered. Not- 
withstanding this, they did not reach our depots. 

The following extracts are from telegrams upon 

this subject: 

Headquarters Armt of TtiE Potomac, | 
October 11, 1SC2— 9 a.m. f 

"We have been making every effort to get sup- 
plies of clothing for this army, and Colonel In- 
galls has received advices that it has been for- 
warded by railroad ; but, owing to bad manage- 
ment on the roads, or from some other cause, it 
comes in very slowly, and it will take a much 
longer time than was anticipated to get articles 
that are absolutely indispensable to the armj-, 
unless the railroad managers forward supplies 
more rapidly. George B. McClellan. 

Major-General. 

Major-Gencrai II. W. IIalt.eck, 

General-in-Chief, Washington. 

Headquaktkhs Army of tub Potomac, ( 
October 11, 1862. ) 

I am compelled again to call your attention to 
the great deticicncy of shoes, and other indis- 
pensable articles of clothing, that still exist in 
some of the corps in this army. Upon the as- 
surances of the Chief Quartermaster, who based 



his calculation upon information received from 
"Washington, that clothing would be forwarded 
at certain times, corps commanders sent their 
wagons to Ilagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it 
It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet 
arrived. Unless some measures are taken to in- 
sure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, 
there will necessarily be a corresponding delay 
in getting the army ready to move, as the men 
cannot march without shoes. Every thing has 
been done that can be done at these headquar- 
ters to accomplish the desired result. 

George B. McCleli.ax, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General H. "VV. Hali.eck, 

Commander-in-Chief, Washington. 

IIeadquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
October 15, 1S62— 7 p.m. ) 

I am using every possible exertion to get this 
army ready to move. It was only j'esterday that 
a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Ha- 
gerstown. It is being issued to the troops as 
rapidly as possible. George B. McClellan, 

Major-General. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, J 
October 15, 1S62— 7.30 p.m. ) 
General Franklin reports that there is by no 
means as much clothing as was called for at 
Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had better 
have additional supplies, especially of sho-^s, for- 
warded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. 

R. B. Makcv, 

Chief of Staff. 

Colonel R. Ingalls, 

Care of Colonel Kucker, Quartermaster, Washington. 



Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
October 



Potomac, ) 
10, 1SG2. (■ 

General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as fol- 
lows : " My quartermaster reports that there are 
no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at Pla- 
gerstown. He was able to procure only a com- 
plete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few 
socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves man}'- of 
the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions 
call for five thousand two hundred and fifty-five 
pairs of shoes." 

Please push the shoes and stockings up to 
Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. 

R. B. Marcy, 

Chief of Staff. 
Colonel R. Ixgalls, 

Care of Colonel Rucker, Quartermaster, Washington. 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I 
Camp near K.noxville, Maryla.nd, October 9, 1862. j 

You did right in sending clothing to Harper's 
Ferrj^ You will not be able to send too much 
or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, can- 
teens, etc., very much. Rdfus Ingalls, 

Lieutenant-Coionel and Aid-de-Carap, Chief Quartermaster. 

Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, 

Depot Quartermaster, Washington. 

Headqpartp.rs Army op the Potomac, I 
Camp near K.no.willb, Maryland, October 10, 1S62. j" 

vShi))nients to Hagerstown must be made direct 
through, to avoid the contemptible delays at Uar- 



DOCUMENTS. 



643 



risburgh. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to 
send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suf- 
fering and impatience are excessive. 

RUFUS IXGALLS, 
Lieutenant-Colonel and Ald-de-Camp, Cliief Quartermuster. 

Captain AuGfSTUs Boyd. 

Quartermaster, Philadelphia. 

Hradquarters Army op thk Potovvc, I 
Camp near Knoxville, October 13, 1SG2. ( 

Has the clothing arrived yet? If not, do 3-011 
know M-here it is? What clothing was taken by 
the rebels at Chambersburgh ? Did they cap- 
ture any property that was en route to you? 
Have we not got clothing at Ilarrisburgh ? Send 
an agent over the road to obtain information, and 
hurry up the supplies. Reply at once, 

RuFUS TxCtALLS, 
Lieutenant-Colonel and Aid-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. 

Captain Geok<;e \\'. Weeks, 

Depot Quartermaster, Hagerstown. 

Sharpsbdrgh, October 15, 1S62. 

I have just returned from Hagcrstown, where 
I have been for the clothing for the corps. 
There was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, 
and a few uniform coats and socks. There were 
not any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter-tents. 
Will you please tell me where and when the bal- 
ance can be had^? Shall I send to Harper's Ferry 
for them to-morrow ? The corps surgeon has 
just made a requisition for forty-five hospital- 
tents. There are none at liagerstown. Will you 
please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's 
Ferry ? Fieldino Lowkv, 

General IngalLS. Captain and Quartermaster 

flAGERSTOw.v, October 15, 1S62. 
I want at least ten thousand (10,000) suits of 
clothing in addition to what I have received. It 
should be here now. G. W. Weeks, 

General IngaLLS, Assistant Quartermaster. 

Quartermaster. 

Harper's Ferry, October 22, 1SC2. 
We have bootees, twelve thousand; great-coats, 
four thousand; drawers and shirts are gone; 
blankets and stockings nearly so ; fifteen thou- 
sand each of these four articles are wanted. 

Alex. Bliss, 
General Ivgalls Captain and Assistant Quartermaster. 
Ciiief Quartermaster, etc. 

McClELUN'S HRATiQUtRTEnS, I 

October 24, I&G2— 11 a.m. ( 

Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Fer- 
ry, ten thousand blankets, twelve thousand caps, 
five thousand overcoats, ten thousand pairs boot- 
ees, two thousand pairs artillery and cavalry boot.s, 
fifteen thousand pairs stockings, iifteen thousand 
drawers, and fifteen thousand pants. The cloth- 
ing arrives slowly. Can it not be hurried along 
faster ? May I ask you IjO obtain authority for 
this shipment ? Rufi's Ixgalls, , 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Aid-de-Camp, Ciiicf Quartermaster. 

Captain 1). G. Tuo.AfAS, 

Military Storekeeper, Washington. 

Hagerstow.v, October 80. 
Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken 
by rebels. Shall I supply Franklin, and retain 



portions for Porter and Reynolds until called for ? 

G. AV. AVi:ek.s, 

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster. 

Colonel Ingalls. 

The following statement, taken from a report 
of the Ciiicf Quartermaster with the army, will 
show what progress was made in supplying the 
army with clothing from the first of September 
to the date of crossing the Potomac on the thirty- 
first of October, and that a greater part of the 
clothing did not reach our depots until after the 
fourteenth of October: (See table, page 044.) 

Colonel Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, in his re- 
port upon this subject, says : 

"There was great delay in receiving our cloth- 
ing. The orders were promptly given by me and 
approved by General Meigs, but the roads v.ere 
slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland 
Valley road. 

" For instance, clothing ordered to liagerstown 
on the seventh October for the corps of Frank- 
lin, Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive until 
about the eighteenth, and by that time, of course, 
there were increased wants and changes in posi- 
tion of troops. The clothing of Sumner arrived 
in great quantities near the last of October, al- 
most too late for issue, as the army was crossing 
into Virginia. AVe finally left fifty thousand suits 
at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived, 
and partly in store." 

The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force 
have already been recited. The difficulty in get- 
ting new supplies from the usual sources led me 
to apply for and obtain authority for the cavalry 
and artillery oGiccrs to purchase their own horses. 
The following are the telegrams and letters on this 
subject: 

nKADQUAUTERS ArMT OF THK PoTOMAC, ) 

October 12, 1S02— 12.4o p.il. ) 

It is absolutely necessary that some energetic 
means be taken to supply the cavaliy of this army 
with remount horses. The present rate of supply 
is (1050) one thousand and fifty per week for tiie 
entire army here and in front of AVashington. 
From this number the artillery draw for their 
batteries. George B. McClellan, 

Major-Gcneral Commanuing. 

Major-General IIalleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

The General-in-Chief, in a letter to me dated 
AVashington, D. C, October fourteenth, 18(!2, re- 
plies to this despatch in the following language: 

" I have caused the matters complained of in 
your telegrams of the eleventh and twelith to bo 
investigated. 

" In regard to horses, you say that the present 
rate of supply is only one hundred and fifty per 
week for the entire army here and in front of 
AVashington. I find from the records that the 
issues for the last six weeks have been eight thou- 
sand seven hundred and fifty-four, making an av- 
erage per week of one thousand four hundred and 
fifty-nine. 

'"'One thousand and fifty (lU.JO) is the number 



644 



REBELLION RECORD, 18G2-63. 



stated in the original despatch, now in my pos- 
session ; and as not only figures were used, but 
the number was written out in full, I can hardly 



sec how it is possible for the telegraphic operator 
to have made a mi.stalie in the ti'ansmissionof the 
message. 



Statement of Clothing and Equipage received at the different depots of the Army of the Potomac, 
from Se/demler 1, 1803, to October 31, 18()2. 





















•6 
a 
















.2 








3 






Eece^veJ at the depot— 




m 












t.; 


E, 




3 








m 


^ 


"^ 


ri 


"to 


" 


- 












^ 




>. 


c 


_ 




u 










to 


u 




"5 

> 

C3 




a 


1 


fe 


o 
o 






P 




UJ 


Ul 


o 


Q 


^ 




B 




m 


From Sent?mbpr 1 to October 6, 


10,700 


4.000 


6,200 


4,190 


3,000 


6,000 


6.200 


6,000 


4,200 


4,200 


11,100 


rroni ^ctober 6 to October 15, 


17,000 


11,000 


2-2,025 




500 


10,2.'l 


1^,325 


12,989 


1.000 


6,000 


3,000 


From Ootob'M- 15 to October L'5, 


40,000 


19,500 


65,'200 




l,'2oO 


9,000 


1S,ST6 


5,0!I0 


2,500 


3,600 


9,000 


From October 115 to October 31, 


30,000 




80,000 




1,500 


8,00S 


2,200 


9,900 


5,000 


20,040 




Total, 


9;, TOO 


31,500 


123,4^5 


4,190 


6,250 


28,229 


45,301 


83,8S9 


12,700 


33,S40 


23,100 







Statement 


of Clothing 


and Equipage recei 


ycfZ, etc. — Continued. 






KecclTed at tlie depot — 


P. 

a 

o 


c 


o 

> 
O 


i 

< 


"5 
5 


3 
O 

s 
o 

1 

O 




2 

a 




(§ 


Knit shirts. 


From September 1 to October 6, . . . 

From O.-t'iber (> to October 15 

From October 15 to October 25,.... 
From October 25 to October 31 , 


799 
1.302 
1,S94 


2,030 
2,100 
4,500 


3.500 
12,000 
14,770 


1,200 

500 

1,750 

1,000 


20 

6,510 
4,3S4 


],"00 

875 
8,500 
2,015 


2,900 
7,000 


2 000 
12,000 
22,500 

7,500 


2,000 

9,500 

39,620 

25,000 


2,000 

7,OOU 

52,900 


2,655 

2,424 

11,595 


Total, 


8,995 


8,630 


80,270 


4,450 


10,904 


7,590 


9,200 


44,060 


70,120 


61,900 


16,674 







IlEiDQC.iKTERS ARMT OF TUB POTOMAC, 



October 14, 1SG2— 7 p.m. 



'( 



With my small cavalry force it is impossible for 
me to watch the line of the Potomac properly, or 
even make the reconnoissances that are necessary 
for our movements. This makes it necessaiy for 
me to weaken my line very much, by extending 
the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This 
will continue until the river rises, and it will be 
next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry 
raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morn- 
ing, should be largely and immediately increased, 
under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river, 
<jr advance on the enemy, or both. 

Geokge B. McClellan, 

Major-tieneral. 
Mnjor-General II. W. Halleck, 

Comraander-in-Chief. 

The following is an extract from the official re- 
port of Colonel Ingalls: 

" Immediatel v after the battle of Antietam efforts 
were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and 
horses. Large re(iuisitions were prepared and 
sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large 
numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on 



the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms 
were deficient when they left "Washington. A 
most violent and destructive disease made its ap- 
pearance at this time, which put nearly four thou- 
sand animals out of service. Horses reported 
perfectly well one day would be dead lame the 
next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would 
end, or what number would cover the loss. They 
were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one 
seemed able to account for the appearance of this 
disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in 
time, but could not he iDorlced. I made applica- 
tion to send West and purchase horses at once, 
but it was refused, on the ground that the out- 
standing contracts provided for enough, Init the]/ 
icere not delivered sufficiently fast, nor in suffi- 
cient numbers, until late in October and early in 
November. I was authorized to buy two thou- 
sand five hundred late in October, but the deliv- 
ery was not completed until in November, after 
we had reached Warrenton." 

In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 
fourteenth of October, and addressed to the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief, it is stated : " There have been is- 
sued, therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since 
the battles in front of Washington, to replace 



DOCr.MKXTS. 



645 



losses, (9254) nine thousand two hundred and 
fifty-four hor-;es." 

What number of horses were sent to General 
Pope before liis return to AVashin.2:ton, •! have no 
means of determining ; but the followin-^ state- 
ment niade upon mj' order, by the Chief Quarter- 
master with the army, and who had incans for 
gaining accurate information, force upon my mind 
the conclusion that the Quartermaster-Cieneral 
was in error : 



nEADQUAHTKR.S ArMY OF THE POTOMAC, 

Chief Quartermaster's 
October 31 



roMAC, I 
Office, V 
, lS6i ) 



Horses purchased since September sixth, 
18r)'2, by Colonel Ingalls, Chief Quarter- 
master, and issued to the forces under the 
immediate command of Major-General 
George Ti. McClellan, 1200 

Issued and turned over to the above force 
by Captain J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter- 
master, (in Wasliington,) 2261 

Issued to forces at and near Washington 
which have since joined the command, . . 352 

Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls and is- 
sued and turned over by Captain Dana to 
the forces in this immediate command, . . .3813 

Issued by Captain J. J. Dana, Assistant 
Quartermaster, to the forces in the vicin- 
ity of Washington, 33G3 

Grand total purchased by Colonel R. In- 
galls, Chief Quartermaster, and issued and 
turned over by Captain J. J. Dana, As- 
sistant Quartermaster, to the entire army 
of the Potomac and the forces around 
Washington, 7176 

About three thousand horses have been turned 
over to the Quartermaster's department by offi- 
cers as unfit for service ; nearly one thousand 
five hun Ired should now be turned over also, 
being wo.-ii out and diseased. 

Respectfully submitted. Fi4En. Myeks, 

Lieutenant-Colonel and QuaTtermasler. 

This official statement, made up from the re- 
ports of the quartermasters who received and 
distributed the horses, exhibits the true state of 
the case, and gives the total number of horses 
received by the army of the Potomac, and the 
troops around Washington, during a period of 
eight weeks as (7176) seven thousand one hun- 
dred and seventy-six, or (2078) two thousand 
and seventy-eight less than the number stated 
by the Quartermaster-General. 

Supposing thiit (1500) one thousand five hun- 
dred were issued to the army under General 
Pope previous to its return to Washington, as 
General Meigs states, there would still remain 
(578) five hundred and seventy-eight horses 
which he does not account for. 

The letter of the General-in-Chief to the Sec- 
retary of War on the twenty-eighth of October, 
and the letter of General ileigs to the General- 
in-Chief on the fourteenth of October, convey 
the impression that, upon my repeated applica- 



tions for cavalry and artillery horses for the army 
of tlie Potomac, I had received a much greater 
nunibn- tlian was really the case. 

It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report 
that, of all the horses alluded to by General 
Meigs, only (3813) three thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen came to the army with which 1 was 
ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of 
course the remainder did not in the slightest de- 
gree contribute to the efficiency of the cavalry or 
artillery of the army with which I was to cross 
the river. Neither did they in the least facilitate 
any preparations for carrying out the order to 
advance upon the enemy, as tho' Gencral-in- 
Chicf's letter might seem to imply. 

During the same period that we were receiving 
the horses alluded Ho, about (3000) three thou- 
sand of our old stock were turned into the (Quar- 
termaster's department, and one thousand five 
hundred more reported as in such condition that 
they ought to be turned in as ynfit for service ; 
thus leaving the active army some seven hundred 
short of the number required to make good ex- 
isting deficiencies, to say nothing of providing 
remounts for men whose horses had died or been 
killed during the campaign and those previously 
dismounted. Notwithstanding all the efforts 
made to obtain a remount, there were, after de- 
ducting the force engaged in picketing the river, 
but about a thousand serviceable cavalry horses 
on the twenty-first day of October. 

In a letter dated October fourteenth, 18G2, the 
General-in-Chief says : 

" It is also reported to me that the number of 
animals with your army in the field is about 
thirt3^-one thousand. It is believed that your 
present proportion of cavalry and of animals 
is much larger than that of any other of our 
armies." 

What number of animals other armies l)ad 1 
am not prepared to say, but militai-y men in 
European armies have been of the o])inion th:it 
an armj'' to be eflicicnt, while carrying on active 
operations in the field, should have a cavalry 
force equal in numbers to from one sixth to one 
fourth of the infantry force. My cavaliy did not 
amount to one twentieth part of the army, and 
hence the necessity of giving every one of my 
cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. 

Cavalry maybe said to constitute the antennm 
of an aimj'. It scouts all the roads in fi'ont, on 
the flanks and in the rear of the advancing col- 
umns, and constantly feels the cnemj'. The 
amount of labor falling on this arm during the 
Maryland campaign was excessive. 

To persons not familiar with the movements 
of troops, and the amount of transportation re- 
quired for a large army marching away fi-om 
water or railroad communications, the nunilcr 
of animals mentioned by the General-in-Chief 
may have appeared unnecessarily large ; but to 
a military man, who takes the trouble to enter 
into an accurate and detailed computation of the 
number of pounds ol subsistence and forage re- 
quired for such an army as that of tiie I'otomac, 
it will be seen that the thirty-one thousand aai 



646 



REBELLION" RECORD, lsr.2-63. 



mals were considerably less than was absolutely 
necessary to an advance. 

As we were required to move through a coun- 
try which could not be depended upon for any 
of our supplies, it became necessary to transport 
everything in wagons, and to be prepared for all 
emergencies. I did not consider it .safe to leave 
the river without subsistence and forage for ten 
days. 

The ofTicial returns of that date show the ag- 
gregate strength of the army for duty to have l)cen 
about one hundred and ten thousand men of all 
arms. This did not include teamsters, citizens, 
employes, oflicers' servants, etc., amounting to 
some twelve thousand, which gave a total of one 
hundred and twenty-two thousand men. 

The subsistence alone of this army for ten 
da}'^ required for its transportation one thousand 
eight hundred and thirty wagons at two thou- 
sand pounds to the wagon, and ten thousand 
nine hundred and eighty animals. 

Our cavalry horses at that time amounted to 
five thousand and forty-six, and our artillery 
horses to six thousand eight hundred and thirty- 
six. 

To transport full forage for these twenty-two 
thou.sand eight hundred and sixty-two animals 
for ten days required seventeen thousand eight 
hundred and thirty-two additional animals ; and 
this forage would only supply the entire num- 
ber (fortjr thousand six hundred and ninety-four) 
of animals with a small fraction over half allow- 
ance for the t'm J specified. 

It will be ob-ierved that this estimate does not 
embrace the animals necessary to transport quar- 
termasters' supplies, baggage, camp equipage, 
ambulances, reserve ammunition, foi'age for otli- 
cers' horses, etc., which would greatly augment 
the necessary transportation. 

It may very truly be said that we did make 
the march with the means at our disposal, but it 
will be remembered that we met with no serious 
opposition from the enemy; neither did we en- 
counter delays from anj^ other cause. The roads 
were in excellent condition, and the troops 
marched with the most commendable order and 
celerity. 

If we had met "with a determined resistance 
from the enemy, and our progress had been very 
much retarded thereby, we would have consumed 
our supplies before tiiey could have been renew- 
ed. A proper estimate of my responsibilities as 
tlie Co\nmander of that .army did not justify me 
in basing my preparations for the expedition 
upon the supposition that I was to have an un- 
interrupted march. On the contrary, it was my 
duty to be prepared for all emergencies ; and not 
the least important of my responsil)ilities was 
the duty of making ample provision for supplying 
my men and animals with rations and forage. 

Knowing the solicitude of the I'resident for an 
early movement, and sharing with him fully his 
anxiety for prompt action, on the twenty-first of 
October I telegraphed to the General-in-Ohiof as 
follows • 



IIeadqcarteks Army of tiik Potomac, \_ 
October 21, lSi;2. ) 

Since the receipt of the President's order to 
move on the enemy, I have been making every 
exertion to get this army supplied with clothing 
absolutely necessary for marching. 

Thi.s, I am happy to say, is now nearly accom- 
plished. I have also, during the same time, re- 
peatedly urged upon you the importance of sup- 
jilying cavalry and artillery horses to replace 
those broken down by hard service, and steps 
have been taken to insure a prompt delivery. 

Our cavalry, even when well supplied with 
horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of 
the enemy, but m efficiency has proved itself 
superior. So forcibly has this been impressed 
upon our old regiments by repeated successe.s, 
that the men are fully persuaded that they arc 
equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry. 

Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in 
picketing the river, I have not at present over 
about one thousand (1000) horses for service. 
Officers have been sent in various directions to 
purchase liorses, and I expect them soon. AVith- 
out more cavalry horses our communications, 
from the moment we march, would be at the 
mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, 
and it would not be possible for us to cover our 
flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary infor- 
mation of the position and movements of the en- 
emy, in such a way as to insure success. My 
experience has shown the necessity of a large 
and efficient cavalry force. 

Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave 
to ask whether the President desires me to march 
on the enemy at once, or to await the reception 
of the new horses, every possible step having 
been taken to insure their prompt arrival. 

Oeo. B. McCleli.an, 

Miijor-General Conimauding. 

Major-Genoral H. W. Hali.eck, 

General-in-Chief, Wasliington. 

On the same day General Ilalleck replied as 
follows : 

WAsniNGTON, October 21, 1SG2 — 3 p.m. 

Your telegram of twelve m. has been submitted 
to the President. He directs me to say that ho 
has no change to make in his order of the sixth 
instant. 

If you have not been, and are not now, in con- 
dition to obey it, you will be able to show such 
want of ability. The President does not expect 
impossibilities ; but he is very anxious that all t'lis 
good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. 
Telegraph when you will move, and on wnat 
lines you propose to march. 

II. W. IIalleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General Geo. B. McOlellan. 

From the tenor of this despatch I conceived 
that it was left for my judgment to decide whether 
or not it was possible to move with safety to the 
army at that time ; and this responsibility I ex- 
ercised with the more confidence in view of the 
strong assurances of his trust in me, as commandei 



DOCUMENTS. 



647 



of that army, with which the President had seen 
lit to honor me during his h\st visit. 

The cavalry requirements, without which an 
advance would have been in the highest degree 
injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. 

The country before us was an enemy's country, 
where the inhabitants furnished to the enemy 
every possible assistance; providing food for men 
and forage for animals, giving all information 
concerning our movements, and rendering every 
aid in their power to the enemy's cause. 

It was manifest that we should find it, as we 
subsequently did, a hostile district, where we 
could derive no aid from the inhabitants that 
would justify dispensing with the active cooper- 
ation of an efficient cavalry force. Accordingly 
I fixed upon the first of November as the earliest 
date at which the forward movement could well 
be commenced. 

The General-in-Chief, in a letter to the Secre- 
tary of War, on the twenty-eighth of October, 
says : " In my opinion, there has been no such 
want of supplies in the army under General Mc- 
Clellan as to prevent his compliance with the 
orders to advance against the enemy." 

Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed by 
such high authority, I am compelled to saj'' again 
that the delay in the reception of necessary sup- 
plies up to that date had left the army in a con- 
dition totally unfit to advance against the ene- 
my — that an advance, under the existing cir- 
cumstances, would, in my judgment, have been 
attended with the highest degree of peril, with 
great suffering and sickness among the men, and 
with imminent danger of being cut off from our 
supplies by the superior cavalry force of the en- 
emy, and with no reasonable prospect of gaining 
any advantage over him. 

I dismiss this subject with the remark that I 
have found it impossible to resist the force of my 
own convictions, that the commander of an army 
who, from the time of its organization, has for 
eighteen months been in constant communica- 
tion with its officers and men, the greater part 
of the time engaged in active service in the field, 
and who has exercised this command in many 
battles, must certainly be considered competent 
to determine whether his army is in proper con- 
dition to advance on the enemy or not ; and he 
must necessarily possess greater facilities for 
forming a correct judgifient in regard to the 
wants of his men, and the condition of his sup- 
plies, than tlie General-in-Chief in his office at 
Wasliington City. The movement from Wash- 
ington into Maryland, which culminated in the 
battles of South-Mountain and Antietam, was not 
a part of an offensive campaign, with the object 
of the invasion of the enemy's territory and an 
attack upon his capital, but was defensive in its 
purposes, although offensive in its character, and 
would be technically called a " defensive-ofiensive 
campaign." 

It was xmdertaken at a time when our army 
had experienced severe defeats, and its object 
was to preserve the national capital and Balti- 



more, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and 
to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These pur- 
poses were fully and finally accomplished by the 
battle of Antietam, which brought the army of 
the Potomac into what might be termed an acci- 
dental position on the Upper Potomac. 

Having gained the immediate object of tho 
campaign, the first thing to be done was to insure 
Maryland from a return of the enemy ; the sec- 
ond, to prepare our own army, exhausted by a 
series of severe battles, destitute to a great ex- 
tent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery 
and cavalry horses, for a definite offensive moTc- 
ment, and to determine upon the line of opera- 
tions for a further advance. 

At the time of the battle of Antietam the Po- 
tomac was very low, and presented a compara- 
tively weak line of defence unless watched by 
large masses of troops. 

The reoccupation of Harper's Ferry, and the 
disposition of troops above that point, rendered 
the line of the Potomac secure against every 
thing except cavalry raids. No time was lost in 
placing the army in proper condition for an ad- 
vance, and the circumstances which caused the 
delay after the battle of Antietam have been fully 
enumerated elsewhere. 

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicini- 
ty as a proper base of operations for a movement 
upon Richmond. I still considered the line of 
the Peninsula as the true approach, but, for ob- 
vious reasons, did not make any proposal to re- 
turn to it. 

On the sixth of October, as stated above, I was 
ordered by the President, through his General- 
in-Chief, to cross the Potomac and give battle 
to the enemy, or drive him south. Two lines 
were presented for my choice : 

First. Up the valley of the Shenandoah, in 
which case I was to have twelve thousand to 
fifteen thousand additional troops. 

Second. To cross between the enemy and AVash- 
ington — that is, east of the Blue Kidge — in which 
event I was to be rcenforced with thirty thou- 
sand men. 

At first, I determined to adopt the line of the 
Shenandoah, for these reasons : The Harper's Fer- 
ry and Winchester Railroad and the various turn- 
pikes converging upon Winchester afforded su- 
perior facilities for supplies. Our cavalry being 
weak, this line of connuunication could be more 
easily protected. There was no advantage in in- 
terposing at that time the Blue Ridge and the 
Shenandoah between the enemy and myself 

At the period in question the Potomac was still 
very low, and I apprehended that, if I crossed the 
river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy would 
promptly check the movement by recrossing into 
Maryland, at the same time covering his rear by 
occupying in strong force the passes leading 
through the Blue Ridge fi'om the south-east into 
the Shenandoah Valley. 

I anticipated, as the result of the first course, 
that Lee would fight me near Winchester, if he 
could do so under favorable circumstances ; or 



648 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



else that he would abandon the Lower Shenan- 
doah, and leave the army of the Potomac free to 
act upon some other line of operations. 

If he abandoned the Shenandoah, he would 
naturally fall back upon his railway communica- 
tions. I have since been confirmed in the belief 
that, if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's 
Ferry in the early part of October, General Lee 
would have recrossed into Maryland. 

As above explained, the army was not in con- 
dition to move until late in October, and in the 
mean time circumstances had changed. 

The period had arrived when a sudden and 
great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at 
any moment ; the season of bad roads and diffi- 
cult movements was approaching, which would 
naturally deter the enemy from exposing himself 
very far from his base, and his movements all 
appeared to indicate a falling back from the river 
toward his supplies. Under these circumstances, 
I felt at liberty to disregard the possibility of 
the enemy's recrossing the Potomac, and deter- 
mined to select the line east of the Blue Ridge, 
feeling convinced that it would secure me the 
largest accession of force, and the most cordial 
support of the President, whose views, from the 
beginning, wore in favor of that line. 

The subject of the defence of the line of the 
Upper Potomac, after the advance of the main 
army, had long occupied my attention. I desired 
to place Harper's Ferry and its dependencies in 
a strong state of defence, and frequently address- 
ed the General-in-Chief upon the subject of the 
erection of field-works and permanent bridges 
there, asking for the funds necessary to accom- 
plish the purpose. Although I did my best to 
explain, as clearly as I was able, that I did not 
wish to erect permanent works of masonry, and 
that neither the works nor the permanent bridges 
had any reference to the advance of the army, 
but solely to the permanent occupation of Har- 
per's Ferry, I could never make the General-in- 
Chief understand my wishes, but was refused the 
funds necessary to erect the field-works, on the 
ground that there was no appropriation for the 
erection of permanent fortifications ; and was not 
allowed to build the permanent bridge, on the 
ground that the main army could not be delayed 
in its movements until its completion. 

Of course I never thought of delaying the ad- 
vance of the army for that purpose, and so stated 
repeatedly. On the twenty-fifth of October I sent 
to the General-in-Chief the following telegram : 

Headqcabters Army of the Potomac, > 
October 25, 1802—10.45 p.m. ( 

As the moment is at hand for the advance of 
this army, a question arises for the decision of 
the General-in-Chief, which although perhaps 
impliedly decided by the President in his letter 
of the thirteenth, should be clearl}' presented by 
floe, as 1 do not regard it as in my province to de- 
liermine it. 

This question is the extent to which the line 
of the Potomac should be guarded, after the army 
leaves, in order to cover Maryland and Pennsyl- 



vania from invasion by large or small parties of 
the enemy. 

It will always be somewhat diflBcult to guard 
the immediate line of the river, owing to its great 
extent and the numerous passages which exist. 

It has long appeared to me that the best way 
of covering this line would be by occupying 
Front Royal, Strasburgh, Wardensville, and 
Moorefield, or the debouches of the several val- 
leys in which they are situated. 

These points, or suitable places in their vicini- 
ty, should be strongly intrenched and permanent- 
ly held. One great advantage of this arrange- 
ment would be the covering the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, and an essential part of the sys- 
tem would be the construction of the link of rail- 
way from "Winchester to Strasburgh, and the re- 
building of the Manassas Gap railway bridge over 
the Shenandoah. 

The intrenchment of Manassas Junction would 
complete the system for the defence of the ap- 
proaches to Washington and the Upper Potomac. 
Many months ago I recommended this arrange- 
ment; in fact, gave orders for it to be carried 
into effect. I still regard it as essential under all 
circumstances. 

The views of the Chief Engineer of this army, 
in regard to the defences and garrison of Harper's 
Ferry and its defences, are in your possession. 

The only troops under my command, outside 
of the organization of the army of the Potomac, 
are the Maryland brigade, under General Kenly ; 
the Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania, Colonel Voss;.. 
Twelfth Illinois cavalry, and Colonel Davis's 
Eighth New- York cavalry ; total, two thousand 
eight hundred and ninet3r-four infantry, one bat- 
tery, and about nine hundred cavalry men. 

There are also two of my regiments of cavalry 
(about seven hundred and fifty men) guarding 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Han- 
cock and Cumberland. 

As I have no department, and command simply 
an active army in the field, my responsibility for 
the safety of the line of the Potomac and the 
States north of it must terminate the moment I 
advance so flir bejond that line as to adopt 
another for my base of operations. The question 
for the General-in-Chief to decide, and which I 
regard as beyond my province, is this : 

First. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry and 
the line of the Potomac be regarded as assured 
by the advance of the army south of the Blue 
Ridge, and the line left to take care of itself ? 

Second. If it is deemed necessary to hold the 
line, or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, 
how many troops shall be placed there, at what 
points, (and in what numbers and of what com- 
position at each,) and where shall they be sup- 
plied — that is, . from the army, or from other 
sources ? 

Omitting the detached troops mentioned above, 
and the small garrisons of Boonsboro and Fred- 
erick, the last returns show the strength of this 
army for duty to be about (116,000) one hundred 
and sixteen thousand officers and men. This in- 
cludes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, 



DOCUMENTS. 



649 



but does not include Heintzelman, Sigcl, and 
Bayard. 

If Harper's Ferry and the river above are re,i- 
dered fully secure, it is possible that the active 
army, if it supplies the garrison, maj' be reduced 
so much as to be inadequate to the purposes con- 
templated. If it is preserved intact, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio Kail- 
road may be unduly exposed. 

I leave the decision of these grave questions to 
the General-in-Chief I know nothing of the 
number of troops at Baltimore, etc. 

An important element in the solution of this 
problem is the fact that a great portion of Bragg's 
army is probably now at liberty to unite itself 
with Lee's command. 

I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the 
morning, and must ask a prompt decision of the 
questions proposed herein. 

George B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General Halleck, 

General-in-Chief, Washington. 

To which I received the following reply : 

Washington, October ,26, 1862— 1..35 p.m. 

In addition to the command which you had 
when I came here, you also have the greater part 
of that of Major-General Pope. Moreover, you 
have been authorized to use any troops within 
your reach in General Wool's department, and 
in "Western Virginia. General Banks's command 
is also under your direction, with the single re- 
striction that he is not to remove troops from 
Washington till he has notified me of his orders. 

Since )^ou left Washington I have advised and 
suggested in relation to your movements, but I 
have given you no orders ; I do not give you any 
now. The Government has intrusted you with 
defeating a«id driving back the rebel army in your 
front. I shall not attempt to control you in the 
measures you may adopt for that purpose. You 
are informed of my views, but the President has 
left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you 
may deem best. 

You will also exercise your own discretion in 
regard to what points on the Potomac and the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied 
or fortified. I will only add that there is no ap- 
propriation hv permanent intrenchments on that 
line. Moreover, I think it will be time enough 
to decide upon fortifying Front Royal, Strasburgh, 
Wardensville, and Moorefield, when the enemy 
is driven south of them, and they come into our 
possession. 

I do not think that we need have any immedi- 
ate fear of Bragg's army. You are within (20) 
twenty miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant 
about (400) four hundred miles. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

On the twenty-ninth I sent the following : 

Hbadqoarters Army of thb Potomac, ) 
October 29, 1SG2— 1.15 p.m. ) 

On the twenty-fifth instant I sent you a des- 



patch requesting you to decide what steps .should 
be taken to guard the line of the Potomac when 
this army leaves here. To this I received your 
reply that I had been intrusted by the President 
with defeating and driving away the rebel array ; 
that you had given me no orders lieretofore — did 
not give me any then, etc. Un'l<ir t*- cso circum- 
stances I have only to malvc such a,/angements 
for guarding this extended line as the means at 
my disposal will permit, at the same time keep- 
ing in view the supreme necessity of maintaining 
the moving army in adequate force to meet the 
rebel army before us. 

The dispositions I have ordered are as follows, 
namely : Ten thousand men to be left at Harper's 
Ferry ; one brigade of infantry in front of Sharps- 
burgh ; Kenly's brigade of infantry at Williams- 
port; Kelly's brigade, including Colonel Camp- 
bell's Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania infantry, at Cum- 
berland ; and between that point and Hancock. 
I have also left four small cavalry regiments to 
patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad from Cumberland down to Harper's 
Ferry. 

I do not regard this force as suflBcient to cover 
securely this great extent of line, but I do not 
feel justified in dexaching any more troops from 
my moving columns ; I would, therefore, recom- 
mend that some new regiments of infantry and 
cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by 
me. 

There should be a brigade of infantry and sec- 
tion of artillery in the vicinity of Cherry Run, 
another brigade at Hancock, an additional brigade 
at Williamsport, one regiment at Hagerstown and 
one at Chambersburgh, with a section of artillery 
at each place if possible. This is on the suppo- 
sition that the enemy retain a considerable cavalry 
force west of the Blue Ridge ; if they go east of 
it, the occupation of the points named in my des- 
patch of the twenty-fifth instant will obviate the 
necessity of keeping many of these troops on the 
river. 

There are now several hundred of our wounded, 
including General Richardson, in the vicinity of 
Sharpsburgh, that cannot possibly be moved at 
present. 

I repeat, that I do not look upon the forces I 
have been able to leave from this army as suffi- 
cient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only description 
of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as 
you are aware, deficient in this arm. 

G. B. McClellan, 

Major-General Commanding. 

Major-General Halleck, 

General-in-Chief, WasUngton. 

To which I received on the thirtieth this reply : 
■Washington, October SO, 1862—11.80 a.m. 

Your telegram of yesterday was received late 
last evening. The troops proposed for Thorough- 
fare Gap will be sent to that place whenever you 
are in position for their cooperation, as previous- 
ly stated, but no new regiments can be sent from 
here to the Upper Potomac. The guarding of 



660 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



that line is left to your own discretion with the 
troops now under your command. 

H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 

Major-General G. B. McOlellan. 

I accordinixly left the Twelfth corps at Harper's 
Ferry, detaching one brigade to the vicinity of 
Sharpsburgh. General Morell was placed in 
command of the line from the mouth of the An- 
tietam to Cumberland ; General Slocum in com- 
mand of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the 
mouth of the Antietam. 

The orders given to these ofiScers were as fol- 
lows : 

Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, I 
October 29, 1S62— 1 p.m. f 

The General Commanding directs that you send 
one brigade of your corps to march at once to the 
position now occupied by General F. J. Porter's 
corps, in front of Sharpsburgh, to watch and 
guard the line of the river, the ford near the 
mouth of the Antietam Creek to the mouth of the 
Opequan Creek. 

The officer in command will also take steps to 
afford proper protection to the sick and wounded 
in the hospitals in the vicinity of Sharpsburgh 
and Boonsboro. The regiment now at Boons- 
boio will be placed under his orders. General 
Kenly, at "\Villiamsport, will guard the river 
from the mouth of the Opequan alone, including 
the ford at the mouth of the Opequan. 

The Commanding General also directs that you 
take immediate steps to establish the remainder 
of your corps as follows, namely, one brigade 
on Maryland Heights, one brigade on Loudon 
Heights, with the remainder on Bolivar Heights 
and at Harper's Ferry. 

These dispositions should be made at once, so 
that General Couch can move with his corps. 
Please acknowledge the receipt of this. 

R. B. Marct, 

General H. W. Slocum, Chief of staCf. 

Commanding Army Corps, Harper's Ferry. 

Headquarters Army of titb Potomac, (^ 
October 31, 1S62. ( 

General : I am instructed by the Command- 
ing General to say to you, that he has selected 
you to perform the highly important and respon- 
sible duty of taking charge of and commanding 
the troops left for the defence of the line of the 
Potomac River, from the mouth of the Antietam 
to Cumberland, as well as any other troops that 
may hereafter be sent for the protection of the 
Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier within the 
limits of the lines herein specified. The force 
which has been left to guard the line is not deem- 
ed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all 
that the Commanding General feels authorized to 
detach from the army of the Potomac at the 
present time, and it devolves upon you to make 
the best use of this force in your power. You 
will have four cavalry regiments under your com- 
mand, which should be so distributed along the 
river as to watch all the available fords, and give 



timely notice to the infantry of the approach of 
any force of rebels. 

You will afford all the protection in your 
power to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 

You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids 
into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

You will take steps to have all the sick and 
wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel 
army within your lines, properly taken care of 
until they can be sent to general hospitals, or 
discharged, or paroled. 

You will make your headquarters at Hagers- 
town, and occasionally visit the different parts of 
your line. 

You will please report promptly to these head- 
quarters every thing of importance that occurs 
within the limits of your command. 

The three brigades now at Cumberland, Wil- 
liamsport, and Sharpsburgh, including the Fifty- 
fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cumber- 
land, will be under your command. They are 
commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenly, and Gor- 
don. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
S. Williams, 

Assistant AdJutant-QeneraL 

General G. "W. Morell, 

Commanding Upper Potomac. 

On the twenty-fifth of October, the pontoon- 
bridge at Berlin was constructed, there being al- 
ready one across the Potomac, and another across 
the Shenandoah, at Harper's Ferry. 

On the twenty-sixth, two divisions of the Ninth 
corps, and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry, cross- 
ed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. 

The First, Sixth, and Ninth corps, the cavalry, 
and the reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin be- 
tween the twenty-sixth of October and the second 
of November. 

The Second and Fifth corps crossed at Har- 
per's Ferry between the twenty-ninth of October 
and the first of November. Heavy rains delayed 
the movement considerably in the beginning, 
and the First, Fifth and Sixth corps were obliged 
to halt at least one day at the crossings to com- 
plete, as fiir as possible, necessary supplies that 
could not be procured at an earlier period. 

The plan of campaign I adopted during this ad- 
vance was to move the army, well in hand, par- 
allel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the 
point of direction for the main army ; seizing 
each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments, as 
we approached it, and guarding them after we had 
passed as long as they would enable the enemy 
to trouble our communications with the Poto- 
mac. It was expected that we would unite with 
the Eleventh corps and Sickles's division near 
Thoroughfare Gap. We depended upon Har- 
per's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the 
Manassas Gap Railway was reached ; wlien that 
occurred, the passes in our rear were to be aban- 
doned, and the army massed ready for action or 
movement in any direction. 

It was my intention if upon reaching Ashby's 
or any other pass, I found that the enemy were 
in force between it and the Potomac in the vallev 



DOCUMEXTS. 



651 



of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and 
endeavor to gain their rear. 

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, hut did 
expect that hy striking in between Culpejier 
Court-IIouse and Little "Washington I could 
either separate their army and beat tliem in de- 
tail, or else force them to concentrate as far back 
as Gordonsvillc, and tlius place the army of tl>e 
Potomac in position either to adopt the Frcder- 
icksburgh line of advance upon Richmond, or to 
be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprclicnd- 
cd, it were found impossible to supply it by the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad beyond Cul- 
pepcr. 

On the twenty-seventh of October, the remain- 
ing divisions of the Ninth corps crossed at Ber- 
lin, and Pleasanton's cavalry advanced to Pur- 
cellville. Tlie concentration of the »Si.xth corps, 
dela\'ed somewhat ])y intelligence as to the move- 
ments of the enemy near Hedgesville, etc., was 
commenced on this day, and the First corps was 
already in motion for l>erlin. 

On the twenty-eighth, the First corps and the 
general headquarters reached Berlin. 

On the twenty-ninth, the reserve artillery cross- 
ed and encamped near Lovettsville. Stoneman's 
division, temporarily attached to the Ninth corps, 
occupied Lcesburgh ; Averill's cavalry brigade 
moved toward Berlin from Hagerstown ; two 
divisions of the Ninth corps moved to Wheat- 
land, and one to Waterford. The Second corps 
commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at 
Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east 
of Loudon Heights. 

On the thirtieth, the First corps crossed at 
Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville, and the 
Second corps completed the passage of the Shen- 
andoah. The Fifth corps commenced its march 
from Sharpsburgh to Harper's Ferry. 

On the thirty-first, the Second corps moved to 
the vicinity of Hillsborough ; the Sixth corps 
reached Boonsboro ; the Fifth corps reached 
Harper's Ferrj', one division crossing the Shen- 
andoah. 

On the first of November, the First corps 
moved to Purcellville and Hamilton ; the Second 
corps to "Woodgrove ; the Fifth corps to Hills- 
borough ; the Sixth corps reached Berlin, one 
division crossing. Pleasanton's cavalry occupied 
Pliilomont, having a sharp skirmish there and at 
Bloom field. 

On November second, the Second corps occu- 
pied Snicker's Gap ; the Fifth corps, Snickcrs- 
ville ; the Sixth corps crossed the Potomac and 
cncamned near Wheatland ; the Ninth corps ad- 
vanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philomont. 
Pleasanton drove the enemy out of Union. 
Averill was ordered to join Pleasanton. The 
enemy offered no serious resistance to the occu- 
pation of Snicker's Gap, but advanced to gain 
possession of it with a column of some five thou- 
sand to six thousand infantry, who were driven 
back by a few rounds from our rilled guns. 

On the third, the First corps moved to Philo- 
mont, Union, Bloomfield, etc. ; the Second corps 
to the vicinity of Uppcrville; the Fifth corps re- 1 



mained at Snicker's Gap ; the Sixth corps moved 
to rurcellville ; the Ninth corps moved toward 
Upperville. Plea.'Janton drove the enemy out of 
Upperville after a severe fight; 

On flie fourth, the Second corps took pos.sc.<(- 
sion of Ashby's Ciap ; the Sixth corps reached 
Union ; the Ninth corps, Upperville ; the cav- 
alry occupied Piedmont. 

On the fifth, the First corps moved to Rector- 
town and White Plains ; one division of the 
Second corps to the intersection of the Paris and 
Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's road; 
the Sixth corps to the Aldie i)ike, east of Uppcr- 
ville ; the Ninth corps beyond the Manassas 
Railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with a 
brigade at Manassas Gap. The cavalry under 
Averill had a skirmish at Manassas Gaj), and the 
brigade of Pleasanton gained a handsome victory 
over superior numbers at Barbee's Cross-Road.^. 
Bayard's cavalry had some sharp shirmishing in 
front of Salem. 

On the sixth, the First corps advanced to War- 
renton ; the Second corps to Rectortown ; the 
Fifth corps commenced its movement from 
Snicker's Gap to "White Plains; the Ninth corps 
to Waterloo and vicinity on the Rappahannock ; 
the Eleventh corps was at New-15altimore, Thor- 
oughfare and Hopewell's Gaps; Sickles's division 
guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad 
from ^lanassas Junction toward \V'arrenton Junc- 
tion ; the cavalry near Flint Hill ; Bayard ito cut 
off what there might be in Yfarrenton, and to 
proceed to the Rappahannock Station. 

November seventh, General' Pleasanton was 
ordered to move toward Litjtle Washington and 
Sperryvillc, and thence toward Oulpeper Court- 
House. 

November eighth, the Second corps moved half- 
way to Warrenton ; the Fifth corps to New-Bal- 
timore. 

November ninth, the Second and Fifth corps 
reached Warrenton ; the Sixth corps, New-Balti- 
more. 

Late on the night of the seventh, I received an 
order relieving me from the command of the army 
of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over 
to General Burnside, which I at once did. 

I had already given the orders for the move- 
ments of the eighth and ninth ; these orders 
were carried into eliect without change. 

The position in which 1 left the army, as the 
result of the orders I had given, was as follows: 

The First, Second, and Fifth corps, reserve ar- 
tillery, and general headquarters, at Warrenton ; 
the Ninth corps on the line of the Rajjpahan- 
nock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the Sixth 
corps at New-Baltimore ; the Eleventh corps at 
New-Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare 
Gap ; Sickles's division of the Third corps, on 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, from Ma- 
nassas Junction to Warrenton Junction ; Pleas- 
anton across the Rappahannock at Amissvil.'«v 
Jefferson, etc., with his pickets at Hazel River, 
facing Longstreet, six miles from Cul[>oper Court- 
House; Bayard near Rappahannock Station. 

The army was thus massed near W.-vrcnton, 



652 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



ready to act in any required direction, perfectly 
in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. 
I doubt whether, during the whole period that 
I had the honor to command the army of the Po- 
tomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight 
a great battle. When I gave up the command to 
General Burnside, the best information in our 
possession indicated that Longstreet was imme- 
diately in our front near Culpeper ; Jackson, with 
one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and 
Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their force 
west of the Blue Ridge. 

The reports from General Pleasanton on the 
advance indicated the possibility of separating 
the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either 
beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to 
fall back at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his 
junction with the rest of the army. 

The following is from the report of General 
Pleasanton : 

"At this time, and from the seventh instant, 
my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within 
six miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank 
pickets toward Chester and Thornton's Gaps ex- 
tended to Gaines's Cross-Roads and Newby's 
Cross-Roads, with numerous patrols in the direc- 
tion of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sper- 
ryville. 

" The information gained from these parties, and 
also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as 
well fas citizens, established the fact of Long- 
street, with his command, being at Culpeper, 
while Jackson, with D. H. Hill, with their re- 
spective commands, were in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, cov- 
ering Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expect- 
ing us to pass through and attack them. 

" As late as the seventeenth of November, a 
contraband just from Strasburgh came in my 
camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was 
two miles beyond that place, on the railroad to 
Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road 
and dcstro3'ing the bridges, under the impression 
that we intended to follow into that valley, and 
was en route for Staunton. 

" Jackson's corps was between Strasburgh and 
Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with 
Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels 
were obliged to keep moving to obtain them." 

Had I remained in command, I should have 
made the attempt to divide the enemy as before 
suggested, and could he have been brought to a 
battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot 
doubt that the result would have been a brilliant 
victory for our army. 

On the tenth of November, General Pleasanton 
was attacked by Longstreet, with one division of 
infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed the 
attack. 

This indicates the relative position of our ar- 
my and that of the enemy at the time I was re- 
lieved from command. 

It would be impossible to participate in opera- 
tions, such as those described in the foregoing 
pages, without forming fixed opinions upon sub- 
jects connected with the organization of our ar- 



mies, and the general conduct of military opera- 
tionis.- 

This report would be incomplete without a 
brief allusion to some general considerations 
which have been firmly impressed upon me by 
the events which have occurred. 

To my mind the most glaring defect in our ar- 
mies is the absence of system in the appointment 
and promotion of general and other officers, and 
the want of means for the theoretical instruction 
of the mass of officers. The expansion of the 
army was so great and so rapid at the commence- 
ment of the existing war that it was perhaps im- 
possible, in the great scarcity of instructed offi- 
cers, to have adopted any other course than that 
which was pursued ; but the time has arrived 
when measures may be initiated to remedy ex- 
isting defects, and provide against their recur- 
rence. 

I think that the army should be regarded as a 
permanent one ; that is to say, its affairs should 
be administered precisely as if all who belonged 
to it had made it their profession for life ; and 
those rules for promotion, etc., which have been 
found necessary in the best foreign armies to ex- 
cite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du 
corps and procure efficiency, should be followed 
by us. 

All officers and soldiers should be made to 
feel that merit— that is to say, courage, good con- 
duct, the knowledge and performance of the du- 
ties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those 
of a superior grade — will insure to them ad- 
vancement in their profession, and can alone se- 
cure it for them. 

Measures should be adopted to secure the theo- 
retical instruction of staff-officers at least, who 
should, as far as possible, be selected from offi- 
cers having a military education, or who have 
seen actual service in the field. 

The number of cadets at the Military Acade- 
my should be at once increased to the greatest 
extent permitted by the capacity of the institu- 
tion. The regular army should be increased 
and maintained complete in numbers and effi- 
ciency. 

A well-organized system of recruiting and of 
depots for instruction should be adopted, in or- 
der to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and 
supply promptly the losses arising from battle 
or disease.' This is especially necessary for the 
artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, 
from the beginning of the war, have rendered 
great services, and which have never been fully 
appreciated by any but their comrades. We 
need also large bodies of well-instructed engi- 
neer troops. 

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns 
the direction should be left to professional sol- 
diers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more com- 
petent than a soldier to determine the political 
objects and direction of a campaign ; but those 
once decided upon, every thing should be left to 
the responsible military head, without interfer- 
ence from civilians. In no other manner is suc- 
cess probable. The meddling of individual mem- 



DOCUMENTS. 



653 



bers of committees of Congress with subjects 
which, from lack of experience, they are of course 
incapable of comprehending, and which they are 
too apt to view through the distorted medium of 
partisan or personal pi-ejudice, can do no good, 
and is certain to produce incalculable mischief 

T cannot omit the expression of my thanks to 
the President for the constant evidence given me 
of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to 
sustain the military plans which my judgment 
led me to urge for adoption and execution. I 
cannot atrribute his failure to adopt some of thdfeo 
plans, and to give that support to others which 
was necessary to their success, to any want of 
confidence in me ; and it only remains for me to 
regret that other counsels came between the con- 
stitutional Commander-in-Chief and the General 
whom he had placed at the head of his armies - 
counsels whifb resuUed in the faiUire of great 
caiupai ^ *-'^y| 

if I ' I'rvice 

■ "" ■ p n/.recr u'!ir.:iitar\ arla'.rs wuiiout tlie 

rvision of politicians, the sooner it 
•i.M,.- i,.viu ,iiid places them in position the bet- 
ter will it be for its fortunes. 

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the 
memorandum submitted by me to the President 
on the fourth of August, 1861 ; my letter to him 
of July seventh, 1862 ; and other similar commu- 
nications to him and to the Secretary of War. 
I have seen no reason to change in any material 
regard the views there expressed. 

After a calm, impartial, and patient considera- 
tion of tlie subject — a subject which demands the 
closest tl^ought on the part of every true lover 
of his country — I am convinced that by the prop- 
er employment of our resources it is entirely pos- 
sible to bring this war to a successful military 
issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to 
the roestablishment of the Union is the entire 
defeat or virtual destruction of the organized mil- 
itary power of the confederates ; and that such a 
result should be accompanied and followed by 
conciliatory measures ; and that by pursuing the 
political course I have always advised, it is pos- 
sible to bring about a permanent restoration of 
the Union — a reiinion by which the rights of 
both sections shall be preserved, and by which 
both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while 
they respect each other. 

In this report I have confined myself to a plain 
narrative of such facts as are necessary for the 
purposes of history. 

Where it was possible, I have preferred to give 
these facts in the language of despatches, written 
at the time of their occurrence, rather than to at- 
tempt a new relation. 

The reports of the subordinate commanders, 
hereto annexed, recite what time and space would 
fail me to mention here ; those individual instan- 
ces of conspicuous bravery and skill by which 
every battle was marked. To them I must es- 
pecially refer, for without them this narrative 



them, such ample recognition of their cordial co- 
operation and their devoted services as those re- 
ports abundantly avouch. 

I have not sought to defend the army which I 
had the honor to comm.and, nor myself, again.st 
tile hostile criticisms once so rife. 

It has seemed to mc that nothing more was 
required than such a plain and truthful narrative 
to enable those whoso right it is to form a correct 
judgment on the important matters invol"ed. 

This report is, in fact, the history of the army 
of the Potomac. 

During the period occupied in the organization 
of that army, it served as a b.arrier against the 
advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the 
fortifications of the capital were in progress ; and 
under the discipHn':- which it then receWcd it ac- 
quired strength, education, and some of that ex- 
perience which is necessary to success in active 
lOperations, and which enabled it afterward to 
sustain itself under circumstances trying to the 
most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred 
along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, 
which inured our troops to the realities of war. 
The army grew into shape but slowly ; and the 
delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, 
continuing late into the winter of 1861 -'62, were 
no less trying to the soldiers than to the people 
of the country. Even at the time of the organi- 
zation of the Peninsula campaign, some of the 
finest regiments were without rifles ; nor wero the 
utmost exertions on the part of the military au- 
thorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to 
active service. 

When, at length, the army was in condition to 
take the field, the Peninsula campaign was plan- 
ned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by offi- 
cers and men. Had this campaign been foliowetl 
up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it 
would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our 
arms, and the permanent restoration of the pow- 
er of the Goverrment in Virginia and North-Car- 
olina, if not throughout the revolting States. It 
was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of 
reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my 
duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, 
sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, 
there to abandon one and originate another and 
new plan of campaign, which might and would 
have been successful if supported with apprecia- 
tion of its necessities, but which failed becau.se 
of the repeated failure of promised support, at the 
most critical, and, as it proved, the most fat;d 
moments. That licroisra surpasseu ordinary de- 
scription. Its illustration must be left for tho 
pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, 
when the nation shall be looking back to the 
past from the midst of peaceful days. 

For me, now, it is sulhcient to say that ray 
comrades were victors on every field save one, 
and there the endurance of but little more than 
a single corps accomplished tho object of the 
fijrhtinx, and, by securing to the army its tran.sit 



would "be incomplete, and justice lail to be done. ! to the James, left to. tho enemy a ruinous and 

But I cannot omit to tender to my corps com- 1 barren victory. 

mandcrs, and to other general oSBcers under i The army of the Potomac was fir.st reduced by 

Sop. Doc. 42 



654 



REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. 



— p 

they drove back, beaten and shattered, the en- 
tire eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus 
secured for themselves a place of rest and a 
point for a new adi'ance upon the capital from 
the banks of the James. Richmond was still 
within our gra.=;p, had the army of the Potomac 
been reenforced and permitted to advance. But 
counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent 
events proved unwise, prevailed in Washington, 
and we were ordered to abandon the campaign. 
Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a 
nation than the army of the Potomac for the 
deeds of the Peninsula campaign, and although 
that meed was withheld from them by the au- 
thorities, I am persuaded they have received the 
applause of the American people. 

The army of the Potomac was recalled from 
within sight of Richmond, and incorporated with 
the army^^jjirginia. . The disappointments of 

fought well, faithfully, gallandy. under <]euci;i'. 
Pope ; yet were compelled to fall back on Wasli- 
ington, defeated and almost demoralized. 

The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his 
own capital, poured his troops northward, entered 
Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even 
Washington itself. Elated by his recent victor- 
ies, and assured that our troops were disorgan- 
ized and dispirited, he was confident that the 
seat of war was now permanently transferred to 
the loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil 
was to be relieved from the burden of supporting 
two hostile armies. But he did not understand 
the spu-it which animated the soldiers of the 
Union. I shall not, nor can I living, forget that 
when I was ordered to the command of the troops 
for the defence of the capital, the soldiers, with 
whom I had shared so much of the anxiety, and 
pain, and suft'ering of the war, had not lost their 
confidence in me as their commander. They 
sprang to my call with all their ancient vigor, dis- 
cipline, and courage. I led them into Maryland. 
Fifteen days after they had fallen back defeated 
before Washington, they vanquished the enem}- 
on the rugged height of South-Mountain, pursued 
him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and 
drove him, broken and disappointed, across the 
Potomac into Virginia. 

The army had need of rest. After the terrible 
experiences of battles and marches, with scarcely 
an interval of repose, which they had gone through 
from the time of leaving for the Peninsula ; the 
return to Washington ; the defeat in Virginia ; 
the victory at South-Mountain, and again at An- 
tietam, it was not surprising that they were in a 
large degree destitute of the absolute necessarie.s 
to effective duty. Shoes were worn out; blank- 
ets were lost ; clothing was in rags : in short, the 
army was unfit for active service, and an interval 
for rest and equipment was necessary. When 
the slowly forwarded supplies came to us I led 
the army across the river, renovated, refreshed, 
in good order and discipline, and followed the re- 
treating foe to a position where I was confident 
of decisive victory, when, in the midst of th« 



the withdrawal from my command of the division 
of General Blenker, which was ordered to the 
Mountain department, under General Fremont. 
We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula when 
it was further reduced by a despatch revoking 
a previous order giving me command at Fortress 
Monroe, and under which I had expected to take 
ten thousand men from that point to aid in our 
operations. Then, when under fire before the 
defences of Yorktown, we received the news of 
the withdrawal of General McDowell's corps of 
about thirty-five thousand men. This completed 
the overthrow of the original plan of the .cam- 
paign. About one third of my entire army (five 
divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remain- 
ing being but little larger than a brigade) was 
thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance 
which I had planned, aided by a flank movement 
up the York River, it was only left to besiege 
Yorktown. That siege was successfully conduct^ 
cd by the army, and when these strong works at 
length yielded to our approaches, the troops 
rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful 
battle of Williamsburgh, and thus opened an al- 
mo.st unresisted advance to the banks of the 
Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, sur- 
rounded with fortifications, and guarded by an 
army larger than our own ; but the prospect did 
not shake the courage of the brave men who 
composed my command. Relying still on the 
support which the vastness of our undertaking 
and the grand results depending on our success 
seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The 
weather was stormy beyond precedent ; the deep 
soil of the Peninsula was at times one va^t mo- 
rass ; the Chickahominy rose to a higher stage 
than had been known for years before. Pursu- 
ing the advance, the crossings were seized, and 
the right wing extended to effect a junction with 
reenforcements now promised and earnestlj^ de- 
sired, and upon the arrival of which the complete 
success of the campaign seemed clear. The bril- 
liant battle of Hanover Oourt-Houso was fought, 
which opened the way for the First corps, with j 
the aid of which, had it come, we should then 
have gone into the enemy's capital. It never 
came. The bravest array could not do more, 
under such overwhelming disappointment, than 
the army of the Potomac then did. ' Fair Oaks 
attests their courage and endurance when they 
hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior 
masses of the enemy. But mortal men could 
not accomplish the miracle that seemed to have 
been expected of them. But one course was 
left — a flank march in the face of a powerful en- 
emy to another and better base — one of the most 
hazardovis movements in war. The army of the 
Potomac, holding its own safety and almost the 
.safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to 
the occasion. The seven days are classical in 
American history ; those days in which the noble 
soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an 
outnumbering enem)'- by day, and retreated from 
successive victories by night, through a week of 
battle, closing the terrible scries of conflicts with 
the ever-memorable victory of Malvern, where 



DOCUMENTS. 



655 



a^ovement, while ray advance-guard was actually 
in contact with the enemy, f was removed frora 
the command. 

1 am devoutly grateful to God that my last 
campaign with this brave anny was crowned with 
a victory which saved the nation from the great- 
est peril it had then undergone. I have not ac- 
complished my purpose ii\ by this repoj-t, the 
army of the Potomac is not placed high on the 
roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds 
ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always 
ready for battle, always tirni, steadfast, and trust- 
worthy, I never called on it in vain ; nor will the 
nation ever have cause to attribute its want of 
success, under myself, or under other command- 
ers, to anj' failure of patriotism or bravery in that 
noble body of American soldiers. 

No man can justly charge upon any portion of 
tliat army, from the Z^i _ ..^ jreneral to the 

private Jinj' lack of devotion to tht service of the 



United States Government, and to the cause of 
the Constitution and the Union. They have 
proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, 
danger, and through the very shadow of death. 
Their comrades dead on all the fields where we 
fi^ught have scarcely more flaim to the honor of 
a nation's reverence than their survivors to the 
justice of a nation's gi-atitude. 

T am, sir, very respectfully, jour obedient ser- 
vant, GeOKGB B. McCliEI.LAN, 

Major-General Dnitcd States Army. 

Brigadier-General L. Thomas, 

Adjutant-General United States Army. 



War Departmbnt 

AD/tnAST-GKNKRAL's OfFIOK 

Decvm 



RTMBNT, I 

, Wasdisgton, > 
ibcr 2*2, ISftS. ) 



1 certify that the above is a true copy of the 
original report on file in this office 
E. D. Toi 



OWNSEND, 
Assistant Adjutanl-Grtneral. 



Note.— The Reports of subordinate commauders, referred to by General McClellan, 
(many of which have been published already, under their proper dates, in the Rkbkl- 
Liox Kkcoud,) will be completed in a future part of the Kkoord. 



